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1 Introduction: Why shouldn't They become Us? 
This dissertation studies Danish political debates on how to relate to 'Muslims'. It 
understands the debates as negotiations between conflicting ways of performing 
Danish identity by telling how 'We' differ from Muslims and what to do about that. 
Theoretically, the dissertation investigates how various policies for relating to the 
other contributes to radicalization of conflict between self and other. The focus is on 
the specific ways in which the policy narratives invite – or does not invite – the other 
to future interaction and what the reactions to these invitations may be. 
1.1 Empirical trouble: Danish identity meets Muslims as 
difference 
'Muslims' appear in Danish debates and in Danish policies more often these days than 
ever before. A few snapshots may provide an impression of the unprecedented variety 
of places and roles awarded to Muslims: 
First picture: Armed Danish military personnel and a Danish flag in front of a dessert 
sunset. Denmark was right behind the US in the 'Multi-National Force' invading Iraq 
in 2003.
1
 In Afghanistan, Denmark has – relative to it size – contributed more men to 
tougher tasks than most European countries.
2
 Whether the point of departure was a 
search for weapons of mass destruction or for Al Qaeda terrorists, each of the 
                                           
1
 Cf. the official George Bush White House announcement of the coalition of the willing 
and the Wikipedia pages detailing 'who actually sent what troops when', available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition_of_the_willing, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_Force_-_Iraq; all visited 2009.09.04. 
2
 Cf. NATO's official 'placemat' of the ISAF troop contributions and the Wikipedia page 
discussing of the quality of the assignments undertaken by the troops, available at 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Security_Assistance_Force, both visited on 
2009.09.04.  
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ventures turned into a project of reconstructing a Muslim country: a state building 
project, a nation building project or a project of building democracy. 
Second picture: A drawing of an angry bearded man with a bomb in his turban is – 
along with 11 other cartoons – printed in a Danish newspaper. The newspaper, 
Jyllands-Posten, writes that the publication is meant to communicate to Muslims that 
when you live in a democracy, you need to accept "scorn, mockery, and ridicule".
3
 
The prime minister refuses to meet with Muslim ambassadors to discuss the matter 
which they see as part of an "ongoing smearing campaign in Danish public circles 
and media against Islam and Muslims".
4
 As the Danish prime minister insisted that 
the freedom of expression enjoyed in a national democracy could not be limited even 
in a world of globalized communication, the controversy spiralled into what became 
known in public debate as 'the worst foreign policy crisis for Denmark since WWII'. 
Third picture: A woman – possibly wearing a veil – is sitting in a class room doing a 
multiple choice test on Danish history and society. It might be an 'integration test' to 
qualify for a permanent residence permit or it might be the more advanced 
'citizenship test'. The Act on Danish Nationality and the Integration Act has over the 
course of the last decade introduced these tests to pass – along with declarations of 
allegiance to Danish democracy, society and values to be signed. The point of the 
tests and the declarations is to make sure that only migrants with the right 
qualifications and the right intentions stay in Denmark. Included in the declarations to 
be signed is the denunciation of a series of practices – female circumcision, forced 
marriages, terrorism, and the like – recognizable from debates on how to integrate 
people with a 'Muslim culture' in Danish society. In the same period the Danish Alien 
                                           
3
 "hån, spot og latterliggørelse" (Rose 2005). 
4
 Letter to prime minister A.F.Rasmussen from 11 ambassadors from primarily Muslim 
countries, dated 2005.10.12, accessible at http://gfx.tv2.dk/images/Nyhederne/Pdf/side1.pdf, 
visited 2009.09.04. 
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Act has repeatedly been tightened to 'limit the influx of aliens' – while 'Green Cards' 
and reduced taxation are among the tools employed to invite foreign experts to fill 
vacant positions.
5
 
These debates on 'Muslim relations' are not just a marginal phenomenon in Danish 
debates. The debates on what to do about the Muslims are an important way of 
negotiating who 'We' are. In recent years, research has found Muslims to be featured 
centre stage in many arenas. A political geographer went to a small provincial town 
to interview regular people about what 'Danishness' meant to them – and came back 
surprised that next to everyone immediately invoked 'Muslim culture' as a contrast 
necessary to answer the question (Koefoed 2006:117). A political scientist concluded 
on an electoral survey designed to analyse the 2001 parliamentary elections which 
was called in the wake of 9/11 that "Islam has increasingly become a point of 
condensation for animosity against strangers.” (Tobiassen 2003:361, my transl.)6 
The general thrust of present Danish debates on Muslims seems to be that They ought 
to become like Us. At home and abroad; it would be better, if They were like Us. 
Denmark and the world would be better places if they could be reformed to become 
more identical with Us. 
Such an approach to the difference of the other may, obviously, lead to conflict: If the 
pictures painted of Muslims in Danish debates do not resemble the pictures which the 
                                           
5
 Cf. the official home page of the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration 
Affairs, nyidanmark.dk, visited on 2009.09.03. 
6
 Similar conclusions are reached by political theorist Per Mouritsen focusing on political 
discourse (2006:75-6, 83, 88); international politics scholars Mona Sheikh & Ole Wæver 
focusing on public debates (2005:31); Karen Wren conducting anthropological field work 
(2001:147, 156); political geographers Haldrup et al. analyzing the practices of urban 
everyday life (2006:174, 183); political scientist J.P.F. Thomsen (2006:188) surveying 
puclic opinion; as well as historian Jørgen Bæk Simonsen (2006[2004]:8, 14, 173ff); literary 
scholar Hans Hauge (2003:54); as well as Grøn & Grøndahl (2004: 15, 179; 208f), all 
characterizing public debate. 
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people painted would like to see, they are unlikely to cooperate in the reform process. 
The disagreement may concern both the pictures painted of present day Muslims and 
the pictures of Muslims as they ought to become. Furthermore the policies promoted 
to make Them more identical with Us may lead to internal conflicts in Denmark over 
whether and how to be in conflict with those painted as Muslims. But how, more 
specifically, does identity, policy and conflict relate? 
This question has bearings beyond Denmark. On the one hand, the character of the 
debate in Denmark is neither unique, nor isolated from developments beyond its 
borders. On the other hand, the debates found in Denmark are not exact replicas of 
debates elsewhere in Europe or the West in general. Rather Denmark has been among 
the vanguard in tendencies that may be recognized in a number of countries on 
several 'fronts' in what could be termed the 'Muslim relations' of the West: tightening 
immigration laws to limit the influx of Muslims; awarding vocal Islam critics 
respected and responsible political positions; participating in the US wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (cf. Aydin & Acikmese 2008). Denmark may even – by playing its part 
of the Cartoon Crisis – have contributed to constituting the relation between 'The 
West' and 'Islam' as a self-propelling conflict (cf. Buzan & Wæver 2009:269-274). 
If one connects the image which Denmark presently conveys to the outside world 
with the image which the country have enjoyed for decades (Lawler 2007), the 
change appears to be extreme: To a lot of foreign observers, this new Denmark 
preoccupied with Muslims does not sound like the liberal, tolerant Denmark, they 
thought they knew.
7
F 
Recent research documents that a change actually did occur. Sociologist of religion 
Brian Jacobsen (2008:265-8) charts how the 'guest workers' and 'alien workers' were 
                                           
7
 I.a. Jonsson (2006); Sundström (2009). Cf. Nielsen (2004:15-7, ch.4, 7) who presents a 
detailed account of the picture painted in reports from international organizations and 
foreign media – but finds the picture painted too grim. 
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framed by a labour market discourse in the parliamentary debates in the 60ies and 
70ies: The difference between Danes and migrants concerned the wage level and 
working conditions one was willing to accept – and their presence was conceived of 
as temporary. From the end of the 70ies, however, the presence of the 'immigrants' 
was gradually seen as permanent – and their difference was gradually described in 
terms of ethnicity, language, culture and religion. From that time, 'integration' was a 
central concept. During the 80ies and early 90ies, 'integration' meant that Danish 
society were to facilitate the different culture which the 'Danes with a different ethnic 
background' had brought with them. Gradually during the 90ies, however, the 
parliamentary discourse changed: now their different culture was what distinguished 
them from us – and their different culture was seen to block their integration. 
Jacobsen concludes that at least from the debates on the Alien Act of 1997, it was the 
dominant position in parliamentary debates that the responsibility for integration was 
basically on the shoulders of the immigrants (2008:267) – and it was generally 
implied that the difference discussed was Muslim culture and religion (2008:234). 
Since 2001, the new centre-right majority has combined the Danish People's Party 
who presents the Muslims as a threat, and the Liberal/Conservative government who 
presents their difference as one to be 'integrated' away (2008:267-8).
8
 
Like the foreign observers, a lot of Danes has not really to have gotten used to living 
in this 'new' Denmark: They want to have an 'old' Denmark back. There is, however, 
                                           
8
 Political scientist Lærke Holm basically tells the same story as Jacobsen based on roughly 
the same parliamentary debates, but she finds that the dominant trend of the 80ies was not 
only to facilitate but even to strengthen the culture of the migrants while integrating them 
(2007: 208-12). Furthermore, she places the shift in emphasis of the centre-right wing 
parties from labour market integration to national-cultural already in the late 80ies 
(2007:126-8, 208-10). Holm does, however, not discuss 'Muslims' specifically – probably 
because her research question does not focus on religion and her empirical material is 
limited to a period ending in 2002. Andreassen observes on the basis of an analysis of media 
coverage that 'migrants' and 'Muslims' have been used more or less interchangeably since 
the mid 90ies (2005:156ff). Cf. Jensen (1999a; 1999b); Madsen (2000). 
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a struggle over which 'old' Denmark is the one to long for: On the one side, 
Sudanese-Danish rapper Natasja Saad asks us to "give me my Denmark back / like in 
the good old days" with its "Copenhagen ... my colourful old friend" and its 
"liberality".
9
 She wants to return to a Denmark without the demand for homogeneity. 
On the other side, the Danish People's party asks to 'Give us Denmark back'; a 
Denmark in which one can walk the streets of the presently pluricultural Nørrebro 
without the nuisance of having to face veiled women and ethnic gangs.
10
 Egyptian-
Danish comedian Omar Marzouk trumps by thanking for a 'hate letter' accusing him 
of betraying his country: "Describing me as a traitor to my country must be a sign 
that I am finally considered a Dane ... You will never get Denmark back, it's my 
country now." (Marzouk 2009)
11
 
The dissertation analyzes debates in this new Denmark; debates on how it relates to 
the old Denmark and what kind of Denmark, it should become. The dissertation does 
not tell the story of how old Denmark turned into new Denmark. Rather, the 
dissertation tells a series of little stories of how parliamentarians and political parties 
in this new Denmark attempts to connect with different ideas of what old Denmark 
was and how new Denmark should become in the future. To complete the picture, the 
dissertation turns the table by looking at what roles the stories imply for the other: 
                                           
9
 "Så gi’ mig mit Danmark tilbage, ligesom i de gamle dage / Gi’ mig frisindet igen, der 
lurer under byens tage / Gi’ mig København igen, min farverige gamle ven." Saad, N. 
(2007): 'Gi' mig Danmark tilbage', CD: I Danmark er jeg født, Playground Music, lyrics 
available at http://www.metrolyrics.com/gi-mig-danmark-tilbage-lyrics-natasja.html, visited 
2009.09.04. Generally, where no official English versions of the texts analysed are 
available, the Danish texts translated by the author is reproduced in a footnote. 
10
 Kjærsgaard, P. (2008): 'Gi' os Danmark tilbage', address to the annual congress of Danish 
People's Party, 2008.09.20, http://danskfolkeparti.dk/Giv_os_Danmark_tilbage_.asp, visited 
2009.09.04. 
11
 "At beskrive mig som landsforrædder må være et tegn på, at de samme mennesker endelig 
betragter mig som dansker ... I får aldrig Danmark til tilbage, det er mit land nu." (Marzouk 
2009). 
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What futures are envisioned for those casted as Muslims? And how are They likely to 
respond? In doing so, the dissertation adds up to its own story which points to a 
possible future for Danish Muslim relations – a future of radicalized conflict. The 
Danish narratives ask Them to become more like Us. But the way in which the 
invitations are formulated is likely to result in greater difference, more differences, 
and more conflict. 
The following sections of this introductory chapter explain the premises for and the 
proceedings of the analysis: Section 1.2 positions the dissertation in the field of social 
theories valuating conflict. Section 1.3 formally introduces the philosophical, 
theoretical and empirical problematiques which the dissertation engages – as a way to 
pose its main research question. Section 1.4 lays out the project designed to answer 
the research question in abstract terms. Section 1.5 sketches the theoretical account of 
identity discourse and identity politics framing the analysis. Finally, section 1.6  
introduces the individual parts and chapters of the dissertation by stating the 
questions they answer. 
1.2 Turning trouble into puzzle: Getting conflict under control 
When observing social life, social theory has differed over how to view conflict – 
both over what the prospects of conflict are and over how to value conflict: Among 
the fathers of Sociology, in the one end of the spectrum, Durkheim worried how 
Modern society could integrate in spite of differences stratified to produce centrifugal 
forces (1984[1893]). Parsons laid out how it purportedly did integrate (1970). In the 
other end of the spectrum, Marx prognosticated how conflict would inevitably 
radicalize until a final showdown – a showdown with history – would bring eternal 
harmony (Marx & Engels 2002[1888]). Fukuyama (1992) saw the same Hegelian end 
to – historical – conflicts coming by Liberalism proving itself to be the superior way 
to handle conflicts. Contrarily, Carl Schmitt saw the constitution of conflict as the 
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only meaningful realization of identity (1996[1932]:35; cf. Strauss 1996:100ff; 
Strong 1996:xviii).  
The ontological point of departure for this dissertation is that there is difference. 
Therefore there are differences. And therefore there is conflict (cf. Galtung 
1978:484). Conflicts, however, may be had in many forms and with many 
consequences. Conflicts may range from pleasant exchanges to lethal combat. 
Conflicts may be orderly conducted or they may be spinning out of control. They 
may achieve their own life. Informed by theories of conflict and security evolving out 
of the study of International Relations – a realm where the most massively lethal 
conflicts have occurred – the normative point of departure of this dissertation is that 
conflicts should not have their own life: The dissertation should contribute to our 
engagement in conflicts becoming more reflexive. In that sense, the analysis and 
conclusions should contribute to keeping conflicts under some sort of management. 
One of the things over which there is conflict is who are allowed to be parties to 
conflicts: Who are the identities in each end of difference – in each end of the 
differences. And at another level: who are to decide, who the identities are. That is to 
say: Who are the agents in the conflicts. The introduction to the empirical 
problematique (in section 1.1) showed how that the question of 'who we are' is 
closely related to the questions of 'who we were' and 'who we ought to be'. The 
dissertation should contribute to self-reflection on how we are creating ourselves as 
identical with our selves and as agents – by describing ourselves as different from 
others. And self-reflection on how we are – in this process – allocating roles and 
agency in ways which may radicalize conflict. 
Derridean poststructuralism denies the possibility of success of any one overarching 
resolution to conflicts, not least because identity can never be settled (1988b:52f). 
Laclau & Mouffe (1985:ch.3) put this denial into formula by describing a social 
world which is not present, in the sense that the social consists only of – ultimately 
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impossible – attempts to achieve hegemony for one principle of ordering: Each 
attempt is impossible as it carries with it a surplus of meaning which will produce the 
challenging perspective finally entering into open conflict. The hegemonic project of 
Laclau & Mouffe initially promoted on the basis of this diagnosis was one of opening 
up to more conflict: a radical and plural democracy – i.e. the "equivalential 
displacement of the egalitarian imaginary to ever more extensive social relations" 
(1985:188). In practice this means "the elimination of relations of subordination and 
of inequalities" as these relations meet the demand for equality which turns relations 
of inequality into unacceptable relations of domination (1985:188). The task 
described in the context of academic Marxism (1985:ch.4) was one of articulating a 
series of dispersed, democratic conflicts into one popular antagonism: Even if the aim 
promoted by Laclau & Mouffe was no longer to end oppression once and for all, a 
break with the existing was still envisioned.  
By the turn of the millennia, the strategic terrain seems to have changed: Now, 
Laclau argues the need for a new, leftist populism – not primarily to advance on neo-
liberalism but to counter a right wing populism formulated in ethno-nationalist terms 
(Laclau in Clausen 2001; Laclau 2005). And Mouffe develops a concept of 'agonism' 
as a way of keeping conflict within limits; a way of keeping antagonism from being 
configured in overly destructive, lethal – i.e. often ethno-nationalist – ways (2002; 
2005). 
The dissertation joins in this project, by producing an immanent critique of the 
debates and policies proposed: The dissertation seeks to point out when the debates 
risk radicalizing conflict in spite of the stated intensions of the participants. The 
normative point of departure of the dissertation, hence, is the responsibility of 
academic activities to contribute "to our living in difference and not to some of us 
dying from otherness." (Neumann 1999:37) The trouble is how to get conflicting 
identities under control. One step is to formulate the trouble in terms of a puzzle 
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which may be researched (cf. Bruner 1980:35; 1960; Weldon 1953:75-83): How do 
we study conflicts of identity?  
1.3 Problematiques and research question: Structures 
and dynamics contributing to radicalization 
To contribute to this project of conflict management and potential conflict resolution, 
the dissertation engages three problematiques: a philosophical, a theoretical and an 
empirical.  
Philosophically, the dissertation positions itself within a conversation between – or 
among – social constructivists and poststructuralists on the ontological status of the 
other in the relational construction of identity: The conversation revolves around two 
questions: First; is the other merely a figure of discourse pointed out to differ from 
the self – or is the other an empirical agent out there intervening in the ongoing 
narration of the identity of the self? And secondly; is the difference of the other 
necessarily described as threatening or may the relation to difference be managed in 
other ways? The dissertation argues that these questions should be approached by 
designing an analytical strategy which is able to focus on, firstly, the roles and 
agency awarded to the other in narratives, and, secondly, the dynamics possibly 
radicalizing the conflictual relation.  
Theoretically, the dissertation intervenes by investigating how various policies for 
relating to the other (dialoguing, pointing out as threat, producing knowledge, etc.) 
contributes to radicalization of conflict between self and other. Specifically, the 
dissertation seek inspiration in International Relations and Anthropology to 
circumscribe a range of policies for relating to the other: A range of policies which 
accept that the relation is, exactly, a relation, and therefore – on the one hand – 
necessarily partly conflictual. But a range of policies which – on the other hand – 
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simultaneously escapes the unchecked radicalization of conflict to the point where the 
relation breaks down because one party is denied existence. 
But first and last come the specific situation – introduced in section 1.1 – which the 
dissertation seeks to make sense of: The present Danish debates on Muslims. 
Empirically, the dissertation analyses Danish debates on how to conduct 'Muslim 
relations' to see whether they are prone to set off dynamics radicalizing conflict. The 
point of the philosophical investigation of the ontological relation between self and 
other as well as of the theoretical investigation of the conflictual potential of policies 
for relating to the other is to facilitate this analysis. Therefore, the main research 
question, which the dissertation engages, is: 
 What structures and dynamics in Danish debates on Muslims contribute to a 
radicalization of conflict? 
 
1.4 Research design: The premises for the analysis 
The central procedure employed when answering the main research question is an 
analysis of political discourse on how to conduct Denmark's 'Muslim relations'. An 
analysis involves bringing together a set of elements – empirical material, theories, 
methods – in such a way that each of them are influenced by the relation to the others 
(Glynos & Howarth 2007:ch.6; cf. Laclau & Mouffe 1985). Exactly because the 
choice of elements – which empirical material, which theory, which methods to bring 
into play – makes a difference, each choice involves a strategic element: Every idea 
of what makes up the world – every ontology – makes something visible and 
something invisible. A theoretical account of what is important in some regard directs 
the attention to some dynamics and diverts attention from others. One method 
produces one type of knowledge while other methods produce other types of 
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knowledge. In sum, analysis can only be made following a series of analytico-
strategic decisions.
12
 
These basic analytico-strategic choices are, on the one hand, informed by the research 
question: The focus needs to be directed where the question is directed: to Danish 
discourse on Muslims and its contribution to radicalization of conflict. On the other 
hand, the view of the world (the ontology) and the theoretical account of what goes 
on in the world are articulated to make certain relations visible; i.e. relations 
contributing to radicalization of conflict. In other words, the analytical lenses directed 
to focus on this empirical problematique – and the choice of the very problematique – 
are influenced by the normative point of departure (laid out in section 1.2): If the 
dissertation did not set out to 'get conflict under control', the relevance of both the 
research question and the theories employed would be questionable.
13
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 While Andersen (1994) argues the need for some eclecticism when constructing strategies 
for analysis under postmodern conditions, Howarth (2005:327) points to the limits of this 
eclecticism when he insist that "the theoretical logics and concepts employed in any 
putative explanans must be consistent and compatible with the underlying ontological 
assumptions". This is secured by "the logic of formalization" combining four aspects; "the 
reactivation of concepts and logics [which] turns us back to the precise problems which 
where originally addressed in the constitution of a particular theory"; "the deconstruction of 
those essentialist or deterministic aspects that make them incompatible"; and finally 
"abstraction and commensuration [which] consist in the elaboration of purely formal 
concepts and logics". While the elaboration of the concepts for the account of the ontology 
and theory follows the suggested pattern of formalization, Howarth's insistence on the need 
to reach, firstly, the 'origins' and, secondly, the 'purity' of the concepts seems a bit 
overstretched for a theory informed by Derrida. 
13
 This means that the point of, firstly, presenting ontology and theory and then, secondly, 
confronting them with the empirical world is not to prove that the ontology and the theory 
are right (or contrarily to falsify them). The point of constructing, firstly, an ontology is to 
have a world to observe; by explicitly describing what the dissertation may observe, a 
certain transparency is secured. The point of constructing, secondly, a theory is to present an 
account of what goes on in the world. In the case of the dissertation: an account of what 
may contribute to radicalization. If the analysis – when confronting the theory with 
empirical material – shows no contributions to radicalization, a new choice arises: We may 
either be happy with the empirical world because there is no radicalization; or we may start 
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Section 1.1 briefly introduced the first important element which the analysis 
articulates: The empirical terrain of Danish debates on what to do about the Muslims. 
A first analytico-strategic choice is methodological; it concerns the reduction of the 
vast material of 'Danish debates'. The dissertation elects to analyse five political 
debates departing in diverse policy fields:
14
 the integration and human rights of 
migrants and refugees; protection of the freedom of expression; counterterrorism; and 
Turkish EU accession. The debates involve government and opposition narratives of 
what is in all the debates found to be 'Muslim relations'. 
The second element which the analysis articulates is already present: Even the very 
sketchy introduction (in section 1.1) to the empirical problematique was – as every 
rendition of a series of events – informed both by an idea of what entities and 
relations make up the world and by an understanding of what is going on: In other 
words; the rendition implied an ontology and a theory of what matters. In the 
perspective of the dissertation, the debates on Muslims are part of the performance of 
Danish identity in relation to difference: We define who We are by discussing who 
They are and by deciding how We should relate to Them. These future relations may 
be described in ways which produce more or less conflict.  
Section 1.5 begins the explication of the analytico-strategic premises for the analysis 
by briefly summarising how the dissertation observes relational identity. Subsection 
1.6 lays out the proceedings of the chapters of both the analytico-strategic and the 
analytical part of the dissertation.  
                                                                                                                                            
evaluating what element in the combination of analytico-strategic choices produced an un-
helpful analysis 
14
 Other policy fields could have been selected – and within the selected policy fields, other 
debates could bare been singled out: Different selections would have generated different 
narratives, but the overall impression of both variation and convergence would most likely 
have been the same. 
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1.5 Theory: Identity as relations to the other  
The three subsections 1.5.1-1.5.3 briefly introduce three ways in which identity is a 
relational concept – along with the academic disciplines which have drawn attention 
to them. 
1.5.1 Identity related to the other as constitutive and threatening 
A first inspiration in the development of a relational concept of identity comes from 
post-structuralist philosophy. It deals with the way in which the relation between 
identity and difference is constitutive. This inspiration should lead political science to 
focus on the potentially damaging extreme situation in which the difference of an 
'other' – someone outside identity – is pointed out as an existential threat to identity.  
When viewed from a philosophical perspective, identity is a logical problem. 
Logically, the claim that someone is identical entails that someone else is different. In 
that sense, identity is dependent on difference – or, in other words, difference is 
constitutive to identity: If difference was not there, identity would not make sense – it 
would not be identity.  
So difference is constitutive to identity. But at the same time, difference presents an 
alternative to identity. And as it presents an alternative, it presents a potential threat 
to identity: If something is different – why should not identity be different? Is there 
anything that keeps difference from spreading all over and eradicating identity? 
In Derrida's phrasing, difference is the constitutive outside to identity (1988b:52f): 
Firstly, difference is not identity; it is something distinctively outside identity – that's 
the whole point of defining identity in relation to difference. Secondly, identity needs 
difference to be; if identity could not relate to difference, it would not be identity. 
Thirdly, as an alternative to identity; difference is a potential threat to identity. The 
consequence of this line of thought is that identity is necessarily threatened if it is to 
exist at all. Laclau summarizes the point when he writes that: "Every identity is 
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dislocated in so far as it depends on an outside which both denies that identity and 
provides the condition of possibility at the same time." (Laclau 1990:39) 
Potentially, this philosophical point has serious implications for political science: If 
any identity needs to generate a threat to itself we should expect to see nothing but 
threats out there.
15
 Fortunately, a good deal has been done to cut this philosophical 
point down to its natural size – or rather; to its social size.  
One example is the way Connolly (2002[1991]:8) inserts a 'human handbrake' in 
Derrida's logical, philosophical equation: It might be so that identity needs a threat – 
but it makes a difference, that we are talking about human beings rather than abstract 
concepts. The necessary threat to a collective identity need not be assigned to an 
individual or another collective. And contrarily; when the identity in question is a 
human self – individual or collective – the 'others' (the individuals or collectives 
outside the self) need not be pointed out as existentially threatening. The logical 
structure of the concept of identity leaves this possibility open – but in social life such 
pointing out of an enemy is only a temptation, not a necessity. 
Another example is the way Laclau conceptualizes 'social antagonism' as the way 
'dislocation' is handled: Social life needs some stability. Therefore the constitutive 
outside – that which is excluded from identity, and that which is therefore both 
constituting and constantly dislocating identity (Laclau 1990:17) – needs to be 
domesticated. A primary way of domestication is the very naming of the 'antagonism' 
by pointing out something – someone, some difference – as responsible for the 
existential threat (cf. Laclau 1990:50; Clausen et al. 2000:28; cf. Torfing 1999:129ff).  
                                           
15
 What was arguably the first full scale analysis of identity politics in the realm of foreign 
relations informed by the Derridean perspective, Campbell (1992), actually does find a 
consecutive series of existential threats in the performance of US identity. For discussions 
whether this is a necessary result of the theoretical perspective employed or a contingent 
empirical result, see Hansen (2006:224, n.2); Neumann (1999:24-36).  
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When compared with Connolly's argument, Laclau's move may in the first instance 
appear to go in the opposite direction: Connolly says that it is not necessary to blame 
a specific other for the failure of identity – Laclau says that it is the primary way of 
handling the problem. Laclau's story, however, does not stop here. Firstly, because 
the very naming of the threat already represents a domestication of the threat: 'Now, 
at least, we know what it is that threatens us'. Secondly, because pointing out of some 
difference as an existential threat cannot stand alone – a countervailing logic 
necessarily sets in to explain why some other difference is just a matter of degree and 
not a radical threat to identity (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:129-144).  
While the difference of the other is logically constitutive to the identity of the self, 
this does not necessarily mean that the other is presented as an existential threat. A 
series of studies in International Relations have showed how others may be 'othered' 
in less radical ways; as a helper, as someone in need of help, as an apprentice, etc.
16
 
And within political philosophy Mouffe (2002; 2005) has – as mentioned – 
developed Foucault's notion of an 'agonistic relation' as an ideal of othering an 
opponent without denying its right to exist. 
Nevertheless, as a potentially damaging extreme possibility, the construction of 
radically threatening Others needs to be kept in focus when analyzing identity 
performance. Especially it remains a task for political science to monitor potential 
degeneration from peaceful relations – whether they are hierarchical or equal – to 
violence (cf. Baumann & Gingrich 2004a; 2004b; Neumann 1998).  
                                           
16
 I.a. Neumann 1999; Hansen 1998; 2006; Wæver 2002, Rumelili 2007. 
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1.5.2 Identity articulated by narrating policies for getting the other 
into place 
As implicated in subsection 1.5.1, there are other roles to play for an other in relation 
to identity than that of an existential threat. Narrative theory – the theory of how and 
why stories are told – conceptualizes identity not as a stable (or destabilized) 
structure but as a dynamic process of agency. Combined with Historiography – the 
history of how history is told – narrative theory points our attention to changes in the 
conceptualization of time in narratives. This inspiration should lead political science 
to focus on the way necessity and choice is constructed by articulating past 
experience and expectations for the future into a story about Us and Them. 
Narrative theory – especially as formulated by Ricoeur (1988) – seeks to solve the 
problem of identity as posed by philosophy above: Identity is impossible since it is 
undermined by the difference it needs for its constitution – so how come that there 
seem to be identity anyway?  
Ricoeur's answer is that the identity which is there and which has effects is narrative: 
"Individual and community are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives 
that become for them their actual history." (1988:247) To know who we are – and to 
be sure that we are identical with ourselves – we tell stories. And even the most 
simple story involves not just a self and an other – threatening or not – but a varied 
cast of "characters" (1988:248); a "web of identities" (Hansen 2006:40). A whole 
series of roles are presented for others – and self – to take up; a place for each self 
and other is produced through the telling of stories. 
A story (or narrative) basically consists in the selection and articulation of a series of 
events from a beginning to a conclusion (Ricoeur 1988:41; 66). When the object of 
analysis is the performance of identity in relation to others, it becomes crucial to 
think through where and how to fix the 'beginning' and the 'conclusion'. Identity is 
performed through suggestions on what we ought to do to the other; e.g. through the 
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formulation of policies. And policies necessarily pertain to the future – while they are 
often legitimized with reference to the past (cf. Hansen 2006:21; 49).  
Koselleck (1985), when summarizing his research on how 'time' has been given form 
to serve political purposes in different ages, suggests that we look at 'the past' and 'the 
future' in policy narratives in different ways: On the one hand, experience of the past 
are selected, described and arranged to point to the present situation. On the other 
hand, expectations of the future takes the form of a horizon – i.e. a line behind which 
we cannot see – on which we project specific prognoses or plans for the future. 
Crucial for analysis becomes how necessity is produced in the narrative (cf. Hansen 
2006:26): How certain events in the past involving the other is made to imply the 
necessity of certain decisions in the present to achieve one preferred future and avoid 
different futures. Necessity may be implied by the way in which time or the relation 
between self and other is structured in the narratives – or it may be installed by 
inscribing the narrative with established truths. 
1.5.3 Identity politics as conflicting narratives of the self/other 
relation 
As different necessities may be articulated to self/other narratives, the attention is 
pointed to the role which politics play in the production of identities. Both political 
theory and anthropology tells us, that agreement on identity is a rare phenomenon – 
both internally between the members of 'our identity' and externally between Us and 
Them. This inspiration should lead political science to focus on the dynamics coming 
out of these disagreements – and the feed back effects of the dynamics on the 
constitutive relation between self and other and on the narratives of self and others.  
Laclau & Mouffe (1985) conceptualizes the social world as competing 'hegemonic 
projects', i.e. attempts to order the world by assigning categories to be employed, 
roles to be taken up and rules to be followed. As such projects are ultimately 
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incompatible; conflict is inevitable. In parallel with Derrida's idea of identity, no 
project can ever achieve total hegemony: There is always some element which does 
not fit the pattern imposed and which serves as the point of condensation for a 
counter-project. So 'inside' every identity, there is always more than one voice – and 
therefore more than one story trying to determine any identity, its delimitation, and its 
relation to the cast of others (Neumann 1999:30; Hansen 2006:77). One voice tells a 
story involving a self and an other – another voice replies with a different narrative 
involving a different version of the self and of the other. This is the first site of 
politics in the narration of identities; the site of 'internal' politics. 
The second site of politics in the narration of identities arises from 'external' identity 
politics, or what Hansen calls 'discursive encounters' (2006:76). Each narrative 
involves a cast of self and others – and each narrative implies a 'grammar' for their 
interaction (Baumann & Gingrich 2004), i.e. as a structure proposed to form the 
continued narration of the story of their relation. When a narrative offers a role for an 
other the other might play the role differently than the original script implied (cf. 
Butler 1997). The other might seek to oppose the grammar for interaction implied in 
the narrative told by the Self – and impose an alternative grammar. In that sense, 
there is dialogue of narratives: A self tells a story involving an other – the other 
replies with a different narrative. 
The way in which the other responds to the role which it is awarded in the narrative 
told by the self is, however, decisive for what kind of dynamics that may come to 
characterize the encounter. The response may feed back into the continuation of the 
narrative. If the other challenges rather than recognizes the narrative upholding the 
identity of the self, a dynamic of threat and conflict may ensue (Rumelili 2007:38; cf. 
Triandafyllidou 1998:601b; 2001; 2002:34). If the story is told by the self in a way 
that involves a lot of necessity, the conflict may radicalize as there is no room left to 
facilitate the other. 
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The response of the other may be so challenging that it threatens to make the story 
which the self would like to tell of itself impossible. In that situation one possible 
outcome is the breakdown of what is left of a dialogue of narratives: If the self tells a 
story which does not include a grammar for future interaction, because it insists on 
the need to eradicate the other, there is nothing left to talk about (Baumann & 
Gingrich 2004b; Baumann 2004:46f). In this way, the dynamics of the identity 
politics between self and other may feed back to create the extreme situation pictured 
by philosophy (in section 1.5.1) in which the difference of the other is presented as an 
existential threat to the identity of the self (cf. Wæver 1994). 
Even if the general image of identity politics is one of conflict, inequality and 
domination, a qualitative difference exists between everyday 'system maintaining 
violence' and an radicalized conflict involving 'categorical killings' (Baumann & 
Gingrich 2004b; cf. Neumann 1998:18). This makes conflict management a 
reasonable task (Galtung 1978:488; Wæver 2003:23). 
To be able to contribute to the management of the potentially detrimental conflictual 
dynamics, a sustained focus in the analysis of identity politics need to be on the 
positions awarded to the other in identity narratives; on the necessity implied in the 
narratives; and on the responses which the other may have to the grammars for future 
interaction implied in the narratives.  
As the narratives involved in this 'external' identity politics (between self and other) 
are each also involved in 'internal' identity politics (over how to represent the self), 
the focus needs to include the dynamics connecting internal and external identity 
politics. 
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1.5.4 Identity configuration as relations between structure, agency 
and interaction 
The three subsections 1.5.1-1.5.3 have represented three ways in which identity 
relates to an other: a constitutive relation, a policy relation, and a political relation. 
The relation between these relations may be summed up as an identity configuration 
(cf. Elias 2000[1968]; Buzan & Wæver 2009:fn.17) 
Firstly, the difference of the other is constitutive to identity: If there was no 
exclusion, identity would be meaningless as a concept. By being excluded yet 
necessary for identity to be, the other threatens to reveal the contingency of identity. 
So when analysing identities, the analytical strategy must be able to observe the 
possible degeneration of the relation into one characterised by threats. 
Secondly, you need to explain and protect the identity and the exclusion – and to do 
so, you tell stories. You cannot tell stories about yourself only; you need a cast of 
characters to play each their assigned role. Therefore the other – or rather; various 
others – will be asked to take up positions in the narrative attempts to uphold identity. 
So when analysing narrative agency, the analytical strategy must be able to observe 
the way in which necessity and choice is constructed by relating past experience and 
expectations for the future into a story about Us and Them. These stories are policy 
stories as they pertain to what we should do to achieve a preferred future. 
Thirdly, the varying others pointed out to co-star the identity stories will – as part of 
the roles which they are told to play – be endowed with varying capacities to co-
author or negotiate the continuation of the narratives. The first potential result of 
having more than one author of a story is conflict; i.e. the result is politics. The 
second potential result of politics over identity is that the conflict radicalizes to 
involve threats and violence. So when analysing identity politics, the analytical 
strategy must be able to observe the potential dynamics coming out of disagreements 
over the narrative distribution of roles – and the potential feed back effects of the 
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dynamics on the constitutive relation between self and other and on the narratives of 
self and others. 
To account for an identity configuration involves accounting for, firstly, identity as 
structure; secondly, identity as narrative agency; and thirdly, it involves accounting 
for identity politics as the dynamics of the negotiation of the redistribution of 
structure and agency. Any such identity configuration must be conflictual. 
1.6 Proceedings: What questions are put where? 
Section 1.3 placed the research question of the dissertation in the context of three 
broader problematiques: a philosophical focusing on the ontological status of the 
other; a theoretical focusing on the relation between conflict and policies for relating 
to the other; and an empirical focusing on Danish 'Muslim relations'. Section 1.4 
explained the overall design of the project which should allow the dissertation to 
answer the question, while section 1.5 introduced the way in which the dissertation 
sees identity as a relational concept involving conflict. This section presents the more 
specific proceedings of the dissertation. 
Subsection 1.6.2 introduces the analytical Part II of the dissertation. Before the 
analysis may be conducted, however, the premises for the analysis and the concepts 
informing the analysis must be accounted for. Subsection 1.6.1 lays out how Part I of 
the dissertation asks three analytico-strategic questions to facilitate the analysis: an 
ontological, a theoretical and a methodological question. 
1.6.1 Part I: Analytical strategy – ontology, theory, methods 
Chapter 2 establishes the ontology which the dissertation may analytically observe. 
More specifically, the chapter asks:  
A. What relations make up an identity configuration? 
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The chapter answers this question by establishing a concept of identity as related to 
the other in three ways (as summarized in section 1.5): identity is constitutively 
related to the difference of the other; identity is performed through narration 
involving a cast of characters including various others; and identity is politically 
negotiated between various self/other narratives purported both internally and 
externally. A final discussion of the concepts of identity and conflict provides a 
criterion for what may count as a radicalization of conflict. By establishing the 
concept of an identity configuration as including this set of relations between identity 
and difference – between self and other – a world is established which may be set in 
motion by a more specific theoretical account and empirical observations of conflicts 
in identity politics.  
Chapter 3 establishes a theory of what the dissertation may analytically find when 
observing the world of relations established (in chapter 2) with a view to cast light on 
the possible contributions to radicalization. More specifically, the chapter asks: 
B. What structures, articulations and dynamics in an identity configuration 
contribute to a radicalization of conflict? 
The chapter answers this question by developing a theoretical account of how the 
proposition and pursual of specific policies on how to relate to the other may 
contribute to a radicalization of conflict between self and other. Firstly, a typology of 
policies are developed on the basis of three basic 'grammars' for future interaction 
between self and other. The grammars are basic ways in which one may relate self 
and other: a) distinguishing self from other, b) acting on behalf of the other and c) 
producing knowledge of the self/other relation. The claim is that these basic 
grammars – when combined or weighed to produce a series of specific policies – 
serve as radically different invitations to the other to partake in the continued 
narration of the relation. Secondly, the chapter considers how policy narratives may 
be articulated with necessity. Thirdly, the chapter investigates how some of the policy 
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narratives are more prone than others to provoke counter-narratives feeding back to 
radicalize conflict. 
Taken together, the ontological account of what may be observed as identity in 
relation to difference (chapter 2) and the theoretical account of how certain types of 
self/other policy narratives may contribute to a radicalization of conflict (chapter 3) 
constitutes an image of a world: A world of entities, relations and dynamics which 
the dissertation claims is worth focusing on when analysing radicalization of conflict. 
Chapter 4 explains how the theoretical world (thus established in chapters 2 and 3) 
may in the analysis be confronted with the empirical world of Danish identity politics 
(presented in chapters 5 through 9). More specifically, the chapter asks: 
C. Where and how to focus to observe the identity configuration centred on Danish 
debates on Muslims? 
The chapter answers this question by presenting the specific methodological choices, 
selections and tools employed in the analysis – and by discussing the biases and blind 
spots co-produced. The chapter concludes: That Danish identity discourse itself 
points out parliament and government as privileged sites for negotiating and deciding 
questions of identity politics. That 'the Muslim' appears central – even to debates on 
'other others'. That the Danish party to the Danish/Muslim relation is hierarchically 
structured in a way which allows for a more focused analysis than the one which one 
may conduct on the Muslim party – a limited focus which, it is argued, nevertheless 
may reveal structures and dynamics important for the overall relation.  
Finally, the chapter argues a three step reading strategy: In the first reading, the 
debates are approached on their own terms to observe both what appear to be at stake 
(what concepts and relations does the debate revolve around?); and what mechanisms 
in the discursive structure, agency and interaction appear to set off what dynamics 
(what makes the debate evolve?).  
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In the second reading, the analysis is summarized in terms of what policies are 
promoted and what grammars for future interaction with the other these policies 
entail. In the third reading, possible reactions from the other are prognosticated. To 
allow the second and third reading, each debate is interrogated with the same set of 
questions, designed (in chapter 4) to match the categories of the ontological and 
theoretical accounts of a world of identities in conflict (developed in chapters 2 & 3). 
In each of the analytical chapters this set of questions generate one or more Danish 
narratives of the past, future and necessary relations between the Danish self and a 
Muslim other – and lays out the premises for the negotiation of the continuation of 
the narrative. 
All the analytical questions are – along with the foundational research question and 
the analytico-strategic questions of the dissertation – summarized in table 1.1. The 
table also provides an overview of which chapters answer each question. 
1.6.2 Part II: Analysis – Danish debates on Muslims 
Part II includes the five analytical chapters of the dissertation. On the one hand, the 
five chapters conduct parallel second and third readings as summarized in section 1.4. 
On the other hand, the first two of the five chapters – chapters 5 and 6 – has a special 
role as they introduce the basic features of the present Danish political landscape in 
general and of Danish debates on Muslim affairs in particular: 
Chapter 5 provides a brief overview of how Danish public debates on migrants and 
Muslims have evolved over the last decades, and how they have reached Parliament. 
The chapter proceeds to analyse how the government disagrees with itself over time 
on the means and aims of integrating migrants and refugees. Specifically, the chapter 
analyses government policy papers and statements to distil the threats which the 
process of integration is to avert. At the outset, the government narratives are not 
about religion, scarcely about culture, but rather about labour market integration. 
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Gradually, however, 'Muslim culture' takes up an explicit and distinct role as the 
narratives evolve. 
Chapter 6 provides a brief portrait of the self-image and the relation to others 
produced in Danish identity discourse historically. The chapter proceeds to analyse a 
series of parliamentary debates on how to make sense of international human rights 
based criticism of Danish alien policy. The debates are based on the agreement that 
Denmark is a human rights pioneer. Or rather, that it should be a human rights 
pioneer ... or, at least, a pioneer. The point of (not) formulating the agreement on 
which the debate is founded is that the agreement is crumbling: The debates were 
characterized by opposing hegemonic projects each aiming to re-delimit Danish 
identity discourse. 
Chapter 7 analyses a series of parliamentary debates on two bills introduced to 
facilitate Danish participation in an international network of cities offering refuge to 
writers persecuted in their home country. Even if the bills were in the end 
unanimously adopted, the debates were characterized by sharp divisions over whose 
security to prioritize when championing freedom of expression in the aftermath of the 
Cartoon Crisis. 
Chapter 8 analyses debates on how to prevent terrorism. Firstly, the analysis charts 
how the government narratives involve a gradually more complicated cast of 
characters. Secondly, the analysis zooms in on two specific policy initiatives of the 
government which both suggest 'dialogue' as a preferred policy: a foreign policy 
initiative inviting the Middle East and North Africa to a 'partnership for progress and 
reform' and an action plan to 'prevent extremist attitudes and radicalization amongst 
the young' domestically. Finally, the chapter analyses parliamentary debates on how 
and why dialogue should be employed to counter terrorism.  
Chapter 9 analyses all formal parliamentary debates on the Turkish application for 
EU membership. Even if everyone agrees that Turkey is different, different 
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temporalizations and necessities inbuilt in the narratives prescribe very different 
policies. The chapter zooms in on the way in which Turkey is in government 
discourse indirectly framed as a case of 'Muslim relations' and on the possible 
consequences of this framing. 
Chapter 10 concludes in terms of the main research question of the dissertation. 
Furthermore, the chapter draws implications for the theories engaged in the 
construction of the analytical strategy. Finally, the chapter engages in critical self-
evaluation by discussing the strategic benefits and drawbacks of the analytical 
strategy chosen by the dissertation. 
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Question Ch 
Main research question What structures and dynamics in Danish debates on Muslims 
may contribute to a radicalization of conflict? 
10 
Analytico-
strategic 
questions 
A. Ontology What relations make up an identity configuration? 2 
B. Theory What structures, articulations and dynamics in an identity 
configuration contribute to a radicalization of conflict? 
3 
i How may a self/other policy narrative be structured to 
contribute to radicalization of conflict? 
ii How may identity be articulated to necessity to contribute to 
radicalization of conflict? 
iii How may dynamics in identity politics be structured to 
contribute to radicalization of conflict? 
C. Methodology Where and how to focus to observe the identity configuration 
centred on Danish debates on Muslims? 
4 
Analytical 
questions 
in first 
reading 
1 What is the 
debate about? 
What agreement forms the basis of the debate? 
What disagreements are formed on the basis of this agreement? 
With what tools are the disagreements negotiated? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5, 
6, 
7, 
8, 
9 
Analytical 
questions 
in second 
reading 
2 What are the 
present, 
 
 
future, and 
 
 
 
 
necessary 
self/other 
relations 
implied in the 
narrative? 
Along what parameters is the Muslim described as different from 
'Us'?  
Is the Muslim in question presented as a threat? If so; to what 
exactly? 
3 What future relations between 'Us' and Muslim others are 
preferred? 
What futures are to be avoided?  
What policy is suggested to achieve the preferred future and 
avoid other furtures? 
4 How is this policy proposal necessitated or legitimized by the – 
past, present and future – relations described between 'Us' and 
the Muslim other? 
How is materiality articulated to make certain facts the necessary 
point of departure and arrival for the debates? 
Analytical 
questions 
in third 
reading 
5 How does the 
narrative 
interpellate? 
What roles are offered to Muslim others and what future 
interaction is implied in the policy narratives promoted? 
Do the narratives told indicate feed back from others responding 
to roles and grammars for future interaction? 
Table 1.1 The questions posed by the dissertation and the chapters in which they are 
answered 
The relevance of the specific theoretical questions (i-iii) will be clear from chapter 2. The 
analytical questions (1-5) are developed in chapter 4. 
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2 Identity configuration and conflict: Discourse as 
structure, agency and interaction 
The task for this chapter is to establish the ontology which the dissertation may 
analytically observe. To do so, the chapter asks: 
A. What relations make up an identity configuration? 
The chapter answers this question by establishing a concept of identity as related to 
the other in three ways: Identity is constitutively related to the difference of the other; 
Identity is performed through narration involving a cast of characters including 
various others; and Identity is politically negotiated between various self/other 
narratives purported both internally and externally. By establishing the concept of an 
identity configuration as including this set of relations between identity and 
difference – between self and other – a world is established which may be set in 
motion by, firstly, the theoretical account (in chapter 3) of what structures and 
dynamics may contribute to conflict, and, secondly, the empirical observations (in 
chapters 5 to 9) of conflicts in identity politics. 
Ontologically, the point of departure for this dissertation when answering the 
question is that there is difference. Therefore there are differences. And therefore 
there is conflict. One of the things over which there is conflict is who are allowed to 
be parties to conflicts: Who are the identities in each end of difference – in each end 
of the differences. And at another level: who are to decide, who the identities are. 
That is to say: Who are the agents in conflict.  
Within the social sciences ‘identity’ is always – whether consciously or not – 
shorthand for ‘identity discourse’. Literally no two persons are identical. Neither is 
any one of us identical with the ones we were one or two experiences ago (cf. Fink 
1991). So identity is not something out there; it is not something inside either. 
Identity (i.e. identity discourse) is when we speak about A and B being identical. Or 
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when we speak or act as if A and B were identical. This means that we can only 
observe identity in discourse (Frello 2003:5f).  
Discourse is simultaneously structure and action: Discursive structures are the result 
of the analytical collapsing into synchronicity of a diachronous series of utterances. 
There is no structure of identity behind or below the 'regularity in dispersion of 
utterances' – the only structure identity has is the regularity in dispersion of utterances 
which may be observed (cf. Foucault 1972). 
When departing philosophically in post-structuralism, acts are collapsed into 
structure. To allow a concept of politics, however, a separate task of this chapter is to 
re-establish a place in theory for agents (cf. Neumann 1999:209). Hence, the 
dissertation insists to handle the structure/agency dilemma by observing both 
structure and agency – but observing both structure and agents as limited and 
imperfect. Furthermore, the dissertation observes separate dynamics of interaction, 
irreducible to either structure or agency. 
In terms of academic discipline, both the point of departure and that of arrival are in 
political science – more specifically in the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe. 
Compared with other strands of discourse theory and other ways of moving 'post' 
structuralism, Laclau & Mouffe's has the comparative advantage of conceptualizing 
discourse as a political struggle involving – even consisting primarily in – competing 
attempts at the constitution of identities. The main thrust of the poststructuralism of 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) is to insist on the recurrence of politics: Total hegemony 
never comes – there is always a place for a counter-hegemonic project. In that sense, 
the approach laid out by Laclau & Mouffe works as a nice supplement to the 
archaeology of knowledge of Foucault which  
pose grand questions and answer them with equally grand sweeps. If you are interested in 
large scale tectonic movements, you may just go ahead. ... The problem is that a social 
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science practice must also be able to trace social change in smaller scale and over shorter 
periods of time than such historical analyses invites for (Neumann 2001:85f).
17
 
As Laclau & Mouffe stress the self-destructive course of any hegemonic project in 
the long run, the Foucauldian tectonic plates of discourse are opened up to politics. 
Or the other way around: politics is made necessarily recurring to (re-)produce 
discourse.F
18
F This appears as an advantage against the backdrop of ontological point of 
                                           
17
 "[S]tiller grandiose spørsmål, og besvarer dem med like grandiose sveip. Er man 
interessert i tektoniske skifter i stor skala, er det bare å sette i gang. ... Problemet er at en 
samfunnsvitenskapelig praksis også må kunne spore sosial endring i mindre skala og over 
kortere perioder enn det slike historiske analyser legger opp til." (Neumann 2001:85f) 
18
 There is never just one discourse. Therefore, a central theoretical problem in any 
discourse theory must be to account for the possible relations between this plurality of 
discourses. Neither, however, is there just one discourse on discourse. A number of 
conceptualizations of intertextual relationships between discourses are available to the 
analyst: The surplus of meaning always surrounding and challenging any discourse may be 
seen to organize itself to systematically attempt the re-articulation of elements of the 
discourse in question by fixing their meaning in a discourse organized in a different 
regularity of dispersion; hence, the relationship between two discursive formations is 
conceptualized as a struggle over the definition of a number of floating signifiers (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985). Alternatively, a regularity first identified in one discursive 'order' may be 
shown to be emulated in another 'order' imported via discursive 'genres' (Fairclough 
1995:32). A third option is that a specific regularity at one 'level of sedimentation' may open 
to disagreements over which regularity is to be enforced at another level (Wæver 2000a; 
2000b; 2002; 2004; cf. Foucault 1972:67). Fourthly, a number of 'basic' discourses may be 
constructed to differ at one level, hence allowing each to include a number of 'variations' at 
another level (Hansen 2006:51-4). Fiftly, a number of relatively separate discursive or 
interpretative 'repertoires' may be seen to be drawn upon in the pragmatic attempts of an 
actor to make sense to a situation or argument (Edley 2001:197ff; Potter & Wetherell 
2001:199; Wetherell 1998:400; Gad 2005:61, 97). The choice of metaphoric, however, is 
not a problem of fitting concepts to reality. It is a genuine choice: Any instance of 
intertextuality (i.e. manifest or implicit reference from one utterance to another) may, on the 
one hand, be said to implicate each end of the reference in the same discourse as the 
intertextuality can only be deemed such due to some sort of regularity. On the other hand, 
the re-iteration of any utterance necessarily implies a change of context (Derrida 1988a:15f; 
cf. Kristeva 1986:111), which implies that the regularity of dispersion has changed and we 
may analytically conclude that we have a different discourse. In that sense, “Even languages 
of the day exist ... every day represents another socio-ideological semantic ‘state of affairs’, 
another vocabulary ... its own ways of assigning blame and praise.” (Bakhtin 1981:291). So 
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departure of the dissertation: That there is difference and conflict – and that identity 
is something which is to be produced on this background. 
In a review, Brubaker & Cooper recount the numerous ways the concept of identity is 
employed in the social sciences, proliferating in the 80ies and 90ies (2000:6-9). Their 
conclusion – or at least their sales pitch – is to advocate the abolition of 'identity' as 
an analytical concept, since the use of it in analysis risks contributing to the 
reification of the 'identities' studied (2000:5f; 25ff) and furthermore risks pressuring 
people with "uneven trajectories of ancestry" into these reified identity boxes 
(2000:5f; 10). Since the meaning of the concept is so ambiguous anyway, little will 
be lost by leaving it behind (2000:1).  
This dissertation agrees and disagrees. Basically, the concept of identity is ingrained 
in academic discourse – just as it has been taken up by the objects of study of the 
social sciences (Brubaker & Cooper 2000:4f, cf. Briggs 1996). Certainly it plays an 
active role in Danish political debates. This persistence suggests that the concept of 
identity should be retained as a prism for analyzing a specific discursive structure and 
the discursive action and interaction relating to this structure.  
                                                                                                                                            
the fixation of parts of the context which makes it possible to see the regularity in dispersion 
of utterances always involves a choice. The choice between such conceptualizations of 
intertextual relationships between given discourses is very much a choice of analytical focus 
(cf. Chandler 2001:195). This dissertation chooses to observe identity discourse at two 
levels of abstraction: Firstly, discourse is generically observed as any regularity in 
dispersion of utterances producing identity. This implies that there may be Chinese boxes of 
identity discourses: Within the framework of one regularity in dispersion there may be a 
plurality of bodies of utterances with separate regularities (cf. Jameson 1981:84). Secondly, 
the specific focus of the dissertation – Danish identity discourse – is delimited by the 
agreement – the regularity in dispersion of utterances – that there is such a ‘thing’ as a 
Danish identity. This agreement functions as a starting point for disagreements over what 
Danish identity would more specifically be (Gad 2005:30; cf. Haahr 2003:39). In that sense, 
the discursive battles are organized around Danish identity as an empty signifier in the sense 
of Laclau (1996b). 
53 
To escape the essentialist baggage of the concept of identity the dissertation puts in 
its place the concept of identity configuration to account for the relations between the 
various relations between identity and difference. This relational concept of identity – 
the notion that 'any We imply a They' – involves three relations: Firstly, philosophy 
tells us that identity logically implies difference; we cannot talk about something or 
someone being identical without implying something or someone else being different. 
Secondly, narrative and historiographic theory suggests that to uphold an identity we 
need to tell stories of who we are and how we are identical with ourselves. As stories 
necessarily involve a cast of more than one character, there is a role for Them as well 
as for Us. Thirdly, political theory and Anthropology have taught us that there is 
never just one story of who We are: 'We' disagree internally over who we are, whom 
we ought to be, and what to do to Them. On the top of our own disagreements, They 
tell different stories about themselves and their relations to Us than we do.  
Section 2.1 begins the construction of the concept of 'identity configuration' by 
investigating the concept of identity as a discursive structure. Specifically, identity is 
found to be a double structure of void and narrative. The section finds that the 
intimate relation between identity and difference is best conceptualized as a double 
structure: Firstly, identity as a discursive structure is a void left by the exclusion of 
difference; a void which needs to be explained away. Secondly, identity discourse is 
structured as a narrative of the relationships between identity and difference. The 
section proceeds to develop a generic concept of self/other policy narrative as its 
operational concept of identity. Then the section investigates the temporality of 
policy narratives – and concludes by asserting the primacy of politics. The analytical 
consequence of the primacy of politics is a need to prioritize analysis of the present 
articulation of past and future. 
Two concepts need, therefore, to be introduced to accompany the concept of identity 
as discursive structure: identity as discursive articulation and identity politics. The 
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introduction of these two concepts assists in cutting down the concept of identity to a 
more expedient size – and thereby to accommodate the worries of Brubaker & 
Cooper. 
Brubaker & Cooper criticizes that the concept of identity for connoting a fixed entity 
which is not there: Identity is never complete – it always needs to be completed; it 
needs to be made. This is why they recommend re-focusing from identity as a 
structure to identification as a process (2000:14-17). The dissertation answers to this 
recommendation by conceptualizing attempts to articulate the discursive structure of 
identity in discursive action. Such a concept of discursive action involves the 
reconstruction of a place in discursive structure for a subject or agent capable of 
action – capable of performing the articulation of the discursive structure of identity.  
Section 2.2 investigates the conditions and modalities of the articulation of identity 
by discursive agency. Firstly, it establishes a space for agency in structure by 
conceptualizing structures as limiting, enabling and incomplete. Secondly, it argues 
the need for agency to articulate structures in ways that facilitate future agency. 
Finally, identity as structure needs – on top of identity as discursive action – yet 
another supplement to serve the analytical purpose of the dissertation: When the 
articulation of identity is not a smooth process – when there is not agreement, not one 
discourse on identity to identify with, not only one discursively constituted subject 
attempting to articulate identity – then we have identity politics.  
Section 2.3 develops the concept of identity politics as discursive interaction. The 
section first discusses the recurrence of the political in the articulation of identity. 
Secondly, it discusses how ambiguity and segmentation may divert the political. It 
then proceeds to discuss the concepts of conflict and radicalization to provide the 
criterion necessary to answer the main research question of the dissertation. 
Furthermore, it discusses the division between internal and external identity politics 
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to complete the dissertations account for what relations are involved in an identity 
configuration 
Finally, section 2.4 summarizes the triple function of the other in identity politics – 
the constitutive, narrative, and political relations – and argues why it is pertinent to 
focus the construction of the 'other ends' of the relations which make up an identity 
configuration.  
2.1 Identity as discursive double structure: void and 
narrative 
The point of this subsection is to characterize identity as a discursive structure: What 
is the regularity in dispersion of utterances which is identity discourse?  
The answer which this section provides is that identity is a discursive double 
structure: Firstly, identity has the structure of a void in the sense that identity does not 
exist (subsection 2.1.1). Secondly, identity has the structure of a narrative: the 
identity which seems to exist in spite of its impossibility is there as part of a story 
relating identity to difference (subsection 2.1.2X. Finally, the section lays out how 
narratives facilitate not only identity by relating it to others – but also agency 
(subsection 2.1.3). 
Having characterized identity discourse at this basic level, the section proceeds to 
argue that the narrative structure is the only observable part of the double structure. 
Therefore, a generic concept of self/other policy narrative is provided as the 
operational concept of identity for the dissertation. The concept is developed through 
a discussion of the concepts of time, narrative and policy (in subsection 2.1.4). 
Both the discussion of the narrative endowment of identities with agency and the 
discussion of the temporality of policy narratives point out a need to conceptualize 
the articulation of identity as discursive agency. Section 2.2 takes up this task. 
56 
2.1.1 Identity as impossibility and void 
The relation between identity and difference has been a recurrent theme in 
philosophy. Logically, the claim that someone is identical entails that someone else is 
different. Hence, identity discourse is first and foremost about drawing boundaries 
and thereby including some as identical and excluding others as different (Campbell 
1998:9; cf. Derrida 1988b:53). Figure 2.1 illustrates this basic constitutive relation 
between identity and difference. 
We
They
 
Figure 2.1 Constitutive relation between Our identity and Their difference 
 
One way of characterizing Derrida's deconstructive mode of thinking is as thinking to 
the limit (Dufourmantelle 2000:80); taking concepts to their limit where they break 
down under their own weight. Correspondingly, Derrida (1988b:52f) presents identity 
as an ultimately impossible phenomenon: Identity is never explicated as complete; it 
always needs something extra to complete it. This something – which is its condition 
of being – is simultaneously what prevents it from being realised. So the other – what 
is excluded from identity (discourse) is both constitutive and threatening to the 
identity (discourse).  
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Section 1.2.1 noted that any analysis of identity politics must be able to take this 
threat from the other to identity into account. But it also briefly discussed how 
Connolly and Laclau presented each their way to 'cut the philosophical threat down to 
its social size'. Connolly (2002:8) insisted on a 'human handbrake' when transporting 
Derrida's logical figure from philosophy to the analysis of social practice:
19
 In social 
life it is a structural possibility to point out a human individual or collective as the 
threatening other – but it is only a temptation, not a necessity.20 
Laclau on his side described (Laclau 1990:17; 50; Clausen et al. 2000; cf. Torfing 
1999:129ff) a discursive structure – 'antagonism' – in which the threat to identity 
from outside is ascribed to a specific social other. But the very naming of the threat 
simultaneously to some degree domesticates the threat: A threat pointed out to 
                                           
19
 Connolly's implicit critique of Derrida runs in parallel with the warning Gingrich issues 
against relying too much on philosophical concepts of identity inspired by Heidegger 
(exemplified in 1999[1957]). Gingrich finds that Heideggerian concepts of identity by 
"viewing difference as separate from and external to identity exemplifies a particularly 
'strong' notion of difference ... [and, hence,] tend to transform any 'weak' notions of 'other' 
and of 'alterity' towards their own priority for a 'strong' notion of difference." (Gingrich 
2004:9; cf. Grossberg 1996). Marchart (2004) lays out how Laclau relies on Heidegger on 
this point – Marchart, however, acclaims the relation. Critchley (2008) fixes the problem in 
Heidegger to the way true identity – authenticity – demands the being-together of a 
particular, historically rooted people engaged in communication and struggle (2008:139-41 
focusing on Heidegger 1984:384). Critchley suggests to mend the problem by correcting the 
characterization of death, admittedly certain, indefinite and not to be outstripped, but not – 
as in Heidegger – an individual, non-relational experience. Rather death is fundamentally 
relational: I prepare for my own death exactly when mourning the loss of an other 
(2008:143-4). Subsection 2.1.4 returns to the implications of this discussion for the 
temporality of self/other policy narratives. 
20
 Žižek (1989:93 qtd by Neumann 1999:220) contrarily insist that "'Others,' of course, 
cannot be reduced to empirical others; they rather point to the Lacanian 'big Other,' to the 
symbolic order itself." Žižek's point is that the reduction of the big Other to empirical others 
cannot succeed. This essentialism is discussed in fn. 61. The point of departure of this 
dissertation is that reduction is empirically attempted all the time – but that Connolly is right 
that reduction is only a temptation, not a necessity.  
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originate with a knowable agent is in a sense less frightening than an anxiety 
stemming from an indefinite threat to identity as impossible. 
The point to be made here is that neither Connolly nor Laclau supplies the tools 
necessary to specify the alternatives to pointing out social others as threats to identity: 
Connolly limits himself to describing the threat construction as a 'temptation' – and 
by the choice of metaphoric he implies resistance to the temptation to be primarily an 
ethical than a strategic challenge: a choice to be made rather than a discursive 
construction to be erected. Laclau & Mouffe's Derridean reading of the Foucauldian 
concept of discourse (Grossberg 1996) produces intriguing paradoxes and aporiae 
and, hence, nicely points out how language – and in continuation: other forms of 
meaningful social interaction – is full of pitfalls. Derrida’s philosophy is good at 
pointing out how there is a risk that linguistic operations do not work. A Derridean 
approach is, however, necessarily less apt at identifying what does work – at least 
when employed on its own.  
2.1.2 Identity as narrative – narrative as the possibility of identity 
Nevertheless, Laclau & Mouffe (1985; Laclau 1990) does provide the first building 
stones for a conceptualization of the relation of identity to difference as something 
more complex than a radically threatening constitutive outside. The most notable 
building stones are the concept of articulation and the twin logics of equivalence and 
difference. Articulation in Laclau and Mouffe designates the operation of fixing a 
previously ambiguous element as a moment in discourse by "any practice 
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result 
of the articulatory practice." (1985:105) 
Articulations may generally follow one of two logics contributing to each their way 
of structuring of discourse: The logic of equivalence describes how differences are 
made equivalent as they are collapsed in to one opposing other in a single 
antagonistic relation to Identity. Contrary to the logic of equivalence, the logic of 
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difference describes the production of a plethora of domesticated subject positions for 
others to take up in a discursive formation (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:129-144). The 
radically threatening other is present in both ways of structuring discourse. But under 
the logic of difference, the radically threatening other is relegated to the outskirts of 
social life – while under the logic of equivalence, antagonism runs down the middle 
of the social space organized.  
The specific way in which the second logic – the logic of difference – works remain, 
however, underspecified in Laclau & Mouffe: Moments in discourse may both differ 
from each other and be related in an infinite number of ways. To analyse the 
differential inscription of elements in discourse, the conceptual apparatus of Laclau & 
Mouffe remain too abstract (Thomsen 1997:124 cf. Corry 2000:17). 
The theoretical apparatus of Laclau & Mouffe lacks specificity when it comes to 
analysing differential inscription as a way of organizing discourse. This lack of 
specificity seems to be the background for the call of Howarth – a most distinguished 
scholar in the Laclauian tradition
21
 – to explore the relationship between discourse 
theory and narrative theory (2005:346). And with good reason: The structure of a 
narrative is an effective way of organising discourse. Gottweis notes, in a review of 
policy analysis after the linguistic turn, that: "Th[e] power to create order is an 
attractive quality that makes narratives essential for the shaping of policies, the 
settling of conflicts, or the securing of legitimacy for political action." (Gottweis 
2006:469) 
                                           
21
 I admit to be guilty as charged in potentially sexist partial citation (cf. Merton 1995) by 
slipping from "Laclau & Mouffe" to "Laclau" when referring to the discourse theory 
initially presented in (1985). Most of the theoretically relevant developments discussed here 
have, however, been published later by Laclau alone. When the dissertation – at a later stage 
– turns to the concept of agonism, Mouffe is of course credited. 
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A narrative is a specific way of structuring discourse; a specific regularity in the 
dispersion of utterances. More specifically, a narrative is the result of the selection 
and grasping together of a series of events from a beginning to a conclusion (Ricœur 
1988:41; 66).
22
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates this narrative relation between identity and difference; the 
present relation between self and other is related to past and future relations between 
self and other. The constitutive relation – including the spatial distinction between 
self and other – is explained by these temporal relations to past and future relations. 
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Figure 2.2 Narrative relation between self and other 
 
Ricœur concurs with the poststructuralist point that logical identity, i.e. "identity 
understood in the sense of being the same (idem)", is impossible. The identity which 
may be observed and which may have effects is narrative identity, i.e. "identity 
understood in the sense of oneself as self-same [soi-même] (ipse)" (1988:246). 
                                           
22
 The 'grasping together' is an English rendition of Latin comprehendere which covers both 
'to take in the meaning of something' and 'to take in something as part' (cf. Ricoeur 
1988:159); connotations bringing the operation close to the Laclau&Mouffian notion of 
articulation (cf. above). 
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Ricœur explains why narrative identity – as opposed to logical identity – may exist: 
"Unlike the abstract identity of the Same, this narrative identity, constitutive of self-
constancy, can include change, mutability" (1988:246). Hence, both "[i]ndividual and 
community are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives that become for 
them their actual history." (1988:247) 
2.1.3 Narrative identity as a structure inviting agency 
Narratively produced identity understood, with Ricœur, as  
Self-sameness, 'self-constancy', can escape the dilemma of the Same and the Other to 
the extent that its identity rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of 
dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text. (1988:246) 
This escape – narrative identity – from the dilemma of logical identity, however, 
prompts two questions: 
The first question is: What becomes of the other which is escaped? Or rephrased: 
What becomes of the difference, which Derrida claimed to be constitutive for 
identity? The answer is that difference has to be narrated: Difference may be narrated 
away so that only identity is left. Or difference may be narrated into place: The other 
has to be narrated into a "web of identities" (Hansen 2006:40); a cast of "characters" 
(Ricœur 1988:248) related to the identity. How this is done – how narratives includes 
structures of relational identity – is the focus for chapter 3.  
The second question comes, as phrased by Ricœur, in two versions: "'Who did this?'; 
'Who is the agent, the author?'" of the narratives constituting identity-as-ipse 
(1988:246). The answer which Ricœur provides is that it is the narrated self which 
narrates: "The subject then appears both as a reader and the writer of its own life" 
(1988:246). Or in other words:  
The relation is circular – the historical community [in the case of collective 
identity]... has drawn its identity from the reception of those texts that it had 
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produced. The ... relation between what we may call a 'character' – which may be that 
of an individual as well as that of a people – and the narratives that both express and 
shape this character [is circular] (1988:248).  
The reconstruction of the basis for your own agency is an important element in any 
kind of interaction.  
The observation that identities narrate their own identity does not mean that we 
cannot listen to the stories which the discursively constituted agents tell about 
themselves and each others. Quite the contrary; all we can do is to take our point of 
departure in the subjectivities constructed in these narratives and the narratives the 
subjectivities construct. The implications of the answer to this second question – that 
the narrated self is simultaneously the one which narrates – are developed in section 
2.2 as it investigates the conditions and modalities of the articulation of identity by 
discursive agency.
23
 
From this discussion of Derridean philosophy and Ricœurian narratology, the 
dissertation brings with it two basic points on the concept of identity: Logical identity 
is impossible in social life – therefore narrative identity becomes evermore necessary: 
The discursive structure of identity is – as a necessary supplement to its foundational 
structure of impossibility – a narrative structure. Or in other words: Identity discourse 
is structured as a narrative; the regularity in the dispersion of utterances which is 
identity discourse includes a regularity in the construction of the relation between a 
series of events setting the stage for a subject in relation to a cast of other characters. 
The narration of this narrative identity is put in the hand of the narrated identities 
themselves; hence, narrative identity is a discursive structure inviting agency.  
                                           
23
 Furthermore, Ricoeur grants that "narrative identity is not a stable and seamless identity" 
(1988:248). Therefore "[n]arrative identity ... becomes the name of a problem at least as 
much as it is that of a solution" (1988:249). In that sense, Ricoeur would agree when the 
dissertation finds a need to develop (in section 2.3) a concept of identity politics as 
discursive interaction. 
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The two structures of the double structure of identity – the void and the narrative – 
are equal in the sense that the one needs the other. But they are unequal in the sense 
that the narrative is a more elaborate structure than the void. The void is a neat and 
simple philosophical figure: a distinction is made – prompting an explanation. The 
explanation – the narrative – is a more complicated structure even in the abstract. 
Furthermore it may take an infinite number of paths. But most importantly: if you 
describe the narrative, your description will include the description of the distinction 
producing the void. And, more pertinently, this is the only way the void may be 
described – apart from the naked description of the philosophical figure: As soon as 
you start asking questions like 'What is the difference excluded?', 'Why?' and 'To 
what effect?', the only possible answers are narratives.
24
 
Therefore, when preparing for an analysis of identity as a discursive structure, the 
focus must be on the narrative form. But when the analysis of identity as a discursive 
structure should serve the wider aim of analysing identity politics, the focus should 
not just be on any narrative form. A standard narrative "claim[s] to relate in the 
present a 'past-now'" (Ricœur as rendered by McQuillan 2000c:323; italics inserted). 
Politics, however, is – to be a meaningful concept – directed to the future in ways 
which other uses of narratives are not necessarily. Subsection 2.1.4 explores how this 
orientation makes policy narratives – a central tool in politics – a special form of 
narrative, and how this special form makes the analytical focus on the present 
articulation of the past and the future important. 
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 Compare how Kølvrå (2009:47) needs to map the 'semantic field' to find the lead concept 
organizing discourse. That operation, which includes the observation of causal relations 
constructed between the lead concept and other concepts, already includes narrative analysis 
in the sense developed in subsection 2.1.4. 
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2.1.4 The structure of temporality in policy narratives 
This section has so far found the discursive structure of identity to be a double 
structure: It involves the structure of a void and the structure of a narrative. 
Subsection 2.1.3 found the narrative structure to be the one to focus on when 
analysing identity. The aim of this subsection is to develop the specific narrative 
structure of identity politics; the structure of a policy narrative. Initially, two concepts 
of policy narrative in political science are briefly reviewed. Inspiring as they are 
found, they are also found too award too little attention to the present articulation: 
One prioritizes the past – one prioritizes the future. The subsection, therefore, turns to 
philosophy to discuss concepts of time and policy. After discussing the three aspects 
of time – future, past, present – the section concludes how to analytically approach 
the temporality of policy narratives. 
Gottweis, in a recent review of what he terms the 'narrativist turn' in policy analysis, 
finds that narratives are found on two scales: Firstly,  
Political metanarratives describe general concepts and values of the social order, and 
provide for individual orientation and location in the symbolic universe. 
Metanarratives offer a conceptual framework that provides a polity and its subjects 
with an imagined collective political identity situated in historical time. (2006:469) 
Secondly,  
Policy narratives are more specific and describe the frames or plots used in the social 
construction of the fields of action for policy making, for governmental activities ... 
These frames or plots are principles of organization that govern events and give 
orientation to actors in a policy field. (2006:470) 
A most stimulating example of how to conceptualize political metanarratives in a 
way relevant to this dissertation is found in Smith's 'stories of peoplehood' (2003). 
Smith lays out how 'peoplehood', i.e. political community, is constituted by 'stories', 
i.e. narratives, of power, wealth, and (ethical) worth. An important effect of a 
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narrative in relation to the constitution of communities is the construction of certain 
futures as desirable:  
However well reasoned or well documented, those promises can never be more than 
a plausible conjecture, an imagined scenario of how the future will unfold, made 
credible by a certain account of the past and present that is usually selectively 
stylized (2003:45).  
Smith's Gramscian preference for studying the political rather than social 
construction of narrative identity points – in line with the perspective of the 
dissertation – the attention in the direction of struggles between competing narratives 
(2003:38-42, 53-4). 
Nevertheless, in Smith's analysis the focus slides to the way, in which the past is 
constructed. Most of the analysis focuses on how the past appears after having been 
structured: it re-tells the stories and analyses the structure of the stories told. In that 
sense too much weight is given to the past – and too little to the present.25 For the 
purpose of this dissertation, focus needs to be on the articulation of the past as it is 
constructed to make a future policy as desirable or necessary – and most of all, the 
focus needs to be on the present as it articulates a past and a future.
 
Zooming in on policy narratives, the problem reappears in different shape. In the 
tradition of policy analysis, policy is conceptualized as, on the one hand, an – ideally 
rational – way of approaching a given problem; and on the other hand, as a result of 
politics understood as a weighing of predefined interests taking place within a certain 
                                           
25
 Smith's analysis does touch upon the construction of the past by present actors as it turns 
to present US politics (2003:187-8, 192-3). Another problem in Smith's analytical setup is 
that the peoples (identities) constituted seem in Smith's rendition mainly to be acting 
politically in relation to themselves: The other only seldom appears in the outside end of a 
relation – and when the other appears, no active role is awarded. The pertinence of this 
problem will be clear from subsection 2.2 and chapter 3. 
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institutionalized polity (Torfing 2004:45-6).
26
 In the perspective of the dissertation, 
contrarily, the policy solutions, problems, interests, identities, and settings are co-
constituted through a process of negotiations instantiated in more or less elaborate 
statements of policy narratives (cf. Torfing 2004:45-6; Hansen 2006:21). In the 
tradition of policy analysis, such a perspective has been summarized as 
'argumentative policy analysis'. 
In his review of this perspective, Gottweis observes that while  
Traditionally, the Derrida/Foucault tradition of discourse analysis has been rather 
critical towards the last heroic efforts of the Frankfurt School personified by Jürgen 
Habermas to save the Enlightenment project 
he finds in policy analysis marked by the linguistic turn  
an interesting tension ... between the basically idealistic idea of communicative 
rationality … and the embrace of Foucault and other post-Enlightenment thinkers by 
many authors in argumentative policy analysis. (2006:473) 
This tension is perhaps most elegantly handled by Hajer & Wagenaar. On the one 
hand they insist that "conflict is intrinsic to human communities. Policy issues are 
almost by definition contested." (2003:27) On the other hand their aim is that policy 
analysis should perform a "transformative work" (2003:29) on a situation in which 
traditional governmental institutions are not necessarily "capable of producing 
effective or legitimate solutions" (2003:29-30): In this situation, policy analysis "aims 
to create, through direct and active participation in democratic deliberation over 
concrete policy problems, to develop autonomy, or, a capacity for judgment" 
                                           
26
 An informative discussion of the relation between choice and necessity in the temporality 
of policy may be found in Kay (2006:2-4). This approach, however, stays within a 
rationalistic perspective.  
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(2003:31). As a part of this work, it is the aim to develop new modes of conflict 
resolution (2003:16).  
To account for the "communicative miracle" which take place when "people from 
widely varying backgrounds still find ways to communicate" (2006:70), Hajer 
introduces a most inspiring concept of narrative: A story line is a sketchy narrative 
which may serve as point of coalescence by allowing each actor to 'fill in the blanks' 
in a different way (1995:52-67; 2005:447; 2006:69-71). Hence, "A story-line ... is a 
generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive 
categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena." (1995:56) 
Hajer's concept of story line, however, simultaneously awards too much attention to 
the past and the future – and too little to the present: On the one hand, the concept of 
story line undoubtedly provides a valuable tool in the post facto analysis of 
hegemonic coalitions once formed. It does, however, not allow a focus on the present 
articulation of neither the coalition27 or of the narrative holding it together, as the 
blanks may – by definition – not be filled in lest the coalition fall apart. In that sense, 
there is a bias towards the past in the analytical setup. On the other hand, it is clear 
that the future formation of the coalition is a premise for the past analysed.
28
FIn that 
sense, the bias to the past is only established by installing in the past a bias to the 
future.  
In sum, even if political science provides two inspiring concepts of policy narrative 
both intellectually related to poststructuralist discourse theory, neither facilitates the 
focus on the present articulation of narratives, which the dissertation seeks. The 
section, therefore, proceeds beyond political science to Philosophy and 
                                           
27
 Corry notes this weakness as the lack of an analytical strategy to account for the process 
of establishing the discursive coalition (2003:88). 
28
 Perhaps this is related to what Gottweis (2006:475) calls the "deliberative reflex" of 
argumentative policy analysis. 
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Historiography to discuss how best to conceptualize the temporality of policy 
narratives. 
Gadamer describes the position in which the struggle with the concept of time has put 
philosophy in in this way:  
The perplexity in which thought has become entangled is that time appears to have 
its sole Being in the 'now' of the present, and nevertheless, it is just as clear that time, 
precisely in the 'now' of the present, is as such not present. What 'now' is, is always 
already past. It seems incomprehensible how one is supposed to comprehend what is 
past, as that which no longer is, and what is the future, as that which is not yet, in 
terms of the being of the 'now' which alone exists in such way that the whole 'is' time. 
(Gadamer 1970:341 qtd. by Petersen 2008:70). 
Two of the most influential philosophical treatments of time are developed by 
Heidegger and Ricœur: Heidegger attempts to define Being and develops a concept 
of time to serve this purpose – Ricœur attempts to define Time and develops a 
concept of narrative to serve that purpose. To assist in the discussion of these two 
philosophical landmarks, the dissertation seeks assistance from two Laclau'ian 
interlocutors: Philosopher Simon Critchley and Historian Christoffer Kølvrå, who on 
their part employ Philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas and Historian Hayden White to 
modify the inspiration they receive. To find the most apt metaphoric and strike the 
right balance between the three aspects of time – past, present, future – for an 
analysis of policy narratives, however, the dissertation turns to Historian Reinhardt 
Koselleck. The result is a concept of temporality of policy narrative which combines 
Koselleck's concepts of space of experience and horizon of expectation with Laclau's 
insistence on the primacy of politics. Finally, I rely on literary theorist when 
discussing how far to deconstruct narrative theory. 
For Heidegger  
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Time should be grasped in and of itself as the unity of the three dimensions – what 
Heidegger calls 'ecstases' – of future, past and present. This is what he calls 
'primordial' or 'original' time ... Temporality is a process with three dimensions which 
form a unity. (Critchley 2009a) 
Opposed to this attempt to grasp time phenomenologically or existentially is, in 
Heidegger, chronological or vulgar time:  
the idea of time as a uniform, linear and infinite series of 'now-points'. On this model 
... the future is the not-yet-now, the past is the no-longer-now, and the present is the 
now that flows from future to past at each passing moment. (Critchley 2009a) 
What is important to note is that true existence involves what Heidegger refers to as 
the "transcendence" (Schürmann 2008:120 quoting Heidegger 1984) of vulgar time: it 
is possible to "seize hold of the present" by performing "resoluteness"; or in other 
words: to "make a decision to take over the fact of who I am in a free action" 
(Critchley 2009a).  
Ricœur's way of dealing with the relation between chronological time and existential 
time is on one account quite different. Instead of suggesting how to leave the one sort 
of time behind in preference of the other, he suggests a third sort of time to serve as a 
bridge between the two: Historical or narrative time inscribes the experienced, 
existential time in cosmic, chronological time: Narrative time is on the one hand 
irreversible succession; on the other hand it connects distinct points-in-time. 
(Rendtdorff 2000:124). Specifically, a narrative involves – as mentioned in 
subsection 2.1.2 – the articulation of a series of events from a beginning to a 
conclusion (Ricœur 1988:41; 66). 
When focusing on the moment of articulation, the difference between Heidegger and 
Ricœur is that Ricœur sees lots of articulations: narration is near to omnipresent, 
while Heidegger discards most of these articulations as trite and vulgar and calls for 
more bold action. Nevertheless there seem to be an agreement that the only way out 
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of the perplexity on the question of time, which Gadamer pointed out, is a decision 
articulating the three aspects of time.  
This dissertation follows Ricœur in conceptualizing such an articulation as 
necessarily narrative, i.e. as a grasping together of a series of events from a beginning 
to an end which sets the stage for a cast of characters. The dissertation, however, 
takes account of Heidegger's call for bold action in the sense that the articulation may 
be more or less bold; it may promote a more or less obvious continuation of available 
narratives. 
There is, however, a more important way in which the dissertation conceptualizes 
narrative might be said to leave a Heideggerian impression: The focus of the 
dissertation is on policy narratives. Narratives may certainly be told which take place 
entirely (with both beginning and end) in the past.
29
 But it makes no sense to 
articulate a narrative entirely placed in the past as a 'policy narrative', as policy 
concerns something to be done in the future. "Policies are ... particular directions for 
action" (Hansen 2006:21 paraphrasing Shapiro 1988). Directions, notably, for action 
which has not yet taken place. This means that 'the present' needs to be situated 
among the events grasped together rather than before or after them – or in other 
words that 'the present' must be articulated as situated between the beginning and the 
end of the narrative. 
A policy narrative is necessarily – at the time of its utterance – one which places 'the 
end' of the events to be grasped together somewhere in the future. So at the time of 
utterance, a policy narrative configures the utterance – and presumptively, discourse 
– in three aspects of time: past, future, and present. And more than that: A policy 
narrative necessarily situates the agents narrated into being at a specifically crucial 
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 It might in principle be possible to tell a story which takes place entirely in the future – 
even if some (implicit) reference to a known past (which will then be placed before the 
'beginning' of the story) will be probably be necessary to make the story intelligible. 
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point between the beginning and the end: it situates the agents at a fork in the road, at 
a point where time – even if it still conceptualized as chronologically progressing – 
widens out.  
"Time ... can only be expressed in spatial metaphors" writes Koselleck (1985:273). 
But what metaphors allow for an analysis of policy narrative? The two proceeding 
subsections explain why the dissertation, when developing a concept of 'policy 
narrative' to employ in analysis turns to Koselleck to get the spatial metaphorics right. 
Koselleck arrives at his suggested metaphoric through an analysis of "the shifting 
classification of experience and expectation" throughout history (Koselleck 
1985:271). The dissertation places 'the end' somewhere in 'the future' through the 
metaphor of a 'space of experience' (section 2.1.4.1X – and it places 'the beginning' 
somewhere in 'the past' through the metaphor of a 'horizon of expectation' (section 
X2.1.4.2X). Finally, the dissertation returns to the articulatory moment of 'the present' to 
sum up the analytical implications of conceptualizing identity as structured through 
policy narratives (in sectionX2.1.4.3). 
2.1.4.1 The first aspect of time: the future visible from the present 
This subsection develops the first aspect of time – the future – to be a horizon of 
expectation articulated to be springing out of the present. A discussion of the roles of 
death, of mythical fulfillment, and of the demand for closure – all constructing 
definitive points of arrival for time in narratives – leads to a theoretical preference 
for the more indefinite 'horizon of expectation'. The proceeding subsections show 
how the relative undecidability of a horizon may be reduced by present articulations 
of the past as a space of experience.  
First: Death. "Heidegger subscribes to the ancient maxim that 'to philosophise is to 
learn how to die'. Mortality is that in relation to which we shape and fashion our 
selfhood." (Critchley 2009a) Therefore, according to Heidegger,  
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the primary phenomenon of time is the future that is revealed to me in my being-
towards-death. Heidegger makes play of the link between the future (Zukunft) and to 
come towards (zukommen). ... The human ... always projects towards the future. 
(Critchley 2009b) 
The conclusion is, in the words of Heidegger, that "[temporality temporalizes itself 
primordially out of the future] Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich ursprünglich aus der Zukunft" 
(Heidegger 1984:327 quoted in Critchley 2008:147).  
It is true that the human projects towards the future – and policy narratives do too. 
Heidegger's account, nevertheless, puts too much emphasis on the future – and 
especially one element of the future: death. It might be so that philosophy is learning 
how to die. But politics seems to me much more to be concerned with how to live on. 
Notably, as we will return to in a couple of pages: how to live on. 
Part of the reason might be that politics involve collective identity, and collective 
identities do not face death in the same way as individuals. Death, according to 
Heidegger, is "unbezüglich, gewiβ, unbestimt and unüberholbar: non-relational, 
certain, indefinite and not to be outstripped" (Critchley 2008:143 paraphrasing 
Heidegger 1984). As we shall see below, Critchley takes issue with the element of 
non-relationality. Nevertheless, 'death' for a collective identity might be indefinite 
and not to be outstripped –– but death does not appear certain for a collective identity 
in the same way as it does for a thoughtful individual. A series of scholars of 
nationalism and religion even suggest that the function of the narratives which 
constitute these phenomena is to imbue the mortal individual with a sense of 
immortality (Anderson 1991:ch.2; Smith 1991:161ff). The shift of weight away from 
certainty towards indefinity alone makes a difference for the temporal structure of 
policy narratives. 
Contrarily, for a collective identity death may be overcome by narration. And it may 
be overcome exactly by continued narration. As Campbell puts it in relation to one 
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type of collective identity: "For a state to end its practices of representation would be 
... death." (1998:12) Perhaps death is the vanishing point of narration – but in 
different ways, when it concerns individual and collective identity: "Silence is the 
impossibility of meaning and the possibility of the termination of inter-subjective 
contiguity. ... Silence=Death ... However, this silence is not the end of the story; on 
the contrary it is the beginning. Silence is a necessary condition of the act of narrative 
production" (McQuillan 2000b:27; italics added). Authentic individuals might 
narrate-towards-certain-death – collective subjectivities narrate-to-postpone-
indefinite-death. And even if silence appears to signify death, the silence of a dead 
collective might not be as irreversible as the silence of a dead individual. In that 
sense, it is necessary to allow for a more open-ended structure of temporality when 
developing an analytics to be employed on policy narratives. 
But there are other 'ends' than death. For one, there is fulfilment. Or rather; Heidegger 
sees fulfilment in death – but there are other fulfilments to approach. One is the 
realisation of ones true identity in Utopia. Laclau introduces the concept of 'myths' in 
his theoretical framework as "'spaces of representation', which are designed to make 
sense of and suture dislocations." (Howarth 2004:261) Kølvrå develops the concept 
to designate a specific form of narrative with a specific kind of end: "Political myths 
.. always involve ... an eschatological dimension, because ... they project utopia into 
the future." (Kølvrå 2009:37) Kølvrå' s Lacanian point is that fulfilment in Utopia is 
impossible – but the desire to fill the lack and reach Utopia is what drives narration.  
Agreed: The urge to reach out towards Utopia is in many cases an effective motor for 
narratives of collective identity. But is it necessarily the only one? Perhaps there are 
these overarching narratives holding each large scale collective together. But perhaps 
there are not. Perhaps there are only smaller narratives suggesting how to go on; 
leading to 'lesser' ends than death or Utopia. The smaller narratives may recur to 
grander narratives. Perhaps they have a better chance to catch on if they do so. But do 
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they always have to relate to grand narratives? Does one necessarily refer to one 
organizing suture waiting in the (impossible) end, every time one acts politically?  
Kølvrå bases his argument on White who is investigating the desire for having reality 
be endowed with a meaning, so that we may tell a story of it in which "events seem to 
tell themselves" (1980:8). He finds historiography to be "an especially good ground 
on which to consider the nature of narration and narrativity because it is here that our 
desire for the imaginary, the possible, must contest with the imperatives of the real, 
the actual." (1980:8) Kølvrå paraphrases White to the event that "the problem with 
narrating history is that history as the eternal succession of events in the world does 
not end, but narrative as a form must end – it must at some point conclude" (2009:35; 
cf. White 1980:26). And the reason is that for a narrative to work, it needs to have a 
point: "The demand for closure in the historical story is a demand ... for moral 
meaning, a demand that sequences of real events be assessed as to their significance 
as elements of a moral drama" (White 1980:24).  
I do not have any issues with this account as such; what I wish to contend concerns, 
firstly, scale, and, secondly, the problems involved in conceptualizing the future as 
part of history and the spatial metaphoric imported in this way. To specify these 
problems, we need to look closer at the argument White makes. 
To me it seems that both the problems concerning scale and the choice of spatial 
metaphoric pertains to the way in which White generalizes from history writing: As 
an introite to his focus on the role of narrative, White enumerates a series of diacritica 
of good history writing:  
by common consent, it is not enough that a historical account deal in real, rather than 
merely imaginary, events; and it is not enough that the account in its order of 
discourse represent events according to the chronological sequence in which they 
originally occurred. The events must be ... narrated as well, that is to say, revealed as 
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possessing a structure, an order of meaning, which they do not possess as mere 
sequence. (1980:9) 
More specifically, "it must honor the chronological order of the original occurrence 
of the events of which it treats as a baseline that must not be transgressed in 
classifying any given event as either a cause or an effect." (1980:9; italics added) In 
his concluding remarks, White returns from the specific analysis of history writing to 
the more general problematique of his introduction and of the title of his essay – "The 
Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality" to say that "this value attached 
to narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a desire to have real 
events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is 
and can only be imaginary." (White 1980:27; italics added) 
As indicated above, two points are to be made here: One concerning size, and one 
concerning the specificity of an end. 
Firstly, at what size may an 'end' have the critical effect of closure? Which is to say: 
At what scale does narrative kick in? Death may be a Big end suitable for a Big 
narrative of individual identity; and Utopia may be a Big end suitable for a Big 
narrative of collective identity. And ideal type Modern history writing, focusing on 
the overall political-social order (cf. White 1980:15) needs big ends to narrate big 
moral points.  
But is not every articulation of a cause to an effect a narrative – beginning with the 
cause, ending in the effect? Narratives may be found on a much smaller scale aiming 
at much smaller ends – in every utterance connecting a cause to an effect. "It may be 
useful, then to define the action of a narrative as the representation of an instance, no 
matter how small, of ... events and existents in a chain of temporal causality or at 
least contingency" (McQuillan 2000b:8 paraphrasing Seymour Chatman). Such small 
scale narratives play a central role in the interaction of identity politics, whether or 
not they add up to or articulate big narratives. 
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Secondly, even if one never knows when Death will arrive and if one knows that one 
never ever arrives in Utopia, the direction is in both cases unambiguously decided. In 
narration, according to White, one projects a line towards a single point.  
This kind of singular end is not particularly apt for an analysis designed to open up 
alternative futures.
30
 This may be achieved, contrarily, by pointing out the 
articulation of the hegemonic projection as but one among other possibilities. 
Singular projection is part of the construction of a future – but it cannot stand alone; 
it needs another metaphor to play up against. 'Horizon' is such a metaphor.  
But how are the two metaphors – projection of a point and horizon – to be combined? 
McQuillan suggest that "the subject can construct a present as a distinct ontological 
region of reality ... by placing an imaginary horizon on the boundless and differential 
syntagm of narrative" (McQuillan 2000b:20). So you have an endless line projected; 
you babble along adding events to events – and then you cut it off by 'drawing down 
the curtain' to form a horizon. The result is that the projection stops at the horizon. 
In Critchley's rendition of Heidegger, the relation is the opposite: "to understand what 
it means to be an authentic human being, then it is essential that we constantly project 
our lives onto the horizon of our death." (Critchley 2009a) In this version, the horizon 
is there – and we need to direct our story to reach it at a specific point. The story must 
be made to end at the horizon. 
Both these ways of conceptualizing a horizon, however, produce points.  
In the way Koselleck develops the spatiality of the future-as-expectations, the horizon 
is not just producing a point – it is producing a line, a line allowing for the projection 
of a series of alternative points. Koselleck's description of the aspect of the future as 
expectation begins like Heidegger's in saying that "expectation ... takes place in the 
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today; it is the future made present; it directs itself to the not-yet, to the 
nonexperienced" (1985:272). But Koselleck does not continue the list describing the 
future as the not-yet and the nonexperienced to end with the single point of Death. In 
stead the list describing the future widens out as it directs itself "to that which is to be 
revealed. Hope and fear, wishes and desires, cares and rational analysis, receptive 
display and curiosity: all enter into expectation and constitute it." (1985:272) As "that 
which has yet to be made is spread over minutes, hours, days, years, and centuries; ... 
only the individual parts are visible" (1985:272), hence  
it is more precise to make use of the metaphor of an expectational horizon ... The 
horizon is that line behind which a new space of experience will open, but which 
cannot yet be seen. The legibility of the future, despite possible prognoses, confronts 
an absolute limit, for it cannot be experienced. (1985:273) 
The absoluteness lies not in an end point of Death but in a limit of experience. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates how the first aspect time – 'the future' – may be conceptualized 
as the horizon of expectation visible from the present. 
By insisting on the future of a narrative to direct itself towards a horizon in the sense 
of a line of possibilities, weight is lifted from the shoulders of the future. The weight 
is tilted backwards; towards the past and, not least, towards the present. Death may be 
articulated – as may Utopia – but it is a possibility rather than a necessity.31 But the 
obligation to grasp the events together into a narrative comes not from Death but 
from articulation. The two remaining subsections of this section develop the spatial 
structure of the two remaining aspects of time – past and present – suitable for the 
analysis of policy narratives. 
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 In chapter 3, the dissertation returns to how necessity may be articulated in narratives 
through specific conceptualizations of the future.  
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Figure 2.3 The 1st aspect of time in policy narrative 
The future as horizon of expectation visible from the present ontology 
 
2.1.4.2 The second aspect of time: the past pointing to the present 
Just as expectations are the future made present, according to Koselleck, "experience 
is present past, whose events have been incorporated and can be remembered" 
(1985:272). Both future and past link to the present – and through the present they are 
necessarily articulated to each other:  
in the absence of experience, [expectation] is not to be had. When they are fulfilled, 
expectations that are founded upon experience may no longer involve any degree of 
surprise. Only the unexpected has the power to surprise, and this surprise involves a 
new experience. The penetration of the horizon of expectation, therefore, is creative 
of new experience. (1985:275) 
But how to conceptualize experience as one aspect of time? 
Heidegger, as described above, sees death as defining for the primacy of the future. 
Contrarily, Critchley, following Levinas, sees death as defining for the primacy of the 
past (Critchley 2008:147):  
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For Heidegger, the deaths of others are secondary to my death, which is primary. ... 
On the contrary, I think that death comes into our world through the deaths of others 
... The relation to death is not first and foremost my own fear for my own demise, but 
my sense of being undone by the experience of grief and mourning. (2009a; italics 
added) 
His conclusion is, that  
the self is not the ecstasy of a heroic leap towards authenticity energized by the 
experience of anxiety and being-towards-death. ... Rather ... the self's fundamental 
self-relation is to an unmasterable thrownness, the burden of facticity that weighs me 
down without my ever being able to fully pick it up. (2008:143)
32
 
Defining for the human Being is "its basic ontological indebtedness, its guilt ... my 
past, my personal and cultural baggage, what Heidegger calls my 'having-been-ness' 
(Gewesenheit)." (2009b) 
Critchley's analysis has consequences for the temporality of narratives of individual 
identity:  
Expressed temporally, one's self-relation is not the authentic living present of the 
moment of vision, but rather a delay with respect to oneself that is perhaps best 
expressed in the experience of fatigue or weariness. I project or throw off a 
thrownness that catches me in its throw and inverts the movement of possibility. 
(2008:143) 
The result is a primacy of the past in identity narratives: "[S]uch an inauthentic, 
relational self would be organized in relation to a past for which it is responsible, but 
which it cannot redeem" (2008:149). The past, according to Critchley – here inspired 
by Lacan – is the constitutive void of identity and all the mistakes that have come 
from trying to fill the void. And this past is basically inescapable: "a past that cannot 
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be fully made present and, which for that very reason, will not let go and cannot be 
passed over in silence." (2008:149)
33
 
So the past is explicitly awarded primacy in Critchley. A series of formulations 
("cannot fully be made present"; "cannot be passed over") explicates an impotence of 
agency in the face of the past. To me, these phrases betray the primacy of the present 
in the articulation of the past.  
Koselleck argues that when choosing metaphors to conceptualize the past, "it is more 
illuminating to speak of 'space of experience'" (Koselleck 1985:273) as "completed 
experience is united into a focus" (1985:272; italics added) and "experience based on 
the past is spatial since it is assembled into a totality, within which many layers of 
earlier times are simultaneously present, without, however, providing any indication 
of the before and after." (1985:273; italics added). The articulated structure of 
experience is a totality of simultaneously present layers of earlier times focused on 
the present.  
This resulting structure of the past is produced through a process – it is united; it is 
assembled; it is made to focus. It is articulated to point to the present. This operation 
of articulation may take place again and again – but to have effect now it needs to be 
performed now, even if only as a repetition. Figure 2.4 illustrates how the second 
aspect of time – 'the past' – may be conceptualized as the space of experience focused 
on the present. Subsection 2.1.4.3 discusses how the third aspect of time – the present 
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 Critchley insists that this inescapability of the past calls for "comic acknowledgement 
rather than tragic affirmation" (2008:142; cf. 149). Agreed; the acknowledgement of such an 
"essentially inauthentic self ... uneasy with itself ... divided against itself in the experience of 
conscience" (2008:149) does appear much more realistic and more sympathetic than the 
affirmation of Heidegger's "heroic, non-relational and constant self who achieves authentic 
wholeness through anticipatory resoluteness." (2009:149). Even more so when applied to 
collective identity: Hitler's 'heroic' leap towards self-extinction on behalf of the German 
volk in the last days of the Third Reich neither comes across as sympathetic, nor does it 
appear to have been efficient as an attempt to articulate future or identity. 
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– is the moment articulating the past as experience and the future as expectation. And 
how this articulation invariably includes an – overt or concealed – construction of 
alternative policies. The primacy of the present in the articulation of the past and the 
future means the primacy of politics. 
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Figure 2.4 The 2nd aspect of time in policy narrative 
The past as space of experience pointing to the present ontology 
 
2.1.4.3 The third aspect of time: the present articulating the past and the 
future 
The third aspect of time dissected from the utterance of a narrative is the aspect of 
'the present' articulated by the very articulation: The speech act articulates the present 
as connecting the past and the future as it (the speech act) articulates past, future and 
present.  
First, each speech act articulates 'the past' pointing to 'the present'. It does so in the 
sense that it involves an ontology; i.e. it implies a claim concerning the way the world 
is at the present moment – possibly caused by how it was in the past.  
Further, each speech act articulates 'the future' as a horizon of possibilities visible 
from the viewpoint of the present. Finally, a speech act takes the form of a narrative 
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by presenting not just a static ontology and a horizon of possibilities but also a 
projection of the past into the future, onto a specific point of the horizon. However, it 
simultaneously takes the form of a policy narrative by – implicitly or explicitly – 
presenting more possible futures distributed along the horizon. As a policy narrative 
it presents the future as a choice between at least two options: One option is presented 
as an 'oughtology'; a preferred future which is possible if 'we' act in a specific way. 
One or more different options are presented as 'oughtnotologies'; futures we should 
avoid. These oughtnotologies may include the result of an automatic extrapolation of 
the past (with no action taken) and/or the result of one or more policy alternatives. 
It is in the time of the articulation that necessity, contingency, possibility, and 
impossibility is constructed to connect a past and a series of possible futures.  
White reminds us to 
distinguish between a historical discourse that narrates, on the one side, and a discourse 
that narrativizes on the other: between a discourse that openly adopts a perspective that 
looks out on the world and reports it and a discourse that feigns to make the world speak 
of itself and speak itself as a story. (White 1980:6-7; 1987:202; cf. Gottweiss 2006:471) 
Historical and political discourses in particular are often narativizing discourses – i,e, 
discourses presenting themselves as discourses without a narrator. But no discourse 
speaks by itself. It needs to be articulated. The aim of analysis should be the 
denaturalization of narrativizing articulations. It does not suffice to philosophically 
deconstruct in the abstract the logical square of modalities opposing necessity with 
impossibility and contingency with possibility;
34
 what is needed is an analysis of the 
practical construction and implications of the narrative production of necessities, 
contingencies, possibilities, and impossibilities.  
Foucault writes on the role of genealogy in relation the present:  
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We want historians to confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound 
intentions and immutable necessities. ... [But t]he purpose of history, guided by 
genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its 
dissipation. (Foucault 1977:155; 162) 
This dissertation commits to the same ethos, but directs the attention to the 
necessities of the future. More specifically, it directs itself to the relations which are 
articulated to be necessary to support the necessities of the future. Guided by this 
commitment, the focus must be on the speech act as the site of production of the 
narrative. 
The speech act articulates the present as connecting the past and the future. It does so 
by presenting a specific combination of necessity and choice as necessary: Some 
elements of the past are projected into the future as having necessary consequences. 
Other elements are pointed out as contingent and thereby potential objects of 
intentional change; as objects ripe for policy choice. By presenting some futures as 
possible as the result of policy choices, it hides other futures as impossible – and it 
hides the choices made in constructing causes and effects and thereby deciding what 
constitutes necessities and what is open to change.  
So the dissertation accepts that a policy narrative needs a projection to the future. But 
it does not award primacy to the future, as the projection does not have in advance 
one fixed target on the horizon of expectation; it needs to be projected, to be 
articulated, to be made present. In parallel, the dissertation accepts that a policy 
narrative needs a past of sedimented baggage. But it does not award primacy to the 
past, as the past needs to be selected and grasped together; it needs to be articulated; 
it needs to be made present.  
For the purpose of analysing policy narratives, the dissertation insist on the primacy 
of politics in the sense of "taking a decision in an undecidable terrain" (Torfing 
1999:304). Policy narratives present a package deal of a distinct past and one or more 
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projected futures. The point of analysing policy narrative is to untie the package deal 
presented by the articulation. By untying the package the analyst insist on, firstly, 
keeping the horizon of the future open for the possible projections hidden by the 
selected projections; and, secondly, holding the articulator responsible for the choice 
made.  
On the one hand, like "For Heidegger, the present is not some endless series of now 
points that I watch flowing by. Rather, the present is something that I can seize hold 
of and resolutely make my own." (Critchley 2009a) So far, so good: Decisions are 
made. But on the other hand, for Heidegger the space opened is closed down again: 
"What is opened in the anticipation of the future is the fact of our having-been which 
releases itself into the present moment of action." (Critchley 2009a) And "this 
'moment of vision' [Augenblick, Øieblik] is not just any present – it is a translation of 
the Greek kairos, the right moment." (2009a)  
This means that if we follow Heidegger, there is just one true choice and no more 
analysis: "freedom consists in the affirmation of the necessity of one's mortality. It is 
only in being-towards-death that one can become the person who one truly is." 
(Critchley 2009a) As argued, the decisions narrated by collective subjectivities 
produce a different kind of truth. 
The dissertation attempts to study present politics as Kosselleck studies past 
history.F
35
F The ontology constructed should make it obvious to focus at the agents 
exactly at the point where the space of experience ends and the horizon of 
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(Koselleck 1985:270). This entanglement of past pasts and past futures is, however, exactly 
what should be disentangled by analysis. 
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expectation are opened up. Or – since this is impossible, as this present is already past 
– to fix them as responsible for the just-articulated present. 
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Figure 2.5 The 3rd aspect of time in policy narrative. 
The present as prognosis-and-policy articulating past experience as cause for future 
expectation  
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates how the third aspect of time in a policy narrative – the present – 
articulates, firstly, the past as a space of experience organized to point as a cause to 
the present ontology; secondly, the future as an implicit or explicit choice between 
specific projections onto the horizon of expectations. 
2.1.5 The structure of policy narratives and the politics of 
temporalization 
This section set out to specify the discursive structure of identity – and found it to be 
the double structure of a void and a narrative. In other words, the two first relations 
involved in an identity configuration – understood as a relation of relations – is a 
constitutive relation between identity and difference, and a narrative relation 
between identity and difference. 
Of the two, only the narrative structure of identity is accessible to analysis. Therefore, 
the section proceeded to develop a generic concept of policy narrative as its 
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operational concept of identity. Through a discussion of the concepts of narrative, 
time and policy, the section arrived at a concept of policy narrative to denote the 
articulation of a series of events – including the past as experience pointed to the 
present, and two or more alternative futures projected onto a horizon of expectation. 
The alternative futures made visible from the present included a preferred oughtology 
and one or more oughtnotologies to be avoided. And notably, in a policy narrative it 
is presented as our choice to pursue the one or the other future. The narrative relation 
between identity and difference may therefore be specified to be a policy relation. 
The first task for chapter 3 is to present a theoretical account of how such a policy 
narrative may be configured to set the scene for a cast of characters – and in that way 
relate identity to others – in more or less conflictual ways. Put more formally, the task 
for chapter 3 is to combine the discursive structure of a policy narrative (developed in 
this section) with the discursive structure of a self/other relation to produce the 
discursive structure of a self/other policy narrative.  
Furthermore, the preceding subsection concluded that when analysing a policy 
narrative, the aim must be to lay bare the articulatory operation taking place in the 
present which constructs a certain past to point to the present ontology. Foucault 
writes that "the attitude of modernity" constructs "'today' as difference in history". 
More specifically, "For the attitude of modernity, the high value of the present is 
indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it 
is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is." (1984:41) 
So by focusing on the present, the dissertation is complicit in modernity. 
But it is complicit in modernity in a specific way. Bauman suggests that  
Postmodernity is modernity coming of age: modernity looking at itself at a distance 
rather than from inside, making a full inventory of its gains and losses, 
psychoanalyzing itself, discovering the intentions it never before spelled out, finding 
them mutually cancelling and incongruous. Postmodernity is modernity coming to 
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terms with its own impossibility: a self-monitoring modernity, one that consciously 
discards what it was once unconsciously doing. (Bauman 1991:272) 
By focusing on the present and the politics of articulation, the dissertation performs 
the postmodern move of turning modernity on it self. 
This second order representation of modernity – placing primacy in the present – 
does not necessarily match the self-representations involved in Danish debates on 
Muslims. The subjects constituted by modernity refuse to take themselves serious in a 
postmodern way on a daily basis. They keep on narrating their own narration – and 
their own choices – away and thereby narrating necessity into being. This narrating of 
necessity may, however, be done in different ways. And the different ways of 
narrating necessity may have different effects when it comes to the focus of the 
dissertation: the contribution to radicalization of conflict involved in the debates.  
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Figure 2.6 Self-Other policy narrative 
Present ontology and projected 'oughtology' and 'oughtnotology' 
 
Confronted with narration of necessity, the analytical task is to 'reopen' the future by 
not accepting the projection of a single future presented by the narrative. Rather the 
analysis should lay bare how the narrative constructs the future as a choice between 
an 'oughtology' and one or more 'oughtnotologies'. Figure 2.6 illustrates how the 
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analytical task is to insist on opening up the narratives as policy narratives by 
explicating the implied alternative futures. Chapter 3 specifies this analytical task by 
discussing how necessity may be articulated by temporalizations of the narrative. 
However, before the dissertation may (in chapter 3) turn to the theoretical account of 
how an identity configuration may be structured to contribute to radicalization of 
conflict, the present chapter needs to finish its account of the ontology to be observed 
in the first place: Subsection 2.1.3 concluded, that it is the narrated self which is 
doing the narration. Section 2.2 investigates the conditions and modalities of the 
articulation of identity by discursive agency – and section 2.3 develops the concept of 
identity politics as discursive interaction to complete the dissertation's account for 
what relations are involved in an identity configuration. 
2.2 Identity as discursive agency: articulation to facilitate 
future agency 
The preceding section constructed a concept of identity as discursive structure for the 
dissertation to observe – focusing on the structure of a policy narrative. But this 
discursive structure consists (only) of the regularity determined in the dispersion of 
the discursive acts pointing out the identity. A structure consisting of discursive acts 
is only upheld as long as it is re-iterated (Butler 1997:139f). Any identity consists of 
and is reproduced as well as modified by concrete discursive acts; utterances or 
speech acts but also gesticulations, physical action, and other forms of materialized 
discourse. For sure, the concept of identity as synchronic discursive structure laid out 
above was pregnant with diachrony, with (re-)production through action.  
This section investigates the conditions and modalities of the articulation of identity 
by discursive agency. It does so to account for how the constitutive and narrative 
relations between identity and difference (laid out in section 2.1) are forged. Thereby 
it adds to the picture of relations adding up to an identity configuration – and it 
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allows chapter 3 to account theoretically for the different contributions to 
radicalization of conflict form different ways of forging 'relations between relations 
between identity and difference'. 
More specifically, the preceding section noted with Ricœur how narrated identities 
are awarded agency and takes up this agency by continuing the narration. Subsection 
2.2.1 specifies how this space for agency in structure allows not only re-production of 
the structure but involves a freedom for a subject to articulate. Subsection 2.2.2 
argues the need for agency to articulate structures in ways that facilitate future agency 
– and discusses some of the complications involved. 
Both the discussion of the space for agency in structure and the discussion of the need 
to facilitate future agency by structuring point out a need to conceptualize the identity 
politics as discursive interaction. Section 2.3 takes up this task. 
2.2.1 A space for agency in structure 
The task for this subsection is to reconstitute a space for agency in structure. The 
reconstitution follows the lines summarized by Wæver:  
On the one hand, discourse is 'prior' in the sense that subjects are not given outside 
discourse and it is only from within discourse that certain subject positions are 
opened up from which one can speak. On the other hand ... actors need to be 
conceptualised as having at least the possibility of acting strategically in relation to 
discourse (Wæver 2004:199). 
The point of departure which the dissertation takes in post-structuralism implies a 
certain structuralism: a priority of structure over agency. In political science, the 
latest serving of full-fat structuralism was the French version of Marxism struggling 
to allow for an independent role for political action in relation to ideological state 
apparatuses determined 'in the last instance' by the economy.  
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In Althusser the relation between structure and agent was described as the one-way 
relation of ideology interpellating a subject without any possibility of resistance 
(Mouffe 1997b[1980]:33; Butler 1997:24). This reduction of the subject to subject 
positions was continued in both what has later come to be taken as the early post-
structuralism of the Foucauldian archaeology of knowledge and in the first 
formulations of the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe (1985:115; Žižek 
1990a:250; cf. Laclau & Zac 1994:37). In such a structuralist perspective, change is 
hard to theorize meaningfully: Either change appear to be impossible. Or change 
appears as the result of the unfolding of a logic internal to structure à la the Hegelian 
teleological dialectics inherited by Marx (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:94f; cf. Schmandt 
1965:359f; 375f). Finally, change may appear as purely inexplicable.
36
 
To allow for change in a structuralist theoretical framework is to allow for an acting 
subject: for political articulation to occur, there need to be 'something' doing the 
articulation (Clausen et al. 2002:26f). Or as Skinner puts the same point in relation to 
speech act theory: "if we wish to do justice to those moments when a convention is 
challenged or a commonplace effectively subverted, we cannot simply dispense with 
the category of the author." (Skinner 2002:117) 
But how to avoid that this acting subject escapes structure and becomes a contrary, 
voluntary – and, hence, equally essential – principle; a total structure in its own right? 
Laclau's solution to the reduction of subjectivity to structural effect has been to 
reinstall a subject in the discursive structure – but to install it, notably, not as a 
substance with positive qualities but as a lack (Laclau & Zac 1994:31). The subject 
is, hereafter, in Laclau formally defined as the distance between the structure and the 
political decision made in undecidable terrain. The structure might be pointing out a 
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 When Neumann compares the change of discourses in Foucauldian discourse analysis 
with the slow collision of tectonic plates (Neumann 2001:85), change is conceived of 
somewhere between the inexplicable and the unfolding of an inner logic. 
91 
space of probable decisions, but it does not determine the decision. Sedimentations 
and institutions may install inertia in discourse – and hence impede certain forms of 
articulations of identity to the benefit of other articulations of identity. But even if 
some structures are hugely sedimented, in combination they still overdetermine each 
identity and prevent its closure (Torfing 1999:303). The subject is, hence, the non-
theorizable distance from the discursive structure to the actual act (Laclau 1990:30, 
60).
37
 
This mechanism is described in Lacanian terms: the lack of the subject seeks to be 
filled; the function of the subject is to hide that it exists only in and as the attempt to 
cover over its own fiction; that it exists only as specific, historical acts (Laclau & Zac 
1994:32).
38
 Laclau & Zac writes that: "The ego has the function of misrecognizing 
the impossibility of … the ego" (1994:31): The subject exists only in the 
identification with ever-changing objects, positions, identities.  
The term 'identification' is, however, reserved exclusively for the psychological 
mechanism constituting the subject (1994:31f; cf. Frello 2003:n.31). The analytical 
effect of this reservation is that the only thing of interest is the very recurrence of 
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 In Laclau & Zac (1994:12-15) the argument goes like this: Firstly, freedom needs a 
subject to use this freedom. Secondly; the subject cannot by itself determine what to use this 
freedom for – if it could decide for itself, it would imply that the subject had delimitations to 
freedom build into it, and then the subject would not be free. So the subject needs to seek its 
determination outside its freedom – but the objectivity in which the subject seeks its 
determination cannot be so objective that it determines; that would imply no freedom. The 
solution is, thirdly, that the very organisation of the decision is freedom; the objectivity 
sought to anchor the determination of the subject can only be the very possibility of a 
decision as such, as a principle. As the determination of the subject alters objectivity by its 
articulation, the freedom of the subject is not exempted. Hence, the organisation of the 
decision is neither objective nor is it subjective – it is the crystallization of the tension 
between objectivity and subjectivity which keeps freedom (and, hence, subjectivity) open. 
(Cf. Žižek 1990a:251; Butler 1997:129; Torfing 1999:150; Clausen et al. 2002:27.) 
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 Cf. Žižek (1990a:254); (Butler 1997:50), (Torfing 1999:295n.4); (Jørgensen & Phillips 
1999:55). 
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identification: At a theoretical level there is nothing consequential to be added 
concerning the specific instances of identification. And analytically, access to the 
psyche of the other remains either discursively mediated or speculative. 
Butler presents a slightly different approach to the problem of the subject; an 
approach which allow the subject to be directed beyond its own constitution.
39
 This 
'directedness' comes at a price; a price which, however, is worth paying: When re-
introducing subjectivity in structure through Lacan's notion of identification, Laclau 
carefully made sure that no trace of structure was left in the space of subjectivity. Not 
so in Butler: To her, the subject is "an inherited set of voices, an echo of others who 
speak as the 'I'." (1997:25) When viewed from the perspective of structure, the 
subject capable of acting is constituted by structure (1997:16; 27): It is constituted by 
the speech acts which precede it. As in Ricœur, the subjects take up the characters 
narrated for them and continue the narration. 
Viewed from the perspective of the subject the moment of the discursive act is 
influenced, however, not only by the past but also by the future (1997:25); by the 
expectations which other discursively constituted subjects may have towards the 
actions of the subject in question.
40
 The fact that identification takes place in a 
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 A different – more empirically based – way out of the impasse is represented by post-
colonialism (cf. chapter 3, fn.79). The mechanisms theorized by post-colonialism are 
imperative to focus on when studying extreme situations of near-total objectification – but 
of less interest when studying the agency of more privileged subjectivities.  
40
 The situation is nicely summarized by Bakhtin: "Instead of the virginal fullness of an 
inexhaustible object, the prose writer is faced with a multiplicity of routes, roads and paths 
that have been laid down in the object by social consciousness.... [T]he object is a 
condensation of heterological voices among which his own voice, without which his literary 
nuances would not be perceived, and without which they ‘do not sound’. ... The speaker 
seeks to orient his discourse, and even the horizon that has determined his discourse, in 
relation to the horizon of the other, the one who does the understanding" (Bakhtin quoted in 
Todorov 1984:72; cf. Bakhtin 1981:278ff). 
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complex game of self-presentation and recognition
41
 implies that radical autonomy is 
impossible. The subject is delimited by a constitutive outside; it needs to subject itself 
to a set of implicit and explicit norms delimiting what it may say, how it may act 
(1997:133). This process is repeatedly renewed by interpellating speech acts 
(1997:27). The subject, hence, is not the master of its own subject position; the 
speech of others is subjecting it discursively by expressing expectations. The subject 
is resurrected, but no longer sovereign (1997:139).  
The performativity – the effectiveness – of an act is not determined by the intention 
of the speaker. The subject is, when intending to act, dependent on – and, hence, 
vulnerable to – the accept of the other (Butler 1997:26).42 In other words: The others 
embody the structure which constitutes the subject when it acts.  
When theorizing agency, Butler builds on speech act theory as developed by Austin 
and Derrida. Before Austin, language was primarily discussed as referential: Words 
were seen to signify things and refer to 'actual' conditions. Austin in his intervention 
pointed to the fact that words do not only refer but also work; they do things 
(1975[1962]): Words, in a certain sense, create the 'actual' conditions, which they 
appear to signify. Hence, the label speech acts.
43
 
Austin laid out how one, when saying something, simultaneously perform a whole 
series of acts (1975:133, 146f): 
 Basically a locutionary act is performed: one says something (1975:98). 
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 As observed from diverse theoretical points of observation since Hegel (cf. Butler 
1997:26; Neumann 1999; Barth 1969:11, 13; Jenkins 2006; Jørgensen & Phillips 1999:55; 
Frello 2003b32; Laclau & Zac 1994:31f; Jacobsen 2008:13). 
42
 Cf. Hall 1(996:4); Edley (2001:192); Potter & Wetherell (2001:199). 
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 The similar and simultaneous move by Wittgenstein (1974 [1953]) seems to be made 
independently of Austin (Potter 2001). Austin noted that speech acts and (meaningful) acts 
without words seem to work in the same way (Austin 1975:121f); as a point of departure the 
dissertation does not distinguish between the two in theory. 
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 Simultaneously, the speech act may have an illocutionary force; one performs 
an act "in saying something" (1975:948). Illocutionary acts spring from "a 
certain (conventional) force" (1975:108);
44
 which is to say that when the 
discursive background structures are combined with the rhetorical structure of 
the speech act a general agreement that 'something has happened' will occur. 
 Finally, an act may have a perlocutionary effect; one may "by saying 
something" trigger an effect in the audience (1975:109; 121).Contrary to 
illocutionary acts, "perlocutionary acts are not conventional" (1975:121). Even 
if it may be difficult to distinguish act from effect in practical analysis 
(1975:111), this is the exact distinction between illocution and perlocution.
45
 
Austin enumerates a number of felicity conditions for a speech act to work (Austin 
1975:14f; Derrida 1988a; 1988b; Buzan et al. 1998:32f; Wæver 2003:14): 
 How facilitating or impeding is the discursive structure to which the speech act 
refers?
46
 
 How facilitating or impeding is the general and specific position of the 
speaker?
47
 
 How perfectly is the rhetorical figure completed?48 
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 Austin's conceptualization of the relation between convention and speech act immediately 
translates into the dissertation' conceptualization of discursive structure and discursive 
agency: For a speech act to have success a convention needs to exist for it to refer to – for 
discursive agency to be meaningful a discursive structure needs to exist for it to refer to. 
45
 To warn someone does not need to have a perlocutionary effect to be successful; the 
speech act is complete in the illocutionary act. To frighten someone, to the contrary, is only 
successful if a specific effect has been triggered in the audience by the perlocutionary act. 
46
 The declaration of a priest only works because the institution of marriage already exists. 
47
 It is only the declaration of the priest which institutes marriage. 
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In addition Austin mentions – in a separate, subjective category – two conditions 
relating to the intended and the actual following up on the speech act of the speaker: 
The speech act needs to be seriously intended (1975:9) in the sense that the speaker 
intend to behave according the speech act in the future (1975:10, 15) and – when the 
future arrives – he actually has to do so (1975:15; Potter & Wetherell 2001:200).  
Derrida, however, does away with this fourth category of felicity conditions – 
relating to the intentions of the speaker – as he claims that the absence of not only the 
audience but also of (the intentionality of) the speaker does not necessarily have any 
bearing on neither the illocutionarity nor the perlocutionarity of the speech act 
(Derrida 1988a:8; 1988b:46). 
Derrida then builds on this deconstruction of perfect intentionality to undermine the 
possibility of perfect felicity: Perfect felicity would have to build on a total 
description and total control of the context of the speech act. Total control of the 
context of the speech act includes total control of the intention and very 
consciousness of the speaker – which is, as we just saw, not possible (1988a:14). 
The fact that intentionality is present (only) as something which is impossible to 
achieve in toto – something which is endlessly deferred – is what makes the 
distinction between the different speech acts possible: "this differental/defering 
[différentielle] structure of intentionality alone can enable us to account for the 
differentiation between 'locutionary', 'illocutionary' and 'perlocutionary' values of the 
'same' marks or utterances." (Derrida 1988b:58) Specifically, the distinction between 
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 The Danish police officer needs thrice and in the name of the King and the Law to have 
declared a demonstration to be dissolved before one may be legally sanctioned for 
proceeding. 
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illocution and perlocution is a conceptualization of the speaker's lack of control over 
context (Butler 1997:15, 93).
49
 
For the purpose of reconstructing a space for agency in structure the central point is 
that if a speech act is seen as purely illocutionary, then no answer may derail it – 
answers may only seek to revert it.
50
 Contrarily, as the perlocutionary effect escapes 
the control of the speaker, a space opens up for an answer which may revise the 
effect. This space may be used to point out the responsibility of the original speaker 
for the construction of the position in which the audience is placed (Butler 1997:12). 
If there is a space for an answer, a word may be 'won over' and turned around through 
resignification; the loss of control opens the possibility of action (1997:14, 39). It 
opens not for the reinstallation of a sovereign subject, but it does open a space for 
agency in the discursive structure (1997:15). It creates a possibility for speech acts 
which were not authorized by discourse at the point of departure to take upon 
themselves authority by reconfiguring the discursive structure in which it will 
afterwards – after words – be understood (1997:145; 161). The possibility for 
resistance to discourse is established.  
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 Which means that the three remaining of felicity conditions of Austin are only relative 
conditions of possibility. It is impossible to theoretically exclude the success of even the 
most weirdly performed attempt by the most marginal actor to articulate the (within a given 
discursive context) most exotic rhetorical construct. Or contrarily: it is impossible to 
theoretically exclude the failure of the most perfectly formatted articulation by the most 
discursively privileged actor of the discursively most obvious construction. The analyst will 
after analysing the discursive situation only be able to point out the cases as probable or 
improbable (cf. Derrida 1988a:15). This seem to be the reason why Buzan et al. (1998) 
prefers 'facilitating conditions' to 'felicity conditions' when developing speech act theory for 
the purpose of studying 'securitization' as a speech act. 
50
 Even if the purely illocutionary speech act is performed collectively by author and 
audience, an illocutionary effect still establishes a fait accompli as the point of departure for 
countermoves. 
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But it is important to note how what is established is a space for resistance – not a 
space entirely free for the subject: 
Firstly, the structure is not producing a precisely delimited position for the subject – 
there is a room for subjective identification and resistance: Through discursive action 
the subject may seek to point out new or re-configured positions for itself or for 
others. The actor is never unambiguously determined in one subject position in 
relation to one regularity in the dispersion of utterances – since the social never 
coagulates into such one discursive structure (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:97ff).  
In this situation the actor will necessarily be placed in repeated ideological dilemmas 
in which the actor – to endow the situation with cohesion and meaning – needs to 
choose between different repertoires of meaning (Edley 2001:202ff). Actors may 
avail themselves of discourses as interpretative repertoires (2001:197ff); as 
"available choreographies of interpretative moves ... from which specific moves may 
be selected to fit the context most efficiently." (Jørgensen & Philips 1999:124f)
51
 
So in the place pointed out by discourse for the subject there is a repertoire of 
structures available of which the subject may avail itself and choose from – and, 
hence, reduce the insecurity stemming from the reactions of others to its actions 
(Potter & Wetherell 2001[1998]; Edley 2001; Gad 2005:90ff):  
First, discourse is manufactured out of pre-existing linguistic resources. That is, 
language and linguistic practices offer a sediment of systems of terms, narrative 
forms, metaphors and commonplaces from which a particular account can be 
assembled. Secondly such an assembly will involve choice or selection from 
possibilities. (Potter et al. 1990:207). 
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 "en tilgængelig koreografi af fortolkningsbevægelser .. hvorfra bestemte bevægelser kan 
udvælges, så de mest effektivt passer ind i konteksten" (Jørgensen & Philips 1999:124f). 
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Secondly, even if the subject does articulate one of the interpretative repertoires 
which it finds at hand, such an articulation cannot be reduced to a structural effect 
since a re-iterated speech act does not take up the same place in the structure as the 
speech act it is quoting: The very re-iteration will change the context (Derrida 
1988a:15f). The meaning and force of a speech act comes exactly from the way it is 
breaking with its conventional context and reinscribes itself in a new context (Butler 
1997:145). In the words of Bourdieu there is a social magic in the speech act which 
cannot be reduced to anything else (Butler 1997:153; Buzan et al. 1998:46, n.5; cf. 
Bourdieu 1991:111, 119f, 125). 
To sum up the dissertation's concept of subjectivity as it constructs a space for agency 
in structure: The space of the subject is not a sharply delimited or fixed position 
allowing the analyst to judge either determination or free will. The negotiation 
between structure and agency is an empirically open process (cf. Edley 2001:223f). 
On the one hand, discursive structure is not unequivocal; the room of manouevre is 
not sharply defined. The subject may – through discursive acts – seek to point out 
new or re-configured subject positions for itself or for others. On the other hand, even 
if identities are in this sense all the time articulated and re-articulated, they are never 
constructed entirely anew. To make sense, any attempt to re-construct identity need 
to refer to previous discourse in a meaningful way.  
2.2.2 The complications of structuring to re-enable agency 
Having thus established the place for a post-sovereign subject in discourse – a 
discursively constituted, discourse constituting subject – the question immediately 
arises: By what means and towards what goals does this subject act? The short 
answer is that the subject acts with and by the discursive structures by and in which it 
is constituted. Even if perfectly effective intentionality has been deconstructed, 
intentions are still there – only their effects are systematically doubtful or perverted.  
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A longer answer may specify the perversion by introducing three complications: 
Firstly, the double function of each individual act which should be meaningful in 
relation to both a specific narrative at hand and in relation to the more general 
narratives of the subject which acts. Secondly, that a speech act may simultaneously 
represent more than one subject – i.a. an individual, a political party, a nation state – 
each with their own identity narrative. Thirdly, the problems evolving from the way 
an act may be effective in relation to a specific narrative but have perverse effects on 
other more general narratives. In sum, this subsection finds that articulating the 
discursive double structure of identity – void and narrative – involves the 
complicated navigation between the Scylla of insisting on impossible, logical identity 
and the Charybdis of narrating identity away in stead of in place. 
Firstly, the very effectiveness of an act is complicated by the double function of every 
act: Basically, the immediate goal of any speech act is to continue a specific narrative 
in a meaningful way: it needs to refer to what has just happened and what should now 
be done in some specific relation. But at the same time, the more general goal of the 
speech act is to continue a more general narrative of the subject in an equally 
meaningful way. The speaker needs to perform as a reasonably consistent individual: 
s/he needs to avoid dislocations (Laclau 1990:41ff; Torfing 1999:148) of the 
narratives s/he is giving voice, i.e. s/he needs to uphold the conditions of possibility 
of the regularity in dispersion of utterances so that her/his next utterances may be 
meaningful without s/he being inconsistent. Neumann notes that discursively 
constituted and, hence, short-of-sovereign subjects act “out of intensions to position 
themselves as well as possible taking into consideration who they find themselves to 
be and what they believe they should do given that they are who they are” (Neumann 
2001:164)
52
 This includes the intentions to uphold any privileged position these 
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 "ut fra intensjoner om å posisjonere seg best mulig i forhold til hvem de holder seg for å 
være og hva de mener de bør gjøre gitt at de er de de er” (Neumann 2001:164) 
100 
subjects may have come to occupy. Any such position – including the very position 
as a speaking subject – includes reference to a certain ideal of rationality and strategic 
goal orientation. So each speech act involves both a specific rational intervention 
relating to a specific aim – and a 'meta-rational' intervention relating to the upholding 
of the position as an acceptable, rational subject. Figure 2.7 illustrates how the 
articulation of an identity narrative includes promising to articulate consistent 
narratives of the same identity in the future. 
Time narrated by actor
 
Figure 2.7 The articulation of an identity narrative promises consistent future 
narratives 
 
Secondly, a related complication is that a speech act may represent several subjects 
simultaneously: When a Danish minister speaks, her/his act must constitute a credible 
continuation of both the narrative of her/his individual subjectivity, and of the 
narrative of her/his party and the government coalition it is part of, as well as in many 
instances of the narrative of the Danish nation state. To produce rationality and 
continuity in so many subjectivities may demand a lot of discursive work – or it may 
in some cases appear attractive to say very little. 
Thirdly, a further complication is that it is not always rational arguments that work to 
continue specific narratives. To the contrary irrational, ad hoc arguments may be the 
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ones that fly.
53
 The result of these complications in combination is that there might be 
a trade-off between the short term goal of continuing a specific narrative – and the 
long term goal of re-constituting oneself in the position of a rational subject. Whether 
this trade-off is a problem, depends very much on the specific situation in which the 
actor acts – especially on whether someone systematically and explicitly points out 
specific irrationalities as a problem for the general rationality of the subject in 
question. 
Each of these three complications involves choices for the subject considering its 
next act. The problem is, firstly, that the choices are not innocent. As Butler puts it: 
“To move outside of the domain of speakability is to risk one’s status as a subject” 
(Butler 1997:133). Secondly, contexts evolve – not least since contexts include other 
subjects acting. Therefore the action of subjects always relates to the action of other 
subjects; there is no action outside interaction. The very concept of agency is social: 
it implies a plurality. If there was only one agent, that agent would equal a 
determining structure. As there is more than one agent and more than one structure, 
there is conflict and politics. And conflict and politics make context change. 
When faced with change, articulating the discursive double structure of identity – 
impossibility and narrative – involves the complicated navigation between the Scylla 
of insisting on impossible, logical identity and the Charybdis of narrating identity 
away in stead of in place. On the one hand – Scylla – a first reaction to change could 
be to point it out as a threat to identity: They change – we have to answer to that 
change – the answer makes us change ourselves – then we are no longer identical 
with our selves – we must fight change to make the threat to our identity go away. In 
this process, logical identity is reified by being pointed out as threatened. But the 
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 Cf. Potter & Wetherell 2001:199; Wetherell 1998:400; Jørgensen & Philips 1999:105-
114; Yilmaz 1997:1983-6. 
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result is not the (impossible) preservation of logical identity; rather the result is 
increased insecurity (Wæver 1994). On the other hand – Charybdis – an attempt at 
narrating a continuation of identity may be so creative and dismiss so powerful 
stretches of sedimented structures that it does not receive the accept and support it 
needs to perform narrative identity (cf. Neumann 1999:212f ; Butler 1997:162). The 
result may be that future identity and agency is denied. 
A third strategy when faced with change is to articulate the identity narrative with 
necessity – and thereby limit the space which is available for the other to co-narrate. 
Agency has to do with a will; a will to do something with and to a structure. Agency, 
in that sense, always has a direction. Structure, however, also has a direction; a will if 
you like: It harbours inertia. Structure facilitates some kinds of action and impedes 
other kinds. In that sense it directs agency. Articulation of identity – as a form of 
agency – means making a mark in structure, so that it structures in a different way. 
Identity – as a form of structure – is both the mark made and what the mark is made 
upon. Articulating an identity narrative with the necessity of sedimented structures is 
an attempt to direct the future action of both self and other. Articulating necessity to 
ones identity narrative is a way of securing ones own future agency. 
Articulating necessity may be a way of trying to avoid conflict by removing some 
elements from negotiation. If the other does not accept the necessities it is presented 
with, however, non-negotiables will invite conflict rather than defuse conflict. 
2.2.3 Identity as action inviting interaction 
The preceding section investigated the conditions and modalities of the articulation of 
identity as discursive agency. Firstly, it established a space for agency in structure by 
conceptualizing structures as limiting, enabling and incomplete. Secondly, it argued 
the need for – and the complexities involved in – agency articulating structures in 
ways that facilitate future agency. 
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In sum, a conceptualization of the articulation of identity as discursive agency was 
developed to add to the concept of identity configuration: The discursive structure of 
identity consists of a regularity in the dispersion of acts – the observable regularity 
being the form of an identity narrative. The discursive agency of articulating identity 
is conditioned (facilitated and impeded) by these discursive structures. The concept 
of identity as discursive articulation to be employed in this dissertation includes the 
rational, failed rational, as well as irrational aspects of the attempts by discursively 
constituted subjects at reconstituting and reproducing discursive structures. The 
means of articulating identity is the distribution of subjectivity by the constitution of 
new identities and by the ongoing narration of existing identity. Articulating an 
identity narrative with necessity is a way of attempting to delimit the space available 
for the other to co-narrate. 
So the actions of subjects do not take place in a vacuum. They take place in the 
context of discursive structures. These structures include the discursive actions of 
other subjects. As the concept of identity as discursive structure was pregnant with 
agency, the concept of articulation of identity as discursive agency performed by a 
post-sovereign subject is pregnant with interaction, with politics. Therefore, section 
X2.3X develops a concept of identity politics as discursive interaction. Thereby the 
section completes the account of the relations which make up an identity 
configuration; the ontology which the dissertation observes in the analytical part. 
2.3 Identity politics as discursive interaction: co-
authorship and antagonism 
So far this chapter has presented concepts of identity as discursive structure and of 
articulation of identity as discursive agency to match the two sides of the 
structure/agency dilemma: The dissertation observes identity as a discursive double 
structure – more specifically the structure of a void and the structure of a narrative. 
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And the dissertation observes articulation of identity as discursive action – more 
specifically as the attempts by discursively constituted subjects to redistribute 
subjectivity by continuing existing narratives and by beginning new ones. This 
subsection lays out how the dissertation observes identity politics as discursive 
interaction. More specifically identity politics is observed as the relations between the 
attempts by discursively constituted subjects to redistribute subjectivity.  
To account for the political relation between identity and difference – between self 
and other – subsection 2.3.1 first argues the recurrence of the political and politics in 
the articulation of identity, while subsection 2.3.2  lays out how ambiguity and 
segmentation may divert the political.  
Then subsection 2.3.3 proceeds to discuss the concept of conflict as a way of 
understanding a relation and introduces ‘policies for ending the relation’ as a criterion 
for radicalization of conflict. In that sense the criterion necessary to answer the main 
research question of the dissertation is provided. Subsection 2.3.4 considers how the 
state as an attempt to distinguish between internal and external identity politics makes 
radically different conditions for the conflicts coming out of relating identity to 
difference. 
Finally subsection 2.3.5 sums up how identity politics as discursive interaction may 
take on a structural character. Hence, section 2.4 may in conclusion sum up the 
ontology which the dissertation observes as an identity configuration consisting of a) 
the constitutive and narrative relations between identity and difference; b) the forging 
of these relations by continued narration and by the constitution of new narratives; 
and c) the political relations between the narratives promoted by various identities. 
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2.3.1 The recurrence of the political and politics when identity is 
articulated 
The proceeding section described how a discursively constituted subject will work to 
uphold its position by narrating the continuation of the narrative which covers up its 
impossibility. Given this imperative, the openness of the situation becomes a 
problem: If any articulation of identity is open to challenge by the next honourable 
speaker, the next honourable speaker needs to be narrated into place. Depending on 
what kind of place this other is awarded, very different dynamics may be set off. But 
no place precludes politics:  
 
Figure 2.8 Political relation between different narrative relations between self and 
other 
 
When identity is conceptualised as discourse we cannot but open up identity to 
politics (Connolly 1991:ix, 65). As identity is a discursive phenomenon rather than an 
essence encoded somewhere once and for all, any articulation of identity is open to 
challenge by the next honourable speaker. In that sense, the relation between identity 
and difference is irrevocably political; it involves conflict over what the constitutive 
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and narrative relations between identity and difference should be.
54
 Figure 2.8 
illustrates this political relation between the different narrative relations between self 
and other. 
When faced with challenge to an articulation of identity, one option could be an 
attempt to silence the other by exclusion: by making the other dishonourable, 
irrelevant, or awarding the other no place to legitimately speak from within discourse. 
A different option could be to incorporate the other by accommodating and offering a 
more or less attractive position in the hegemonizing discourse.
55
 Correspondingly two 
ideal types of identity policies may occur: Firstly, an articulation of identity may be 
challenged by Them not accepting the exclusion or the exact position awarded. 
Secondly, an articulation of identity may be challenged from within by 'one of Us' 
deserting to challenge 'our' identity.
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The means available for talking back to challenge the limits of the role awarded may 
radically differ for the ones initially excluded compared to the ones included, 
especially if the exclusion is sufficiently sedimented and institutionalized.
57
 In both 
cases the other may be awarded a role which allows for co-authorship to the 
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 Drawing on the distinction made by Poulantzas between 'le politique' and 'la politique' 
(Torfing 1999:76), 'the political' refers to "the dimension of antagonism ... constitutive to 
human societies" while 'politics' refers to "the set of practices and institutions through which 
an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided 
by the political." (Mouffe 2005:9). 
55
 These two options mirror the two basic forms of articulation in Laclau & Mouffe: the 
logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. Cf. subsection 2.1.3 and Laclau 1997:130f; 
Laclau & Mouffe 1985:131ff; Torfing 1999:33, 126ff. 
56
 Of course in both cases the ideal types immediately implode: In the first case if the out-of-
place other includes itself and the original, excluding subject in a comprehensive identity. In 
the second case as the deviant voice excludes itself by deviating – perhaps only to re-
include the originally including subject in a differently configured identity articulated as par 
of the deviation. 
57
 The chapter will return to this point in section 2.3.4. 
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continued narrative upholding the identity. Such a policy for legitimizing the other as 
a co-author invites politics in the form of agonism: 'I agree to disagree (seriously) 
with you' (cf. Mouffe 2005:52). And in both cases neglect of the limits to agency 
inscribed in the role awarded to the other may turn agonistic co-authorship into an 
antagonistic relation: Actions outside what is legitimated by the script threatens to 
negate the identity which was to be upheld by the narrative. Such actions need to be 
stopped to uphold the identity. 
The important thing to notice at this point, however, is that articulation of identity is a 
relation between a subject and other subjects, and not just a relation between a subject 
and an order (cf. Neumann 1999:208). This way of conceptualizing the relation 
makes the answer of the other much more flexible: a discursive structure produces 
utterances dispersed in regularity – a discursively constituted agent may produce 
irregular utterances when replying to articulations of identity. 
One comparative advantage of Laclau & Mouffean discourse theory over Foucault's 
is – as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter – that it conceptualizes discourses 
not as a sequence of monoliths but as an everpresent struggle: within any given social 
space various discourses strive to achieve hegemony by expanding the reach of each 
their ordering principle.
58
 The recurring fight between these hegemonic projects 
around the institution of a specific ordering principle is simultaneously the moment 
of the political; i.e. the repeated undermining of order – and the moment of politics; 
i.e. the repeated attempts to institute hegemony.  
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 'Any given social space' should probably read 'any given social space within the 
parameters of Modernity' – in so far as Modernity can be defined as the quest for order set 
off by the reflexivity putting an end to unproblematized Tradition. 
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2.3.2 The ambiguity and segmentation of identity diverting the political 
When subjects – each articulating their own and others' identities – are brought into 
interaction, some element of conflict is likely: Identity politics is set off by 
conflicting articulations of identity. Conflict is, however, not a necessary outcome. 
Firstly, there is the possibility that everyone agrees on both the inclusions and 
exclusions which constitutes the identities involved, on the narrative distribution of 
subjectivities, and on the continuation of the narratives. It is not very likely, but it 
remains an extreme possibility at least temporarily. Secondly, there is the possibility 
that one of a number of disagreeing subjects succeeds in promoting its version to total 
hegemony. Again, post-structuralism tells us that there is always some residual trace 
of difference left on which a counter hegemonic project may coalesce.  
Two further possibilities of how political conflict may be diverted deserve more 
attention as they each involve a break with the claims to universality implicit in 
Laclau & Mouffe's insistence of the inevitable recurrence of antagonisms: Firstly, 
articulations of identity which to the outside observer seem to be mutually exclusive 
– antagonistic – may co-exist if they are only articulated as relevant for sharply 
segmented situations of social interaction. If so, the interaction diverts from identity 
politics in the sense that logically conflicting articulations of identity may organize 
each their space without entering into social conflict. Secondly, articulations of 
identity may be so ambiguous that they may simultaneously be part of rather different 
narratives. If so, the interaction diverts – at least for a time – from identity politics in 
the sense that logically conflicting articulations of identity are co-organizing a space 
in a way which – for the time – allows the interaction to proceed without resembling 
conflict (at least over this specific articulation of identity). 
The first of the two possibilities of diverting interaction from conflict – segmentation 
– was originally pointed out by Barth (1969) as part of his theory of ethnicity as the 
social organization of cultural difference. The core of the theory is that an identity 
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boundary – and hence, the identity delimited – is only upheld by being made relevant 
as a diacriticon for relevant behaviour (1969:15). An identity can only be observed in 
its being deemed relevant for social interaction in specific situations and contexts.
59
 
When the diacriticon has no practical consequence, the identity it delimits does not 
exist. 
What is important for the present purpose is a specific anti-essentialism articulated in 
the theoretical concept of ethnicity the social organization of cultural difference – and 
by extension: identity as the social organization of difference:
60
 The very relevance of 
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 Barth's was one of the first conceptualisations of ethnicity which warrants the label 
'postmodern' (cf. Barth 1994). Contrary to existing anthropological knowledge at the time – 
which conceptualized ethnic groups as basically functionally closed cultural systems – 
Barth focused at the drawing of and the interaction across boundaries between ethnic groups 
and cultures by conceptualizing ethnicity as a way of socially organizing cultural difference 
(Verdery 1994:40-50; Vermeulen & Govers 1994:1; Neumann 1996a:142, 166; Eriksen 
1993:37ff). Ethnicity is ascribed to individuals on the basis of presumed origin according to 
specific diacritica to which the actors in a specific situation ascribes meaning. The diacritica 
does not in themselves carry any meaning – meaning is ascribed by the actors in practice: 
"The features that are taken into account are not the sum of 'objective' differences, but only 
those which the actors themselves regard as significant ... in some relationships radical 
differences are played down and denied ... The cultural features that signal the boundary 
may change" (1969:14; cf. 1969:38). Barth's new theoretical position lead him to radical 
formulations like this: "What is surprising is not the existence of some actors that fall 
between these categories [cultures]… but the fact that variations tend to cluster at all." 
(1969:29). Decades later, the conclusion in Anthropology seems to be, on the one hand, that 
identity and difference in cultural practice does not necessarily trigger ethnic identity and 
delimitation (Barth 1994:16; Eriksen 2002:4, 6) – but, on the other hand, cultural 
differences do cluster; the clusters do persist in practice over longer time spans; and thereby 
they do appear obvious to take as the point of departure for rather stable constructions of 
identity (Eriksen 2000:10, 13, 16; 2002a:4, 7ff; cf. Vermeulen & Govers 1994:1-4). Even if 
Barth (1994:179; cf. 1994:5) admits that "the selection of such diacritica is far less 
haphazard than I may have indicated in 1969", Neumann may still conclude that 
theoretically such an admission "does not of course ipso facto rule out any phenomena; 
anything may be inscribed with meaning as a politically relevant boundary marker." 
(Neumann 1999:6). 
60
 Nothing seems to hinder the generalization of the theory from ethnicity to collective 
identity in the abstract: Identity may then be defined as the social organization of difference; 
or in other words, the regularity in dispersion of social acts relating identity to dfference. 
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an identity – and of a diacriticon which is presently important for the articulation of 
this identity as disctinct from difference – may be limited to certain contexts. The 
way in which individuals – and groups – take part in a lot of more or less conflicting 
discursive universes do not necessarily amount to a smooth whole: What we have is 
not necessarily a harmonious combinatorics (Mørck 1998:80; Barth 1989:130). 
When Barth points out that "ethnic categories provide an organizational vessel that 
may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural 
systems" (1969:14) this is valid for both geographically and temporally distant and 
un-related socio-cultural systems but also for socio-cultural systems so 
geographically and temporally proximate that a group or an individual may shuttle 
back and forth between them in a single day.  
In theory, an individual or a group may change identity by practicing differently in 
relation to the identity boundary (1969:21) – provided that the alternative practice 
and, by implication the alternative identity, is accepted (1969:25). The theoretical 
demand for accept, of course, is a severely limiting criterion. But if you are really 
able to uphold two separate lives, bigamy may be an option in a monogamist society. 
Or less dramatically: If you first attend a lecture in the mosque insisting on 
abstinence and then have a raki to accompany your coffee at the café – it need not be 
a problem, unless the imam doubles as the waiter; i.e. if any social authority – 
whether embodied in others or in your mind – in effect covers both situations.  
When trying to escape the social authorities upholding identity, it does make a 
difference where they are based: If the social authority is embodied in a physical 
other, you need to escape his gaze. If you have internalized the social authority, you 
need to live with diverting from the straight path. Here again, it makes a difference 
how the social authority insisting on identity is internalized: If it is internalized as 
part of your socialization, you may still negotiate with your internalized authority. If 
it the authority demanding identity is a biologically installed essentialism, it is 
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difficult to imagine how it may be escaped.
61
 Situating the impetus for articulating 
identity not at the level of the individual psyche, but at the collective level of 
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 I refer here to the essentialism inherent in Lacan's description of the mirror stage. Lacan's 
contribution here is a rendition of how the structure of identity is biologically determined; 
how the mirror phase of early childhood invokes a lack; a sense of alienation that turns out 
to be foundational to the recurring, ever-failing attempts to articulate identity and, hence, 
fill the lack. Lacan describes how he was led to "recognize in the spatial captation 
manifested in the mirror-stage, even before the social dialectic, the effect in man of an 
organic insufficiency in his natural reality ... In man ... this relation to nature is altered by a 
certain dehiscence at the heart of the organism, a primordial Discord betrayed by the signs 
of uneasiness and motor unco-ordination of the neo-natal months. The objective notion of 
the anatomical incompleteness of the pyramidal system and likewise the presence of certain 
humoral residues of the maternal organism confirm the view I have formulated as the fact of 
a real specific prematurity of birth in man. ... This development is experienced as a temporal 
dialectic that decisively projects the formation of the individual into history. The mirror 
stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation – 
and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the 
succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body image to a form of its totality 
... and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark 
with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development." (Lacan 1977:4, italics in 
original). In the Lacanian mirror stage, the difference that makes a difference is actually not 
difference – it is the reflection of itself which the infant meets in the mirror. In that sense all 
difference is subsumed by identity (Gingrich 2004:10f) – and even if identity as the desire 
for identity is an empty identity, it is a biologically installed essence. One may with 
Neumann ask "whether scholarship which sets out to be anti-foundational, but nonetheless 
puts so much store in an arguably foundational category of desire ... can still be considered 
to be anti-foundational." (1998:14). Recent work within the Laclauian tradition generalizes 
the central role of the lack under the label "fantasmatic logics [which] contribute to our 
understanding of the resistance to change of social practices (the 'inertia' of social practices), 
but also the speed and direction of chance when it does happen (the 'vector' of political 
practices)" (Glynos & Howarth 2007:145). A need for coherence need not be implanted in 
the biological constitution of each individual. As Neumann emphatically puts it: "I do not 
share this view that humans 'need' a narrative of self for ontological reasons. My argument 
is only that given the state of discourse as it stands in Europe today ... for the time being, 
this seems to be a consequence of how discourse is formatted." (Neumann 1999:222, n.9). 
Given the present discursive constellations, there is no need for a biological essentialism to 
explain the need to appear consistent. In that sense the proclamations of Post-Modernity 
have not succeeded to move us beyond Modernity so far. Even if Shepherdson seems to 
disagree by effectively establishing a gradual transition from an early (essentialist) Lacan to 
a late (non-essentialist) (Shepherdson 2009), the motor of the perpetual motion of 
identification is in Lacan an essence universally inserted in human bodies – and not 'just', as 
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discourse – i.e. at the level of intersubjective interaction – leaves a greater room for 
ambiguity. 
This takes us to the second of the two possibilities of diverting interaction from 
conflict: Ambiguities may be permanent and functional for discourse (Frello 
2003:99ff). As Hajer puts it:  
Very often it is assumed that the meaning that the receiver 'reads' in a message is the 
same as the sender intended to put into the message. This assumption of mutual 
understanding is false. ... people talk at cross-purpose ... This is a fact of life, but, 
interestingly, this can be very functional for creating a political coalition in the form 
of a hegemonic discourse (2006:69). 
In Laclau & Mouffe a number of discursive constellations may be thought as each 
attempting to articulate an element. But each thing, event, object, subject or utterance 
is – on the premises of the theoretical apparatus of Laclau & Mouffe – either 
articulated to discourse as a moment, or it is not (wherefore it maintains the status of 
an element). The distinction between ambiguity and unambiguity, between 
unequivocality and equivocality is – when viewed from the perspective of the 
discourse – a digital one: either a moment is unequivocaly articulated or it is not 
articulated and, hence, ambiguous.
62
 
                                                                                                                                            
in Derrida, an essence inserted in the Western philosophical project which culminates in 
Modernity. When Derrida employs the Freudian concept of 'desire', it is used as "a model ... 
in order to clarify" (2001:443, n.1) the structure of (Western) thought rather than as an 
explanation of cause and effect: as, e.g., when Derrida writes that "as always coherence in 
contradiction expresses the force of a desire. The concept of centered structure is in fact the 
concept of a play ... constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring 
certitude, which itself is beyond the reach of play. And on the basis of this certitude anxiety 
can be mastered" (2001:352). 
62
 The theory of Laclau & Mouffe does include the concept of 'floating signifiers' – at a 
prominent place, even – denoting elements whose signification and fixation is the object of 
struggle between opposing discourses. But in Laclau & Mouffe the struggle which makes 
the signifier floating demands that the content of the signifier is fixed as far as each of the 
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Theoretically it is important to open up for the possibility that discourses struggle to 
'monopolize' an element without fixating it substantially – and even that such a 
monopolization-as-ambiguous rather than fixed may be functional for the 
hegemonizing discourse (Frello 2003:99ff; Gad 2005:58ff).
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So even if conflict between articulations of identity – i.e. identity politics – is an ever 
present possibility, it is not a necessity. Apart from the extreme situation of total 
hegemony, conflicting articulations of identity may be spatially or temporally 
segmented – or they may be sufficiently ambiguously articulated – in ways that divert 
identity politics. 
2.3.3 Conflict as a relation – radicalization as aiming to end the relation 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the ontological point of departure for this 
dissertation is that there is difference. Therefore there are differences. And therefore 
there is conflict. Subsection 2.3.1 explained the recurrence of the political and, hence, 
of politics whenever identity is articulated. In that sense, the relation between identity 
and difference is irrevocably political; it involves conflict over what the constitutive 
and narrative relations between identity and difference should be. Even if specific 
conflicts may (as discussed in subsection 2.3.2) be diverted, "conflict conceived of as 
                                                                                                                                            
struggling discourses concerns (Frello 2003:82). The thrust of Laclau & Mouffe's theory is 
that discourses strive towards hegemony – just as the subject as a lack strives towards 
articulating identity by identifying. For a theory of hegemonization – as Laclau & Mouffe's 
– the theoretically important distinction is the one between fixation and floating, not the one 
between floating and appearing at random. There is no room for ambiguous articulation to 
discourse – without, that is, the ambiguity becoming an existential threat to the discourse 
(Frello 2003:73f; Gad 2005:58ff).  
63
 The same point is implicit in the consequence McQuillan draws of deconstruction for 
narrative theory: "For a narrative-mark to be able 'to tell' anything at all it must be able to 
tell different, or even contradictory, 'stories' when it is part of another context." (McQuillan 
2000b:11). 
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incompatibility will not be eliminated, and … it cannot be eliminated" (Galtung 
1978:491). 
The aim of this subsection is to add to the picture of an identity configuration by 
specifying this political relation between identity and difference. As the definition of 
an identity configuration is 'the relations between relations', the two following 
subsections complete the picture by specifying the relations between, on the one 
hand, the political relation and, on the other hand, the constitutive and narrative 
relations between identity and difference. 
This subsection specifies the political relation between identity and difference by 
translating Galtung's model of a conflict triangle into the epistemological and 
ontological framework of the dissertation. Reworked, Galtung's model of conflict 
may contribute to the delimitation of 'agonistic' policies for relating to the other from 
'antagonistic' policies. Thereby the subsection provides a criterion necessary to 
observe 'radicalization' of conflict. 
Galtung distinguishes between three corners in a conflict triangle to facilitate analysis 
of "patterns of mutual reinforcement or escalation in conflicts" (1978:487) and find 
"cues to how conflict can be managed" (1978:489). The three corners are: 
 C) 'conflict' as such, formally defined as "incompatibility between goal states, or 
values held by actors in a social structure" (1978:486; all italics in original);  
 A) 'conflict attitudes' and  
 B) 'conflict behavior' (1978:487). 
The triangle is reproduced in figure 2.9 The point is that each of the three may lead to 
the other – and that an "escalating spiral" may ensue, when conflicting behaviour 
based on conflictual attitudes (or vice versa) to the 'original' incompatibility lead to 
new incompatibilities distinct from the 'original' one (1978:487-8). 
The distinction allows Galtung to relieve the conflict as such (incompatibility) of 
both negative normative judgment and strategic salience:  
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One may say that incompatibility is something abstract, although it is concrete in the 
sense of leading to frustration, and that attitude may be destructive, but it is not too 
dangerous (to the extent that it can be contained within the system). But that 
destructive behavior can be brought out into the open and leads to, potentially, the 
most disastrous consequences. (Galtung 1978:488). 
So incompatibility is neither good nor bad – it is a necessary condition. Accept of 
conflict understood as incompatibility, however, "does not mean that one has to 
accept negative, destructive conflict attitudes and behaviour" (1978:490). What may 
be good or bad in effect are attitudes and behaviour. 
Conflict as 
incompatibility
Attitudes Behavior
 
Figure 2.9 Galting's conflict triangle 
 
As the consequences of the triangle of conflict, attitudes and behaviour is potentially 
disastrous,  
it is obvious that something has to be done about conflict and there is no social 
system in the world that does not try to do something. In general we shall refer to all 
such efforts as conflict management. (Galtung 1978:488).  
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Two types of management have different ambitions: "conflict control" aims at 
controlling attitudes and behaviour – while "conflict resolution" aims at "resolving 
the incompatibility underlying the conflict, or defining the conflict" (1978:489). 
Taking his point of departure in the distinction between conflict control and conflict 
resolution, Galtung issues a double warning. Initially, he observes "in our culture, and 
perhaps in most cultures" (1978:484) a widespread agreement that "conflict is bad. … 
Conflicts are there to be done away with" (1978:484f; italics in original). Because of 
this agreement, Galtung warns, firstly, that there is generally too much focus on 
conflict resolution compared to conflict control; and secondly, that the means of 
conflict resolution chosen are often the most destructive:  
One way [of doing away with conflict] is to do away with the antagonist … The 
more vulgar method is to eliminate him physically, for instance by defining him as 
inferior, sub-human, as a threat to the social order, as a class enemy, etc., so that he 
can be segregated away, isolated or even exterminated. Then there is the more 
refined 'democratic' way: by permitting him to organize himself … but at the same 
time relegating him to a constant minority position so that he is eliminated culturally 
by being outvoted. (1978:485). 
Two less immediately destructive versions of conflict resolution, however, "do not 
presuppose any kind of elimination of the antagonist" (1978:485): systems of conflict 
resolution and dissolution of conflicts. In the first version, "the antagonist is worked 
into a system of conflict resolution" (1978:485). The second version consists in the 
possibility of "dissolving conflicts" which "is often done by means of a complete 
restructuring of the situation." (1978:503) 
As a final option remains "a positive view of conflict" implying that one should see 
the "incompatibility of goal states as a tremendous challenge both intellectually and 
emotionally" rather than something to be done away with (1978:490). The challenge 
117 
would consist in separating the conflict as such from destructive attitudes and 
behaviour.  
If the relation is conflictual, yet accepted as not necessarily in need of termination, 
we may speak of it as an agonistic relation:  
Conflict, in order to be accepted as legitimate, needs to take a form that does not 
destroy the political association. This means that some kind of common bond must 
exist between the parties in conflict, so that they will not treat their opponents as 
enemies to be eradicated, seeing their demands as illegitimate … If we want to 
acknowledge on one side the permanence of the antagonistic dimension of the 
conflict, while on the other side allowing for the possibility of its 'taming', we need to 
envisage … the type of relation which I have proposed to call 'agonism'. (Mouffe 
2005:20) 
Galtung's ontology need, however, to be revisited critically to make it compatible 
with the dissertation: Firstly, the behavioralist/psychologist metaphorics needs to be 
translated into the dissertation's focus on discourse.
64
 In consequence, the sharp 
division between conflict control and conflict resolution need to be relaxed to fit the 
focus of the dissertation on policy narratives projecting futures.
65
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 Galtung's early writings have been characterized as 'psychologically reductionist 
behaviorism' (Jenkins qtd. in Lawler 1995:110n.8). The paper discussed here originally 
dates from 1968. 
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 To prepare the formal grounds for the translation, a relational concept of identity needs to 
be teased out of Galtung's social constructivism: On the one hand, the concept of identity 
implied in Galtung's concept of conflict is not relational; self and other are two self-
sufficient entities each constituted in their own right before entering into the relation. Each 
might be bothered by the other; each might be dependent on the other. But the identities are 
not defined by the relation. On the other hand, however, it is clear that in Galtung each 
identity – self and other – may change, evolve, learn from the conflict. In that sense, the 
identity entering into the relation is not identical with the identity coming out of the other 
end of the relation. The identity is changed by the relation whether the process has been one 
of protracted or escalating conflict, one of elimination, one of domestication through 
systems of conflict resolution, or one of dissolution via restructuring: if the process changes 
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Concerning the translation of the ABC-triangle into the ontology of the dissertation: 
Firstly, the basic idea of 'conflict' as 'incompatibility between goal states'
66
 makes 
sense as a prognosis of future identity political interaction: two narratives advocating 
incompatible future self/other relations equal conflict. Conflict concerns preferred 
futures and futures to be avoided. Or in the vocabulary developed in subsection 2.1.4: 
conflict is a situation in which the oughtology of the self equals an oughtnotology of 
the other and vice versa. Conflict is the two mutually cancelling futures made present 
– in analysis or in the narratives analysed.67 This situation is illustrated in figure 2.10: 
The oughtology of one actor is to be cancelled by the oughtnotology of another actor.  
Secondly, 'attitudes' has too psychological connotations. But its place in the triangle 
may be taken by 'policies for the self/other relation' as part of the discursive structure 
of identity: As a structure, policy has the same connotations of latent directedness as 
attitude; a policy – like an attitude – is something waiting to be realized. But as 
discursive structure rather than mental structure it exists only in its articulation; it is 
in a sense less latent – it only exists as it is articulated. Thirdly, 'behavior' translates to 
the discursive agency of articulating identity: the 'articulation of a policy' takes the 
place of 'acting out an attitude' (1978:488). In that way the positive choice of an actor 
to articulate a discursive structure takes the place of a relief from controlling a 
compulsive urge. 
                                                                                                                                            
the values, the value prioritization, or the realization of the values which forms part of the 
identity – then the identity is changed by the relation. Or in the vocabulary of the 
dissertation: if the process changes the narratives which are told to support the self – then 
the identity is changed by the relation. Which means that the identity is relational. Which 
means that it can only be analyzed as relational. 
66
 The alternative incompatibility mentioned by Galtung as part of his definition of conflict 
– that of 'values' – may be subsumed under the incompatibility of 'goal states' since it is only 
in the attempt at realization of the values that they conflict; and such a realization may 
credibly be conceptualized as a 'goal state' 
67
 In chapter 3 the dissertation returns to what differences it may make if parties to the 
conflict are aware of the conflict. 
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Figure 2.10 Conflicting policies for future self/other interaction 
 
Concerning the sharp distinction between conflict control (i.e. controlling attitude and 
behaviour) and conflict resolution (i.e. resolving or dissolving incompatibility): What 
Galtung describes as 'ways' of 'doing away with conflict' – whether by 'doing away 
with the other' or by 'restructuring the situation' – are clearly policies for future 
self/other relations. The brutal end of the spectrum leaves no place for a future 
agency of the other – contrarily the benign end of the spectrum includes a future role 
for the other. In the framework of the dissertation, however, the incompatibility only 
comes with policies for future interaction: Conflict is the incompatibility of futures – 
and these futures are only known by being projected in the form of policy narratives. 
Furthermore, the narratives and policies which constitute the incompatibility only do 
so by being articulated; in instances of agency. What is in Galtung's language labelled 
'attitudes' may for the dissertation only be observed in 'behavior'.  
When incompatibility only comes with the combination of policies which only exist 
in their articulation, conflict control and conflict resolution cannot be sharply 
distinguished. Galtung can only distinguish by reverting attitudes to the mental 
systems, behaviour to social systems, and conflict to the philosophical system of 
logics. In the ontology of the dissertation, the articulation of identity (as discursive 
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agency), the policies (as discursive structure), and conflict (as discursive interaction 
of policies) appear analytically from the same material only approached with 
different analytical lenses. In Galtung's optics the three corners of the triangle ought 
to be separated analytically and in practice. In the optics of the dissertation, they 
cannot.  
Figure 2.11 sums up the translated ABC-triangle which should serve as a model for 
the analysis of feed backs between the three corners: Conflict defined as narratives 
projecting incompatible future self/other relations. Policies for self/other relations as 
structures of identity discourse. The articulation of policies as discursive agency. 
Self/Other Policies
Conflict as 
incompatible
futures
Articulations
SELF
OTHER
 
Figure 2.11 Relational conflict triangle 
Galtung's incompatibility specified as incompatible future self/other relations; attitude 
replaced by policy for future self/other relations; behavior replaced by articulation of 
policies. Triangle doubled to stress relationality. 
 
Galtung's conflict triangle helps – in the reworked version – specifying how the 
relation between self and other is political: The relation between self and other – 
constituted as distinct and each narratively endowed with a capacity for co-
authorship of the continuation of the narrative – is political as they project 
incompatible futures for the relations as part of their policy narratives. 
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Furthermore, the revised definition of conflict may help specify when a political 
relation is agonistic rather than antagonistic. For a relation to be agonistic means that 
the relation is accepted as a political association: This is to say that the relation, on 
the one hand, is political in the sense that self and other are related by projecting 
incompatible futures for the relation. But on the other hand, that the relation is 
simultaneously an association; something common with some sort of common 
purpose (even if only the purpose of managing itself as a relation). Radicalization of a 
conflict may, then, be specified as the articulation of a policy projecting a future 
without the relation. De-radicalization, contrarily, is the articulation of accept of the 
existence of the conflictual relation as not necessarily in need of termination.
 
Chapter 
3 develops this distinction through the juxtaposition of grammatical and anti-
grammatical policies for future self/other relations. 
2.3.4 Internal and external identity politics: The nation state 
Before proceeding to explore the possible dynamic relations in the form of spill overs 
and feed backs between the three corners of the reworked conflict triangle – identity 
politics, identity as structure, identity as agency – the chapter needs to specify the 
units acceptable as self and other. The discussion takes as its point of departure the 
concept of unit implied in Galtung's distinction between intra- and interactor conflicts 
– and arrives at a specification of the difference the state makes as an attempt to 
delimit internal identity politics from external identity politics. 
Galtung's distinguished (1978:486f) between intra-actor conflicts (hinging on the 
making of a choice to end a dilemma involving the realization of two incompatible 
values) and inter-actor conflicts (hinging on the control or resolution of an 
incompatibility of goal states). When analysing conflicts as involving questions of 
identity, the formulation of this distinction is, however, obfuscating.
 
 
The obfuscation is tied to the last part of the definition of conflict, which was not 
explicitly discussed in subsection 2.3.3: Conflict, in Galtung’s definition, is 
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"incompatibility between goal states, or values held by actors in a social structure" 
(1978:486; all italics in original). It is, however, not just so that "the conflict ... 
reproduces conflictual social identities" (Wæver 2009:5 representing Galtung). Most 
conflicts are (also) conflicts over which identities should be in conflict. 
To the dissertation, the relevant social structure in which the actors are situated is the 
relation between self and other. As discussed (in section 2.1) the other not only 
constitutes identity by being excluded as different; they also co-star the narratives 
explaining the relation between identity and difference. And – more pertinently – as 
co-stars they are endowed with a capability of agency: They co-narrate the story. This 
means that self and other constitute the social system of the relation which is the 
conflict – and simultaneously constitute themselves as identities in that relation. 
Conceived in this way there is a theoretical place for conflict over who gets to be an 
actor in the social system; i.e. an actor in the conflict.
68
 
As Galtung – writing in the heyday of the naturalized nation state (the 1978 paper 
originates in 1968) – moves from definition to prognosis, he sees this problematique 
– the conflict over who gets to be in conflict – as a "dislocation of classical loyalty 
patterns”. This dislocation occurs as the nation state with its "clear lines of 
identification" must co-exist with various types of non-national identifications (i.a. 
the ones following migration) (1978:492). Galtung foresees that the co-existence 
types of identifications will lead to "less clear ways of structuring large-scale 
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 In that sense the dissertation proposes as its analytical grasp on conflict what Galtung 
proposes as a normative approach when he advocates as part of a 'positive view of conflict' 
that "far from separating two parties, a conflict should unite them, precisely because they 
have their incompatibility in common. The incompatibility should be seen as a visible or 
invisible bond tying them together, coupling them to each other because their fates are 
coupled." (Galtung 1978:490). 
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conflicts" (1978:492-3).
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 Galtung probably overstates the historical success of the 
nation state in actually monopolizing identification – but he is precise in his pointing 
to the conflict potential in a claim to monopoly on legitimate identification that does 
not succeed (whether it ever did or not). It is, nevertheless, fair to say that empirically 
the nation state has been a relatively successful attempt at such a fixation.  
The nation state's tendential monopoly of identification appears most full blown 
when observed a) in Europe and b) from the 'outside' perspective of the international 
state system: "In some periods one type of political unit dominated, at others different 
kinds coexisted [but f]or a time (the seventeenth to twentieth centuries), politics 
converged on the sovereign 'nation state' as the form" (Buzan et al. 1998:143). In this 
'high modernity' of the nation states, "the principle of identity ... was pursued within 
states. International politics became the ... realm of difference itself." (Walker 1993 
qtd. by Neumann 1999:223) In these conditions "The passage from difference to 
identity as marked by the rite of citizenship is concerned with the elimination of that 
which is alien, foreign, and perceived as a threat to a secure state." (Campbell 
1992:36) In the event of new actors making their way into conflict, in each realm it 
was clear who were the relevant actors to be in conflict with; and it was clear that it 
was the members of this "circle of recognition" one should engage to fight ones way 
into the circle (Ringmar 1996:164f; cf. Neumann 1999:223). 
Also from the inside, however, nation states present themselves as the obvious 
distinction between internal and external identity politics: One of the most significant 
political effects of the widespread perception of the foundational character of political 
communities construed as national is the tendency to imbue the nation-states built 
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 It is these conflicts over the relevance of identities which Smith studies as conflicts 
between narratives of political peoplehood (2003:19-22) and which Sonnichsen 
conceptualizes as hegemonic struggles between discourses of 'primary political community' 
(2009). 
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upon them with high degrees of seemingly obvious legitimacy. Nation-states (as 
institutions) are experienced as infrastructures representing the organic social base 
existing before them and built to express them. This gives the nation-state the task of 
articulating the identity and interests of the nation including the task of safeguarding 
its sovereignty as a condition for its autonomous development. In this way the nation 
(as social base) and the nation-state (as institution) have – especially in Europe – 
become cognitively inseparable (Sonnichsen & Gad 2008:8). 
Bech Dyrberg & Torfing argues that  
The special quality of political institutions is that they operate on the basis of the 
necessary fiction of society as a totality, and that it is towards this imaginary totality 
which political strategies aim when striving to speak 'in the name of society' 
(1995:123 paraphrasing Easton 1965:54; trl. by upg). 
Hence, national political institutions – in the Eastonian sense: a functionally 
differentiated subsystem of society responsible for the authoritative allocation of 
value – produces a set of discursively privileged positions which may be utilized in 
hegemonic struggles (1995:127f). 
The nation state as a discursive structure produces, first and basically, privileged 
positions for the included to participate in identity politics from, and – corresponding 
– relatively de-privileged positions for the excluded to participate in identity politics 
from. Secondly, the nation state as a discursive structure points out – within its 
already privileged inside – a privileged text producing centre.70 
                                           
70
 The analytical implications of both these stratifications in relation to the focus of the 
dissertation are discussed in chapter 4. 
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2.3.5 Identity configuration: identity politics as interaction generating 
structure 
Section 2.1 presented a constitutive and a narrative relation between self and other. 
Section 2.2 described how these relations are articulated by identities narratively 
endowed with agency. This section has specified the relations between the 
constitutive and narrative relations as they are articulated by different identities. In 
this sense identity politics is observed as the relations between the attempts by 
discursively constituted subjects to redistribute subjectivity.  
Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 found that these relations were political – yet politics 
could be diverted by segmentation and ambiguity. Subsection 2.3.3 defined 
radicalization of a conflictual relation as marked by the articulation of a policy 
projecting a future without the relation; without the other. De-radicalization, 
contrarily, was defined as the articulation of accept of the existence of the conflictual 
relation as not necessarily in need of termination. Subsection 2.3.4 found the nation 
state to be a historically important attempt to distinguish between internal and 
external identity politics which produces privileged – and de-privileged – positions 
for relating identity to difference.  
On the one hand, identity politics is process: Conceptualizing the articulation of 
identity in the context of interaction between subjects rather than as a relation 
between a subject and an order makes for flexibility in the answer of the other to the 
articulations of identity attempted by the subject. The flexibility, of course, is 
mirrored in the retort of the subject to the response of the other. When combining, the 
flexibility of the subjects makes for distinct dynamics of interaction – i.e. dynamics 
of identity politics. 
On the other hand, these processes may acquire their own 'static' structural character: 
The processes may become structures in the sense that they may 'lock' the interacting 
actors in a repeated pattern of action. Furthermore these structures of interaction may 
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take on a recognizable direction. The structures of interaction may be structured as a 
radicalization of conflict or as a de-radicalization: As discursive structure is nothing 
but the regularity in dispersion of acts, interactional dynamics feed back into the 
constitutive and narrative structures of identity. In that sense, one may observe "the 
conflict as self-reproducing social pattern…. how the conflict sustains itself ... how 
the conflict has become a ‘form of life’." (Wæver 2009:5 paraphrasing Galtung)  
Time co-narrated by actors
 
Figure 2.12 Feed backs from identity politics to identity narratives and articulations of 
identity 
 
Figure 2.12 illustrates how identity politics consist in the ‘spill overs’ from the 
articulation of identity and the structures of identity articulated – and, conversely, 
how identity politics may feed back to the articulation of identity and the structures of 
identity articulated. It is these spill overs and feed backs – these relations between 
relations between self and other – which the dissertation observes as identity 
configurations.
71
 The task of chapter 3 is to present a theoretical account of how the 
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 Buzan et al. (1998) introduces the concept of 'constellation of securitizations' inspired by 
Elias’ concept of configurations (or rather ‘figurations’): “The networks of 
interdependencies among human beings is what binds them together. Such 
interdependencies are the nexus of what is here called the figuration, a structure of mutually 
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identity configuration may be structured – i.e. how these spill overs and feed backs 
may contribute – to contribute to radicalization of conflict. 
2.4 The triple function of the other in identity politics: 
constitutive outside, character of the cast and 
counterpart 
This chapter has laid out the ontology which the dissertation observes. It did so by 
developing concepts of identity as discursive structure, articulation of identity as 
discursive agency, and identity politics as discursive interaction and relating these 
three concepts to form an identity configuration. An identity configuration includes 
the relations between the three ways in which identity is related to others: a 
constitutive relation, a policy relation, and a political relation: 
Firstly, the difference of the other is constitutive to identity: If there was no exclusion 
of difference, identity would be meaningless as a concept. The difference of the other 
serves as the constitutive outside of identity. By being excluded yet necessary for 
identity to be, the other threatens to reveal the contingency of identity. So an identity 
configuration involves a constitutive relation between self and other. 
Secondly, the identity and the exclusion need to be explained and protected – and the 
explanations have a narrative form. You cannot tell stories about who you are 
yourself only; you need a cast of characters to play each their assigned role. 
Therefore the other – or rather; various others – will be asked to take up positions or 
                                                                                                                                            
orientated and dependent people. Since people are more or less dependent on each other ... 
they exist ... only as pluralities, only in figurations.” (2000[1968]:481-2). Buzan et al. 
describes how "it is not the units themselves in a static way that make up the whole; it is the 
way their movements, actions, and policies relate to each other that forms a truly political 
pattern at the level of relations of relations" (1998:191, n.3); i.e. the constellation is found at 
the level of interactions of interactions. 
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roles in the narrative attempts to uphold identity. So on top of the constitutive 
relation, an identity configuration involves a narrative relation between self and other. 
Thirdly, these varying others pointed out to co-star the identity stories will be 
narratively endowed with varying capacities to co-author or negotiate the 
continuation of the constitutive narratives: If you allow the other agency, you loose 
control. And you inevitably do, as even mis-recognition may serve as a platform for 
agency. The co-authoring other turns into a counterpart in conflict if the policy which 
it narrates points to a future mutually exclusive with the one you envision. So an 
identity configuration involves a political relation between self and other. 
In that sense, identity is a discursive structure that in itself carries the constitution of 
an other – not only structurally undermining the security of identity by presenting an 
alternative – but also engaging actively with the identity by influencing the 
continuation of the narrative. Any invocation of identity runs the risk of the sorcerer's 
apprentice: You delimit your identity – and thereby delimit an other into being. You 
tell the story of how this delimitation of identity is – and in the cast of that story the 
other is awarded a role. To get the story going, you need the other to act according to 
the script – and thereby you award the other an agency which may be used as a 
platform for talking back and change the story. 
The political relation between self and other may be agonistic if it accepts that these 
incompatible futures need to co-exist. But the conflict may radicalize into an 
antagonistic relation if a narrative concludes with a need to terminate the relation to 
secure the preferred future. Chapter 3 accounts theoretically for how an identity 
configuration may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict. More 
specifically, it accounts, firstly, for how three ‘grammars’ for future interaction 
between self and other may combine to delimit agonistic policy narratives from 
antagonistic ones; secondly, for how narratives may be articulated with necessity; 
thirdly, various policy narratives serve as radically different invitations to the other to 
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partake in the continued narration of the relation; and finally, how some of these 
policy narratives are more prone than others to be provoked by counter-narratives fed 
back to them. 
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3 The radicalization of identity politics: Grammars for 
interaction, necessity, spill over and feed backs 
Chapter 2 established the overall ontology of the dissertation as it described how an 
identity configuration involves three relations between identity and the difference of 
the other: A constitutive relation excluded the difference of the other from the 
identity of the self. A narrative relation explained the difference of the other into 
place – and, in the course of this narration, invited the other to take up a role in the 
narrative. Finally, a political relation engaged the other – narratively endowed with a 
capability for agency – in the narration of the continuation of the narrative of the 
relation between self and other. This political relation, chapter 2 argued, is 
necessarily conflictual. The conflict may, however, radicalize into an antagonistic 
relation if the narrative promoted concludes with a need to terminate the relation to 
secure the preferred future. 
The task for this chapter is to theoretically account for what the dissertation may 
analytically find when observing the world of relations and dynamics established (in 
chapter 2) with a view to cast light on the possible contributions to radicalization. 
More specifically, the chapter asks: 
B. What structures, articulations and dynamics in an identity configuration 
contribute to a radicalization of conflict? 
The chapter answers this question by developing a theoretical account of how the 
structures and articulations of specific policies for how to relate to the other – and the 
relations between these structures and articulations – may contribute to a 
radicalization of conflict between self and other. This entails revisiting the elements 
of the ontology laid out in chapter 2 focusing on the elements which may be 
structured to contribute to radicalization. 
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Section 3.1 tends to the contribution to radicalization of conflict from identity as a 
discursive structure – more specifically, to the discursive structure of a self/other 
policy narrative. It asks: 
i. How may a self/other policy narrative be structured to contribute to radicalization 
of conflict? 
The section develops a typology of self/other policies on the basis of three basic 
'grammars' of identity/alterity. The grammars are basic ways in which one may relate 
self and other: a first grammar consists in distinguishing self from other; a second 
grammar consists in acting on behalf of the other; while a third grammar consists in 
producing knowledge of the self/other relation. In combination, the three grammars 
delimit a realm of policies which allow future interaction between two distinct 
entities – and three distinct ways in which the future envisioned may not include a 
relation between self and other. Furthermore, the section recollects how self/other 
policy narratives may be legitimized and necessitated by relating self and other along 
parameters of spatiality, temporality and intentionality. 
Section 3.2 tends to the contribution to radicalization of conflict from the articulation 
of identity by asking: 
ii. How may identity be articulated to necessity to contribute to radicalization of 
conflict? 
More specifically, the section discusses how necessity may be installed in self/other 
narratives either by the articulation of certain temporalities or by the articulation of 
sedimented structures including materiality. 
Section 3.3 tends to the contribution to radicalization of conflict from irreducibly 
interactional dynamics. It does so by asking:  
iii. How may dynamics in identity politics be structured to contribute to radicalization 
of conflict? 
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More specifically, the section explains how different self/other policy narratives may 
serve as radically different invitations to the other to partake in the continued 
narration of the relation. Special attention is given, firstly, to how self/other policies 
may interpellate grammatically or anti-grammatically; and secondly, to how 
narratives may be told in a way which make them particularly sensitive to counter-
narratives feeding back. In both cases, the result may be radicalized conflict. 
Section 3.4 recapitulates the theoretical account of what structures should be kept in 
focus when setting out to analyse what may lead to radicalization of conflict. Chapter 
4 accounts for the specific analytical choices, strategies and tools employed in the 
analysis of Danish debates on Muslims.  
3.1 Structures of identity radicalizing conflict: Self/other 
policy narratives as grammars for interaction 
Chapter 2 discussed the specific structure of temporality in a policy narrative. On the 
one hand, the discussion found that a policy narrative articulated a past as pointing to 
a present and a future. On the other hand, a policy narrative explicitly includes a 
choice between a plurality of futures. The conclusion was that analysis of policy 
narratives must focus on the present articulation of the past and the future and 
thereby open up for more futures. This section combines the discursive structure of a 
policy narrative with the discursive structure of a self/other relation – resulting in a 
discursive structure of a self/other policy narrative. To contribute to the theoretical 
account of how an identity configuration may be structured to contribute to 
radicalization of conflict, the section may then ask 
i. How may a self/other policy narrative be structured to contribute to radicalization 
of conflict? 
When aiming to account for the contribution to radicalization of conflict from the 
discursive structure of a self/other policy narrative, the structure of the relation 
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between self and other needs to be conceptualized to serve this aim. This entails that 
even when developing the concept of narrative as part of the concept of identity as 
discursive structure, the individual utterance of a narrative should not only be 
observed as a structural snapshot. The snapshot needs to be focused in a way which 
facilitates an analysis of how the structure works as an invitation to the other to take 
part in the ongoing co-narration. This means that the place of the other needs to be in 
focus: The relation between self and other needs to be central to the analysis and the 
other needs analytically to be awarded not just a position in a web of identities but a 
role – including agency – in a cast of characters co-narrating the story.  
Subsection 3.1.1 discusses the structure of the self/other relations at heart of the 
debates to be analysed. The subsection reviews conceptualizations of self/other 
relations in IR theory, and finds the conceptualization of the self/other relation 
lacking with regard to the political relation between self and other. Therefore 
subsection 3.1.2 suggests – following inspiration from philosophically inclined 
Anthropology – to reorganize these conceptualizations in terms of 'structural 
grammars' for the future interaction between self and other As a structure, a grammar 
invites the other to participate in a specific form of interaction; it invites the other to 
act in a specific way.  
Subsection 3.1.3 discusses how certain futures do not involve the other in a relation. 
The discussion relates Baumann & Gingrich's counter-concept of 'genocidal anti-
grammar' to the concepts of securitization and violisation (both introduced in IR). 
Subsection 3.1.4 analyses how three basic grammars identified in Anthropolgy 
combine to form specific policies, each issuing different invitations to the other to co-
narrate the future relation. The result is a typology of grammatical and anti-
grammatical policies. Subsection 3.1.5 sums up the discussion of grammars for future 
self/other interaction by combining the discursive structure of a policy narrative 
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(developed in chapter 2) with the discursive structure of a self/other grammar to form 
a self/other policy narrative. 
Subsection 3.1.6 seeks inspiration in conceptual history and postmodern social theory 
to take the operationalization the last step by singling out the specific parameters 
along which self/other relations may be constructed to support grammars and 
policies. Three groups of parameters combine to form the grammars that make up the 
points of departure and arrival for the self/other narratives in identity discourse: The 
parameters of spatiality include the diacriticon for distinguishing self from other; the 
hierarchical distribution of their positions; and the distance between them. The 
parameters of temporality include the possible knowledge of the history of the 
relation; the permanency or historicity of the relation; and possible causality in the 
form of Their influencing Us. The parameters of intentionality include the possible 
ascription or limitation of agency to the other; the posture of the other in relation to 
the self; and the dialogicality of the other – i.e. the possibility of engaging in a 
dialogue by listening and communicating. Special attention is given to how the 
configuration of these parameters may install necessity in the self/other narratives as 
necessity installed present a less open, more conflictual invitation to co-narration to 
the other. 
A final subsection sums up the theoretical account of the contribution to 
radicalization of conflict from self/other policy narratives as a discursive structure. 
Section 3.2 discusses other ways in which necessity may be installed in a self/other 
narrative. 
3.1.1 Typologies and dimensions of self/other relations in IR 
The IR-discipline includes since the early 90ies a debate on how best to conceptualize 
the relation between self, other and foreign policy. This debate has – among other 
things – been about how theoretically to escape the image of radically threatening 
others constructed to support one, monolithic identity.  
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One of the early applications of post-structuralism to the study of the relation 
between state identity and foreign policy was Campbell's study of the construction of 
US identity through relations to a series of threatening Others (1992). Even if 
Campbell expresses hope that Connolly is right that this extreme kind of othering is 
only a temptation (1992:78; cf. chapter 1), the image left by the analysis is one of 
radically threatening others constructed to support one monolithic identity (cf. 
Neumann 1999:24-7; Hansen 2006:38-9). Two ways have been pursued to open up 
the monolith to politics: one allowing for internal identity politics, one allowing for 
external identity politics. 
One way to open up the seemingly monolithic identity constructed in relation to one, 
threatening other is to 'relax' the poststructuralist reflex which portrays identity as 
defined by the exclusion of threatening difference: Necessity is opened up to politics 
by allowing for disagreement on the inside of the identity as to the character of the 
identity and its relation to the other. Neumann (1999:30) lauds what he calls the 
Copenhagen Coterie of identity studies (1996a:162; 1998:16)
72
 for stressing the not-
so-single character of every purported Self (Hansen 2006:77): The point is that there 
are different versions of the self constructed in relation to different others (cf. Frello 
2003:450). 
A central tool in this opening up for internal identity politics has been a more 
nuanced reading of Todorov's historical anthropological study of the meeting 
prompted by Columbus' voyage to the new world (cf. Hansen 1998:117ff; Neumann 
1996a; 1996b; 1999:21). Todorov analyses a series of positions in the attempts of the 
Spaniards to come to grips with the possible humanity of the American Indians 
(1999[1982]).  
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 Including Hansen (1996), Holm (1993), Wæver (1992; et al. 1993) and Neumann 
(1996b). 
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To make his analysis, Todorov intimates that "we must distinguish among at least 
three axes, on which we can locate the problematics of alterity": First, the 
problematics involve a "value judgment (an UaxiologicalU level): the other is good or 
bad, I love or do not love him, or ... he is my equal or my inferior (for there is usually 
no question that I am good and that I esteem myself)."
73
 Second, the problematics 
involve  
the action of rapprochement or distancing in relation to the other (a UpraxeologicalU 
level): I embrace the other's values, I identify myself with him; or else I identify the 
other with myself, I impose my own image upon him; between submission to the 
other and the other's submission, there is also a third term, which is neutrality, or 
indifference. 
Thirdly, the problematics involve the question whether "I know or am ignorant of the 
other's identity (this would be the UepistemicU level); of course there is no absolute 
here, but an endless gradation between the lower or higher states of knowledge." 
(1999:185; italics in original, underlining added) 
Finally, the central maxim remains "There exist, of course, relations and affinities 
between these three levels, but no rigorous implication; hence, we cannot reduce 
them to one another, nor anticipate one starting from the other." (1999:185)
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 Todorov's axiological level is constructed asymmetrically, as "there is usually no question 
that I am good and that I esteem myself" (Todorov 1999:185). As a statement generalized 
beyond Todorov's case, this is empirically doubtful (cf. Gad 2005:61-4). 
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 The organization of each axis may, as well as the ease of their combination, be debated 
(cf. Connolly 1991:42f; contra Hansen 1998:117ff; Neumann 1999:21ff; Frello 2003:95ff; 
148ff; Gad 2005:54-6 – and subsection 3.1.6 of this chapter). Most significantly, Hansen 
discards with Todorov's 'epistemic' axis as "When dealing with contemporary international 
security what is at stake is not a massive difference in factual knowledge but competing 
interpretations of factual knowledge articulated around different sets of ideas of how we 
can speak about security, community, history, responsibility and identity" (1998:125). In 
stead she retrieves from Todorov's formulation an 'UontologicalU axis' covering the 
constitution of the identity/difference of the other in relation to the self. The overall validity 
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On the one hand, Todorov's taxonomy is most helpful as it puts into play distinctions 
which are imperative to look for in the analysis of identity discourse. On the other 
hand, it involves some limitations which stem from the way it presents the question 
of alterity as one which is basically unilaterally decided (cf. Rumelili 2007:31). Even 
if Todorov did not merely set out to reinforce the myth of European superiority, the 
case analysed is one with a rather definitive winner.
75
 Related, the story told is one of 
a relation in which the agency of the other is not featured as very important: It is 
implied, that the answer of the Indians to the images put forward by the Spaniards did 
not have any significant bearing on their final articulation of identity. Finally and 
related, the choice involved in the policies proposed is not one which presses itself on 
the Spaniards with urging necessity: It was not the Indians who suddenly popped up 
in Andalucia – quite contrarily; the Spaniards went quite far (geographically) to seek 
up the choice of 'what to do to the other'. One option remained that they returned 
home and let the other be; such a policy would have made the continuation of the 
narrative less pressing.
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So the specific case analysed seem to be at least one reason why the analytical 
opening up to internal politics is accompanied by the closing down of the space for 
external identity politics – that is, the space for the answer of the other. This image of 
the articulation of identity as an 'internal affair' is repeated by Hansen in her 1998 
                                                                                                                                            
of the maxim of free combinability seems to be generally accepted; cf. Neumann (1999:21) 
and Hansen (2006:26 echoing 1998:127). 
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 Pagden (1999:xi); cf. Frello (2003:96, n.52). 
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 Even this choice would have requested a reconfiguration of the construction of 
Christianity as the universal goal of all mankind. On the individual level, this is the 
conclusion of later Las Casas (Todorov 1999:193). Connolly stresses how universality is 
what reduces strategies of 'tolerance' to a tactical awaiting the right moment for conquest, 
conversion or elimination to finally solve the problem of difference (1991:42f) 
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thesis focusing empirically on another geographical expedition from a dominant self 
– this time to the Balkans.77 
Even if Todorov is featured less prominently in Hansen's 2006 book version, the 
perimeters which Todorov laid out to delimit the problematique is still in place: The 
theoretical framework describes a configuration of a self related to an other to 
legitimize a policy of the self towards the other (2006:21). The conceptual framework 
of the 2006 book does include the possibility of analytically staging a “discursive 
encounter” which “contrasts the discourse of the Self with the Other’s ‘counter-
construction’ of Self and Other” (2006:76). Substantially, however, there is no 
theoretical account of how the voice of the Other could find a place within the 
discourse of the self.  
Neumann diagnoses this blind spot of poststructuralism as the way identification “is 
conceptualized as an affair between a subject and an order, and not as an affair 
between a subject and an other. Poststructuralists, therefore, do not have an 
intersubjective take on the process of identification” (1999:208f). 
The lack of place for the agency of the other is manifest also in the specific analytical 
lenses, Hansen constructs to engage the empirical material: The lenses do not in a 
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 Hansen (1998:113) notes that the identity of the West has both an internal and an external 
side – but these are the relations as constructed in discourse; e.g. when a discourse both 
poses "the West" in an external relation to "the rest of the world" and negotiates the 
relationship between "Europe" and "the US". Hansen (2006:30) lays out how there are 
external constraints to the deliberation of identity and policy – but these are the established 
identities and policies "situated within, or products of, older and competing discourses". 
There is no place in the theory for an other to speak from. Kristensen (2009) takes this 
approach to an extreme by developing what he labels "reflexive subjectivism" as a 
framework for constructing a genealogy of how NATO's 2001 move 'out of area' was made 
possible; in his analytics both the outside other (i.a. USSR) and the internal subaltern part of 
the self (Europe) speaks only through being reacted and referred to in mainstream US 
discourse, which may – hence isolated from any necessary outside confrontation – unfold 
according to its own inner possibilities. A Foucauldian Hegelianism, so to speak. 
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definitive way preclude the analysis of a series of narratives told in turn by self and 
other – but neither are the lenses focused specifically to this task. An inbuilt 
asymmetry distracts attention from the possible agency of the other. 
Hansen contends that  
At the grandest philosophical scale, space, time, and responsibility are the big 
concepts through which political communities – their boundaries, internal 
constitution, and relationship with the outside world – are thought and argued. Even 
abstract discourses constitute subjects by situating them within particular boundaries, 
by investing them with possibilities for change or repetition, and by constructing 
ethical relations. (2006:46; note omitted)
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So if we describe the relation constructed between a self and another in terms of 
spatiality, temporality, and ethicality, we should be well equipped for analysing the 
relation in general. The terms in which the three analytical tasks are described, 
however, skew the description of the relation in the direction of the self. 
The spatial relation is, as developed by Hansen, truly symmetrical in its operation; it 
concerns the constitutive borders – territorial or social – between self and other 
(2006:47): When some entity is denominated, an outside is by definition 
symmetrically produced. Asymmetry comes from the way one of the sides to the 
distinction is positively marked while the other is negatively marked – the 
prototypical example being the inside and the outside of the nation state. 
The temporal relation also comes across as a symmetrical concept – even if the 
symmetry comes only after completing all the steps of the analytical operation rather 
than from the analytical concept itself. Hansen writes:  
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 The note refers to the organization of the chapters of Walker (1993), which partly 
coincides with the three 'big concepts'. 
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one might ask first, how the temporality of the Other is constituted in relation to the 
temporality of the Self: if the Other is constituted with a temporal identity similar to 
the one of the Self, or if it is articulated as an object in a time different from the one 
of the Self (2006:48).  
What is prescribed are; first, that parallel analyses are made of the self and of the 
other – then that the result of these analyses are related through comparison. Here, of 
course, asymmetry often re-enters as the analytical result. 
The ethical relation, however, is not at all constructed as a symmetrical concept with 
equal focus on the two sides of the relation: "The focus of discourse analysis on 
articulations of ethical identity implies ... a concern ... with, in short, the Self's 
articulation of (non)responsibility toward the Other." (2006:50) Here, the analysis 
suggested is relational – but it is not symmetrical: What should be investigated is the 
construction in discourse of the responsibilities of the self (towards, i.a., the other) – 
not the implicated responsibilities of the other (towards, i.a., the self). 
This is why especially the description of the last of Hansen's three relational 
dimensions – the ethical relation – skews the analytical setup: The analytical grid 
prepared for analysis does not involve a place from which the other is expected to act: 
It produces a snapshot of the discourse of the self; a snapshot which may be repeated 
to produce a dynamic account of the development of the discourses of the Self (cf. 
Hansen 1998:364). But not a snapshot which analyses the invitation issued to the 
other to partake in interaction – or one which analyses the response of the other. In 
that sense, it does make a difference whether the other is theoretically constituted as 
part of a "web of identities" (Hansen 2006:40) or the other is narrated into a cast of 
"characters" (Ricoeur 1988:248). 
It is an undeniable achievement of Hansen to provide a framework which "can be 
used as a way of more systematically comparing and discussing discourses which 
share major elements yet differ in small, but still important ways." (Hansen 
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1998:365) A series of examples and analyses provided exemplifies how a minor 
difference in the construction of one dimension of the self/other relation may 
legitimize a different policy towards the other. Nevertheless: the more important the 
differences are in terms of theoretical effects, all the more important is it which 
differences are systematically produced by the analytical grid. The response of the 
other is not one of them. 
In contrast to Hansen, Rumelili (2004; 2007) moves beyond the perimeters which 
Todorov laid out for the problematique; i.e. the self in relation to an other involving a 
strategy of the self. In other words, she opens up the image of a monolithic identity 
related to threatening difference by focusing not on internal but on external identity 
politics. 
Rumelili takes her cue from Connolly's remark that identity is "vulnerable to the 
tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert 
definitions applied to them." (1991:64; cf. Rumelili 2007:31) Especially, according to 
Connolly, the complexities of the self/other relation includes  
variations in the extent to which the voice of difference is heard as that with which 
one should remain engaged or as a symptom of sickness, inferiority, or evil; 
variations in the degree to which self-choice or cultural determination is attributed to 
alter-identities (1991:65).  
In other words; the ascription of agency to the other is crucial to the description of the 
self/other relation. Both in terms of the very capability of agency and of the 
legitimacy of the agency. 
Rumelili describes the relation between self and other as including three "constitutive 
dimensions", which appear to be organized diachronically (2007:38-43). Firstly, self 
describes the "nature of difference" between self and other as seen from the 
perspective of the self. Basically two options are presented: Either the identity 
relation is "inclusive" as the decisive characteristics are presented as "acquired" – or 
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the relation is "exclusive" as the characteristics are presented as "inherent". Secondly, 
the "response of the other" – the second 'constitutive dimension' – may either 
challenge or recognize the representation performed by the self. A challenge may set 
off a dynamic of threat and conflict – unless the challenge may be handled by the self 
in the third 'constitutive dimension'; the "social distance maintained between self and 
other".  
The immediately appealing side to Rumelili's theoretical setup is the way it creates a 
place in discourse to speak from for the other.
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 The theoretical setup therefore 
focuses the analytical attention on the aspects of the discursive self-construction 
which the other would want to reply to. The flip side seems to be, that Rumelili 
collapses whatever synchronic relation to the other constructed by the self into one 
axis: 'nature of difference' as either acquired or inherent. And in relation to her main 
empirical interest – EU's relation to Turkey – this is a suitable place to economize 
with concepts. Rumelili develops a conceptual grid to fit her specific problematique: 
regional inter-state community and order – and in this problematique the state as a 
unit is the obvious object of temporalization. The distinction between characterising 
the other as permanently non-self' and 'temporarily less-self' does, however, not 
beyond the state-centric problematique produce sufficient information to make sense 
of neither the invitation to co-narration nor the response of the other.  
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 Or rather: For some others. "Morocco has so far" for undisclosed reasons "not been able 
to successfully resist the construction of its identity as geographically non-European." 
(2007:64). Theoretically, Rumelili bases the opening of the discursive structure of the Self 
to the co-authorship of the other in postcolonialism – more specifically in Bhabha’s concept 
of mimicry (2007:32). Bhabha's point is that "the ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same, 
but not quite)" performed by subalterns in colonial circumstances – the very way in which it 
is undecidable whether a mimic performance is an unsuccessful attempt to copy the 
dominant discourse or rather a conscious mockery – opens a space for agency (1994:85). 
Rumelili (2007) does not develop the theoretical implications explicitly; it seems, however, 
to work in parallel with the opening constructed theoretically in this dissertation (in chapter 
2) by way of Butler’s queer feminism and Ricoeur's narratology. 
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This dissertation has as its focus the complex Danish debates on Muslims. The task 
for this chapter is to account theoretically for the contribution to radicalization of 
conflict from the identity narratives, the articulations of identity, and the identity 
political dynamics of these debates and the identity configuration they are part of. 
These three relations more or less mirror Rumelili's three ‘constitutive dimensions’ – 
but it would not suit the analytical purpose of the dissertation to follow Rumelili in 
reducing the complexity of the structure of the self/other relation to the question of 
inclusion/exclusion. More detail is needed in the conceptualization of the synchronic 
self/other relation. Here Hansen's three dimensions will work as a handy point of 
departure for working out the parameters of the self/other relation.  
Before the dissertation turns to this task in section 3.1.6, a third way to organize 
self/other relations deserves to be developed. This way of analytically organizing the 
self/other relations are, on the one hand, synchronic snapshots. But, on the other 
hand, the snapshots are diachronically inclined in the sense that what is in focus, is 
the way they point to the future. This way of organizing self/other relations are 
rudimentarily present in IR; a couple of examples will suffice: 
As mentioned, Rumelili contributes a dichotomous typology: Either an identity is 
inclusive and "can possibly be acquired by any state if it fulfils certain criteria." 
(2007:38) – or it is "exclusive, and assumed to be based on some inherent 
characteristics." (2007:38)
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In the analytical chapters of Hansen (2006) the three dimensions of self/other 
relations are synthesised as 'discourses'. The labels used for these discourses are, on 
the one hand, proper names hinting at their policy implications or pedigree (Byronic, 
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 In Rumelili's discussion it is implied that inclusiveness equals universalistic pretentions 
(2007:52-3). This might be empirically correct as far as liberal identities – the one of the EU 
as well as the one of the US – are concerned. But the possibility of an inclusive identity 
offering itself to the other without insisting should not be ruled out. 
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Balkanization). On the other hand, the policy advice is in general terms often 
recognizable from other contexts and the pedigree is often one which has produced 
offspring beyond the specific analytical context (Civilization, Clash, Romanticism, 
Gendering, Genocide, Orientalism). Obviously, the discourses identified in the 
analysis recur to broader, even more sedimented discourses on how to relate to 
others.
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Diez sketches a summary of "some of the strategies of constructing 'self' and 'other' in 
international politics" and includes four types: "[r]epresentation of the the other as an 
existential threat ('securitization')", "[r]epresentation of the other as inferior", 
"[r]epresentation of the other as violating universal principles", and "[r]epresentation 
of the other as different". Simultaneously, however, he characterizes the three first as 
"approximations" or "variants" of each other (2005:628). In the concluding remarks 
concerning one of the cases – EU's relation to Turkey – he notes that EU's "discourse 
is not unidirectional, but multifaceted, and cannot be easily controlled. It empowers 
EU actors, but it also empowers other actors to remind EU politicians of their words." 
(2005:633) This last point deserves to be lifted out of its status as an ad hoc 
conclusion. It needs to be the central focus in the analysis of the representation of 
self/other relations. Specifically, it needs to be the organizing principle when 
constructing a typology of synchronic self/other relations. 
Therefore the following subsections (3.1.2 through 3.1.4) proceeds to develop a 
typology of synchronic self/other relations to facilitate the analysis of the 
contributions to radicalization of conflict from self/other policy narratives as part of 
the discursive structure of identity. It does so by importing from Anthropology the 
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 Kølvrå (2009:49) argues a parallel move by warning against prejudicing one's analysis by 
applying typologies – but a few pages down the text he advocates utilizing secondary 
literature to generate working hypotheses as "We need not of course approach these 
questions in total naivety." (2009:50-1). 
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concept of grammars for self/other interaction and combining it with the concept of 
securitization.  
Subsection 3.1.5 combines the resulting synchronic structure of grammatical relation 
between self and other with the structure of temporality in policy narratives. Finally, 
subsection 3.1.6 returns to a discussion of the parameters of the grammatical structure 
of self-other relations. 
3.1.2 Structural grammars of identity/alterity in Anthropology 
So the challenge when analysing identity as structure, is to do so in a way which 
focus on the way in which the structure projects the agency of the self and invites the 
agency of the other: identity is articulated in relation to an other rather than to an 
order. To produce this analytical focus, recent Anthropological theory suggests 
reading the synchronic relation between self and other as 'grammars for interaction'. 
In this way the analytical focus is directed to the invitation – or the lack thereof – to 
mutual co-authorship of self/other narratives.  
Eriksen presents the job of the Anthropologist as an intellectual to protest against 
attempts to present identity as based in digital essentialism – the notion that 
identity/alterity is an either/or question excluding the possibility of hybridity. The 
primary tools in the deconstruction are to point out paradoxes and to present 
alternative conceptualizations of identity/alterity relations (1995:117ff). This 
dissertation seeks inspiration in this Anthropological aspiration for alternatives to 
binary otherings in the concept of 'grammars of identity/alterity', developed by 
Baumann & Gingrich (2004a; 2004b; Baumann 2004).
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 Their project is akin to the one of Eriksen (1995), only more theoretically developed. 
Their point of departure is a critique of concepts of identity/difference inspired by Lacan 
(via Spivak) and Heidegger (via Derrida) respectively. (Cf. the discussion in fn. 19 & 61).  
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The concept of 'grammars' are theoretically developed by Baumann & Gingrich to 
denote "classificatory structures or ... schemata" (2004a:ix) which are "used as guides 
as to how different discourses order the relationship between self and other" 
(Baumannn 2004:19). On the one hand, a grammar is a synchronic structure: it relates 
self and other as they are constructed to be in the present. On the other hand, a 
grammar is always a grammar for the future interaction: it is a structure suggesting 
how interaction should proceed – and, notably, suggesting how each side should act 
to produce the interaction prescribed.
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As alternative ways to relate identity and alterity – rather than as a digital or binary 
choice of either/or – Baumann & Gingrich present three basic grammars which they 
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 In constructivist IR Milliken (2001) has used the concept of grammar in a related, yet 
different, way: Through "grounded theorising" (2001:9) she deduces from "a history of 
sequences of moves and countermoves that, for the participating governments, constituted 
their interaction" (2001:14) a "conflict grammar" for the Korean War describing how groups 
of "state managers defined state activities and assembled their interaction into an ordered 
sequence of exchanges". The resulting "grammar" is "an interpretative theory of permissible 
combinations of categories for actors, acts, effects, etc. in the Korean War social context." 
(2001:9). The grammar deduced consists of a "lexicon" for the "practical ontology" of the 
parties: "a set of definitions of, and rules of combination for, action phenomena in the 
Korean War" (2001:14f) mainly describing the "'semantics of state conflict: the types of 
actions and other phenomena that are meaningful to governments: the types of actions … 
meaningful to governments; … and how they understand them to be typically related" 
(2001:15). Milliken's aim when constructing the 'grammar' as a structure for the unfolding 
of the whole conflict is to be able to study "'situations that are given' (such as conflict 
interactions during the Cold War)" by answering the following rather structuralist question: 
"what else could have been done according to the 'rules of the game' that participants 
recognised and were following?" (2001:10) – the participants being a well-defined group, as 
"undertaking interactions of this kind is the specialised province of state rulers … authorised 
to determine … which conflict situation their state faces." (2001:22). This dissertation does 
not focus on a government-government relation of war in the context of the Cold War (in 
which Milliken shows that there is a grammar "recognised and followed") – but at the 
diffuse Muslim relations of a 'Denmark' to which a state claims a monopoly of 
representation which cannot be upheld (which means that the whole interaction is very 
much a question which grammar should be followed, and who the 'participants authorised' 
to be on the 'other' side should be). 
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label Orientalism, Segmentation, and Encompassment. The grammars, they admit, 
has been adapted "quite ruthlessly" from three "classic social theories" each 
developed from empirical studies in diverse cultural contexts by academic 
"'ancestors'" (Baumann 2004:19): Edward Saïd's account of Western construction of 
the Orient; Evans-Pritchard's study of the social organization of the Nuer; and Louis 
Dumont's analysis of the Hindu caste system. Each of these studies produces an 
original way of relating self and other. In that sense the theoretical labels and the 
'ancestors' serve as metaphors for the logics described rather than direct suppliers of 
exact theoretical concepts. 
Baumann & Gingrich match the three grammars with the basic modalities of 
figurative language which, according to White (1973), organize Historiographic 
writing: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. 
The Grammar of Orientalism describes a "reverse mirror-imaging" (Baumann 
2004:19) mode of relating identity to alterity: Some elements – or most elements – in 
Our identity are said to be mirrored in Theirs:
84
 "what is good in us is bad in them, 
but what got twisted in us remains straight in them" (2004:20). The orientalist 
grammar is metaphorical in the sense that it compares a whole with a whole.
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 Other appropriations of Saïd and his concept of Orientalism have taken other directions. 
Most other readers stress the unequivocal hierarchy between self and other implied to be 
central to Orientalism (cf. Diez 2005:628). This hierarchy is possible but not necessary in 
Baumann’s version of Orientalism. 
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 Baumann & Gingrich comes close to dividing Orientalism into two versions: a 
hierarchizing version working as a metaphor comparing two wholes to the benefit of the 
self, and a self-ironic version self-identifying with the negative traits allocated by the other 
(2004b:198-9). As will be clear from the analysis of the theoretical concepts employed in 
the proceeding subsection, the metaphor of a metaphor seems to be most suitable. The 
ironical attitude may, to my mind, be articulated to each of the grammars, even if the self-
irony seems to be articulated most easily to the strict distinctions of Orientalism. 
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The Grammar of Encompassment describes a mode of relating identity to alterity by 
"hierarchical subsumption" (2004:25) in which “the putatively subordinate category 
is adopted, subsumed ... into the identity defined and, as it were, owned by those who 
do the encompassing.” (2004:26): Our superiority allows Us to see that even though 
They insist on being different from Us, They are actually a (subaltern) part of Our 
identity. The grammar of encompassment works as a synecdoche by reducing othered 
wholes to parts (Baumann & Gingrich 2004b:198). 
The Segmentary Grammar describes a mode of relating identity to alterity by "a logic 
of fission or enmity at a lower level of segmentation, overcome by a logic of fusion 
or neutralization of conflict at a higher level of segmentation” (Baumann 2004:22): A 
We/They-relation on a basic level may be accompanied by a simultaneous agreement 
on a common We at a higher level opposed to yet another They. In that sense, the 
segmentary grammar plays metonymically with the wholeness of parts and the 
partialness of wholes (Baumann & Gingrich 2004b:198).  
XFigure 3.1 reproduces the way Baumann & Gingrich illustrate the three grammars 
graphically. 
Gingrich & Baumann discuss whether the three grammars are in some sense logically 
exhaustive of the possible combinations of relations between self and other 
(Baumann & Gingrich 2004b:198f).
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 More interesting than logical exhaustiveness, 
however, is whether the three concepts allow thinking beyond the digital self/other 
relation. On the one hand, each of the concepts – if employed on their own – stays 
within a binary logic: Orientalism, in a sense, is binary par excellence. 
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 In the end, Baumann & Gingrich keep the framework theoretically open for more possible 
grammars (2004b:198) – and during the development of the theory a "transcendent grammar 
of love" (Baumann 2004:42) is mentioned just as a rudimentary "binary grammar of 'we are 
good, so they are bad'" (2004:19) is described as a pretext to the anti-grammar discussed in 
section 3.1.3. 
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Encompassment needs the digital distinction to postulate its hierarchy. Segmentation 
induces the proliferation of digital distinctions – but the distinctions need to be there.  
^
/   \
/ \ / \
/\ /\ /\ /\
Self as Whole
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Self <- Other as
as Part Sub-Part
Self Other
+ -
Self Other
- +
 
Figure 3.1 The three grammars: Orientalism, Segmentation, Encompassment 
as illustrated by Baumann & Gingrich 2004 
 
Baumann & Gingrich stress, however, that the three grammars may be found "in 
mutual interaction and as rival logics" (Baumann 2004:47) shaping "processes of 
selfing/othering" (2004:46). More specifically, they shape these processes as  
They provide a repertoire of structures through which to put forward arguments 
about self and other; but it is crucial to stress that all grammars are always at the 
disposal of all social actors, and it is precisely the constantly shifting invocations and 
revocations of each grammar that matter in the social processes of selfing and 
othering as we can observe them empirically (2004:31).  
Section X3.1.4 develops one way in which the grammars interact. It does so by 
combining the grammars to produce a typology of policies for relating to the other. 
First, however, one more important element in Gingrich & Baumann's theoretical 
apparatus needs to be introduced – and modified – to the benefit of the task of this 
section; i.e., to account for contributions to radicalization from discursive structures. 
This has to do with a crucial point concerning the grammars: That they are 
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grammatical. The crucial point is that even if these conceptualizations of the relation 
between self and other are fraught with hierarchizations, dominance, and power – 
they each point out some kind of place for the other to speak from, even if it is a 
subordinated, dominated, and disempowered position (2004:46f). They each include 
two positions – one for the self and one for the other. They are relational. But not all 
imagined futures are relational. 
3.1.3 Anti-grammar and securitization 
Gingrich & Baumann delivers the concept of interactional grammar with the counter-
concept of anti-grammar closely articulated to physically violent policies such as 
genocide and categorical killings. Even if this counter-concept is not the only way of 
envisioning futures without a relation between self and other, its close affiliation with 
violence makes it an important focus for identity political analysis. 
Furthermore, the concept of 'genocidal anti-grammar' invites articulation with a 
conceptualization in International Relations of a specific type of self/other relation; 
the securitized relation: When an other is securitized – pointed out as an existential 
threat to the self – it is very difficult to see the relation as implying a grammar for 
future interaction. To the contrary; an obvious policy option towards a securitized 
other – an other pointed out as an existential threat to you – is the elimination of the 
other. That policy conclusion is, however, not the only one possible to apply to a 
securitized relation. A securitized relation need not necessarily end up anti-
grammatical: re-opening a space for dialogical co-authorship becomes a crucial task 
in such 'anti-grammatical' situations. 
Baumann portraits "the breakdown of all three grammars [as] a return to the anti-
grammar of: 'we are good, so they are bad' with the genocidal conclusion: 'we must 
live, so they must die'" (Baumann 2004:42). The result is "categorical killings" 
(Baumann & Gingrich 2004b:195). Difference turns into radical otherness exactly 
when the grammars cease to work: "In situations of genocide, the Other is turned 
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from being a necessary, if undervalued, partner in the process of collective selfing 
into an obstacle to selfing that must be removed by indiscriminate violence." 
(Baumann 2004:47) 
This criterion is mirrored in Neumann's call to add the concept of 'violisation' to the 
theoretical apparatus of the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization: A 
securitization is attempted when an existential threat is pointed out to a valued 
referent-object along with the means for the aversion of the threat – and securitization 
has succeeded when the relevant audience accepts the breaking of rules involved 
(Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). The rhetorical figure of securitization is, along 
with the securitizing agent and the audience, illustrated in figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.2 The speech act of Securitzation 
 
When someone gives in to the temptation to point out a sociological other as the 
constitutive threat to ones identity, a special situation occurs in which both the threat 
and the referent-object is narratively endowed with agency: The securitizing agent 
speaks on behalf of the self (whether everyone included in the self agrees or not) – 
and the threat pointed out may (whether intended or not) eavesdrop and react to being 
pointed out as a threat. This situation is illustrated in figure 3.3. "Violisation" is to 
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denominate the process in which not only security status but "the use of force" is 
added to politics in the form of large-scale violence: war (Neumann 1998:18). 
Neumann and Gingrich & Baumann agree that not all violence crosses the threshold 
which they try to define: Neumann grants that "identity is already violised for 
example when an asylum centre is arsonised and people die as an effect" (1998:18). 
But even as the concept of violisation is suggested to cover "the cases where large-
scale violence is actually in evidence", the article focuses on the outbreak of war, and 
Neumann suggests that "societal violence which is not intended to impinge on the 
question of state borders may be bracketed" (1998:18). This dissertation opts to 
remove the brackets and follows the generalization performed by Baumann & 
Gingrich. Firstly, they grant "that there is system-immanent or system-maintaining 
violence" (2004b:195). Secondly, however, a qualitative threshold is passed when 
"the exceptional violence of irretrievably anti-grammatical selfings/otherings ... aim 
to annihilate the other" (2004b:196). 
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Figure 3.3 Securitization as othering 
The other pointed out as existential threat (possibly) doubles as a (possibly) unintended co-
audience of the speech act. 
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This criterion in Baumann & Gingrich is followed by a second diacriticon which they 
argue coincide with the first one (genocidal violence): Genocide is made possible, 
when the construction of a group no longer follow “the conventions of othering the 
other by one or another of the three grammars and thus to define identities and 
alterities as mutually constitutive and at least residually dialogical.” (Baumann 
2004:46, italics added) The choice of the labels 'grammar' and 'anti-grammar' is 
explained by analogy:  
Just as linguist's grammars make the difference between sentences meaningful to 
others and sentences unintelligible to others, so the grammars of identity/alterity spell 
the difference between otherings that are meaningful to the others and the 
ungrammatical otherings that are unintelligible to the othered 
because it insists on the annihilation of the other (2004:46; italics added).  
The distinctions 'residually dialogical'/'non-dialogical' and 'different/existential threat-
which-must-be-eliminated' coincide as "The denial of the right to be different turns 
into a denial of the right to be." (2004:47) Or phrased differently; the "different 
grammars do entail different directions and degrees of dialogical potential" 
(Baumann & Gingrich 2004b:194); but "only at the threshold of empowering the anti-
grammar of dehumanization ... identity and alterity ceased to be conceivable as 
mutually constitutive or potentially dialogical." (2004b:197)
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Constructing a self/other relationship by playing on the three grammars, hence, 
implies a structural openness to the other as a co-author of the discourse of the self – 
even if the openness is small and the space for reconstruction delimited. The 
conceptual pair grammar/anti-grammar, hence, establish a theoretical platform for 
and delimitation of the agency implied in both Bhaba's concept of mimicry (as 
                                           
87
 The distinction is discursively protected when system-immanent violence – by contrast – 
is "represented in dominant discourses as a form of dialogue or communication" and hence 
insisted to be grammatical (2004:197): 'We are sending them a message by punishing them'. 
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suggested by Rumelili, cf. subsection 3.1.1) and the agency achieved via the 
alternative, yet partially parallel theoretical way by Butler’s queer feminism (cf. 
Gingrich 2004:9 and chapter 2).  
Recall Butler's definition of the subject as "an inherited set of voices, an echo of 
others who speak as the 'I'" (1997:25), and, hence, "constituted by discourse, but at a 
distance from oneself" (1997:33f) from where "it is clearly possible to speak with 
authority without being authorized to speak" (1997:157). Also for Butler, however, 
the possibility remains that "one can be 'put in one's place by such speech, but such a 
place may be no place" (1997:4, 137). The anti-grammar of genocide is the extreme 
denial of place for the other in the narrative of the relation between self and other. 
If an other is constructed as a dehumanized, existential threat, then no place is left to 
speak from: "What ever they do or say in their defence, they are wrong and will not 
be accommodated within any of the established grammars." (Baumann & Gingrich 
2004b:196) But annihilation of the other may, contrary to what Baumann & Gingrich 
implies, not be an automatic response to the pointing out of the other as a threat. Not 
even to the pointing out of the other as an existential threat.  
The Copenhagen School of security theory suggests that a securitization – the 
conversion of a problem into a security problem – involves the pointing out of an 
existential threat to a valued referent object. It also, however, suggests that when you 
point out an existential threat, you need to follow up with an extraordinary means to 
its aversion – at least if you want to stay in authority (Wæver 1995). But the policy 
need not be the annihilation of the other. Huysmans observes that when targeted at an 
identity category  
securitization makes constructive political and social engagement with the dangerous 
outside(rs) more difficult. It also has a tendency to inscribe predispositions towards 
violence in social relations. ... In ... security framing, individual[s...] become indexes 
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of a collective force. ... Under these conditions dialogue and constructive engagement 
will become more difficult (Huysmans 2006:57-8) 
Difficult, but not necessarily impossible. 
In that sense, 'securitization' may be discerned as a limit of grammatical othering; a 
last resort (or: last exit) before genocidal anti-grammar. The policy of securitization 
closes down the dialogical openness to the other – but large scale categorical killings 
is not a necessary conclusion.
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Grammars lay out the conditions for the co-authorship of the other in self/other 
narratives – anti grammar denotes the extreme case where there is no possible voice 
for the other as there is no legitimate life for the other. Securitization defines the limit 
where the dialogue is closing down but the termination of life is not pointed out as 
necessary. 
Closer inspection, however, may find a variation of ways in which relational 
grammars for the future may break down. More ways than may be accounted for 
satisfactorily by the single counterconcept of genocidal anti-grammar. Subsection 
3.1.4 analyses how the three basic grammars may combine to form a typology of 
policies for the future relation of self and other – and finds how grammar may break 
down in three distinct ways. 
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 When Buzan et al. (1998:32) refers to 'the grammar of securitization' as a 
felicity/facilitating condition of a securitizing speech act, this structure is also a grammar for 
action – albeit a more specific act, namely for the speech act of securitization. In Austinian 
speech act theory, reference is often made to the importance of performing perfectly the 
conventional 'grammar' institutionalized in discourse allowing the speech act to work; i.a. a 
grammar-for-the-speech-act preceding the speech act. As implied above, what I have in 
mind in this discussion is the grammar-for-subsequent-action included in the speech act. 
'The policy of securitization' as understood by the dissertation – i.e. as a involving a specific 
combination of the basic grammars for relating to the other – may be installed by 
successfully following the grammar of the securitizing speech act. 
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3.1.4 A typology of policies based on grammars of interaction 
This subsection analyses the logics of the three grammars with a view to produce a 
typology of policies for relating to the other. The typology is presented in the form of 
a map of policies.  
The analysis proceeds by examining what kind of specific policies for relating to the 
other each of the basic grammars have as their condition of possibility – and in 
parallel; what kind of policies for relating to the other which constitutes the condition 
of impossibility of the grammar: If you relate to the other according to, e.g. the 
grammar of Encompassment: What is the first thing, you need to do? What is the last 
thing, you should do? And what kind of policy for the future could you promote to 
save the basic grammar if approaching its impossibility? 
Furthermore, the analysis discerns in each grammar a 'point of diffraction' – a specific 
way of structuring identity, articulating identity, or interacting in identity politics – 
which directs the grammar in question in the direction of either the one or the other 
grammars. A series of 'combined' policies are, in that way, made visible.  
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Figure 3.4 Building a map of policies by combining grammars of self/othering 
Baumann & Gingrich's illustrations of the three grammars inserted using the three sides of 
the triangle as baselines. 
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To begin the construction of the map, the three basic grammars each form the base of 
an axis. To recollect the three logics, the graphical illustrations of the grammars are 
placed in a triangle in figure 3.4: Orientalism produces mirror-images of self and 
other; Encompassment subsumes 'other' as subsidiary part of self. Segmentation 
allows flexible inclusion/exclusion of other in self at various levels of abstraction. 
Having, thus, delimited the map to be filled out, let us proceed to the first step of the 
analysis focusing on the conditions of possibility and impossibility of each of the 
grammars.  
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GRAMMAR OF 
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Figure 3.5 Conditions of Orientalism 
 
 
The grammar of Orientalism insists to mirror Our qualities with Theirs. What is the 
condition of possibility of mirroring? What kind of policy for relating to the other 
must one perform to mirror? Orientalism only makes sense, if the distinction between 
Us and Them is upheld:
89
 You need to take the trouble to make the difference – to 
distinguish according to a diacriticon – for Orientalism to be meaningful. In that 
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 For a dissertation on self/other relations, this may read a bit trivial. In the light of the 
proceeding analysis of the two other grammars, it is not. 
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sense, a policy of distinguishing is the condition of possibility for Orientalism.And in 
the same sense, hybridity constitutes the condition of impossibility of Orientalism: If 
self and other – according to the diacriticon insisted on by the specific version of 
Orientalism – gets so mixed up that the projection of distinction becomes 
meaningless, then Orientalism breaks down. Figure 3.5 illustrates the conditions of 
possibility (distinguishing) and impossibility of the grammar of Orientalism 
(hybridity). 
Orientalism need, however, not be successful. The other – and the self – may not stay 
in each their place, nicely distributed on each their side of the distinction between 
identity and difference. The situation may, hence, approach hybridity. If nothing is 
done, hybridity may prevail, and orientalism would loose its meaning. The 
foundation on which Orientalism erects itself is a diacriticon – when the diacriticon 
collapses, Orientalism ends. Beyond the breakdown of distinction lies – as one 
specific form of anti-grammar – the policy of indifference: a careless refraining from 
distinguishing.  
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Figure 3.6 Policies of and beyond Orientalism 
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Faced with hybridity, however, the Orientalizing self could also very likely react to 
protect Orientalism. Such a defensive reaction might very well be to insist on a policy 
assimilating the hybrid other to self. If successful, however, the paradoxical result of 
an assimilatory policy aiming to protect Orientalism would be the annulment of not 
only hybridity but also otherness and thereby the very distinction foundational to 
Orientalism. Figure 3.6 illustrates the policies making the grammar of Orientalism 
possible (distinguishing), its paradoxical policy of last resort (other-assmilaton), and 
the anti-grammatical policy beyond it (indifference). 
Let us proceed to the grammar of Encompassment; what is the condition of 
possibility of a grammar insisting that the other is really a subordinate part of the 
self? Encompassment only makes sense, if the self articulates a will to subordinate 
the other. In that sense, a policy of acting on behalf of the other is the condition of 
possibility for Encompassment. You need to be able to articulate the encompassment 
– to represent the other – for Encompassment to be meaningful.  
And in that sense, paralysis constitutes the condition of impossibility of 
Encompassment: If the self is so powerless – absolutely powerless, or powerless 
relative to the power of the other – that it cannot execute its intentions (on behalf of 
the other), then Encompassment breaks down. Figure 3.7 illustrates the conditions of 
possibility (agency) and impossibility (paralysis) of the grammar of Encompassment. 
Faced with paralysis the self may – to save some kind of agency – turn to a policy of 
self-assimilation to the other: By obtaining part in the capability for agency which the 
other has proven to have, the self may be saved from paralysis.
90
 The paradoxical 
result of saving agency by self-assimilation, however, is the annulment of the agency 
of the self foundational to Encompassment.  
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 An example: When Denmark proved itself incapable of defending itself honourably on 
the 9th of April, 1940, some Danish nationalists joined the nazi occupiers to contribute to 
their strength and gain a share in their glory. 
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Figure 3.7 Conditions of Encompassment 
 
Beyond the breakdown of the capability to encompass lies – as a second specific 
form of anti-grammar – the policy of unconditional love distracting oneself from any 
individual intentionality (cf. Baumann 2004:42). The foundation on which 
Encompassment erects itself is an intentionality directed to towards the other. When 
this intentionality collapses, Encompassment ends. Figure 3.8 illustrates the policies 
making the grammar of Encompassment possible (agency on behalf of the other), its 
paradoxical policy of last resort (self-assimilation), and the anti-grammatical policy 
beyond it (unconditional love).  
Finally, Segmentation; the grammar which allocates identity and alterity flexibly by 
fusing and distinguishing between comprehensive and particular identities. What is 
the condition of possibility of the grammar of Segmentation? Segmentation only 
makes sense, if the there is a variety of diacritica available. The flexibility distinctive 
of Segmentation arises from the production of a series of distinctions. In that sense, a 
policy of producing knowledge about the relevance and irrelevance of distinctions in 
various situations is the condition of possibility of Segmentation. 
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Figure 3.8 Policies of and beyond Encompassment 
 
You, however, need to allocate resources for producing the complex of distinctions 
which constitutes the possibility for flexibly contracting and expanding the relevant 
We. One crucial resource for knowledge production is time. If distinction is to be 
made now there is no time to produce knowledge of possible selves or others. There 
is no time for employing any of the specific operations producing knowledge: 
empirical investigation, recourse to authoritative sources, negotiation, etc. Therefore 
urgency constitutes the condition of impossibility of Segmentation: In conditions of 
urgency, Segmentation breaks down as a grammar for future interaction between self 
and other. Figure 3.9 illustrates the conditions of possibility (producing knowledge) 
and impossibility (urgency) of the grammar of Segmentation. 
The self which relates to the other by segmentation will face urgency as a threat. If 
the other is seen to be occasioning the urgency, the other becomes the threat. In that 
situation, an obvious choice for the self is to turn to a policy of securitization which 
consists in pointing out the other as a threat to the knowledge production constituting 
the self engaged in practices of Segmentation. The paradox of securitizing to secure 
Segmentation, however, is that the urgency implied when constructing a need to 
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protect oneself from an existential threat annuls the possibility of knowledge 
production necessary for Segmentation.  
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Figure 3.9 Conditions of Segmentation 
 
The foundation on which Segmentation erects itself is temporality – when 
temporality collapses, Segmentation ends.  
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Figure 3.10 Policies of and beyond Segmentation 
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If there is no time for producing knowledge, only distinction and action is possible: 
Orientalism insisting on distinction between Us and Them – and Encompassment 
insisting on Us acting on Their behalf. Distinguishing now and acting now. If we 
know who the other is, and the other is the one threatening us – only one course of 
action is possible. Shoot now and ask questions later. Beyond the breakdown of 
temporality lies – as a third specific form of anti-grammar – the policy of genocide or 
categorical killing; the dedicated eradication of the other. Figure 3.10 illustrates the 
policies making the grammar of Segmentation possible (producing knowledge), its 
paradoxical policy of last resort (securitization), and the anti-grammatical policy 
beyond it (categorical killings). 
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Figure 3.11 Conditions of grammar 
 
Figure 3.11 charts the policies which constitutes and the conditions of possibility and 
impossibility of the three grammars.
91
 The figure, hence, specifies the limits of 
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 One may, on the one hand, note the similarities of the typology developed with Todorov's 
typology of self/other relations in the sense that Todorov's ontological axis is parallel with 
the Orientalist distinction and its collapse; Todorov's epistemic axis is parallel with the 
temporality allowing Segmentation and its collapse; and Todorov's axiological axis is 
parallel with the intentionality articulated by Encompassment and its collapse. It is, 
however, also important to notice the differences: Firstly, that the typology of the 
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grammatical othering and show that grammar may break down in three distinct ways 
leading to three distinct types of anti-grammar.  
In figure 3.12, the policies beyond and the policies paradoxically seeking to save the 
conditions of possibility of the three grammars are inserted to complete the first stage 
of the construction of a map of policies. 
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Figure 3.12 Policies of and beyond grammar 
 
It is useful, however, to insert one more distinction to make the typology of policies 
more nuanced. The remains of this subsection investigate how the grammar 
combined two and two produces three 'combined' polices. It does so in two steps: 
Firstly, it is argued how 'points of diffraction' points each grammar in the direction of 
each of the other grammars. Secondly, it is argued how a 'combined policy' 
constitutes the meeting point between each couple of grammars. In figure 3.13, the 
                                                                                                                                            
dissertation developed by the dissertation is entirely on the level of discourse: In Todorov, 
the epistemic axis concerns knowledge possessed or not possessed of the other as s/he is (cf. 
Hansen 1998:125). In the dissertation, Segmentation hinges on knowledge produced – in 
different ways, yes; but this knowledge always co-produces the other in the discourse of the 
self. Secondly, the crucial difference is that the typology of the dissertation is developed 
specifically to facilitate the analysis of the possible co-authorship of the other. In Todorov 
the agency of the other is inconsequential (cf. subsection 3.1.1).  
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three graphical illustrations of the grammars are re-inserted in the map of policies in a 
way which graphically suggests the points of diffraction in relation to each grammar.  
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Figure 3.13 Points of diffraction for grammars 
Baumann & Gingrich's illustrations modified to illustrate the point of diffraction in each 
grammar. 
 
Orientalism diffracts over the question whether self or other is positively valued 
when mirroring each other:
92
 If the other is negatively valued, the distinction 
foundational to Orientalism is made primarily to disengage: why engage with 
someone less valued? This points the policy choice in the direction of 
Encompassment; of acting on behalf of the other, to keep it from influencing the self 
negatively.  
If, contrarily, the other is positively valued, the distinction between self and other 
may be constructed to allow a delimited self to engage with the other. This points the 
policy choice in he direction of Segmentation; of getting to know the other, possibly 
to learn. As the very distinction between self and other is the foundation of 
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 Note that Todorov's typology of self/other relations is blind to this, as his point of 
departure is that the self is always valued higher than the other (cf. subsection 3.1.1). 
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Orientalism, the policies must in both cases insist on the other as externalized: The 
other is something else than the self; its difference places it outside.
93
 
Encompassment diffracts over the way the other responds to the self acting on its 
behalf: If the other protests by insisting to act on its own behalf – maybe even by 
insisting on behalf of the self – then self's intention to act must be violently 
implemented. This points in the direction of Orientalism; the policy choice is pointed 
in a direction of upholding distinction. When the will of other to represent the self 
threatens to erase the will of the self to represent the other – then the answer is to 
insist on keep up distinctions.  
If contrarily the other accepts that the self acts on behalf of it, then self's intention to 
act need not turn openly violent. The intention of the self to act on behalf of the other 
is implemented ideologically.
94
 If so, the policy choice is pointed in the direction of 
Segmentation; in direction of accepting the legitimacy of the position from which the 
other articulates its accept. As the very capability to act on behalf of the other is the 
foundation of Encompassment, the policies must, however, in both cases insist on 
limiting the independent agency of the other. 
Segmentation diffracts over the type of knowledge produced when moving up and 
down the ladder of fusion and fission. If the knowledge produced concerns the 
differences between self and other, fissions between a self and an other are 
constituted: The more differences between Us and Them are produced to coincide, 
the more it seems that the distinction between Us and Them is the important 
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 Again, this may read a bit trivial. But in the light of the proceeding analysis of the two 
other grammars, it is not. And the non-triviality is what constitutes the politics of separating 
internal and external identity politics (cf. chapter 2) in a way which ensures constant 
conflict (cf. subsection 3.3.1). 
94
 This concept of ideology does not imply any notion of 'false consciousness' on the side of 
the other; only that the other submits itself in accordance with its own identity narrative.  
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distinction. So fissions point the policy choice in the direction of Orientalism; in the 
direction of confirming the distinctions produced by this grammar.  
If contrarily the knowledge produced concerns our identity, a fusion of lesser selves 
and others is facilitated: If We and They are the same in this and that regard – then 
the distinction between Us and Them might not be so interesting. If so, the policy 
choice is pointed in the direction of Encompassment; in the direction of affirming that 
our differences may be subsumed under an encompassing identity. As the very 
production of knowledge, however, is the foundation of Segmentation, the policies 
must in both cases insist on allowing the other some form of agency: If the other is 
not allowed any agency, it may not be engaged in a way which allows it to make a 
mark on common narrative. If the other is not allowed to make a mark, there is no 
way of producing distinctions; i.e. there is no production of knowledge.  
Figure 3.14 summarizes how the points of diffraction of each grammar points the 
policy conditioning its possibility in the direction of one of the other grammars. What 
remains is to see in which 'combined policies' the grammars meet on each side of the 
points of diffraction. 
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Figure 3.14 Policy diffraction of grammars 
 
169 
Recall how Orientalism diffracts over the valuation of the other: negative valuation 
points to policies of disengagement – positive valuation points to engagement. 
Encompassment diffracts over the response of the other: protest points to violence – 
accept points to ideology. Segmentation diffracts over the type of knowledge 
produced: production of differences points to fission – production of identity points 
to fusion. 
When Orientalism distinguishes the negatively valued other from the self to 
disengage, while Encompassment violently acts on behalf of the other in spite of its 
protest, the result is a policy of monologue: Only one voice may legitimately speak.  
The policy of monologue is rather far removed from Segmentation as it does not 
imply any of the openness to the other which is a precondition for producing new 
knowledge. The self performing a monologue is in no need to produce knowledge of 
the other: The other is already known; known to be of less valued; known to be 
inclined to act contrarily to her/his own true interest. 
When Orientalism, contrarily, distinguishes the positively valued other from the self 
to engage, while Segmentation seeks knowledge of differences, the result is a policy 
of dialogue: Two voices are envisioned to engage in an orderly interaction in which 
both parties are open to the other.  
The policy of dialogue is rather far removed from Encompassment as it needs to 
allow the other a liberal measure of agency: The other needs to be allowed agency to 
engage the self in a way which leaves marks on the interaction. The marks of the 
other are needed as objects of knowledge production. Therefore the self engaging in a 
dialogue needs to restrain its own intentionality to allow a room for the intentionality 
of the other: The intentionality of the other is positively valued and necessary. If there 
is no room for the other to articulate its intentionality, there is no production of 
170 
knowledge about the differences between self and other - the only knowledge 
produced is confirmation of the identity of a self.
95
 
When Segmentation, contrarily, seeks knowledge of identity, while Encompassment 
acts ideologically legitimized on behalf of the other with its accept implied, the result 
is a policy of agonism. A policy of agonism foresees an interchange in which, on the 
one hand, the other has a legitimate place: the place of the other is legitimate as the 
other is supposed to use this place to accept the place it is awarded. The other is 
expected to accept the primacy of identity over difference; and accept that the self 
ultimately affirms its encompassment. But, on the other hand, agonism 
simultaneously implies an interchange in which the other is illegitimately at liberty to 
articulate its intentionality to subvert the order. The other, paradoxically, gains the 
liberty to subvert by initially accepting the legitimacy of the delimitated place it is 
awarded to speak from.  
The policy of agonism is rather far removed from Orientalism as it needs to allow 
identity and difference to be flexible concepts rather than unequivocally distinguished 
from each other: The self engaging in agonistic interchange needs to keep up this 
flexibility to be able to produce new knowledge about the differences and identities. 
The need for knowledge comes not from an urge to learn from a positively valued 
other, but because the other is acknowledged as a legitimate opponent: You need to 
know your opponent to be able to strategically engage it. When seeking to articulate 
your will on behalf of the other, you need to know his/her possible reaction. 
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 Galtung takes this policy to its extreme in which it self-assimilates the will of the self into 
the dialectical constitution of a future common self (1996:78-84). He opposes dialogue to – 
i.a. – debate, which is less directed towards future synthesis (1988:72, 84). In that sense, 
Galtungian dialogue is anti-grammatical – while the dissertation's concept of dialogue 
would equal Galtung's concept of debate. 
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The three 'combined' policies resulting from the combination of the diffracted 
grammars are inserted in the map in figure 3.15: Monologue combines disengaging 
from the negatively valued other with acting violently on behalf of the other. 
Dialogue combines engaging with the positively valued other with seeking 
knowledge of the difference of the other. Agonism combines acting ideologically on 
behalf of the other with seeking knowledge of the identity of the other with the self. 
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Figure 3.15 Combined policies 
Gammars directed towards each other by points of diffraction, combining to form three 
policies 
 
Figure 3.16 completes the tasks which the subsection posed for itself; to construct a 
map of policies for relating to the other developed on the theoretical basis of 
Baumann & Gingrich's concept of grammars for self/other interaction. On the one 
hand, the map delimits a realm of grammatical policies for relating to the other: The 
grammatical policies are delimited by allowing Firstly, a basic distinction between 
self and other; secondly, two distinguishable wills each seeking to act in and on 
behalf of the relation; and thirdly, an at least a residual possibility to seek knowledge 
of the other to potentially relativize the difference of the other. Within these limits, 
the policies may be more or less black and white, more or less insisting, and more or 
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less curious – but they all allow a future interaction between two distinct yet mutable 
entities.  
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Figure 3.16 Map of policies for self/other relations 
 
On the other hand, the map delimits three distinct anti-grammatical policies: The 
futures pursued in each of these policies are ones in which there is not a relation 
between self and other: Categorical killings seeks to eliminate the threatening other. 
Unconditional love erases the intentionality of the self. Indifference gives up 
distinguishing self from other.  
Obviously some policies are more prone to radicalize conflict than others when 
meeting the policies for the future relation promoted by the other. A negative image 
is more likely to be protested than a positive one. If someone wants to dispossess you 
of your agency, you are likely to counteract. Furthermore, the liminal policies may 
produce each of their specific conflictual response. Subsection 3.3 investigates these 
dynamics systematically as part of the account for the contribution of identity politics 
to radicalization of conflict. 
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3.1.5 The concept of self/other policy narrative 
Let us recapitulate the discursive structures of temporality in policy narratives (laid 
out in chapter 2) and of self/other relations read as grammars (as reconstructed in this 
section) – and then combine the two structures into a structure of a self/other policy 
narrative. 
Firstly, a policy narrative grasps together a 'past' pointing to 'the present' ontology – 
and it further articulates a choice between two or more 'futures' (an oughtology and 
and one or more ougthnotologies) projected on a horizon of possibilities visible from 
the viewpoint of the present. (Recall how this structure was illustrated in figure 2.5 in 
chapter 2). 
Secondly, the relation between self and other works as a grammar for interaction 
more or less dialogical – i.e. the relation may be described as more or less open to the 
co-authorship of other when developing the future relation. The openness – the 
grammaticality, the dialogicality – is conditioned by the relation being conceived of 
as a relation between distinguished entities (to facilitate Orientalism) with each their 
intentionality (to facilitate Encompassment) placed in time (to facilitate 
Segmentation). If we take advantage of the temporality thus inbuilt in the structure of 
the relational grammar, we may implant a snapshot of it on the graphical illustration 
of a narrative.  
Figure 3.17 illustrates the present articulation of a relation between a self and an other 
(distinguished by Orientalism) to have had a common past (allowing Segmentation to 
have produced knowledge of differences and unity). Furthermore, a common future is 
projected (as the result of the combined intentionality of the two: the will of the self 
to Encompass the other expressed as specific policies for its relation; and the co-
narration which the intentionality of the other may be expected to articulate). 
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Figure 3.17 A grammatical self/other relation articulated as ontology at t1 
 
A self/other policy narrative combines the two structures: Both the past, the present 
and the futures grasped together have the form of a grammar for self-other 
interaction. This makes for stories like this: 'In the past, the relation between us and 
them was structured like this, implying this form of interaction – this has led to the 
present relation between us and them, implying that form of future interaction – and 
therefore we now have a choice between following that grammar, which would lead 
us to that unwanted relation with them – or following an alternative policy option, 
which they will answer with an alternative mode of action, and in combination it will 
lead us to a preferred relation with them.' This combined structure is illustrated in 
figure 3.18.  
Every statement of a self-other policy narrative – a story of what we should do to 
them – implicitly or explicitly involves this complex of a temporal structure grasping 
together at least four synchronic structures of self-other relations; a past relation 
pointing to the present relation suggesting a future relation and one or more 
alternative relations. If a self/other narrative – as the one illustrated in figure 3.19 – 
projects only a single future, the task of the analyst is to find the necessity articulated 
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in the narrative and reopen the space for politics closed down by the elimination of 
the possibility of alternative futures. 
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Figure 3.18 The structure of a self/other policy narrative involving agency on both 
sides 
Combining the structure of a policy narrative with the structure of self/other relation 
 
The analytical benefit of this way of conceptualizing self-other policy narrative is that 
it is sensitive to the character of the agency ascribed to the other.
96
 Each of the 
                                           
96
 The analytical complication of this way of conceptualizing self-other policy narrative is 
that the analysis involves temporalities on two levels: There is a temporality implied in each 
relational grammar; and there is a temporality implied in the narrative grasping the 
relational grammars together. To be more specific: The first level of temporality concerns 
the individual grammatical relation. Each grammatical relation between self and other – 
whether placed in the past, in the present or in a future – involves the fixation of a past 
leading to this relation and the choice between alternative future relations. The second level 
of temporality concerns the description of the narrative grasping together the grammatical 
relations. The grasping together of a series of grammars to form a narrative places each of 
the grammars in the past, in the present or in a future – while each grammatical relation 
retains its own configuration of past, present and futures. To be specific: The past leading to 
the present had its own past and it had the present present as part of at least one of its 
futures. And each of the futures possible when viewed from the present must have the 
present (and the past of the present) as its past – but each of the futures will have different 
futures. These separate temporalities of the individual relational grammars may – or may 
not – be explicated in the present articulation. Most often they will not be explicated: the 
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relational grammars described as part of the policy narrative – and each of the steps 
from structural relation to structural relation – involves some idea of how the other 
will re-act to the actions of the self. The idea may be that they will not react – either 
in the sense of continuing their course irrespective of our actions, or in the sense that 
their course will change in a mere cause-effect way as a result of our actions. Or the 
idea may be that they adjust their course as they reflect on the relation being a result 
of interaction. 
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Figure 3.19 Self/other narrative of necessity 
 
Projecting a future relation in which the other is described as threatening the 
existence of the self means proposing an alternative future relation in which 
extraordinary action is taken against the other. This would be a securitizing self/other 
                                                                                                                                            
demand for consistency of the subject entails that the grammars for future interaction 
articulated in the future will be consistent with the one articulated in the present. Two 
examples concerning the past and the future respectively may clarify the point: Firstly, 
when one explains why one has turned out to be wrong concerning some question, the 
argument will typically be a narrative of how – from one's vantage point in the past – certain 
elements of the past or certain possible futures were not visible. Secondly, one might argue 
the need to act in the present to create a situation in the future where one possesses a certain 
knowledge (of the past or of the future) which entails the possibility or impossibility of 
certain future futures.  
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policy narrative. One possible extraordinary means to reach an alternative future is 
the elimination of the other. This would be a genocidal self/other policy narrative .
97
 
3.1.6 Combining parameters to narrate grammars and policies 
To reap the analytical benefit involved in an analytical strategy sensitive to the 
agency of the other we need to return to what Hansen called 'the big concepts at the 
grandest philosophical scale' through which identities and their relation to others are 
thought. These parameters are the building blocks available when narrating the 
relation: As you relate self and other along a parameter, you explain the difference of 
the other; you legitimize your story about what to do about it; you may install 
necessity in the story by relating self to other in specific ways along a parameter or 
along a combination of parameters.
98
 
But on what parameters is one to focus?
99
 When approaching the empirical material 
in focus of this dissertation (Danish debates on Muslims) while keeping the aim of 
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 Gingrich & Baumann overstress the reach of anti-grammatical othering as they intimate 
that "the exceptional violence of irretrievably anti-grammatical selfings/otherings ... not 
only aim to annihilate the other, but implicitly and compulsively abolish the former self" as 
the other is a necessary part of the construction of the identity of the self (2004:196). After 
genocide, the other eliminated will immediately still be there, related to the identity of the 
self through their common past as the other which we have eliminated. This is at least how 
the narrative must be told from the present vantage point of the proposers of genocide. In 
principle it might be possible in some future to construct a past which includes neither the 
genocide nor the other – and hence position oneself as a present identity without any 
relation to the eliminated other. But as Derrida reminds us: "Ghosts haunt places that exist 
without them; they return to where they have been excluded from." (Dufourmantelle 
2000:152). And, as chapter 2 discussed – an identity needs some other to be. 
98
 The instalment of necessity may, as we recall from chapter 2, be attempted to insulate 
certain discursive elements from negotiation – but articulation of necessity may also raise 
the stakes of conflict if the necessity is not accepted. 
99
 What are the 'big concepts' through which we conceptualize the world? Does it make 
sense to construct at final list of the big concepts; to include a specific limited number à 
priori? When surveying analyses based on conceptual history and discourse theory, a far 
reaching consensus seem to arrive at two points: Firstly, that we need three big concepts. 
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the dissertation in mind (to assess the contribution to radicalization of conflict) a 
                                                                                                                                            
Lots of lists include three concepts – not two, not four, but three. Secondly, on the various 
shortlists two concepts reappear: Space and time. What concept is awarded the third spot, 
however, varies. Concerning the general preference for trinities: On the one hand this 
preference might be a tribute to the limited analytical capacity of the average academic: If 
anyone tries to conduct and communicate an analysis organizing something along more than 
three dimensions, things get too complicated for the audience to follow. If creative, you may 
visualize three dimensions in a coordinate system (cf. Chilton 2004) or a table (cf. Hansen 
1998:120; Gad 2005:55) without certain communicative breakdown. On the other hand, one 
might speculate that the same goes for the cognitive capacity of the average human being: 
three dimensions are the maximum manageable – and if this is so, then perhaps human 
interaction might 'actually' tend to be organized along trinities of parameters. Along the 
same line, one might speculate that three is also the number of dimensions organizing space 
as accessible to the human visual and tactile sensations; this might make 'three dimensions' 
a 'sign which is good to think with' (cf. Neumann 2001:66 paraphrasing Lévi-Strauss). This 
line of reasoning would lead to an accept of the first big concept as a universal: Space – 
constituted along three dimensions – seem to be such a good sign to think with, that it 
structures the way we think about the second safe spot on the shortlist of big concepts: Time 
is invariably conceptualized in spatial metaphors (Koselleck 1985:273; Lakoff & Johnson 
1980; Chilton 2004:57). But things get complicated if one wants to fix three universal 'big 
concepts'. One example is the way Koselleck bases his begriffsgeschichte on a universal 
need for any semantic field to order a temporality (in terms of past/present) and a spatiality 
(in terms of in/out) – and as a third universal; a notion of hierarchy (1990:122ff; cf. 
Petersen 2008:71). Hierarchy, however, is a spatial metaphor: up/down is as spatial as 
in/out. More pertinently, if the analysis is to remain open to conceptual change, the concepts 
themselves need to be included in the analysis and, hence, cannot serve as universal: even 
these categories for evaluation of conceptual change must be read out of the empirical 
material (Petersen (2007:71). In this radicalisation of Koselleck's approach the (self-
)diagnosis of the modern condition is expanded to include even the categories in which the 
conceptualisation of change is to be evaluated. So the parameters one must put to work in 
analysis depend on what are appropriate to the field. Appropriateness depends on the aim of 
the study. Nevertheless Petersen reads out of her empirical material exactly the two no 
longer universal categories (temporality and spatiality) as central to her analysis and to 
conceptual change in the empirical field. A different problem may occur if one starts by 
pointing out certain concepts as 'central' to the empirical material: one might need to leave 
the parsimony of the trinity behind. One example is the way Andersen – to analyse the 
institutionalization of ideals – conceptualizes a 'narrative order of discourse' arranged 
around a series of distinctions "which I find to be central" (1994:28; trl. by upg) and ends up 
with five distinctions: inside/outside, up/down, past/present, subject/object and 
helper/opponent (1994:28-33). The two last distinctions – which Andersen takes from 
discourse and narrative theory – are of central to the problematique of this dissertation too. 
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series of concepts appear central. The dissertation elects to organize the analysis of 
the interactional self/other policies in a trinity of trinities.  
The basic trinity encompassing the three lesser trinities consists of the conditions of 
possibility for the three grammars of self/other interaction discussed in subsection 
3.1.4: Recall that to facilitate Orientalist grammar, spatial distinction needs to be 
included. And to facilitate Segmentation, temporality needs to be included. Finally, to 
facilitate Encompassment, intentionality needs to be included. By including these 
three parameters, the analysis may account for how self/other policy narratives are 
placed within or beyond the limits of grammatical othering. The way the trinity of 
parameters of relationality constitutes the conditions of possibility for the three 
grammars is illustrated in figure 3.20.  
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Figure 3.20 Basic parameters of relationality 
Diachriticon, temporality and intentionality as conditions of grammatical relations 
 
So the three basic parameters of relationality observed are: spatiality, temporality, 
and intentionality. Each basic parameter includes yet a trinity of parameters: 
 Difference needs to be established spatially: What is the relevant diacriticon 
for distinguishing between identity and difference? Is there a hierarchy 
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between identity and difference? Is there a physical distance between identity 
and difference? 
 Spatially differentiated, temporal aspects of the identity/difference-relation 
may be added: Is the Other said to causally influence the Self? Does the 
relation have a known history? And what is the historicity of the Other; 
specifically, is it said to have a capability for change relevant for the relation? 
 Finally arises the question of intentionality: Does the Other assume a positive 
or negative posture in relation to the Self? Is the Other described to embody 
the free will of an independent agency or is it reduced to mere structural effect 
when the relation to the self is concerned? And finally is the Other – as the 
result of combining historicity and agency – characterized by a possible 
dialogicality; i.e. the capacity of engaging in a two way interaction with a view 
to possible modification of the relation and the identities? The questions 
concerning the intentionality of the Other is – of course – mirrored by a self-
description of the posture, agency, and dialogicality of the Self in relation to 
the specific Other. 
Each of the questions point to a parameter along which the relation between self and 
other may be described, adding to the specification of the policies combining the 
basic grammars for future interaction between self and other at a specific point of 
time in the narrative. The three groups of parameters are briefly discussed in the 
following subsections. 
3.1.6.1 Parameters of spatiality: diacriticon, hierarchy, distance 
This subsection discusses three parameters of spatiality contributing to the 
construction of a grammar for future interaction: Firstly, it discusses the foundational 
parameter of diacriticon and the relativization or partial annulment of it implied in the 
grammars of encompassment and segmentation. Secondly, it discusses two spatial 
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parameters important to the construction of specific self/other grammars and to the 
instalment of necessities in these grammars: the parameters of hierarchy and distance. 
The double structure of identity as discourse introduced in chapter 2 – identity as 
void; identity as narrative – has at its base a spatial metaphor. The Orientalist 
operation of distinguishing between something included as identical and something 
excluded as different is thought as a spatial operation (cf. Hansen 2006:47): two sorts 
are allocated to two spatially distinct piles. Both structures combined in the double 
structure are necessarily constructed spatially. Firstly, when the distinction between 
identity and difference is made, a void to be filled is left in identity – or as Rumelili 
puts it: "how we think of 'who we are' are conditioned by prevailing understandings 
of how one ought to be a self: cohesive, distinct from ... others" (Rumelili, n.d.:4; 
italics added). Identity involves an effective ideal of solidity and distinction – 
qualities only imaginable as spatial – and this spatial ideal is left unfulfilled. 
Secondly, the construction of a narrative is dependent on the distinction between 
included and excluded as well (Andersen 1994:28-33); otherwise there would be no 
distinct roles or role-takers: "The simple use of 'we' and 'you' establishes a boundary 
and is in this respect a condition of possibility determining the capacity to act." 
(Koselleck 1985:159f)
100
 The focal point of the analysis of the foundational 
parameter of spatial ontology is the diacriticon pointed out as relevant for 
distinguishing between identity and difference. 
What is important to note, is that this foundational, spatial parameter of being distinct 
– of having a distinct identity; an identity different from other identities – is one of 
the qualities fought over in identity politics. To uphold distinction is not a given affair 
– as one may meet a grammar of encompassment through which the other insist that 
there is no to separate identities: The self claims that the other is identical with the 
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 We return to this crucial parameter – the capacity to act – in subsection 3.1.6.3. 
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self (cf. Hansen 1998:117f). This construction seems on the face of it to be somewhat 
paradoxical: When accepting that identities appear only as discourse, how may 
something be constructed simultaneously as identical and different?  
The answer is, of course, that discourse never exists in the singular: There will 
always be struggles over representation. The simultaneous construction of something 
as identical and different provides, hence, the penultimate basis for internal and 
external identity politics (cf. subsection 3.3.1): the struggle over what identity 
discourses should count leaves their mark in the individual narratives partaking in the 
struggles. Therefore the analysis must be able to observe how the relevance of 
individual diacritica – and the identities made distinct by the diacritica – varies in 
different situations (Barth 1969; cf. chapter 2). 
The means with which this fight over the relevance of diacritica and identities is 
conducted include the other parameters of spatiality, temporality, and intentionality 
as well as the way in which they are combined. Identity may be displaced from the 
present by being placed in the past or in the future.
101
 Or a presumptively distinct 
identity may – along with the relevance of the diacriticon demarcating it – be 
annulled by being included in an encompassing, hierarchically superior identity. 
A second spatial parameter is, as suggested by Koselleck, hierarchy. Most if not all 
relations between self and other im- or explicitly involve an ordering of self and other 
in a hierarchy. Or rather; it may order self and other in a number of hierarchies. A 
vertical positioning of self relative to other – the one over the other or the two on a 
par with each other – may be ascribed according to more than one criterion. And 
more hierarchies may be established simultaneously.  
Most notably hierarchies of truth, power, and moral value may be constructed to 
interfere with each other – or they may be constructed to coincide or support each 
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 More on this in subsection 3.1.6.2. 
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other by being entangled beyond disentanglement. For example, opposing hierarchies 
of strength and worth may be simultaneously implied in the distinction between 
centre and periphery: The centre may in colonial discourse be strong and good as 
related to a weak and morally inferior periphery; post-colonial discourse affirms the 
hierarchy of power while reversing the hierarchy of worth – thus attempting to 
perform a reconfiguration of the hierarchy of power. Todorov seems to construct his 
axiological level to describe moral value (Todorov 1999:185; cf. subsection 3.1.1) – 
but a separate point of his analysis is the way the true, the good, and the powerful 
often merges in the self-description of the Spaniards. Contrarily, Smith (2003) retells 
narratives of power, wealth, and ethical worth separately – implying separate 
hierarchies. Andersen suggests focusing on hierarchies of authority and responsibility 
(1994:28-33 referring to Bauman 1990:144); both categories which may involve both 
normative and descriptive qualities.
102
 The point to be noted here is that an analysis 
must be sensitive to different hierarchies possibly constructed simultaneously. 
A third spatial parameter is distance. Or, once again; distances in the plural: The 
territorial distance between us and them may be zero (as we may share a territory) 
while the social distance is upheld (as they are upholding a 'parallel society' within 
this shared territory). When Rumelili analyzes the relation between the EU and 
Turkey, she focuses on the two entities as politico-territorial entities. She may 
therefore focus on the "social distance maintained between self and other" (2007:38-
43) as both 'stay in their territorial place', so to speak: Close, being neighbours – but 
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 Chilton seems to go very far to uphold his trinity, as he (2004:54-61) collapses the 
"epistemic true", the "deontic right" and the "Self-negating Other" into one “composite” 
scale of “modality” to combine with the two dimensions of space and time. "Modality", as I 
understand the text, would amount to the 'posture' discussed as part of the parameters of 
intentionality (in subsection 3.1.6.3). 
184 
nevertheless territorially distinct.
103
 Other analyses have included – as part of the 
relation between Europe and Turkey – the construction of Turkish migrants in 
Germany and other countries;
104
 in such a perspective, the territorial and territorial 
distances combine in altogether different patterns. A crucial and sedimented 
diacriticon aiming to establish and uphold both social and territorial distance – as 
well as cultural, legal and other forms of distance – is, of course (as discussed in 
chapter 2), the national diacriticon. 
Important necessity-effects may be achieved from combining spatial parameters: 
Derrida describes how a superior position in a hierarchy of moral value may be 
legitimized by (zero) distance (in terms of both space and time) in "ontopological" 
reasoning, i.e. “an axiomatics linking indissociably the ontological value of present-
being to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the 
topos of territory, native soil, city, body in general” (2006[1993]:103).105 An even 
more aggressive necessity-effect comes out of linking distance and hierarchies of 
worth and/or truth in 'universalizing' reasoning: the argument that this is not just true 
and/or valuable here (as in ontopological reasoning) but true and/or valuable 
everywhere. A claim to universality in effect places dissent as impossible or 
illegitimate (cf. Koselleck 1985:161ff).
106
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 At least distinct when viewed as politico-territorial units. As geographical and historical 
identities, things are more complicated. Not to mention culture. 
104
 Tocci (2007:22ff); cf. Hannibal (2008); Bliddal & Christensen (2006). 
105
 “[U]ne axiomatique liant indissociablement la valeur ontologique de l’être-présent (on) à 
sa situation, à la détermination stable et présentable d’une localité (le topos du territoire, du 
sol, de la ville, du corps en général).” (1993:137; cf. Torfing 1999:202). 
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 Koselleck analyses what he terms 'asymmetrical counterconcepts' of selves and others; a 
narrative involving only two roles which between them exhausts the social universe. It 
appears very difficult to uphold such a distribution of roles for a protracted period of time – 
save in the case of a securitization closing down the voice of the other: "It is characteristic 
of counterconcepts that are unequally antithetical that one's own position is readily defined 
185 
In sum: A diacriticon for demarcating identity from difference is, on the one hand, 
the foundational spatial parameter for describing the relation between self and other – 
and as a consequence hereof it is, on the other hand, fought over in identity politics. 
Two further spatial parameters – hierarchy and distance – serve as efficient means for 
installing necessity in the self/other policy narrative. 'We are better/stronger than 
Them, therefore we may… They are close, therefore we must…' 
3.1.6.2 Parameters of temporality: causality, history, historicity 
Once spatially differentiated, the relational grammar may be temporalized. Any 
temporalization implies placing the relational grammar in a narrative – but a few 
basic forms of micro-narratives may be discerned. A relational grammar may, hence, 
be described along three basic parameters of temporality as it involves causality, 
history, and historicity.  
One basic narrative made possible by a temporalization of the self/other relation – 
one parameter of temporality in the description of a policy for future interaction – is 
causality: Does the other influence the self – or is its existence inconsequential? An 
influence may be positive or negative – threatening or 'inspirational' (Triandafyllidou 
2002:34; cf. Rumelili 2004).
107
 Causality – no matter if positive or negative – implies 
importance: If the other influences you, it is difficult to ignore the other. 
A different parameter of temporality of the relational grammar is that of history: Does 
the relation between self and other have a history? Is the past of the other (and its 
relation to the self) described as known? Or is it unknown, whether enigmatic or just 
so far not deemed worthy of interest?
 
Purported knowledge of the other's past may be 
                                                                                                                                            
by criteria which make it possible for the resulting counterposition to be only negated." 
(Koselleck 1985:163). Symmetrical counterconcepts,to the contrary, may be posed in 
existential conflict (1985:197), but they may also be peacefully segmented (1985:172f). 
107
 Notably, causality does not necessarily involve intentionality or agency on behalf of the 
other. We return to these parameters to in subsection 3.1.6.3. 
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utilized to project certain futures as more probable than others – or even some futures 
as certain. Lack of knowledge of the other may spur an urge to study its past and its 
present. Attempts to get to know – to imagine, project, prognosticate – the future of 
the other and of the relation will often articulate known pasts of the other. 
A third parameter of temporality of the relational grammar is historicity: Is the 
character of the relation between self and other permanent or capable of change? 
Permanence may be ascribed to both ends of the relation – and/or to the relation 
itself. In parallel, capability of change may be attached to the self, the other and/or to 
the relation as such (cf. Hansen 2006:48). Rumelili (2004:37) describes how the 
historicity of the relation is formed by – and formats – the historicity of both ends to 
the relation: One option is the permanence of a self/other relation involving a self 
excluding an other as 'permanently non-self' due to inherent characteristics. A 
different option is the changing (even dissolving) relation between a self ready to 
include an other deemed only 'temporarily less-self' due to acquired characteristics. 
The possible change may occur in the form an unfolding of a predetermined inner 
logic. Or change may occur as possible due to malleability: Self, other or the relation 
as such may be describes a changeable; as something self and/or other may work on. 
In sum: Three temporal parameters – causality, history, and historicity – serve as 
efficient means for installing necessity in the the self/other policy narrative: 'They 
influence Us, therefore we must… We know that They are X, therefore We must…. 
They never change, therefore We must…'  
3.1.6.3 Parameters of intentionality: agency, posture, dialogicality 
Finally comes the whole point of placing the self/other relation within a narrative. 
The point is that placing self and other within the parameters of spatiality and 
temporality makes it possible to observe the relation between self and other as a 
grammatical relation; as a grammar for interaction. As discussed (in chapter 2 and in 
subsection 3.1.6.1 and 3.1.6.2), spatial constitution and temporal narration makes it 
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possible to conceive of self and other as intentional agents posed in relation to each 
others. Spatial constitution and temporal narration makes three parameters of 
intentionality possible: agency, posture, and dialogicality. 
What is discussed in this subsection as three parameters of intentionality has been 
conceptualized in numerous analytical configurations. Foucault's archaeology of 
knowledge (1972) all but discards with any meaningful form of agency by 
distributing its content to two other categories: Firstly, the category of 'enunciative 
modality' denotes the place in discourse from which an utterance is uttered 
(1972:50ff).
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 Secondly, the category of 'strategy' accounts for a broad sense of 
directedness (1972:64ff). In Foucault, neither enunciative modality nor strategy imply 
agency as such – except from the 'agency', so to say, performed by the structure 
determined by its 'strategies'. Such a 'directedness' or 'will' of structure could perhaps 
better be termed 'intentionality'. Both agents and structure may, in that sense, be 
endowed with intentionality (cf. Nelson 2003:§19). 
In Ricœur's theory of the narrative, spatiality and temporality is organized to facilitate 
a specific form of intentionality: agency. The question could, with Andersen 
(1994:28-33), be phrased: Is the entity in question described as a subject capable of 
manipulating other entities – or solely as a manipulable object? Is an independent 
subjectivity of some sort ascribed – or is the relation between self and other an 
attempt at objectification; a reduction of the other to a structural effect bereft of any 
independent subjectivity? Where the macro-perspective of Foucault's archaeology of 
knowledge democratically cancels out all agency, the post-colonial problematique par 
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 Others have taken up this conceptualization under the label 'subject position'. 
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excellance is, after Saïd (1978) exactly how it may take a specific configuration of 
the self/other relation to cancel the agency of the other.
109
 
So 'intentionality' as a concept including the directedness of both structure and 
agency seems, on the one hand, to be somewhat more directed than Foucault's 
enunciative modality. On the other hand, it is somewhat less specific regarding the 
direction of the intentions than Hansen's concept of responsibility (cf. subsection 
3.1.1). Responsibility is directed towards someone – towards self or towards some 
other. Intentions do not need to be directed at someone; it may be directed at an 
object. Furthermore, even intentions which happen to involve an other need not be 
grounded in an intention measurable on a scale ranging from responsibility towards 
the other to lack of responsibility towards the other. The intensions may be directed 
elsewhere and merely coincidentally be involving the other in question. In that 
situation, 'posture' may be a better metaphor: An other may be posed aggressively, 
affirmatively or indifferently towards me without the posture involving any intentions 
– the posture may be a structural effect or it may be an un-intentional side-effect of 
intentions directed at someone or something else.  
A positive posture may, however, be ascribed to the other as the result of a deliberate 
choice of the other to assume a positive attitude towards the self. This would amount 
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 Or when viewed bottom up: the possibility of subjectivity under near-total hegemony. 
Saïd (1978) investigates what might be counted as one extreme case: the near-to completely 
successful objectification of the colonial subject. On the one hand, the position of the 
colonial subject in the hierarchy of subjects and objects is so, that it is almost impossible for 
it to speak (cf. Saïd, 1978:34f). On the other hand Saïd – in an explicit polemics against 
Foucault (1978:22f; cf. Neumann 1999:15) – insists that the individual author may make a 
difference. The individual author, that is, who is from the outset empowered by discourse. 
Spivak (1988) lays out just how difficult it is for the colonial subject to get post- 
objectification – without leaving the identification with the co-colonized behind. The 
subaltern may not speak – as subaltern. By acquiring a voice – i.a. by entering academia – 
the subaltern enters the hegemonic discourse and loses its status as subaltern. Hence, the 
subaltern remains without voice. As discussed in fn. 79, Bhabha is more optimistic when it 
comes to possible subaltern agency. 
189 
to the role of a helper or even a friend. In parallel, a deliberately negative posture 
would be that of an opponent or an enemy.
110
 The other may, however, "pose a 
challenge" (Triandafyllidou 2002:34) without any bad intentions. The other may be 
described as causally influencing the self by its mere existence – or by its actions or 
intentions directed elsewhere: Positively, its existence as source of inspiration may 
pose a challenge. Negatively, its mere existence as a huge power concentration may 
(even if inattentive to the self) be presented as a threat (Triandafyllidou 2002:34).
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Whether a challenge from an other is positive or negative – and whether it occurs as a 
structural effect or from deliberate agency – it may be constructed to trigger a 
specific distribution of responsibility for dealing with the challenge on behalf of the 
Self. 
Finally, given the constitution of self and other as distinct entities each endowed with 
some sort of agency, a third parameter of intentionality becomes possible: 
Dialogicality. This parameter concerns the capability to engage in a two way 
interaction with a view to possible wilful modification of the relation – and thereby 
the identities. Is the other engagable or unreachable? Is the self willing to engage in 
self-reflection? Does it make any sense to try to communicate with the aim of 
achieving a joint reflexive process concerning the relationship? 
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 Cf. Andersen (1994:28-33) referring to Greimas (1974) and Bauman (1991:143-169). 
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 Rumelili's third dimension of the self/other relation concerns, as described in subsection 
3.1.1, "how the other responds to the construction of its identity" on a spectrum from 
recognition to resistance (2004:37f). The effects on the self of the 'response' of the other are 
not dependent on the 'response' being deliberate or intentional. An (inadvertently) 
challenging posture may have the same effect as a deliberate negative response worthy of 
the label 'resistance' – just as an inadvertently reaffirming posture may have the same effect 
as the deliberate positive response of 'recognition'. 
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The concept of dialogicality employed in the dissertation obviously owes to Bakhtin. 
In Bakhtin, dialogicality is the name for the relationality of every identity.
112
 The 
dissertation moves the quality of dialogicality from the identity to the relation. 
Dialogicality is a way for the self to construct the relation between the self and the 
other. To construct a dialogical relation the self must describe both self and other as 
capable of receiving input. Implied in such a construction is a willingness to (at least 
reflect on whether self or other should) engage in the self-reform necessary for 
transformation of the relation. Dialogicality, hence, needs to be founded on 
agentiality and both sides of a relation between distinct entities.  
In sum: The distribution of agency is a crucial parameter of intentionality in the 
description of the relation between self and other. In its extreme, the distribution of 
agency sets out two radically different positions from which to protest the 
construction of the relation: In the position of an object you have no legitimate voice. 
In the very different position of a subject you have a voice (necessarily limited but 
nevertheless, you do have a voice). Being crucial, the distribution of agency and 
subjectivity is – intimately related to identity – fought over in identity politics. 
Posture is another parameter of intentionality. Especially when configured negatively 
– as a threat, or even an existential threat – the ascription of a posture to the other 
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 Bakhtin's critique of Hegel is that the relation between self and other in Hegelian 
dialectics is actually monological as the end point is one of synthesis; of unity: There is, 
finally, only one voice unfolding (cf. Neumann 1999:14 quoting Kristeva 1986:58). In 
contrast to dialectics, Bakhtin's position is that every utterance is always dialogical in the 
sense that more than one voice is present. Even if there is not more than one voice explicitly 
present, then more voices are at least present as the implicit context (past and future) which 
the speaker is inadvertently orienting himself to. Nevertheless, an utterance may "postulate" 
to perform "a simple and unmediated relation of speaker to his unitary and singular 'own' 
language … as well as a simple realization of this language in the monologic utterance of 
the individual" (Bakhtin 1981:269). In that sense, according to Bakhtin, 'centripetal forces' 
postulating monologue and 'centrifugal forces' revealing dialogicality meet in every 
utterance (1981:270-2). 
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may serve as an effective means for installing necessity in the self/other narrative. 
Necessities installed are, as mentioned, generally potential points of conflict. But 
necessities installed by the means of pointing out existential threats, however, are 
especially tricky points of conflict: When the posture of an other is described as 
existentially threatening to the self, it is (as may be recalled from subsection 3.1.3) 
next to impossible to construct the relation along the third parameter of intentionality: 
dialogicality. This third parameter of intentionality in the construction of the 
relational policy – dialogicality – is potentially decisive for the dynamics of 
interaction as it opens the possibility of a joint self-reflexive management of the 
relation. (This line of reasoning is pursued in section 3.3).  
First, however, the analytical lenses focused on identity as a discursive structure 
constructed in this section need to be summed up (in subsection 3.1.7) and the 
analytical lenses to focus on the articulation of identity as discursive action needs to 
be constructed (in section 3.2). 
3.1.7 Self/Other policy narratives inviting or averting the agency of 
the other 
The task assigned to this section was to account theoretically for the contribution to 
radicalization of conflict from identity as discursive structure. It did so by analyzing 
how self/other policy narratives may be structured to imply different grammars for 
future interaction between self and other. 
The section described the form of a self/other policy narrative to consist in the 
combination of two structures: The structure of temporality of a policy narrative 
(developed in chapter 2) – and the structure of a self/other relation. It did so to 
facilitate a focus on the implied future interaction between self and other. The 
specific future envisioned by a policy is grammatical insofar as it involves a 
combination of three basic grammars: a) a grammar of distinguishing self from other 
(Orientalism), b) a grammar of acting on behalf of the other (Encompassment) and c) 
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a grammar producing knowledge of the self/other relation (Segmentation). Analysing 
the self/other relation constructed by looking for the implied combination of 
interactional grammars means focusing the analysis on the conditions for future 
interaction between self and other. In combination, the three grammars delimit a 
realm of policies which allow future interaction between two distinct entities – and 
three distinct ways in which the future envisioned may not include a relation between 
self and other.  
A series of obvious candidates for contributions to radicalizations appear in this map 
of self/other policy narratives:  
Firstly, any policy interfering with the agency of the other – by Encompassment 
insisting on acting on behalf of the other – is more likely than not to meet some kind 
of resistance. 
Secondly, any policy legitimated by an Orientalist mirroring of a positively valued 
self with a negatively valued other would seem to invite protest. 
Thirdly, policies combining Orientalism and Encompassment in prescribing violent 
disengagement from the other – in the form of securitization or outright categorical 
killings – are likely to be perceived as threatening by the other. 
Fourthly, the two assimilatory policies – other-assimilation and self-assimilation – 
warrants further consideration: Other-assimilation appeared as the paradoxical 
reaction of the Orientalist self faced with hybridity. Self-assimilation appeared as the 
paradoxical reaction of the Encompassing self faced with paralysis. These policies 
may provoke an other who wants the relation intact as a relation between two distinct 
wills. 
Finally, the very flexibility of Segmentation – allowing oscillation between in- and 
exclusion – might frustrate those who want to conclude identity politics. 
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Even if such a series of obvious candidates for contributions to radicalization present 
themselves, the section cannot finish the account of contributions from identity as a 
discursive structure. The reason is that no structure can produce a conflict by itself; 
conflict only comes with the response of an other.
113
 Therefore, the chapter needs to 
put the final account of the contributions to radicalization of conflict from discursive 
structure aside for section 3.3. In this final section the policy narratives articulated by 
the self meets the response of the other in identity politics. How conflictual this 
meeting turns out to be, hinges not only on the relation per se narrated between self 
and other. It hinges also on how the narrative is articulated with necessity. So before 
we may turn to discursive interaction the dissertation needs to consider the 
contribution to radicalization of conflict from the discursive articulation of identity 
with necessity.  
Subsection 3.1.6 has already begun this discussion by noting how self/other policy 
narratives could be articulated with necessity by constructing the synchronic relation 
between self and other along certain parameters in specific ways. More generally, the 
subsection discussed how specific combinations of interactional grammars are 
narrated along a series of parameters of spatiality, temporality, and intentionality to 
legitimise various policies of the self towards the other. Figure 3.21 summarizes how 
a grammar for future interaction between a self and an other may be described along 
the three types of parameters. Section 3.2 continues the discussion of how necessity 
may be articulated to various elements of self/other policy narratives. In other words, 
the two proceeding sections account for the contribution to radicalization of conflict 
from the articulation of identity with necessity and from identity politics. 
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 To take an extreme example; a genocidal self/other relation in which the self describes 
the other as existentially threatening the other and projects a future concluding with 
'categorical killings'. Such a way of narrating the relation immediately appears as a way of 
radicalizing conflict. In principle, however, even to securitization an answer exists which 
would defuse conflict: If the other commits suicide, there is no conflict. 
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We
They
Temporality:
• History
• Historicity
• Causality
Spatiality:
• Difference
• Hierarchy
• Distance
Intentionality:
• Agency
• Posture
• Dialogicality
Policy:
• Agency
• Posture
• Dialogicality
 
Figure 3.21 Parameters of relational grammar 
A relation between self and other may be described along three parameters of spatiality, 
three parameters of temporality and three parameters of intentionality. 
 
3.2 Articulations of identity radicalizing conflict: Installing 
necessity  
As discussed in chapter 2, discursive action includes the rational, failed rational, as 
well as irrational aspects of the attempts by discursively constituted subjects at 
reconstituting and reproducing discursive structures. Articulation of identity is the 
subcategory of discursive action aimed at the discursive structure of identity. The aim 
of articulating identity is the distribution of subjectivity by the constitution of new 
identities and by the ongoing narration of existing identity. 
This section sets out to account for the contribution to radicalization of conflict from 
the articulation of identity. Specifically, the section asks: 
ii. How may identity be articulated to necessity to contribute to radicalization of 
conflict? 
To answer the question, the focus needs to be on the articulation of identity with a 
view to observe how subjects may strategically seek to install necessity in the 
self/other policy narratives they promote. Necessity, firstly, has the potential effect of 
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stopping internal identity politics. If necessity is installed, certain elements of the 
narratives are presented as 'non-negotiables'. Necessity therefore, secondly, has the 
potential effect of closing down – as far as concerns the necessitated element – the 
possibility of self-reform, self-reflection and dialogicality in relation to the other; i.e. 
in external identity politics. Necessity successfully installed stops debate internally – 
and it attempts to limit the space of co-narration of the other. If the other does not 
accept to be muted on the element invested with necessity, the instalment of necessity 
transports conflict from internal identity politics to external identity politics. Figure 
3.22 illustrates the effect of articulating necessity to a narrative.
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Time narrated by actor
 
Figure 3.22 Self/other policy narrative articulated to necesisty 
Consistency is projected into future articulations of narratives by the agent 
 
Necessity may be installed in a policy narrative in various ways: As pointed out in 
subsection 3.1.6, necessity may be installed via the formation of the self/other policy 
narrative as such; i.e. via the specific way in which the relation constructed between 
self and other presents itself as an interactional grammar. I.a. when Their posture is 
described as threatening to Us; or when Their presence in a territory described as 
                                           
114
 When read in continuation of figure 2.7. 
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Ours is presented as a infringement of our rights or our identity. These – and other – 
ways of relating Them and Us are presenting specific elements as necessary to 
include in the future narration of the relation. 
This section investigates two further ways in which elements may be presented as 
necessary in the continued narration of a relation. Firstly, necessity may be 
articulated via the temporalization of a narrative. Necessity articulated by 
temporalization is discussed in subsection 3.2.1. Secondly necessity may be installed 
via the articulation of the inertia of sedimented discourse. This way of articulating 
necessity – not in but to the structure of the self/other policy narrative – is the focus 
for subsection 3.2.2.  
3.2.1 Installing necessity by the temporalization of narratives 
Chapter 2 noted how narratives may be narrativized when it "feigns to make the 
world speak of itself and speak itself as a story." (White 1980:6-7) In this way, 
narrativizing discourse installs necessity in the world by letting the world tell how 
things are or will be articulated – rather than presenting how things are being 
articulated to form the world. Chapter 2 took this as an occasion to generally focus 
the analysis of the dissertation on such articulating away of the articulation. The 
overall modus of analysis is to uncover the way elements are made necessary by 
covering up the way they are made necessary. 
The most basic way of constructing necessity in a narrative is to fixate one specific 
future as the inescapable consequence of the past: simple cause and effect. Such a 
'causal necessity' annuls the policy character of the narrative. It does not rule out 
action. It just leaves action futile as it will have no effect; the effect being determined 
by the cause in the past. Not a very bright prospect for a politician who, by trade, 
earns his living from proposing action under the name of policy. Such a 
temporalization places too much weight on the past to appear satisfactory in 
modernity: It cancels out the sense that our actions now may have an effect. If the 
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past determines, we are – as a collective – out of control. However, a series of more 
complex temporalities are available to a measured narrating away of the narrating 
present by discursively re-allocating primacy to either the past or the future. 
Koselleck describes the modern ideologies – the -isms – as programs for the future 
with disregard for the past:
115
 The necessity of the future projected by these –isms 
comes from an explicitly made choice awarding more value to this future than to that 
future. It seems even today that in most political debates references to courses of 
events more than a couple of decades ago come across as peculiar. In some debates, 
these modern '-isms' live on.  
As a politician you may, however, prefer a different version of necessity than the 
necessity of cause and effect or a necessity depending on a choice. You might prefer 
a 'you would be stupid not to-necessity'. In this kind of necessity, the narrative is 
structured by grasping together a past with a policy proposed in the present leading to 
a future goal which is implicitly constructed as undisputed. Necessity comes not as 
un-avoidable; neither does it come as the result of a choice; it comes across as 
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 Koselleck describes how this is implicated in the modern temporality of progress: the 
past is largely irrelevant as 'everyone knows' that 'everything has changed' (cf. Koselleck 
1985:277). Specifically, the '-isms' which turned Modernity into a programme are 
"[c]oncepts of movement [which] ... open a new future. ... All concepts of movement share a 
compensatory effect, which they produce. The lesser the experimental substance, the greater 
the expectations joined to it. The lesser the experience, the greater the expectations: this is 
the formula for the temporal structure of the modern, to the degree that it is rendered a 
concept by 'progress'." (Koselleck 1985:288). Koselleck explains the conditions of 
possibility of the progressive –isms with "[T]echnical innovations and discoveries in early 
modernity" which made for "a consciousness of difference between traditional experience 
and coming expectation." (Koselleck 1985:277). Hence, "[t]he opening of a new horizon of 
expectation via the effects of what was later conceived as 'progress'" moved "[t]he objective 
of possible completeness, previously only attainable in the Hereafter, [so that it] henceforth 
served the idea of improvement on earth ... Henceforth history could be regarded as a long-
term process of growing fulfilment which ... was ultimately planned and carried out by men 
themselves. ... the effects anticipated by plan or prognosis became the titles of legitimation 
of political action" (Koselleck 1985:278-9). 
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unquestionably good. There are alternatives – but they are not a question of choice; 
they are unquestionably bad. Therefore present action is necessary – and the direction 
of the present action is necessary. In this version of necessity the articulating present 
is not totally wiped out, but it is all but dominated by the necessity of the future 
articulated. The effect of this way of constructing necessity is to legitimize the 
proposed policy – and to de-legitimize any alternatives (whether they are mentioned 
explicitly or only implied). The result is de-politicized narratives advocating that 
what is left of lesser choices should be left to those best capable of managing the road 
to the future implicitly accepted by all. 
But the -isms of modernity and the technical narratives are supplemented with new -
isms of postmodernity. As Friedman has poetically put it:  
Modernity moves east, leaving postmodernity in its wake; religious festival, ethnic 
rennaissance, roots and nationalism are resurgent as modernist identity becomes 
increasingly futile in the West. In the … confusion, …the periphery and margins of 
the system also react in … a complex combination of Third and Fourth world 
strategies. (Friedman 1992:360) 
As indicated by the words chosen – rennaissance, roots – the temporality of these 
movements are different from the typical modern temporality described by 
Koselleck: 
Taken at face value, the temporality of some of these new -isms is circular rather than 
linear: They propose not the constitution of a future Utopia but the re-storation of a 
lost Golden Age.
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 It goes without saying that a construction of such a Golden Age 
to be restored relies heavily on a present narrating away of past experience. 
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 Like the typical nationalist narrative, according to Smith (1991:161; cf. Gad 2005:81f). 
Hence, a narrative of restoration does not conform to the temporality of historical myth, 
which is still linear: myths, according to Kølvrå, "do not simply contrast a pre-
communitarian chaos to a utopian present, but, as an integral part of ideology, they project 
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A very different – and more extreme – way of dealing with the past consists in 
making experience totally irrelevant. If the point of arrival is the only sure thing, then 
the point of departure looses significance. As 'religious festival' has returned as 
resonance room for policy formulations, this eschatological temporal figure has made 
a surprising comeback.
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Yet another way to prioritize the future in the articulation of a narrative makes the 
need to analytically dissect the attempted closure even more pertinent: the security 
narrative. Recall (from chapter 2) the difference between the way in which individual 
and collective identities narrates towards death: Authentic individuals, according to 
Heidegger, narrate-towards-certain-death – collective subjectivities, according to 
Campbell, narrate-to-postpone-indefinite-death. One specific modality of articulating 
collective identity might, however, implicate narration-towards-death in its narration-
to-postpone-death. A narrative which securitizes an identity – by pointing out an 
existential threat to the identity along with the means to avert the threat – tells how 
we may to survive as ourselves (Wæver 1994) when confronted with otherwise 
certain 'death'.
118
 A security narrative directs the narrative towards a single immediate 
                                                                                                                                            
utopia into the future." (Kølvrå 2009:37). Whether Utopia is placed in the present or in the 
future, the movement from chaos to Utopia is still linear. In contrast the recreation of a lost 
golden age constructs temporality as circular. 
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 Koselleck describes how this temporality worked for the Puritans as they "draw their 
overwhelming force from anticipation of the future; since this was not susceptible to 
refutation through contrary experience, it was constantly open to repetition. That which 
today is ruled out by negation will be regarded in the future as superseded. A dualism 
temporalized in this manner sorts out possible experiences and opens up a horizon of 
expectation that is quite elastic." (Koselleck 1985:186). 
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 Buzan et al. note as "a trivial but rarely noticed feature of security arguments: They are 
about the future, about alternative futures – always hypothetical – and about counterfactuals. 
A security argument always involves two predictions: What will happen if we do not take 
'security action' (the threat), and what will happen if we do" (1998:32). 
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– almost present – end with the aim of avoiding it.119 A security narrative, hence, 
includes both kinds of narration in the shadow of death – the narration-towards-death 
and the narration-to-postpone death. And their combination conceals the quality of 
the narrative as a policy narrative involving different possible futures. The 
concealment is achieved by two means: Firstly, by means of an extreme version of 
the 'you-would-be-stupid-not-to-necessity' effectively cancelling out any alternative 
policy proposals: If we do not follow this policy proposal, we will not be here to 
remedy our mistake. Secondly, by means of the urgency created by placing the 
expectational horizon of the future – beyond which it is impossible to see – very close 
to the present: If we do not stop talking and act now, it will be too late.
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Table 3.1 summarizes the different ways in which self/other policy narratives may be 
articulated with necessity by temporalization. The temporalizations tilt the weight of 
the narrative away from the present articulation – mainly towards the future, but by 
installing specific constancies also towards the past. 
In sum, the future bears most of the weight when the various forms of narrativizing 
narratives conceal their articulation. Nevertheless, they depend on the past. Most 
often they rely on the construction of specific constancies to be decisive: Even if 
'everything changes', 'We' are identical with the ones we have always been – or 'They' 
are inescapably as we know that they have always been. The installation of such a 
specific permanence works as a necessity delimiting the ongoing narration. Not in the 
sense that it determines or defines the future in toto – but in the sense that it makes 
certain futures impossible. Certain futures are impossible since certain elements are 
immune to policy. This kind of temporalization relies on the articulation of 
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 In contrast to the temporal structure of a myth which (as discussed in chapter 2) directs 
the narrative towards a single end in the distant future with the aim of achieving it. 
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 Subsection 3.1.4 argued that this temporal structure characteristic of security narratives is 
connected to the way securitization works as a limit to grammatical self/other-relations. 
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sedimented discourse. The construction of specific constancies depend on the 
articulation to self/other narratives of taken-for-granted ideas of what the world looks 
like, which is not part of the discursive structure of a self/other narrative as such. This 
installation of necessity via the articulation of sedimentation is the focus for 
subsection 3.2.2. 
Temporality Past Present Future Necessity produced 
Cause-effect  Defining Action irrelevant Defined Necessity of future 
produced by 
necessity of past. 
Progressive  
–isms 
Of little 
importance 
Action crucial 
but dependent on 
choice 
Oughtology: 
explicitly good 
Oughtnotology: 
explicitly bad 
Necessity of action 
dependent on choice 
of oughtology 
You would 
be stupid not 
to 
Given Action obvious Oughtology: 
implied universal 
validity 
Oughtnotology: 
delegitimized 
Necessity of action 
made obvious by 
implied universal 
validity of goal 
Restoration Defining Action defined 
by  
future-as-past 
Oughtology: 
defined by future-
as-past 
Oughtnotology: 
delegitimized 
Necessity of action 
made obvious and 
validity of goal 
implied by future-as-
past 
Eschatology Irrelevant Action irrelevant 
or determined 
Oughtology: 
necessary 
Oughtnotology: 
impossible 
Necessity of future 
self-referential 
Security Given Action crucial 
and necessitated 
by 
oughtnotology  
Oughtology: 
implicit universal 
validity 
Oughtnotology: 
explicitly 
catastrophic 
Necessity of action 
and validity of goal 
explicitly co-
constituted by 
reference to 
oughtnotology 
Specific 
constancy 
Delimiting  Action limited by 
past 
Certain elements 
defined 
Necessity of certain 
elements make 
certain futures 
impossible 
Table 3.1 Different types of necessity produced by different temporalizations 
X 
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3.2.2 Installing necessity by articulating materialities 
Subsection 3.1.6 pointed out how necessity may be implied in the specific way in 
which the relation constructed between self and other presents itself as an 
interactional grammar. In that sense, it focused on the necessities articulated as 
present in the present relation between self and other. Subsection 3.2.1 discussed how 
necessity may be articulated to the narrative via temporalization concentrating on 
ways which tilt the weight of the narrative to the future. This subsection focus on the 
articulation of necessities of the past: It discusses how necessity may be installed in a 
narrative via the articulation of the inertia of sedimented discourse.  
The point of departure for the discussion in this section is that both agency and 
structure – as noted in subsection 2.2.2 – has to do with a will. Both agency and 
structure always have a direction: Agency wants to direct structure in a certain 
direction. And structure harbours inertia in the way it facilitates some kinds of action 
and impedes other kinds. Structure directs in a combination of two ways: Firstly, 
structure is formatted to direct in a specific direction. Secondly, however, structure 
directs in the direction it is formatted to direct by the force of the inertia inscribed in 
it. Agency may seek both to re-format the structure and it may seek to install new 
inertia.  
This subsection, firstly, briefly discusses a series of metaphors employed to account 
for inertia: recursivity, sedimentation, institutions, and materiality. Secondly, the 
subsection presents three ways in which necessity may be installed in narratives via 
the articulation of materiality: the naturalization of objects, the formalization of 
language, and the interpellation of subjectivity. 
The point of departure for the dissertation is that the individual speech act is 
recursive cf. Andersen 2003b:319): This means, on the one hand, that it is capable of 
articulating itself to previous operations. It may seek recourse in the authority of 
established discourse. On the other hand, to have made a lasting mark, it is dependent 
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on future speech acts to articulate themselves to it. It needs to establish itself as 
something which other speech acts seek recourse to.  
It is, however, crucial to what previous structures the speech act is articulated – how 
the new intervention is framed. The basic mechanism of framing as a discursive 
strategy is to place a thing, event or utterance in some category, on the basis of which 
action may then be taken (Brown & Yule 1983:ch.7.6). The thing, event or utterance 
is articulated to discourse in a specific way – facilitating some possible consecutive 
articulations while marginalising others. By contextualizing an object, a specific 
world is created as relevant for it; a specific ontology is instituted.
121
 
But what are the conditions of this politics of framing? What structures are more 
prone to be articulated than others? What articulatory attempts are more likely to 
succeed than others?  
Foucault describes in the abstract how discourses may be layered as he describes how  
[a] whole group of relations forms a principle of determination that permits or 
excludes, within a given discourse, a certain number of statements: these are 
conceptual systematizations, enunciative series, groups and organizations of objects 
that might have been possible (and of which nothing can justify the absence at the 
level of their own rules of formation), but which are excluded by a discursive 
constellation at a higher level and in a broader space. (1972:67) 
Also in the abstract, Laclau employ Husserl's metaphor of sedimentation when he 
conceptualises the layered character of discourse: "any political construction takes 
place against the background of a range of sedimented practices" (Laclau 1990:35). A 
conclusion to a question on one level of discourse may be sought by recourse to a 
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 The means of framing may be subtle: A narrative may be condensed into a single 
metaphor implicating the self/other relation relation and the narrative (Mottier 2000; 2008). 
204 
more sedimented layer of discourse (cf. Kosselleck 1985:285): The answer may be 
inferred from a more sedimented discourse (Fairclough 1992:84).
122
 
If we, however, ask Laclau what accounts for the conjunctional sedimentation of this 
– as opposed to that – discursive constellation; or what accounts for the articulation 
of this – as opposed to that element, the response is highly generic "The answer is: 
the unevenness of the social." (Laclau 1996:43)
123
 Laclau passes lightly over a 
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 Holm (1993; 2001a; 2001b) and Wæver (2000a; 2000b; 2002; 2004) combines 
Foucault's idea of layered discourses with Laclau's metaphor of sedimentation to facilitate a 
study of the compatibility of national identities permitting European integration. Compared 
with Fourcault's general statement, Holm & Wævers intervention consists in a formalization 
of the relations between the levels – and in the re-introduction of the actor. The point of 
departure for Wæver's intervention is that in (post-/)structuralist analysis the meaningfulness 
of orders (wheter labeled 'epistemes', 'discourses', or 'structures') are approached 
synchronously. In such a situation, change may only be conceptualized as a 'leap' to the next 
synchronous snapshot. By introducing a concept of the layered quality of discursive 
structure – by "placing the discourses as Foucauldian boxes inside each other" "placere 
diskurserne som Foucauldianske kasser indeni hinanden” an analysis of change within 
continuity (up to a certain point) is allowed (2000b:286f). Furthermore a conceptualization 
is achieved in which opposition to dominating discourse and marginalized discourses may 
be incorporated at a deeper level: Political opponents and competing hegemonic projects 
need to relate to each others and to the same elements if they want to advance on each 
others (2000b:286f). If an actor is caught between two discourses the least rigid one will be 
modified (2000b:287, 293). Wæver intimates that the metaphoric of 'deeper' and 'surface' 
does not implicate that 'deeper layers' of discourse are more true or that they are binding for 
'surface' discourse – the 'depth' refers only to the degree of sedimentation (2000b:287). 
123
 As two distinguished Laclauians explain: "social logics are always contextual entities, 
arising in particular historical and political circumstances. This means we can add little 
more to social logics by way of conceptual substance at this level of abstraction" (Glynos & 
Howarth 2007:137). Laclau generally privileges political processes (Corry 2000:17) over 
social structures (Thomsen 1997:kap.5). The political is ascribed primacy in the sense that 
all social relations are constituted through political practice (Jensen 1997:189; Torfing 
1999:69ff). Laclau seems, on this background, to focus his theoretical investigations on 
these processes of politicization. In other words, Laclau does not award great attention to 
the processes of de-politicization leaving certain discourses unproblematized and, 
specifically, the qualities of discourse which keeps certain elements unproblematized. This 
tendency might be explained by the point of departure of the theory in critical, Marxist 
discourse: Firstly, Laclau continues the critical ambition by focusing on the emancipatory 
effects of politicization (Torfing 1999:96, 247f; Bech Dyrberg et al. 2000b:337). Secondly, 
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theoretical problematique crucial for practical analysis: the specification of the 
“relative degrees of institutionalization of the social” (Laclau 1990:223, italics in 
original). To account for the varying inertia of sedimentations or institutions, we need 
to look beyond Laclau. 
In his presentation of discourse theory Neumann suggests institutions to be 
conceptualized as “symbol based programmes which regulates social interaction and 
has a materiality” (Neumann 2001:80).124 Materiality, according to Neumann, is an 
important source of inertia in discourse. Neumann takes his departure in the dictum 
that  
The main point of discourse analysis is to provide a method which is capable of 
analysing the linguistic and the material in one holistic perspective. This is done by 
understanding discourse as both a linguistic and a material phenomenon. (Neumann 
2001:81)
125
 
                                                                                                                                            
the background in the Marxist logic of determination makes the establishing of the 
autonomy of politics particularly important (Torfing 1999:ch.1). The under-theoretization of 
the structure has especially been criticized as it has contributed to the impression of an 
'unbearable lightness of postmodernity'. It has been taken to imply that the always-already 
structured point of departure for discursive politics only has little influence (Thomsen 
1997:kap.5) as the inertia involved in discursive structures is played down. It is in this vein 
that Laclau may be criticized for studying politics in an institutional vacuum (cf. Bech 
Dyrberg & Torfing 1995:120). 
 
124
 "[S]ymbolbaserte programmer som regulerer sosial samhandling og som har en 
materialitet" (Neumann 2001:80). 
125
 "Hovedpoenget med diskursanalyse er å frembringe en metode som kan analysere det 
sproglige og det materielle i et helhetsperspektiv. Dette gjøres ved å forstå diskurs som både 
et sproglig og et materielt fenomen" (Neumann 2001:81) Neumann refers to the infamous 
passage where Laclau & Mouffe deals with the question of materiality. Let us, for once, 
quote the passage at length: "The fact that every object is constituted as an object of 
discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought ... the falling 
of a brick is an event that certainly exists ... we will affirm the material character of every 
discursive structure. ... What constitutes a differential position and therefore a relational 
identity certain linguistic elements, is not the idea of the building-stone ... but the building-
stone ... as such. ... The linguistic and non-linguistic elements are not merely juxtaposed, but 
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But just because you insist on analysing linguistic and material elements in a holistic 
perspective, "the difference between the linguistic and the material does not disappear 
for that reason.” (Neumann 2001:81)126 To the contrary; ”The material world resists 
when one tries to change it” (2001:80),127 and hence,  
Material objects are hard (but, as most of us know from experience, not impossible) 
to 'explain away'. Therefore certain representations will be more inert when they are 
subjected to attempts to change them; signs which are 'good to think with' ... and 
representations of material objects will often be among them. (2001:66)
128
 
But how does it matter that discourse is material? And how does it matter that 
discourse is embodied in different ways; in different forms of materiality? These 
questions are often left out of focus – even if they are central to the study of the 
                                                                                                                                            
constitute a differential and structured system of positions – that is, a discourse. The 
differential positions include, therefore a dispersion of very diverse material elements. ... 
The practice of articulation ... cannot consist of purely linguistic phenomena; but must 
instead pierce the entire material density of the multifarious institutions, rituals and 
practices through which a discourse is structured." (1985:109). While short versions of the 
quote are often taken to mean that the distinction between material and non-material does 
not matter – the passage actually says that it does matter that discourse is material. Still, the 
division between materiality and non-materiality is only available to us through the 
rhetorical invocation of it. As Miller’s recollection of the Western tradition of thinking on 
materiality shows, it is a matter of philosophical self-positioning whether it is the materiality 
as such or the discursive construction of the concept and limits of materiality in a specific 
instance which induces the inertia of materiality in discourse (cf. Miller 2005). Even if 
materiality ‘as such’ does not matter, the Western tradition of thinking materiality as given 
is so sedimented that its invocation installs inertia. Things accepted as material are endowed 
with a ceteri paribus constancy.  
126
 "[F]orskjellen mellom det sproglige og det materielle forsvinner jo ikke av den grunn." 
(Neumann 2001:81). 
127
 "Den materielle verden gjør modstand, når man forsøker å forandre den." (Neumann 
2001:80). 
128
 "Materielle gjenstander er vanskelige (men, som de fleste vet av egen erfaring, ikke 
umuligt) å ’bortforklare’. Enkelte representasjoner vil altså være tregere å forandre enn 
andre; tegn som er ’gode å tenke med’ ... og representasjoner af materielle gjenstander vil 
ofte være blant disse." (Neumann 2001:86). 
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sedimentation of discourse and thereby to the study or discursive articulations 
dependent on sedimented discourse.  
Materiality endows institutions with inertia in at least three basic ways relevant for 
this dissertation: Firstly, discourse may acquire materiality as physical objects are 
structured to facilitate and impede specific patterns of social interaction (Neumann 
2001:85). Secondly, structures of meaning become observable for the analyst as they 
acquire the materiality of writing and speaking as media for language (cf. Neumann 
2001:80-3). Thirdly, individual cognitive structures based on experience with social 
interaction might constitute a ‘materiality of the mind’. The subsection concludes by 
very briefly discussing each of the three materializations and the way their 
articulation installs necessity in narratives. 
Firstly, the naturalization of objects. If a discourse has articulated materiality by an 
adaption of the physical structures to the social practice prescribed by discourse it is 
more difficult to alter the discourse in question. Or as Hajer puts it: "[P]eople do 
things with words ... settings do things with people too." (Hajer 2006:72) 
Correspondingly, a speech act may seek to install necessity in a narrative by 
articulating the materiality of naturalized objects: On the one hand, the articulation 
naturalizes the objects which are implied to exist. On the other hand, the objectivity 
of the objects implied appears in the narrative as something necessary. Some things 
cannot be denied; these things need to be accounted for in any attempt to continue the 
narrative.
129
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 When you arrive at an airport, you have to present the physical object of a passport 
identifying you. If you cannot, certain social practices will place your body in a proscribed 
physical environment. In parliament, partially distinct physical infrastructures are available 
to MPs, to the general public, and to various categories of officials in between. Only MPs 
will, e.g., be allowed to speak in the plenary sessions. 
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Secondly, the formalization of language:
130
 Formality involves making structures of 
meaning explicit. It often means writing the structures down, i.e. endowing them with 
a specific form of materiality.
131
 The result of explication is a reduction of the degree 
of ambiguity. Furthermore formalization often implies a prioritization of procedure 
over substance.
132
 Formalization in isolation would probably make the discourse 
more inert by making unintended, incremental change more difficult.
133
 The result of 
'making explicit' might, however, sometimes contrarily be an increased reflectivity 
which could facilitate decisive change. In this way formalization could actually 
decrease the inertia of discourse. A speech act may seek to install necessity in a 
narrative by articulating the materiality of formalized writing: On the one hand, the 
articulation could claim that 'we should not have this substantial discussion; we 
should just adhere to the established conclusion or follow the established procedures 
for concluding the matter'. On the other hand, any such recurrence to formality 
reproduces the conclusions and procedures for recurrence at a later stage in time. The 
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 Neumann (2001:84) warns that the classic distinction between formal and informal 
institutions has been awarded too much weight, so that entire disciplines of the social 
sciences have made themselves blind to the one or the other side of the distinction. 
Formality, however, does make a difference. Not necessarily if one is concerned with the 
substantive form of configuration of the discourse and its institutions, norms or roles – but 
definitively if one is concerned with the inertia of the discourse. 
131
 Within certain settings even the materiality of oral speech will do. 
132
 These elements summing up to a definition of formalization is taken from Andersen 
(1994:34), who as a final element in the definition includes an articulation to systems of 
sanction (judiciary systems at the societal level or internal bodies of e.g. an organization). 
The subsection returns to this question immediately below when discussing the third way of 
articulating materiality (interpellation). 
133
 Hajer notes that "In political reality, to argue against routinized understandings is to 
argue against the institutions that function on the basis of specific, structured, cognitive 
commitments. ... Although it seems true to say that institutions function only to the extent 
that they are constantly reproduced in actual practices, these routinized institutional 
practices tend to have a high degree of salience." (Hajer 1995:57-8). 
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articulation, thus, seeks to isolate certain elements from re-narration: They are 
(written down) as they should continue to be. 
Thirdly, the interpellation of subjectivity: Once a subject is discursively constituted 
as a set of roles, expectations, and as a space of agency,
134
 this subjectivity involves 
an instinct of self-preservation. (cf. Neumann 2001:164).
135
 A speech act may seek to 
install inertia in a narrative by articulating such pre-established subjectivity. As 
discussed in chapter 2, a certain level of 'consistency' is demanded of the subject. The 
problem, of course, is who defines in relation to what the consistency is required. 
Althusser discussed the articulation of the subject as interpellation; the speaking a 
subject into its place (cf. Mouffe 1997a:24). In the language of institutionalism, 
interpellation aims at defining which appropriateness is to frame the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ for the thus interpellated subject. Interpellation structures materiality 
and interaction towards the reception of the actions of the once-constituted subject: 
Both other subjects but also material infrastructure are expecting a once-constituted 
subject to act – and act in some ways rather than in other ways. In that sense, 
interpellation seeks to install inertia in a narrative by making a subject continue the 
narration according to specified necessities. If interpellation works, the necessities are 
not a problem; they are just naturalized. Section 3.3, however, discusses how 'failing' 
necessities may contribute to radicalization of conflict if interpellation does not work 
in a straight forward way.  
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 No matter how the constitution of a subject is conceptualized; as the result of a 
constitutive antagonism, as a differential inscription of a subject position, or as the 
recurring-but-ever-failing identification with a lack. 
135
 Andersen includes in his definition of formalization and institutionalization of ideals that 
they are 'sanctioned' (Andersen 1994:34-5). If there were no inertia of the subject, the 
concept of sanctions would make no sense 
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3.2.3 Articulating identity to stop debate – displacing identity 
politics 
This section has discussed the instalment of necessity through temporalization of 
narratives and through the articulation of narratives with materiality.  
Necessity may be installed in a narrative by a temporalization: If the past or the future 
is articulated as decisive for the narrative, the importance of the present articulatory 
operation is concealed. Necessity may be installed in a narrative by configuring 
physical objects to support it: The objects are, simultaneously, naturalized. Necessity 
may be installed in a narrative by formalizing it; by inscribing it with the materiality 
of speech or written text. Necessity may be installed in a narrative by interpellating 
pre-constituted subjects to partake in it. If sufficient inertia is engaged, necessity-
effects may stop internal debate on elements of the narrative or the narrative in toto. 
If you, however, structure your action so that it promotes a narrative in which the 
other is ascribed agency, you inscribe the inertia of the subjectivity of the other in 
your narrative: You invite the other to partake in the continued narration of the 
narrative – but the other's co-narration may follow its own directions. As the inertia 
of the subjectivity of the other does not necessarily point in the same direction as the 
inertia of other elements inscribed in the narrative to stop internal debate, the result 
may be a radicalization of conflict in external identity politics. Or in other words: The 
result may be the displacement of conflict from internal to external identity politics. 
Therefore section 3.3 now proceeds to discuss how to account for the contribution to 
radicalization of conflict from dynamics inherent in identity politics. 
3.3 Identity politics radicalizing conflict: Spill over and 
feed backs from conflictual co-authorship 
As discussed in chapter 2 identity politics involves the dynamics and feed backs 
between the attempts by discursively constituted subjects to redistribute subjectivity. 
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These dynamics between the attempts at redistribution of subjectivity are, on the one 
hand, recurrently political as they appear in conflict. On the other hand, political 
conflicts may be diverted by segmentation of interaction or by performing the 
articulation of identity ambiguously. 
This section sets out to account for the contribution to radicalization of conflict from 
identity politics. Therefore, it asks the question: 
iii. How may dynamics in identity politics be structured to contribute to radicalization 
of conflict? 
To answer the question, the section needs to focus on identity politics with a view to 
discerning connections to the structures of identity and to the articulation of identity 
but also possible radicalizing dynamics at the level of interaction itself. More 
specifically, the section explains how policy narratives may serve as radically 
different invitations to the other to partake in the continued narration of the relation. 
Special attention is given, firstly, to how self/other policies may interpellate 
grammatically or anti-grammatically in ways which radicalize conflict according to 
distinct dynamics. Secondly, attention is given to how narratives may be told in a 
way which makes them particularly sensitive to counter-narratives feeding back and 
how distinct sensitivities may contribute to radicalization and de-radicalization 
respectively. 
First, however, subsection 3.3.1 argues that the very attempt to constitute a 
distinction between inside and outside – between internal and external identity 
politics – necessarily generates conflict. The argument takes its point of departure in 
the analysis of the points of diffraction of three basic grammars for future interaction 
between self and other: Orientalism, Encompassment, Segmentation (as discussed in 
subsection 3.1.4). More specifically, the point is that the points of diffraction on the 
one hand facilitate the meeting of the three basic grammars in the three combined 
policies of Dialogue, Monologue and Agonism. But, on the other hand, these 
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combined policies are systematically conceived of as internal affairs when 
approached from one of the basic grammars conspiring to produce the policy – and as 
external affairs when approached from the other basic grammar. 
The proceeding subsections takes up the two main analytical concepts developed in 
the discussions of identity as structure and identity as articulation: the grammars for 
self/other interaction involved in self/other narratives (from section 3.1) and the 
necessity articulated to self/other narratives (from section X3.2). The point of taking up 
the discussion of the lenses is to specify the identity political dynamics which the 
grammars and the necessity may set off. Subsection 3.3.2 discusses how the policies 
for future self/other interaction may interpellate the other grammatically or anti-
grammatically – with different conflict dynamics as result. Subsection 3.3.3 discusses 
how the articulation of – or the lack of – necessity to self/other narratives may 
transport conflict from internal identity politics to external identity politics. 
A final subsection (3.3.4) discusses the possible ways in which a self/other relation 
may turn reflexive – facilitated by insight, agreement, and dialogicality – and the 
possible contribution of reflexivity to the de-radicalization of conflicts. Subsection 
3.3.5 sums up the consequences of the discussion of identity political dynamics in 
terms of analytical strategy. 
3.3.1 The distinction internal/external as conflict generator 
Chapter 2 noted how the nation state historically has been relatively successful in 
claming a monopoly on legitimate identification. This success may now be 
reformulated – and relativized – in the terms developed in sections 3.1 and 3.2. The 
point is that the very distinction between internal and external identity politics 
necessarily leads to conflict; at least as long as the relation between self and other is 
residually grammatical. 
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The first thing to notice is how the international system of nation states has 
articulated sufficient necessity in a single Orientalist distinction – the one between 
national/alien – to award this distinction a leading role in the modern project of 
sorting everything into orderly boxes. The distinction national/non-national is – still – 
the basis of a lot of other disctinctions. The success of this one distinction is evident 
in the way the two other grammars for self/other relations have been subordinated to 
it: Knowledge production has historically been organized in separate academic 
disciplines specialized in knowing Our History and Their Cultures respectively. 
Agency on behalf of the other was systematized in the discourse of war between 
nation states (Bartelson 2010) – and the discourse of colonialism claiming that They 
were not ready to act on behalf of themselves (cf. Said 1978:ch.1.IV). Colonialism 
claimed that They were not capable of having their own nation states – present 
development policies add a 'yet' to the narrative.  
The second thing to notice is how the relational grammars (introduced in section 3.1) 
may be employed to specify the terms of the conflict over who gets to be an actor. 
More specifically, it may explain why there is necessarily a conflict over who gets to 
be an actor in the conflict – as long as the conflict is grammatical. Recall (from 
subsection 3.1.4) that for a self/other policy to be grammatical all three grammars 
need to partake in organizing the relation. This means that there need to be 
distinction, the self need to act on behalf of the other, and the self needs to produce 
knowledge of the relation. When elements of all three grammars need to be present 
simultaneously, it means that the policy pursued must be a combination; i.e., an 
articulation of the 'pure' policies constituting the conditions of possibility for each of 
the grammars. Hence, the policy pursued – as long as we stay within the perimeters 
of grammatical otherings – must oscilate between dialogue, monologue, and agonism. 
The explanation for the re-currence of the conflict over who gets to be part in the 
conflict is that each of these combined strategies looks differently from the 
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perspective of the two grammars co-organizing them: Monologue, dialogue, and 
agonism each look like an internal affair from the one side while it look like an 
engagement with the other from the other side: 
Orientalism is constituted by seeing any engagement with the other as external 
identity politics. Encompassment is constituted by seeing any engagement with the 
'other' as internal identity politics (as it sees the other as really a subordinate part of 
the self). This means that the policy of monologue, when approached from protested 
Encompassment is conceived of as an internal monologue telling a subordinate 
protester to get back in the legitimate place. Contrarily when approached from 
Orientalism monologue a means of disengaging the other by excluding him from 
dialogue. 
Segmentation is constituted by switching from seeing the other as identical or 
different depending on the level of fission or fusion. The point of diffraction directing 
Segmentation towards either a policy of dialogue or a policy of agonism, however, 
also directs Segmentation to systematically view the other in the opposite way than 
the grammar it meets: Dialogue is an external affair when seen from Orientalism 
reaching out to listen to a positively valued other. Contrarily dialogue is an internal 
affair when seen from Segmentation looking out for differences within identity. 
Agonism is an internal affair when it – seen from Encompassment – allows a 
circumscribed place for the subordinate other. Contrarily Agonism is an external 
affair when it – seen from Segmentation – looks out for the identity uniting across 
differences. 
So as long as the policies for engaging with the other are grammatical, there is, 
firstly, a place from which the other may spur a conflict over how to be a part in the 
conflict. But regardless of whether the other uses this place to protest, there are, 
secondly, tensions inbuilt in the grammars which keeps the distinction between inside 
and outside from fixating. This situation is illustrated in figure 3.23. 
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Figure 3.23 Dislocation of the distinction internal/external 
Combined policies appear internal and external from each side of the point of diffraction 
 
The two subsequent subsections (3.3.2 and 3.3.3) discuss the spill over mechanisms 
from what is in this way contingently constituted as 'internal identity politics' to 
'external identity politics'. 
3.3.2 Policies interpellating grammatical and anti-grammatical 
conflicts 
This subsection discusses how distinct policies for relating to the other – organized 
by the way they combine the basic grammars for future interaction – may set off 
distinct dynamics of conflict by the way in which they interpellate the other. 
Recall (from section 3.1) how each self/other policy narrative involves a specific 
combination of grammars for the future interaction of self and other. The concept of 
grammar was meant to convey the invitation issued to the other to partake in the 
continued co-authoring of the narrative in circumscribed ways.  
Juxtaposed to grammars for future self/other interaction was 'anti-grammar' 
foreseeing no future interaction. A corollary of grammatical otherings was that they 
are at least residually dialogical: As long as there are two entities endowed with at 
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least residual distinction, will and temporal extension dialogue remains a possibility. 
This begs the question: How do we avoid anti-grammatical closure and keep 
dialogicality open? Are some of the grammars better than other in this regard? The 
point of taking up the discussion is to specify how distinct grammars may set off 
identity political dynamics contributing to radicalization of conflict. 
Baumann & Gingrich claim that the evaluation of the grammars cannot be done in the 
abstract alone (2004b:194). Nevertheless, they offer some preliminary thoughts:  
Encompassment tends toward a monologue ... Segmentation tends toward dialogue 
[however, only] among those perceived as 'equivalent' ... it does exclude those who 
cannot be accommodated ... Orientalizing ... stands somewhere in-between the 
monological and the dialogical in so far as its more intelligent versions do harbour 
the potential of ... mirroring the self in the other. (2004b:194) 
The final judgment is that "The grammars ... are not better or worse in themselves, 
but relatively better or relatively worse, depending on agency in context." 
(2004b:194) 
The task of this chapter has basically been to specify the 'agency in context' by 
conceptualising identity discourse as structure, agency, and interaction to allow for a 
more detailed analysis. Section 3.1 pointed to the importance of the policies 
combining the grammars of interaction - and the policies marking the limits between 
grammar and anti-grammar. This subsection considers that part of the context of the 
individual statement of a policy for self/other relations which consists in the 
interactional dynamics between policies promoted by various actors. 
A policy for future self/other interaction may in principle involve a de novo narration 
of a role for an other: A new narratives may issue an open invitation for 'anyone' to 
take up a new role. It is, however, more likely that the role is intended for someone 
already present. Perhaps the first version of the narrative looks open – but as the 
seemingly open invitation fails to attract anyone, a second or third version of the 
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narrative may be more specific in who ought to take up the role. This specified other 
is talked into taking up a specific new role. Or, in the vocabulary developed in section 
3.2; interpellation attempts to articulate the inertia of a subjectivity – pre-constituted 
elsewhere – in the self/other narrative. In this case the other will have its own identity 
narratives more or less in conflict with the narrative interpellating it: The result is a 
conflict of futures projected by different combinations of interactional grammars. As 
self and other adjust their stories to the way in which the other takes up – or does not 
take up – the role awarded, the interpellatory attempts evolve. The conflict of futures 
evolves. This narrative 'pursuit' of the other to successfully interpellate may take up 
recognizable forms. Distinct dynamics may follow from the ways in which different 
policies attempt to interpellate. 
Butler (1997) and Hage (2008) draw attention to differences in the ways in which 
interpellation may misrepresent relative to the preferred self-representation of the 
other.
136
 Butler formulates the general condition of misrepresentation so that "One is 
still constituted by discourse, but at a distance from oneself." (Butler 1997:33f) The 
distance, however, may be shorter or longer – and the road 'home' may be configured 
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 On the one hand, interpellation involve what Chilton discusses as strategies of (de-
/)legitimisation and (mis-/)representation): Any interpellation involves awarding legitimacy 
to some actors and some actions and de-legitimising other (potential) actors and actions. 
And any interpellation aims at representing some actors into being and, hence, the mis-
representation of others (and even the mis-representation of the actors which are 
represented). On the other hand, these strategies appear in Chilton’s rendition as either truly 
representative or mis-representative of the subject in question as determined in an 
Habermasian style coercion-free speech situation (cf. Chilton 2004:46; 54ff). Such a 
yardstick can hardly be provided – at least not an extra-discursive one. Misrepresentation as 
measured against intra-discursive – or intra-interactive – yardsticks remains, however, an 
important discursive strategy: If you are able to force your construction of your opponents 
position upon him, he will by definition have a harder time continuing the struggle than if 
he is able to choose his own armour and battleground. In that sense, the difference between 
misrepresentation and delegitimization of the Other disappears. 
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in different ways. One may in different ways meet invitations to play roles which one 
does not seem fit to be casted for. 
The conclusion to section 3.1 identified a series of policies for self/other relations as 
possible contributors to radicalization of conflict. The remaining part of this 
subsection discusses how these policies may lead to radicalization of conflict along 
different routes: Firstly, a conflictuality of non-interpellation departing from 
Encompassment. Secondly, a conflictuality of negative interpellation departing in 
Orientalism valuing the other negatively. Thirdly, a conflictuality of violent 
disengagement from the other. Finally, the conflictuality of two types of paradoxical 
interpellations – of assimilatory policies and of unchecked relativist Segmentation. 
First, any policy interfering with the agency of the other by involving some element 
of Encompassment is likely to meet some kind of resistance. If you insist on acting 
on behalf of the other, you rely on the self-erasure of the other to avoid conflict all 
together. 'Non-interpellation' excludes by not presenting an other with any 
subjectivity of relevance at all (Hage 2008:503): The role presented is co 
circumscribed that it reduces the other to an object or to a structural effect of the 
position awarded. In that sense, it follows an anti-grammar denying a relation 
between self and other.  
If the narratives you tell about yourself do not fit the ones permitted by others in any 
way, one possible result is silence. In the first instance, the result may be silence as 
one perceives to have received no authorization to speak (in a specific discursive 
context): "one can be 'put in one's place by such speech, but such a place may be no 
place" (Butler 1997:4, 137). In the second instance, the result may be silence because 
resistance implies to high a risk or prize as society has institutionalized a series of 
means for dealing with the deviant; people who do not act as proscribed (1997:139; 
cf. Hansen 2000; Foucault 1961).  
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The silencing of non-interpellation points out a position where any protest turns 
threatening. In the first instance for the interpellating narrative; and therefore possibly 
in the second instance for the protesting non-interpellated other: Because the 
reformulated version of the narrative has to take into account that a voice breaks what 
was supposed to be silence. In that sense the non-interpellated becomes a securitized 
position; a position from which speech presents an existential threat – in the first 
instance to the silencer, and therefore in the second instance to the silenced. In that 
sense, a protest against non-interpellation may lead to a policy of securitization – and 
on to violent anti-grammar. 
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Figure 3.24 Conflictuality I: Non-interpellation 
 
Non-interpellation may be partial: Agency may be delimited by necessities 
articulated to a narrative which seek to bar the other interpellated from interfering 
with certain elements of the future. And in a sense non-interpellation is most often a 
gradual condition: Only the total self-erasure of the self would bestow unchecked 
agency on the other. Figure 3.24 charts the policies involving non-interpellation on 
the map of self/other policies. 
Secondly, any policy legitimated by an Orientalist mirroring of a positively valued 
self with a negatively valued other would seem to invite protest. 'Negative 
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interpellation' awards the other in question a subordinate role (Hage 2008:503).
137
 
Figure 3.25 charts the policies producing negative interpellation on the map of 
self/other policies. This type of interpellation produces a sense of being marginalized 
from community; of not belonging to it (Hage 2008:503). Necessity combined with a 
grammar of Encompassment, it produces a socially outside but territorially inside 
position from which one may attempt "to speak with authority without being 
authorized to speak" (Butler 1997:15).  
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Figure 3.25 Conflictuality II: Negative interpellation 
 
Thirdly, policies combining Orientalism and Encompassment in the proscription of 
violent disengagement from the other – especially in the form of securitization or 
outright categorical killings – are likely to be perceived as threatening by the other. 
These policies are charted in figure 3.26. 
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 In principle, a parallel may be found in an overly positive interpellation. At first, this 
might not give rise to problems. The second round following a disappointed first round of 
positive interpellation, may be a negative interpellation. This game may be played 
strategically in the sense that an overly positive interpellation may be issued explicitly while 
expecting 'disappointment'. This would result in the 'mis-interpellation' discussed below. 
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Figure 3.26 Conflictuality III: Violent disengagement 
 
A genocidal interpellation does not just point out no future place for an other; it 
points the presence of the other out as a threat to be eliminated. It projects an 
immediate future in which the other is physically eliminated from the position s/he 
holds now. Provided that the interpellator is capable of implementing its oughtology, 
there will be no future for the other. The only immediate end to the conflict is if the 
other is unilaterally capable of effecting an immediate dissociation, i.a. by physically 
fleeing the confrontation. Every other immediate response will either involve a 
reverse genocidal interpellation of the original interpellator – or it will demand that 
the answer violently articulates the inertia of materiality to win time. 
A securitized interpellation also means that an other is pointed out as a threat which 
should be averted by extraordinary means. But what the other is met with is not the 
promise of immediate physical elimination. Elimination seems to be a possibility – 
but it is not necessary. It is not a reassuring interpellation – but it is not as definitive 
as the genocidal one. When interpellating you as an existential threat, chances are that 
the interpellator will dismiss your possible attempts to engage him/her in a dialogue. 
A countersecuritization is an obvious choice – but you may still hope that other 
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measures than elimination will be chosen to avert the threat you are represented to 
pose. 
Fourthly, the two assimilatory policies – other-assimilation and self-assimilation – 
warrants further consideration: Subsection 3.1.4 discussed how other-assimilation 
appeared as the paradoxical reaction of the Orientalist self faced with hybridity. Self-
assimilation appeared as the paradoxical reaction of the Encompassing self faced with 
paralysis. These policies may provoke an other who wants the relation intact as a 
relation between two distinct wills. Such an other may dis-interpellate:  
[T]he consciousness necessary for obeying an ideological demand also produces the 
capacity or ability for avoiding or misunderstanding such forms of cultural 
domination. The capacity for interpellation within social systems thereby implies the 
presence of dis-interpellation as a basis for resistance (Stauth & Turner, 1988:92).  
Dis-interpellation would in this case imply the denial of the assimilation of self to 
other – either by insisting on Orientalist difference, on post-Orientalist indifference 
and hybridity– or on the continued production of differences implied in 
Segmentation. Both self- and other-assimilation are at the outset measures to protest 
when control over the co-narration is slipping through the fingers of an actor: Other-
assimilation is a policy to protect Orientalism against hybridity and indifference. 
Self-assimilation is a desperate reply to paralysis faced with a powerful other. When 
such policy narratives are met with dis-interpellation securitization would seem to be 
an obvious continuation to the narrative. Only the direction of the securitization 
differs: Unsuccessful other-assimilation would point out the un-assimilable other as 
the threat in the narrative of the self. Denied self-assimilation risks pointing out the 
self as the threat in the narratives of the other. 
Finally, the very flexibility of Segmentation – allowing oscillation between in- and 
exclusion – might frustrate those who have as a priority the very bringing identity 
political negotiation to a conclusion. Hage discusses how 'mis-interpellation' begins 
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by pointing out a place for the other – only to withdraw the invitation when the place 
is taken up.
138
 In principle this could follow any kind of grammar: If a subordinate 
position following from a grammar of encompassment appears attractive, even the 
invitation-to-and-denial-of such a position may be mis-interpellating. But the 
defining characteristicon of Segmentation is especially prone to produce this kind of 
interpellation: Incessant production of distinctions without any will or guiding 
privileged distinction lapses into a relativism which may, firstly, in itself be 
provoking to some; secondly, be utilized strategically to deny the other a point of 
attachment for narration. 
Mis-interpellation, writes Hage, gives rise to a sense of being marginalized within a 
community, a sense of disappointment with the community one thought one belonged 
to (2008:503f). A far more destructive combination in which you see your identity 
denied and, hence, threatened by the narrative that you thought it was – you were – 
made for. Contrary to non-interpellation, the other has in the situation of a mis-
interpellation been awarded a position involving agency. And contrary to negative 
interpellation, it is not the position awarded which is protested – it is, at first, the non-
awardance of the position, which is protested: The carrot is accepted – but its 
withholdance is protested, in some cases by the rejection of the carrot. The result may 
be that one discards the narrative which one at first wanted to be articulated by to the 
benefit of narratives and identities in open conflict with this first narrative 
(2008:507). It may, in other words, result in a radicalization of the other; it may make 
the other take up a position of a radically threatening other. In that sense, the first 
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 Hage describes the difference between the non-interpellation of traditional racist 
nationalism and the mis-interpellation of present integration policies like this: In mis-
interpellation society begins by hailing the individual by the Althusserian 'Hey you, citizen'. 
The answer 'Yes, it is me', however, is met with the reply 'No, Piss Off. It is not you I am 
calling'. Non-interpellation, in contrast, gives rise to narratives of 'being treated like an 
animal' as society does not hail at all (2008:504). 
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narrative has produced a response of the other which presents itself in the 
continuation of the narrative as a security problem. The policies likely to mis- or dis-
interpellate are charted in figure 3.27. 
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Figure 3.27 Conflictuality IV: Paradoxical interpellations of other- and self-
assimilation 
 
All types of interpellations may set off conflicts. All grammatical and anti-
grammatical policies may be protested – and they may be protested in ways which 
make it difficult for the self to continue its narrative. But some policies are better 
suited to receive protest and continue without degenerating into radicalization: the 
spectrum reaching from Dialogue to Agonism, dominated by but not collapsed into 
the basic grammar of Segmentation. This spectrum of policies interpellates the other 
as a positively valued independent agent worth interacting with and worth listening to 
– without giving up the claim of an independent agency for a (somewhat) distinct will 
of the self necessary to interact with, value and listen to the other.
139
 This section of 
the map of polices for self/other relations is highlighted in figure 3.28. 
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 The specification of this spectrum of policies does not entail any normative position on 
neither the policies nor the possible others to which one may direct them – except what 
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Figure 3.28 Less conflictual policies self/other relations 
 
To sum up: The dynamics inherent in the policies discussed may be specified – even 
if only in dissimilar ways: Non-interpellation will – if protested in spite of difficulty – 
probably lead to an instantly radicalized conflict. Negative interpellation will lead 
initially to conflicts over the diacriticon for delimiting internal from external – as a 
pretext to a conflict over valuation. Genocidal interpellation makes de-radicalization 
of conflict – and a return to grammatical self/other relations – very difficult. 
Securitizing interpellation begs counter-securitization – but despite the urgency 
implied other responses are still possible even if there is no guarantee that they will 
work. Dis-interpellation denying – in one way or the other – the identity narrative 
promoted risks provoking securitization of the unassimilable. Mis-interpellation 
could lead to many types of reactions – but one possibility is that it would lead a few 
of the mis-interpellated to take up radically conflictual counter-identities. Table 3.2 
summarizes the contribution to radicalization of conflict involved in the types of 
interpellation discussed. 
                                                                                                                                            
follows from the stance taken to conflict as such in chapter 1: that conflict should not be 
allowed to escape control altogether. 
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Interpel-
lation 
Variation Policy Conflict 
Non-
interpel-
lation 
Total: 
Objectifi-
cation 
Acting on behalf of 
the other... 
The narrative of the self does not award the 
capability of agency to an other. 
The other acts – and forces its agency on the 
narrative of the self. 
Gradual: 
Domina-
tion 
... as far as the other 
allows 
The narrative of the self only awards the 
other insufficient agency to counter the will 
of the self. 
The other acts to subvert the will of the self. 
Partial: 
Delimita-
tion 
... on specific issues The narrative of the self articulates certain 
regions as necessary and thus insulated from 
the agency of the other. 
The other questions the necessity. 
Negative interpellation Distinguishing Us 
from Them: Valuing 
the other negatively 
The narrative of the self values the other 
negatively. 
The other values itself positively. 
Violently 
anti-
gramma-
tical 
interpel-
lations 
Genocidal 
interpel-
lation 
Categorical killings The narrative of the self projects a future in 
which the other is eradicated. 
The other does not commit suicide. 
Securitized 
interpel-
lation 
Securitization The narrative of the self constructs the other 
as an existential threat to the identity of the 
self. 
The other does not flee. 
Paradoxic
al 
interpella
tions 
Dis-
interpel-
lation 
Assimilation  
/ Self-assimilation 
The narrative of the self projects a future in 
which the other is assimilated to self (or vice-
versa). 
The other resists the assimilation to protect 
the distinction – or hybridity – of the 
identities. 
Mis-
interpe-
llation 
Producing knowledge 
of the other: Flexibly 
of identity and 
difference 
The narrative of the self offers a role to the 
other. 
The other accepts the role – which is instantly 
retroactively denied. 
Table 3.2 Types of conflictual interpellation inherent in selected self/other policies. 
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This completes the discussion of the contribution to radicalization of conflict from 
the discursive structure of identity. The section may now turn to the contribution to 
radicalization of conflict from the discursive articulation of identity. 
3.3.3 Necessity spilling over conflict from internal to external 
identity politics 
As discussed (in chapter 2) the articulation of identity includes the attempts by 
discursively constituted subjects at reconstituting and reproducing discursive 
structures. One tool in the articulation of identity is the articulation of self/other 
narratives with necessity (cf. section 3.2). This subsection discusses how the 
articulation of necessity to self/other narratives may 'transport conflict' from internal 
identity politics to external identity politics. And how necessity not installed in 
internal identity politics may also spur external identity political conflict. In that 
sense, the discussion specifies how the necessity – or the lack of necessity – may 
contribute to the radicalisation of conflict by setting off identity political dynamics.  
Basically, the articulation of necessity has the potential effect of stopping internal 
identity politics. When an element of a narrative is articulated as necessary, the point 
is to have it removed from debate. If successful, the articulation of necessity, 
therefore, has the effect of closing down internal conflict.  
Along with internal conflict, however, the possibility of self-reflection and self-
reform are closed down: Certain things are the way they are and cannot be discussed. 
As self-reflection and self-reform is made impossible, dialogicality in relation to the 
other is restricted: It is much more difficult to be open to demands from the other if 
the objectives of the demanded reform are pre-articulated with necessity. In that case, 
necessity successfully installed may transport conflict from internal identity politics 
to external identity politics. A series of specific dynamics of internal identity politics 
may contribute to the articulation of necessity.  
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Firstly, the primacy of the extreme in internal identity politics. Wæver recalls  
how ‘peace processes’ … get de-railed by extreme groups on one side who manage 
to convince sufficiently many on their side that the other side remains a mortal threat, 
that ‘they’ still harbour radical visions that would eradicate ‘us’, maybe not 
physically as persons but certainly socially as community, identity or functioning 
society. … Generally, conflict processes are much more influenced by extreme – 
unlikely but very dramatic – scenarios at the fringes than by the cool calculation and 
balancing of the different more likely scenarios that play too much of a role in most 
conflict analysis. (Wæver 2009:6 citing empirical examples in n.15) 
As Wæver describes, by drawing up unlikely but catastrophic futures, an extreme 
voice may articulate a policy with necessity. Such a policy made necessary may 
constitute a highly conflictual invitation for interaction with the other.  
Secondly, a dynamic which may be characterised as 'pre-empted consistency' may 
facilitate the success of extreme voices in defining the invitation to interaction 
conveyed in external identity politics: As discussed (in chapter 2) an actor needs to 
uphold a measure of consistency over time to be considered credible. To have a better 
chance of upholding consistency in the future, the actor in question might try to avoid 
installing too much necessity in the present: Flexibility appears to be functional for 
future consistency. In other words, the actor in internal identity politics may employ 
articulate an ambiguous self-interpellation in an attempt to defer the choice between 
articulating oneself as identical with A or B. This strategy, however, involves the risk 
of leaving the definition of ones consistency in the hands of others: When you refrain 
from choosing A or B, others may have a greater chance of succeeding in imposing 
their demand for a specific consistency on you. Such an imposition may be 
performed by framing the choice as 'one of a kind'; a kind of which you have in other 
instances chosen A. In the context of an authoritative deferral of articulating identity, 
229 
an extreme voice may stand a better chance at installing necessity in a conflictual 
narrative. 
Necessity installed may transport conflict from internal to external identity politics. 
But internal identity politics may also radicalize external conflict when necessity is 
not installed.  
Basically, Hajer notes that  
political actors must constantly reckon with the fact that what they say at one stage to 
one particular public will often, almost instantaneously, reach another public that 
might 'read' what has been said in a radically different way and mobilize because of 
what it heard. (Hajer 2009:9-10; all italics in original) 
One cannot be sure that ones interventions intended to influence internal identity 
politics stay 'back stage'. Interventions in internal identity politics may – under a 
series of distinct circumstances – be read in external identity politics.  
First of all, if a conflictual policy is advocated in internal identity politics and never 
effectively stopped credibly from structuring the internal debates – then this extreme 
voice may perform interpellation in external identity politics whether authorized or 
not. Extreme voices may present themselves as representing the self. And it may by 
the other be taken to define the identity and the policy it proposes for future 
interaction with the other. This problem of un-authorized interpellation has to do 
with the lack of monopoly of any identity over its own representation – even of the 
most sedimented hierarchy, i.e., the nation state. Privileged as it might be, the nation 
state cannot control who speaks in its name. Much less can it control who is 
perceived as speaking on its behalf. 
The unauthorized, extreme voice need, however, not be interpreted as representing 
the self per se to have interpellatory effects. The very fact that internal identity 
political debates are not stopped may spur mis-interpellation: If a conflictual policy is 
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repeatedly advocated in internal identity politics and never authoritatively de-
legitimized – then the other may doubt not only who represents the self but alsowhat 
policy is really pursued. One moment, a conciliatory voice is heard – followed by an 
aggressive voice the next moment. Even if the individual voices of internal identity 
politics are each consistent, the presence of – and the accept of the presence of – 
extreme voices among a plurality of voices may have effect in external identity 
politics. The effect may likely be mis-interpellation. 
Finally, extreme voices presenting themselves as speaking on behalf of self and other 
may engage each other in a 'dialogue of the extremes'. The very presence of extreme 
voices on the one side promoting extreme policies for future interaction make the 
extreme voices on the other side more credible. Such a dynamic may effectively 
erode the possibility of a dialogical centre (cf. Sheikh & Gad 2008).  
In sum, conflicts in external identity politics may be radicalized by both the way in 
which the identity narratives involved are structured and by the way the articulation 
of identity is performed. To be more specific: Subsection 3.3.2 discussed how 
specific policies for future self/other interaction may be narratively configured as 
more or less dialogically, and, hence, interpellate the other in a more or less 
conflictual way. This subsection discussed how conflictual spill over from internal 
identity politics may appear both as a consequence of internal debate being stopped 
by an articulation of identity successfully installing necessity in the policies presented 
in external identity politics – and how conflictual spill over may appear from debates 
not being stopped, in which case extreme voices in internal identity politics may 
effectively come to represent the self in external identity politics. Table 3.3 
summarizes the dynamics contributing to spill over of conflict from internal to 
external identity politics.  
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Spill over 
from 
necessity 
installed in 
internal 
identity 
politics 
Internal necessity makes 
external conflict 
Necessity installed in internal identity politics 
stops internal conflicts but transports conflict to 
external identity politics 
Primacy of the extreme  
(in internal identity 
politics) 
Necessity installed in internal identity politics by 
extreme voices promoting extreme scenarios 
Pre-empted consistency Necessity installed by extreme voices when 
central actors perform ambiguous self-
interpellation 
Spill over 
from lack 
of necessity 
in internal 
identity 
politics 
No front stage  
/back stage 
Internal identity politics transparent to external 
identity politics 
Unauthorized 
interpellation 
Extreme voices may present themselves as 
representing – or be taken to represent – self in 
external identity politics 
Mis-interpellation by 
plurality of voices 
Accept of the presence of extreme voices in 
internal identity politics may lead to doubt over 
who represents and over what policy is pursued 
Dialogue of extremes Extreme voices of two identities play up against 
each other 
Table 3.3 Dynamics contributing to spill over from internal to external identity politics 
 
3.3.4 The reflexivity of identity configurations 
The first subsection argued that conflict is a necessary corollary of any distinction 
between inside and outside. On this background, the preceding subsections discussed 
ways in which, firstly, identity structures and, secondly, the articulation of identity 
with necessity may contribute to radicalization of conflict in external identity politics. 
This subsection proceeds to discuss conflictual dynamics departing in the interaction 
of external identity politics. More specifically, the focus is on the possible 
contribution from various dimensions of reflexivity – insight, agreement, 
dialogicality – to radicalization or de-radicalization of conflictual relations.  
The point of departure for this subsection is the point of arrival of chapter 2: That 
identity politics is a process which may acquire its own regularity in dispersion of 
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acts; its own structural character. These structures of interaction may take on a 
recognizable direction: The structures of interaction may be structured as a 
radicalization of conflict; or as a de-radicalization.
140
 Figure 3.29 and figure 3.30 
illustrate how feed back from identity politics to identity as structure and individual 
articulations of identity may radicalize and de-radicalize conflict respectively. 
Time co-narrated by actors
 
Figure 3.29 Radicalizing feed backs from identity politics 
to identity narratives and articulations of identity 
 
One way of approaching the question of interactional dynamics is through asking 
what it takes to stop a dynamic. Galtung proposes, as one extreme way of 
intervention in a conflict, that an outside "conflict dictator … imposes a solution" 
(1996:105). The opposite extreme is "dissociative nonviolence" (1978:563n.27) 
which is the result of "Dissociation: disintegration, fission: The conflict parties do not 
communicate but separate, dissolving their formation." (1996:104; italics removed) 
These two extreme types of intervention in effect end the conflict by dissolving the 
relation as a relation: Dissociation means that the relation ends. In the extreme, an 
outside imposition of a solution ends the relation in the sense that the two parties in 
                                           
140
 In principle the structures of interaction may also be structured to uphold the same level 
of conflict. 
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conflict cease to be constituted as separate entities capable of agency; in stead they 
are subordinate elements determined by the 'dictator'. 
Time co-narrated by actors
 
Figure 3.30 De-radicalizing feed backs from identity politics 
to identity narratives and articulations of identity 
 
Between from these two extreme options any intervention in a conflict as a relational 
structure – by a party to the conflict or by an outsider – requires communication. This 
communication may be more or less dialogical (Galtung 1996:104-5). Between the 
two extremes, all the communicative interventions aim to uphold the relation as a 
relation by de-radicalizing it – hence following Galtung's preference: "far from 
separating two parties, a conflict should unite them, precisely because they have their 
incompatibility in common." (1978:490) 
The point of this subsection is, firstly, that such a self-reflexivity of a relation does 
not necessarily lead to de-radicalization. And, secondly, that it is achieved only at the 
cost of reifying the relation as a relation. This conclusion is reached by considering 
how the relation between self and other may be characterized on three dimensions of 
reflexivity – and how these dimensions of reflexivity may relate to radicalization/de-
radicalization. The prospects for de-/radicalization may be related to: Firstly, the 
insight of the parties in the conflict in the conflict, they are part in. Secondly, whether 
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the parties agree or disagree over what the structure of the conflict is. Thirdly, 
whether both parties construct the relation as mutually dialogical. 
Firstly, it may make a difference for the future of the conflict whether the actors 
recognize the configuration which they are part of. An insight in the conflict which 
they are part in may make it possible to de-radicalize it, should they want to. 
A classical point in IR security theory is that a relation defined by threat/defence may 
give rise to 'security dilemmas' (Herz 1950; Wæver 1994; Roe 1999): The one party 
takes action to secure itself – the defensive actions are, however, perceived as 
threatening by the other party, who must then secure itself – which the first party 
perceives as a threat, etc. Figure 3.31 combines two instances of the rhetorical figure 
of securitization to form a security dilemma: The means which actor 1 employs to 
avert threat 1 to referent-object 1 equals threat 2 aimed at referent object 2 which 
make actor 2 employ means 2 which unfortunately equals threat 1...
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Figure 3.31 The structure of a security dilemma 
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 Cf. the illustration of the figure of a securitization in figure 3.2.  
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Notably, this is a dynamic which may take place without the parties to it realize it: To 
perceive a threat implies only to have insight in the existence of a conflict – not 
necessarily to have insight in the structure of the relation, not to mention the 
dynamics of the relation. The result is that the conflict may spiral into radicalization. 
The radicalization may either proceed to (mutual) anti-grammatical action – or it may 
stabilize at some level of incompatibility acquiring some structural permanence of a 
conflictual configuration.
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Insight into the structure of the conflict makes active self-reflection possible in the 
sense that one may evaluate 'the action performed by ones action'.
143
 Such insight and 
self-reflection need, however, not lead to the dissolution of the conflictual 
configuration. To the contrary, it might make the actor-in-conflict even better at 
interpellating the other in ways that keep the conflict alive.
144
 Nevertheless, insight 
into the structure and dynamics of the relation does open a possibility for self-reform: 
If you do not realize what your own actions effect, it is difficult to reflect on it and 
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 Buzan & Wæver – in a discussion of their theoretical equivalent of a configuration – 
specifies that "The larger scale elements of constellations are generated by a variety of 
actors who may or may not be conscious of the social structure they have created and which 
their behaviour sustains, changes or erodes." (2009:286). 
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 In that sense, a security dilemma – and one way out of it – may be described with Hajer 
as "positioning effects: actors can get 'caught up' in an interplay. They might force others to 
take up a particular role, but once others are aware of what is going on, they might also try 
to refuse it ... This positioning not only occurs at the level of persons but can of course also 
be found among institutions or even nation-states." (Hajer 2006:73). McQuillan warns that 
"the subject to be more fully informed of the experience represented by the narrative-mark, 
it must also read the counternarratives which both contest and constitute the narrative-mark" 
(2000b:24) McQuillan goes on to quote Said: "The point is that contrapuntal reading must 
take account of both processes, that of imperialism and that of resistance to it, which can be 
done by extending our reading of the texts to include what was once forcibly excluded." 
(1993:79 qtd. in 200x:24). Increased insight into the identity narratives promoted by the 
other is central when seeking insight in the conflicts one find oneself caught up in. 
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 An obvious example would be the way extremes voices may be even better at keeping a 
'dialogue of the extremes' – and thereby the conflict – going (as discussed in subsection 
3.3.3) if they know what they are doing. 
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communicate the reflections even if you do find yourself in a situation which you 
would like to change. Even if there is no necessary link between insight and self-
reform – insight still facilitates dialogicality, once an actor is caught in a conflict 
configuration.  
Secondly, it may make a difference for the future of the conflict whether the actors 
agree or disagree over how the conflict which they each find themselves involved in 
is structured.  
One extreme option is that the parties – whether they each are aware of the others 
point of view it or not – agree to both being in the conflict, what it is about, and how 
it should be conducted through interaction. Milliken describes by the label 
assemblage how – even when engaged in conflict – "people structure their 
interactions to make them orderly sequences of exchanges that unfold over time … 
through enacting rounds of interaction" (2001:16; italics in original).
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 For such a 
well ordered assemblage to unfold presupposes a basic agreement on what the 
conflict is about. But more pertinently, it presupposes an agreement on how 'a 
conflict' – or just how 'this conflict' should evolve; i.e. an agreement on i.a. what 
constitutes an aggressive move, what constitutes a concession, and what constitutes a 
conciliatory move. Such an agreement might occur if the parties have been in the 
conflict for a long time, if they know each other in other ways, or if they have parallel 
experience with conflicts in similarly sedimented social systems. Or the orderly 
exchange of an assemblage may not occur if the agreement is only partial or due to 
lack of good intentions.
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 Agreement on what the conflict is about, however, 
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 Cf. n.83. 
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 Cf. the scene in Tim Burton's (1996) Mars Attacks in which a) the Martian's arrive and 
are translated to say "We come in peace"; b) a greater in the Human crowd frees a dove; c) 
the Martians shoots down the dove and the crowd (accessible at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gsXnK0ouTL8&NR=1, visited 15 December 2009). 
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facilitates dialogicality as it facilitates that the responses of the other make the sense 
intended in the narrative told by the self. 
Thirdly, it may make a difference for the future of the conflict whether both parties 
construct the relation as mutually dialogical. Openness to the input of the other – and 
envisioning a parallel openness in the other – facilitates self-reflection and self-
reform to the benefit of de-radicalization. Even if it necessitates neither.  
Subsection 3.1.3 found – when discussing the concept of grammars for future 
self/other interaction implied in self/other policy narratives – that a grammar of 
securitization constituted the limit between, on the one side, (residually) dialogical 
grammars, and, on the other side, anti-grammar proscribing categorical killings. 
Subsection 3.1.6.3 found – when discussing the parameters of self/other relations 
summing up to interactional grammars – that to construct a self/other relation as 
dialogical, the narrator must describe both self and other as capable of receiving input 
and as willing to (at least reflect on whether self or other should) engage in the self-
reform necessary for transformation of the relation. The remaining part of this 
subsection discusses how the relation may become self-reflexive if each side 
constructs the other as dialogical. Furthermore, it is pointed out that this self-
reflexivity is achieved at the cost of reifying the relation as a relation, i.e. a relation 
between two parties whose distinctiveness (rather than the diacritica of their 
distinctiveness) is reified. 
Galtung poses as a prerequisite for conflict de-radicalization that each end of the 
relation should 
not polarize. … [but] keep in contact with the opponent rather than avoid it; try to 
establish a dialogue with him rather than isolating from him or fighting him. Try to 
stem the tide towards black-white thinking, rather than indulging in the luxury of the 
traditional and destructive conflict stereotype. Try to let conflicting images of reality, 
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one from the antagonist and one from oneself, coexist in one's mind – at least until 
further development leads to major revisions in the images. (1978:501) 
Galtung pushes the argument to the extent that an important quality in relation to 
conflict de-radicalization is to "be able to tolerate ambivalence" (1978:502). Actually, 
in the future, he speculates (in 1968), "'tolerance of ambivalence' is not merely going 
to be an interesting and laudable property, it will become a necessity for survival … 
Tolerance of it may in fact be too little; [Man] may have actually to like 
ambivalence." (1978:502)
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Wæver warns, however, that when setting out to get a securitized relation back into 
the agonistic spectrum of conflict, insistence on ambivalence may very well be 
counter-productive:
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A securitized situation does not contain the openness that allows for a redefinition of 
identities. When the parties to a protracted conflict see themselves as existentially 
threatened, it is not the time to come to them and problematize the concept of their 
national or religious identity, show its constructedness and contingency. (Wæver 
2009:6; cf. Buzan et al. 1998:120f) 
So de-securitization may require a measure of strategic essentialism (cf. Hall 1996a). 
In parallel; to have a dialogue, you need to have two distinct entities. Dialogue is, 
after all, still a relation.  
                                           
147
 A rather stark demand when contrasted to national high modernity in which "Men really 
love their culture, because they now perceive the cultural athmosphere (instead of taking it 
for granted), and know they cannot really breathe or fulfil their identity outside it." (Gellner 
1983:111). Perhaps the contrast is still too stark considering the way the national principle 
including its demand for cultural homogeneity still (as discussed) performs its work as it is 
sedimented in the institutions of the nation state. 
148
 Neumann comes close to claiming that the same warning is valid for all identity political 
interventions (1999:209-216). 
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So when the aim is conflict de-radicalization, dialogue is, on the one hand, at once a 
means and an end: dialogue as interaction may – and to transform the conflict it must 
– feed back to reconfigure the grammars of future self/other interaction involved in 
the identity narratives told on both side. On the other hand, even if dialogicality 
facilitates dialogue and dialogue facilitates self-reform in the direction of 
dialogicality, neither are the philosopher's stone guaranteeing de-radicalization: 
neither a performed openness to the other nor an exchange actually taking place need 
lead to self-reform. But a self-reflexive relation at least has the chance of choosing to 
perform a reform of itself.
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Dimension Low                                                                                                      High 
Insight  In existence of relation  –  In structure of relation  –  In dynamics of relation 
Agreement  On existence of relation  –  On structure of relation  –  On future of relation 
Dialogicality  Self or other described as dialogical  –  Relation described as self-reflexive 
Table 3.4 Dimensions of reflexivity in identity configurations 
All three dimensions are always partial. High score on one dimension may facilitate higher 
scores on other dimensions - but the dimensions are neither dependent nor determining each 
others. 
 
To sum up: Insight into the conflict and agreement on the structure of the conflict 
among its parties may facilitate dialogicality, self-reflection and self-reform. Table 
3.4 summarizes how the reflectivity of a conflict may be characterized along three 
dimensions: insight, agreement and dialogicality. Even perfect self-reflexivity of a 
relation does, however, not guarantee self-reform and conflict de-radicalization. And 
the collective self-reflectivity of mutual dialogicality is achieved only at the cost of 
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 Normatively the decision whether to facilitate insight and dialogicality must rely on 
either trust in the parties to be able to 'handle the truth' and use both in a benevolent way. Or 
it may rely on trust not in the effect of speaking 'truth to power', but of speaking 'truth about 
power' in the sense that the parties will have a harder time radicalizing conflict in the 
context of the 'disclosure' of the consequences of their agency. 
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reifying the relation as a relation, i.e. a relation between two parties whose 
distinctiveness (rather than the diacritica of their distinctiveness) is reified. 
3.3.5 Feed backs from identity political dynamics 
This section set out to account for the contribution to radicalization of conflict from 
identity politics. To do so the discussion, firstly, focused on connections between, on 
the one hand, the structures of identity and the articulation of identity, and, on the 
other hand, identity politics. Secondly, the discussion focused on possible 
radicalizing dynamics inherent at the level of interaction.  
Subsection 3.3.1 argued that the very attempt to constitute a distinction between 
inside and outside – between internal and external identity politics – necessarily 
generates conflict. The argument took its point of departure in the analysis of the 
points of diffraction of three basic grammars for future interaction between self and 
other: Orientalism, Encompassment, Segmentation. More specifically, the points of 
diffraction on the one hand facilitate the meeting of the three basic grammars in the 
three combined policies of Dialogue, Monologue and Agonism. But, on the other 
hand, these combined policies are systematically conceived of as internal affairs 
when approached from one of the basic grammars conspiring to produce the policy – 
and as external affairs when approached from the other basic grammar. 
The proceeding subsections discussed the two main analytical concepts developed in 
the discussions of identity as structure and identity as articulation: the grammars for 
self/other interaction involved in self/other narratives and the necessity articulated to 
self/other narratives in internal identity politics. 
Subsection 3.3.2 specified how policy narratives may serve as radically different 
invitations to the other to partake in the continued narration of the relation. Basically, 
the interpellation is always partly misfiring – but it may miss its target more or less 
and with more or less potential for radicalization of conflict.  
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The different types of (unsuccessful) interpellation are prone to set off different 
conflictual dynamics. Non-interpellation denies the other agency (altogether or on 
specific issues) – and any act, the other may nevertheless perform, involves a 
potential for radicalization of conflict. Negative interpellation values the other 
negatively compared with a positive self valuation – and the other reversing this 
valuation involves a potential for radicalization of conflict over inclusion/exclusion. 
Genocidal and securitized interpellations already involve radicalized conflict – but an 
attempt from the other to de-radicalize is more or less hopeless as answers to the two 
kinds respectively. Dis-interpellation may be the result of assimilatory policies; the 
other reacts by insisting to uphold the distinction or hybridity of identities. Mis-
interpellation involves a sequence of offering the other a role; the others' accept of the 
role; and the retroactive denial of the role once offered to the other – frustration may 
lead the other to take up radically conflictual counter-identities. 
Subsection 3.3.3 discussed relations between, on the one hand, the articulation of 
necessity to self/other narratives in internal identity politics, and, on the other hand, 
external identity politics. A series of specific mechanisms were identified which may 
contribute to transport conflict from internal identity politics to external identity 
politics. Basically installation of necessity in a self/other narrative may serve to stop 
debate (and, hence, ease conflict) in internal identity politics. But by necessitating 
certain elements of the narrative, the potential for radicalization of conflict in external 
identity politics may become higher: As more elements of the identity narrative are 
necessitated, less room for co-narration is left to the other. 
The lack of closure in internal identity politics may, however, also spill over conflict 
to external identity politics. Extreme voices may present themselves as representing – 
or may be taken to represent – the self. Or the very plurality of voices in internal 
identity politics may result in mis-interpellation of an other. 
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Finally, subsection 3.3.4 discussed the possible ways in which a relation may turn 
reflexive – facilitated by insight, agreement, and dialogicality – and the possible 
contribution of reflexivity to the de-radicalization of conflict. The discussion 
concluded that insight into the conflict and agreement on its structure facilitates 
dialogicality, self-reflection and self-reform. Even perfect self-reflexivity of a relation 
does, however, not guarantee self-reform and conflict de-radicalization. And the 
collective self-reflectivity of mutual dialogicality is achieved only at the cost of 
reifying the relation as a relation between two distinct entities. 
3.4 Identity configurations self-radicalizing and de-
radicalizing 
This chapter set out to account theoretically for the possible contributions to 
radicalization from the way an identity configuration is structured. It did so by 
revisiting the individual elements of the ontology laid out in chapter 2 focusing on the 
elements which may be structured to contribute to radicalization. Specifically, the 
focus was, firstly, on how the discursive structure of a self/other policy narrative may 
be structured to issue different invitations to the other to co-narrate the future 
relation. Secondly, the focus was on how necessity may be installed in the narratives 
by structuring temporality or by articulating the narrative with materiality. Thirdly, 
the focus was on the relations between, on the one hand, the structures of the policy 
narratives and the articulations of necessity, and on the other hand, the dynamics of 
identity politics. This section briefly summarizes the contribution of these three foci 
to facilitate the development of their analytical implications in chapter 4. 
Section 3.1 developed a typology of self/other policies on the basis of three basic 
'grammars' of identity/alterity. The grammars are basic ways in which one may relate 
self and other: a first grammar consists in distinguishing self from other; a second 
grammar consists in acting on behalf of the other; while a third grammar consists in 
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producing knowledge of the self/other relation. In combination, the three grammars 
delimit a realm of policies which allow future interaction between two distinct 
entities – and three distinct ways in which the future envisioned may not include a 
relation between self and other. These 'anti-grammatical' policies in each their way 
involve existential threats to self or other. Furthermore, the section recollected how 
self/other policy narratives may be legitimized and necessitated by relating the 
present self and other along parameters of spatiality, temporality and intentionality.  
In sum, when Danish narratives on Muslims are to be assessed for their contribution 
to radicalization of conflict, the analysis of identity politics will focus on  
 the parameters of difference constituted between self and other. 
 the future relations narrated between self and other. 
 possible threats constructed involving the other. 
Section 3.2 discussed how necessity may be installed in self/other narratives. One 
option is the articulation of certain temporalities which conceals the present 
articulation by tilting attention towards necessities in the past or in the future. An 
different option is the articulation of materiality in various forms – notably the 
naturalization of physical objects, the formalization of written text, or the 
interpellation of pre-established subjectivities. The interpellation of pre-established 
subjectivities, notably, makes the narrative dependent on the collaborative co-
narration of the other.  
In sum, when Danish debates on Muslims are to be assessed for their contribution to 
radicalization of conflict, the analysis of the articulation of identity will focus on  
 the installation of necessity in narratives by temporalization. 
 the installation of necessity in narratives by the articulation of materiality. 
 the interpellation of pre-established subjectivities as an attempt to articulate 
materiality and install necessity. 
244 
Section 3.3 discussed how conflicts in external identity politics may be radicalized by 
both the way in which the identity narratives involved are structured and by the way 
the articulation of identity is performed: The policies for future self/other interaction 
implied in the identity narratives promoted may be configured more or less 
dialogically, and, hence, interpellate the other in distinct more or less conflictual 
ways. And conflictual spill over from internal identity politics may appear as a 
consequence of internal debate being stopped by an articulation of identity 
successfully installing necessity in the narratives presented in external identity 
politics. But conflictual spill over may also appear from debates not being stopped, 
whereby extreme voices in internal identity politics may in effect come to represent 
the self in external identity politics. 
Furthermore, the section discussed how conflicts may acquire their own life. The 
discussion concluded that even if there is no necessary link between a party gaining 
insight in the conflict and that party engaging in self-reform, insight still seems to be 
a condition for dialogicality. Finally, the section found, on the one hand, that dialogue 
as interaction may – and to transform the conflict it must – feed back to reconfigure 
the grammars of future self/other interaction involved in the identity narratives told 
on both side. On the other hand, even if dialogicality facilitates dialogue and dialogue 
facilitates self-reform in the direction of dialogicality, neither guarantees de-
radicalization. A self-reflexive relation has, however, at least the chance of choosing 
to perform a reform of itself. 
In sum, when Danish debates on Muslims are to be assessed for their contribution to 
radicalization of conflict, the analysis of identity politics will focus on 
 the spill over – in the form of various kinds of interpellation – from the self/other 
narratives and from the way in which the narratives are articulated with necessity,  
 the feed backs from identity politics to the structures and articulation of identity 
dependent on the way in which the parties reveal insight in the dynamics of the 
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conflict; engage in self-reflection on behalf of the relation; and the dialogicality of 
this self-reflection. 
Chapter 4 develops the analytical implications of this theoretical account of how an 
identity configuration may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict. 
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4 5BAnalytical choices, selection and tools 
To recapitulate; chapter 1 posed the main research question, which the dissertation 
seeks to answer: 
 What structures and dynamics in Danish debates on Muslims may contribute to 
a radicalization of conflict? 
Taken together, chapters 2 and 3 accounted ontologically and theoretically for a 
world of entities, relations and dynamics which the dissertation claims is worth 
focusing on when analysing radicalization of conflict. The task for the present chapter 
is to explain how this theoretical world may – in chapters 5 through 9 – be confronted 
with the empirical world. More specifically, the chapter asks: 
C. Where and how to focus to observe the identity configuration centred on Danish 
debates on Muslims? 
The chapter answers this question by presenting the specific methodological choices, 
selections and tools employed in the analysis – and by discussing the biases and blind 
spots co-produced.  
Firstly, concerning the most basic choices of focus and attention, the chapter asks: 
Why accept the Danish nation state as the institutional frame for identity political 
negotiations? Why focus on Danish political debate as it may be found in 
parliamentary negotiations and government statements? Why a focus on 'the Muslim' 
as the other in question?  
Secondly, concerning the selection of the specific debates for analysis, the chapter 
asks: What exactly make a debate qualify as a debate – and what makes it qualify as a 
debate on 'Muslim relations'? And why select these specific debates to read?  
Thirdly, concerning the specific analytical tools employed when engaging with the 
texts, the chapter asks: Why read these debates in the ways they are read?  
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Finally, concerning the biases and blind spots: Why the difference in treatment when 
focusing on Denmark and 'the Muslim'? And what kind of knowledge is it that the 
dissertation produces? 
4.1 Analytical choices: Political debates on Muslims – is that 
all there is to Danish identity? 
The dissertation analyses Danish-Muslim relations as they are constructed in political 
discourse, i.e. in the debates of the Danish parliament, Folketinget and in government 
statements. Now, one might legitimately ask, 'Is that all there is to Danish identity?' 
After all, Danish identity may be produced everywhere; at the dinner tables and in the 
primary school, at the grocery store and by the public pool, in the newspapers and on 
the internet, in courts and in international politics. Furthermore, a lot of others may be 
pointed out beside the Muslim ones. 
So, this section asks, why accept the Danish nation state as the institutional frame for 
identity political negotiations? Furthermore, why focus on Danish political debate as 
it may be found in parliamentary negotiations and government statements? And 
finally, why a focus on 'the Muslim' as the other in question?  
Chapter 3 found that as long as the policies for engaging with the other are 
grammatical, there is, firstly, a place from which the other may spur a conflict over 
how to be a part in the conflict. But regardless of whether the other uses this place to 
protest, there are, secondly, tensions inbuilt in the grammars which keeps the 
distinction between inside and outside from fixating. Nevertheless, empirically it 
seems – as discussed in chapter 2 – reasonable to take as the point of departure for 
analysis that the nation state constitutes a comparatively successful attempt to 
institutionalize a single Orientalist distinction between inside and outside. 
At least when the analysis concerns Denmark, the nation state has institutionalized 
itself as a relevant distinction between internal and external identity politics – and it 
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has acquired a privileged position on both sides of the distinction: It is – by 
articulating materiality in numerous ways – making itself a contingent but effective 
focal point of both identity politics inside and identity politics outside itself. 
Contingent in the sense that this position is not necessary; it could have been different 
– but contingent also in the sense that it is not different; the nation state does take up 
this position. This privileged position makes it difficult to ignore an invitation to 
conflict issued from a nation state. And this is what warrants placing the Danish 
nation state in the focus of the analytical lenses of the dissertation. 
Furthermore, the privileged position of the nation state allows it a certain freedom in 
defining its preferred partner in conflict; in defining what other to relate to. Connolly 
observes that 
The primary targets of state negation are most functional if (a) they can be 
constituted as evils responsible for the threats to the common identity, (b) their 
visibility might otherwise signify defects and failings in the established [civic] 
identity, (c) they are strategically weak enough to be subjected to punitive measures, 
and (d) they are resilient enough to renew their status as sources of evil in the face of 
such measures. (1991:207) 
When reading Danish identity discourse, 'Muslims' seem – as a collective asserting its 
own unity and importance while differing over the consequences, aspirations and 
leadership over the important unity – to fit this check list. This is what warrants 
placing 'the Muslim' as the other to which Denmark relates in an asymmetrical 
identity political conflict over who gets to be part of this relation.  
The privileged position of the nation state is, however, not unconditional. Firstly, 
even if privileged the nation state does not constitute a unitary actor: there are actors 
in conflict both inside and outside the nation states. Secondly, even if privileged the 
nation state does not monopolize the relation between inside and outside. Thirdly, 
even if privileged the nation state does not monopolize its own representation. In 
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sum, it is not just so that internal identity politics may spill over to external identity 
politics and external identity politics may feed back to internal identity politics – 
what is at stake in the process is also the re-constitution of the national identification 
as the primary one and, hence, of the nation state as a discursively privileged point of 
identification. This privileged, yet conditioned position of the Danish nation state is 
what warrants placing the Danish debates on how to relate to Muslims in analytical 
focus. 
More specifically, the dissertation focuses its analysis on the debates on Muslim 
relations in the political system. It does not base this choice on any claim of a causal 
relation between the debates of the political system on the one hand and media or 
wider public debates on the other, irrespective of the direction of possible causal 
relations. Rather, the choice of analytical material for the dissertation is made by 
choosing to take the discourse studied seriously: 
Danish national identity is intimately related to ‘its’ nation state; in its own self-
understanding the nation built the welfare state to nest the unfolding of its inner 
qualities (Hansen 2002:51f, 60f, 69, 80ff). Even if the elite might be feared to let ‘the 
people’ down (Hansen 2002:58, 60f; Haahr 2003:40), the state is basically ‘ours’ and 
‘we’ elected ‘the politicians’ to make the state do ‘us’ good. The discourse itself 
points out the institution of the Danish state as pivotal in Danish identity discourse 
(Bertramsen et al. 1991). 
As noted, there will always be struggles over representation; even if the state is 
pointed out as the locus of authority on behalf of the nation. When these struggles 
concern what identities count and how to delimit the identities in question, we have 
identity politics. Danish identity discourse, however, points out a privileged site of 
popular sovereignty; i.e. a site privileged both for disagreement and – more pertinent 
– for deciding disagreements on what is and ought to be Denmark: The Danish nation 
has institutionalised a parliament to frame these and other kinds of struggles. This 
251 
position of parliament – initially as the two chamber Rigsdagen; since 1953 as the 
unichamber Folketinget – has been unchallenged since the King's last substantial 
attempt at intervention in 1920 (Knudsen 2007:149ff). Parliament decides – 
Government executes. Or, when parliament has decided to award the government 
with a room for discretion: Government decides and executes – parliament controls 
and sanctions. Including parliamentary negotiations and government policy 
statements as the primary empirical material seems to be a way of taking the nation’s 
own self-description seriously. This is what warrants a focus on parliamentary 
negotiations and on texts referred to in parliamentary negotiations.
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 The selection of parliament and government as the primary site of discourse does indeed 
carry a number of problems and limitations with it: First, the selection of the 
institutionalised representatives for Denmark as the primary site of investigation 
systematically prioritizes one We – i.e. the Danish – over other possible We’s. But such a 
priority seems historically rather uncontroversial when keeping the dominant position of the 
nation state in present days in mind (Billig 1995; Smith 1998; Sonnichsen & Gad 2008). 
Furthermore, the head-on attempts to deconstruct or denaturalize the nation state – in 
general or in the Danish case – have not had any widespread effect in the empirical world 
(Østergaard 2006:64, 72; Hauge 2009; Neumann 1999:212f). As Butler has put it; "The 
desire not to have an open future can be strong." (1997:162). Hence, politically one might as 
well choose a less ambitious aim. And most importantly; the analytical focus does not 
preclude the construction of other We’s by the ones whom Danes have institutionalized to 
represent them – other We's which may or may not carry the potential to disturb the Danish 
nation state as primary object of identification. A second limitation arises when combining 
A) the priority given to the political system when selecting the material to be analyzed with 
B) the religious character of the other implied in focusing on the construction of 'the 
Muslim': With these à priori prioritizations, the dissertation does risk to overlook other 
dynamics of othering. As Barth (1969) pointed out, different diacritica may be deemed 
relevant in different situations. By giving priority to religion and politics in the research 
focus and by the selection of empirical material respectively, the dissertation risks 
systematically generating diacritica which relate religion and politics. The best answer to 
this challenge to the analytical setup of the dissertation is that the articulation of an 
encounter between (Their Muslim) religion and (Our secular) politics – which seem in 
Danish identity discourse to be construed as two functionally differentiated subsystems best 
kept apart – activates such a huge range of re-articulations, that it (partially) structures the 
most diverse debates. Actually, the Muslim is so solidly placed centre stage that it serves to 
further marginalize already marginalized issues: When the new government took office in 
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So, to answer the questions posed in the beginning of the section: No the dissertation 
does not cover all there is to Danish identity; Danish identity is produced in relation 
to Muslims beyond the debates of the political system; obvious examples would be: 
everyday life (Koefoed 2006) and the media (Hervik (ed.) 1999; 2002; Hussain et al. 
1997; Madsen 2000). And the production of Danish identity involves other others 
than the Muslim (Hansen 2002; Haahr 2003; Berendt 1983). But to focus on 
parliament and government is to take Danish identity discourse seriously – and the 
Muslim Other does appear central these days.
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4.2 Selection for analysis: Why these debates? 
Section 4.1 argued why the dissertation focuses its analysis on Danish parliamentary 
debates and government statements on Muslim relations. This section asks: What 
exactly make a debate qualify as a debate – and what makes it qualify as a debate on 
'Muslim relations'? And why select these specific debates to read?  
The debates analysed vary in both qualitative and quantitative format: Some are 
situated exchanges between parliamentary representatives on a specific text (i.a., a 
report, a policy proposal, or a bill) within the formal delimitation of one point on the 
                                                                                                                                            
2001, it dismantled the Ministry of Housing, effectively marginalizing the housing sector 
from political priority. The main housing related issue to reach the political agenda has been 
how to counter 'ghettofication' – that is the concentration of ethnic minorities in suburbian 
social housing projects (Ministeriet 2004: Regeringens strategi mod ghettoisering, accessed 
26 August 2009, available at 
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/bibliotek/publikationer/regeringsinitiativer/2004/regpub_ghettoi
sering/index.htm). Recently, the Minister for Employment who is also the Minister for 
Gender Equality, argued that immigrant women was her main priority as their problems 
were the main gender equality problem in Denmark. (Støjberg, I. 2009: 'Diskussion om 
fokus på ligestilling', interview in DR P1 Morgen, 2009.06.16 07:09, 
http://www.dr.dk.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/P1/P1Morgen/Udsendelser/2009/06/16/094311.htm, 
visited 2009.09.04.) This line of reasoning has served to marginalize concern for gender 
equality among ethnically Danish women (Andreassen 2005:165ff; Pedersen 2009). 
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 A discussion of the strategic risks and benefits of this decision is initiated in subsection 
4.4.2 of this chapter and taken up in the concluding chapter. 
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agenda on a specific date of a plenary session. Other debates are prolonged, dispersed 
exchanges on an issue meandering in and out of different media for months or years 
(– departing in parliamentary plenary sessions on specific proposals or general 
debates but switching to i.a. committee reports, written questions to the minister and 
resulting answers, media coverage, etc.).  
What nevertheless delimits each of them as debates is that the participants agree to 
disagree in the sense that they refer to each others as referring to the same issue – 
even if they do not agree on what the issue is or on what the conclusion to the debate 
should be. A debate is characterized by involving an agreement which facilitates a 
disagreement (Gad 2005:32). In some of the debates, different actors are disagreeing 
with each others across the parliamentarian spectrum. In other debates, actors – most 
pertinently; the government – are disagreeing with them selves over time.152 
Not every participant in these debates would agree when the dissertation contends 
that these debates are on 'Muslim relations' – let alone that they sum up to an overall 
debate on Denmark's 'Muslim relations'. Actually, a common denominator for the 
debates is that some – in some debates even most – of the participants appear as 
actively working to keep the debate in question focused on something else than 
Muslims; or focused on 'Muslims'-as-something-else-than-Muslims.  
Granted, all the debates are also debates on issues apart from Muslims – or rather; on 
issues other than but not apart from Muslims: The dissertation claims that in 
Denmark it is currently not possible to debate the issues analysed without articulating 
them as related to Muslims – at least one should articulate the issue as possibly 
articulated to Muslims by an opponent. Presenting textual evidence for such an 
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 Especially, chapters 5 and 8 give more attention to the different self/other policy 
narratives which the government has told about the 'same' issue – whether the narratives are 
told interchangeably or the one narrative has superseded the other – than to the debate 
between different identity politicians. 
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indirect articulation of a relation as Muslim, of course, constitutes an analytical 
challenge. But it is a challenge that can only be met in analysis. It cannot be solved 
once and for all on the level of analytical strategy, as it is impossible à priori to 
finalize a catalogue of possible articulations that would produce 'a Muslim'. 
Related to the question of what constitutes a debate on 'Muslim relation' is the 
question whether one should analyse high profiled debates on controversial issues – 
or one should seek up debates which does not reach the headlines.  
Concerning the low profile end of the spectrum, there is a true dilemma at one level: 
There are lots of 'Muslim relations' in the everyday life of Danes and in the 
integration measures of the Danish states. Even if thinking in terms of Us and Them 
may be learned so thoroughly that it has to become inscribed in bodily practice 
(Pedersen et al. 2006) – there are also everyday practical relations which ignore the 
distinction and the tensions it raises (Hedetoft 2006a:419f). But at another level, the 
analytico-strategic dilemma fades. In relation to public and especially parliamentary 
debates, seeking up non-controversial debates misses the point: Any implication in a 
debate of something which might be framed as 'Muslim' involves moving into what 
could be termed 'the shadow of a future controversy'. When an actor in Danish 
identity politics foresee that a debate may come to be articulated as a debate of 
'Muslim relations', s/he needs to take into consideration that s/he may soon be caught 
in high pitched controversy (cf. Mandaville 2008). So in that sense, there is no low 
key debate on 'Muslim relations'; if an issue is articulated as 'Muslim', it is already – 
at least potentially – high pitched. 
Still remains the part of the dilemma concerning whether one should analyse the most 
high profiled and high pitched debates. Or to be specific: Why not focus the analysis 
on the debates on the Cartoon Controversy? As the debates on the Cartoons and the 
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controversy itself has already been scrutinized from a diversity of angles,
153
 however, 
the dissertation prefers to add to the understanding of the events indirectly by 
focusing on debates which made the cartoons and the controversy possible; and on 
debates which – as will be clear from the analyses – were partly structured as 
evaluations of processes leading to and following the cartoons.  
Between these two extremes – debates seemingly avoiding controversy and the 
controversy par excellence – the dissertation chooses a diversity of 'normal 
controversy' debates: 'Normal controversy' both in the sense that controversy is the 
normal when debating how to relate to Muslims, and in the sense that the controversy 
is not at its most extreme. The 'normal' level of controversy chosen allows room for 
an analysis answering to the research question posed in chapter 1 in terms of the 
theoretical account of chapter 3: What structures and dynamics may contribute to a 
radicalization of conflict? Analysing a debate at its highest pitch might have given 
more insight in how the normal is turned into the extreme; the chosen focus 
conversely produces a picture of how extreme, the normal has turned. 
The debates chosen are diverse in the sense that they take their departure in different 
policy fields as they are institutionalized in the government bureaucracy and the 
division of labour between parliamentarians. The point of selecting debates in diverse 
policy fields is not to compare the debates in any formal sense.
154
 Rather the point is 
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 Spiegelmann (2006); Holm (2006); Hedetoft (2006b); Beck-Jørgensen (2006); Rynning 
& Schmidt (2006); Jensen (2006); Qvortrup (2006); Modood et al. (2006); Hansen & 
Hundevadt (2006); Larsen & Seidenfaden (2007); Larsen, H. (2007); Rytkønen (2007); 
Lægaard (2007b); Lawler (2007); Lehtonen (2007); Lindekilde (2007); Olsen (2007); 
Ammitzbøll & Vidino (2007); Keane (2008); Lagouette (2008); Andreasen (2008); Langer 
(2008); Powers (2008); Davies et al. (eds) (2008); Meer & Mouritsen (2009); 
Triandafyllidou (2009); Petersen (2009); Sløk (2009); Gregersen (2009); Feldt (2009); 
Ridanpää (2009); Müller et al. (2009); Holmström et al. (2010); Rostbøll (forthcoming). 
154
 The rationale behind the need for diversity is not a formal 'maximum variation case 
selection' (Flyvbjerg 2006:230) or 'diverse case selection' (Seawright & Gerring 2008:301). 
Seawright & Gerring notes the relation of the methodological choice of selecting 'diverse 
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to supply a diversity of specific instances of debate to compare with the world of 
entities, relations and dynamics which chapter 3 claimed to be worth focusing on 
analytically, when analysing radicalization of conflict. In that sense, it is more 
important that the debates analysed take their point of departure in a variety of policy 
fields than the exact selection of the one debate over the other. Even more so, as a 
separate point of the dissertation is that each of the debates develops from its point of 
departure to resemble policy narratives of other policy fields.
155
 
More specifically, the dissertation analyses five instances of debate on what is found 
to be 'Muslim relations'. The debates depart in five different policy fields: integration 
(chapter 5), immigration (chapter 6), cultural policy (chapter 7), security policy 
(chapter 8), and foreign policy (chapter 9).
156
 Other policy fields could have been 
selected – and within the selected policy fields, other debates could bare been singled 
                                                                                                                                            
cases' to Mill's logical 'method of agreement and difference' (1872; cf. Seawright & 
Gerrring 2008:fn.3), another name for comparison – a name which, however, stresses that 
you need a category of 'fruit' to make a meaningful comparison of apples and oranges. The 
dissertation does not postulate a generalization to neither other Danish debates on Muslims 
than the ones analysed nor beyond the Danish debates. Rather the dissertation limits itself to 
comparing the theoretical account of structures and dynamics which may radicalize conflict 
with the specific debates analyzed. 
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 The concluding chapter discusses how this tendency is a symptom of the condensation of 
a variety of relations into a single relation to a Muslim other – and how this in itself 
involves a potential for conflict radicalization. 
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 Chapters 5 and 6 stand out as they do not only provide each an analysis of a debate. They 
also briefly introduce the political landscape and identity discourse which produces the 
Danish 'Muslim relations'. This special status awarded to chapters 5 and 6 is purely 
instructional in the sense that the dissertation needs to communicate these basic features of 
the Danish political landscape; rather than doing this in a separate chapter this is done while 
introducing the two first debates. The special status in the text of the dissertation implicates 
neither that the debates are 'paradigmatic' in the sense that they are meant to constitute an 
ideal type for the reader to recognize (cf. Flyvbjerg 2006:230ff) nor that they are 
'emblematic' in the sense that they constitutes a model or frame of reference for the way the 
actors conduct other debates (cf. Hajer 2006:68). The status of all the debates – including 
the ones analysed in chapters 5 and 6 – are equal in the sense that they all form part of a 
convergent Danish debate on Muslim relations (cf. the concluding chapter). 
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out: Different selections would have generated different narratives, but the overall 
impression of both variation and convergence would most likely have been the same. 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the debates selected for analysis: Firstly, by listing 
whether each chapter provides an analysis of synchronic disagreements across the 
parliamentarian spectrum and/or an analysis of the government's disagreement with 
itself over time. Secondly, it summarizes how the debates a) all relate to Muslims – 
while b) taking their point of departure in a variety of policy fields. (As the table also 
summarizes the analytical questions posed to the debate in the specially designed first 
reading, the table is inserted in the end of subsection 4.3.1). 
4.3 Analytical tools: How to read the debates? 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 argued the general choice and specific selection of material to 
focus on. This section turns to the specific questions which are posed to the material 
to let it meet the theoretical categories developed in chapter 2 and 3. The section asks, 
why the dissertation reads the debates selected in the way they are read – bearing in 
mind that the point of the reading is to contribute to the main research question of the 
dissertation:  
 What structures and dynamics in Danish debates on Muslims may contribute to 
a radicalization of conflict? 
The central contribution of the theoretical account of how an identity configuration 
may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict (chapter 3) was the 
importance of how a self/other policy narrative may be grammatical or anti-
grammatical; i.e. how the narrative works (or does not work) as an invitation to 
continued co-narration. Crucial in this regard is the position of self/other security 
narratives as describing a liminal policy; a policy narrative which denotes the end of 
grammar as it closes down the invitation to continued co-narration by pointing out the 
other as a threat to the continued existence of the self. 
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When approaching the material selected for analysis bearing in mind the central 
concept of grammar for future interaction, the dissertation performs three readings of 
each debate: 
A first reading approach the debate as much on its own terms as possible. This first 
reading basically asks what the debate is about.  
The second reading articulates the world found in the debate with the world of 
entities, relations and dynamics which chapter 3 claimed worth focusing on when 
analysing radicalization of conflict. It does so by posing a series of questions 
designed to operationalize the categories developed in chapter 3. The questions 
basically sum up to 'what is the self/other policy narrative(s) promoted in this 
debate?' These questions are developed in subsection 4.3.2. 
The third reading turns the table to look how the narrative described sounds for the 
other invited – or not invited – to co-narrate the continuation of the narrative. 
Subsection 4.3.3 explains what it means to ask 'how does the narrative interpellate' – 
and to what degree such a question may be answered by analysing the material 
selected. 
4.3.1 First readings: What is the debate about? 
The first readings performed in each of the analytical chapters attempt to capture 
what is at stake in the debate in focus: What concepts and relations does the debate 
revolve around? And what mechanisms in the discursive structure, agency and 
interaction appear to set off what dynamics: What makes the debate evolve? 
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Each of the chapters employ a selection of the ontological categories accounted for in 
chapter 2 to characterise the debates as debates:
157
 
1. What agreement forms the basis of the debate? 
 What disagreements are formed on the basis of this agreement? 
 With what tools are the disagreements negotiated? 
Certain strands of conversation analysis propose that the analyst should approach the 
empirical material without any prejudices (cf. Schegloff 1997). This is hardly 
possible – and attempts to do so anyway may be (self-)deceptive (Wetherell 1998). 
Each of the chapters 5-9 are the result of an iterative process back and forth between 
'theory' and 'empirical material'; back and forth between induction and deduction. The 
first readings of the debates were performed at an earlier state in this iterative process 
than the second and third reading; therefore each analytical chapter presents its own 
set of categories employed.
158
 And for the same reason the first readings appear more 
inductive than the second and third reading: When the debates were first approached 
'on their own terms' the material was observed through the general conceptual lenses 
presented (in chapter 2) as the ontology of an identity configuration – rather than 
through the more specific conceptual lenses presented (in chapter 3) as a theoretical 
account of how an identity configuration may be structured to contribute to 
radicalization of conflict. The reason why the analyses of the chapters are 
nevertheless presented in the language of chapter 3 is, of course, that the first, open 
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 Cf. the definition of a debate provided in subsection 4.2. 
158
 A central characteristic of qualitative investigations is that the main categories of the 
analytic cannot be clear at the beginning of the process (Dahler-Larsen 2008:18). This 
means, contra Popper and Positivists before him, that 'the context of discovery' should be 
visible in the text as part of 'the context of justification': The proceedings and conclusions 
gain validity not (only) from a stringent method but (also) from the relevance of the 
associations helping the (re-)construction of the analytical strategy (2008:18). 
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readings turned out to produce specific kinds of stories which may be told in 
categories suitable for narratives of contribution to radicalization of conflict. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the analytical categories employed in the first reading of each 
debate – along with the way in which the individual debate meets the criteria for 
selecting debates for analysis (as discussed in subsection 4.2). What debates are in 
focus? Who are the parties to the debates? How does the individual debate live up to 
the fixed criteria for selection (that they are about a 'Muslim relation')? How does the 
individual debate contribute to the selection of debates departing in a 'diversity' of 
policy fields? What analytical categories is the individual debate submitted to in the 
first reading? 
4.3.2 Second reading: What is the self/other narrative? 
In the second reading, each debate is summarized on the terms of the theoretical 
account (presented in chapter 3) of what structures found in an identity configuration 
may contribute to radicalization of conflict. In short, the second reading asks three 
kinds of questions to characterize the self/other narratives promoted in the debate as it 
is presented in the first reading:
159
 What are the present, future, and necessary 
relations of the narrative. 
Firstly, to describe how the narrative implicates the present relation between self and 
other, the second reading asks: 
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 An alternative strategy would have prescribed approaching the material directly with the 
analytical tools of the second reading (after having skipped the first reading). The benefit of 
this alternative strategy would have been to allow more strict formal comparisons over time 
and issue areas and between different debates. The benefit of only applying the narrative 
lenses of the second reading after having filtered the material through the first reading is 
that the analysis is concentrated on the narratives most important to the specific debates; 
i.e., the narratives specifically involved in the struggles over what is at stake in the specific 
debates. 
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Ch Debate in 
focus 
Parties to 
debate 
Selection of debates Analytical categories 
employed in first 
reading 
a) All debates 
analysed exhibit a 
Muslim relation 
b) Debates 
depart 
from 
diverse 
policy 
fields 
5 Integration 
of migrants 
and refugees 
Government 
narratives 
over time 
Gradually increased 
role of 'Muslim 
culture' and Islam as 
causes in narratives 
of integration 
Integration 
policy 
Self/other security 
narratives 
6 HR based 
criticism of 
criteria and 
procedures 
for residence 
permits 
Parliament-
tarian 
landscape 
Need to limit influx 
to allow integration 
(which, according to 
ch. 5, is increasingly 
a question of 
'Muslim culture') 
+ Need to protect 
against 'Muslim' 
practices  
Immigra-
tion policy 
a) Rationales for action 
and responsibility 
b) Legitimizing 
narratives  
c) Articulation of 
materiality 
d) Projects for re-
delimitation of discourse 
7 Refuge to 
foreign 
writers 
whose 
freedom of 
expression is 
infringed 
Parliamen-
tarian 
landscape 
Cartoon crisis 
explicit context  
+ Declaration 
denouncing 'Muslim' 
cultural practices 
Cultural 
policy 
a) Self/other security 
narratives  
b) Diacritica for 
exclusion 
8 Dialogue as 
terrorism 
prevention 
Government 
narratives 
over time  
+ Parlia-
mentarian 
landscape 
Dialogue across 
religio-cultural 
difference  
+ Targeted at 
'Muslims in danger 
of radicalization' 
Security 
policy 
a) Self/other security 
narratives 
b) Reflexivity 
9 Turkish EU 
accession 
Parliamen-
tarian 
landscape 
Allusion to 'Muslim' 
problems 
Foreign 
policy 
a) Temporalization of the 
difference of the other 
b) Diacriticon for 
exclusion 
Table 4.1 Overview of debates analyzed 
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2. Along what parameters is the Muslim described as different from 'Us'? 
   Is the Muslim in question presented as a threat? If so; to what exactly? 
The relation between self and other may – as detailed in chapter 3 – be described 
along parameters of spatiality, temporality, and intentionality: Basically, the relation 
is constituted by an exclusion from identity on some criteria, and the relation is 
described in a series of relational terms of space (What distinguishes Us from Them, 
Their hierarchical position vis à vis Ours, Their distance to Us); time (Our common 
history, Their effect on Us, Their possible development relative to Ours); and 
intentions (Our and Their capabilities to act, Their posture vis à vis Us, Their 
willingness to listen to Us).  
At a synthetic level, if the Muslim is presented as a threat, this may be an obvious 
contribution to radicalization of conflict. Other ways of characterising the Muslim 
and the relation between Us and Them may involve a conflictual potential as well. 
Contrarily, if the Muslim is presented as someone with whom you may engage in a 
meaningful dialogue, the immediate potential for conflict is lower. 
Secondly, the relation is told as a policy narrative which lays out what we should do 
to them to achieve a preferred future configuration of the relation. To describe how 
the narrative implicates alternative future relations between self and other, the second 
reading asks:  
3. What future relations between 'Us' and Muslim others are preferred? 
 What futures are to be avoided? 
 What policy is suggested to achieve the preferred future and avoid other   
   futures?  
E.g., a policy of 'leaving alone' immediately contributes less to radicalization of 
conflict than one of 'conquering'. 
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Thirdly, to describe how necessity is inscribed in the narrative, the second reading 
asks. 
4. How is this policy proposal necessitated or legitimized by the – past, present 
and future – relations described between 'Us' and the Muslim other?  
How is materiality articulated to make certain facts the necessary point of 
departure and arrival for the debates? 
E.g., a policy which is presented as necessary due to an unalterable quality of the 
Muslim is potentially contributing more to conflict than one presented as optional.  
In sum, the second reading lays out how the self/other policy narrative analysed 
prescribes a specific future interaction between Us and Them: The relation between 
Us and Them is presented to be in a specific way at this moment – while a different 
relation is sought to be realized in a future moment. The development from this 
moment to the future moment is sought through some proposed action – and the other 
is asked to agree or participate by acting in a specific way. 
4.3.3 Third reading: How does the self/other narrative interpellate? 
The third reading focuses on how the narrative(s) promoted in the debate interpellate 
the other. It attempts to turn the table by describing reactions to the roles narrated for 
the other to take up. This third reading asks: 
5. What roles are offered to Muslim others and what future interaction is implied 
in the policy narratives promoted? 
Do the narratives told indicate feed back from others responding to roles and 
grammars for future interaction? 
A carefully circumscribed role awarded to the Muslim – and the very specific policy 
for future interaction it entails – may contribute to radicalization of conflict, as it 
makes the discretion left to the Muslim when playing his/her role very limited. 
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Indications in Danish debates of active protest against the grammar point to the 
realization of such a potential for radicalization. Contrarily, indications in Danish 
debates of passive protest – in the sense that no one takes up the assigned 'Muslim' 
role may point to a different route to radicalization in the sense that the unilaterally 
told Danish narratives may start 'chasing' Muslims by continuing the narrative by 
explaining why no Muslims took up the role. 
This third reading is partly straight forward, partly symptomatic (Althusser & Balibar 
[1968]1970:354-5; Jameson 1981), and partly speculative: Firstly, even if the 
material read consists of only Danish debates, it may still include Muslim voices or 
representations of Muslim voices. Secondly, even if the Muslim voices are neither 
included nor represented, they may still have left their mark on the narratives told – 
even if the narratives work to repress these marks. Thirdly, the dissertation allows 
itself a measure of qualified guessing on the basis of a theoretical knowledge of the 
self/other narratives promoted by various groups of people casted as 'Muslims'. It 
does so, as refusals or modifications of a policy for future interaction and the roles 
implied are likely to provoke some kind of feed back into the continued narration – 
and into the internal politics of this narration. In that sense, any proposition of a 
grammatical or anti-grammatical policy for future interaction constitutes the first step 
of the identity political dynamics which is the overall focus of the dissertation.  
4.4 Biases and blindspots: What kind of knowledge is 
produced? 
So far this chapter has concentrated on presenting what the methodological choices, 
selections and tools allow the analysis see. This section discusses the most important 
blind spots left by these decisions and argues that the knowledge produced qualifies 
as social science. 
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4.4.1 What a difference a state makes: Asymmetrical analysis of identity 
politics 
The most important blind sport of the dissertation, obviously, is produced by the 
difference in treatment when focusing on Denmark and 'the Muslim' respectively. On 
the one hand, the theoretical framework of the dissertation points to the importance of 
identity politics – and the definition of identity politics include the external dynamic 
interaction between narratives of the relation between self and other as they are 
presented by representatives of self and of other (cf. chapter 3). On the other hand, 
the analytical focus of the dissertation is unilaterally on Danish debates – i.e. on the 
internal politics of one of the parties to the external politics.  
When judging the value of such a contribution, the conditions for analysing each end 
of the relation need to be taken into consideration. As described in section 4.1, 
Danish identity discourse points out a privileged place for staging and concluding on 
debates on policies; the Folketinget. But where would one find a relevant, parallel 
institution on the Muslim side? Certainly, there is no scarcity of self-proclaimed 
representatives of Islam and Muslims – internationally (Pultz 2009; Waardenburg 
(ed.) 2000) and nationally (Kühle 2004; 2009). Islamic discourse claims a unity 
which is patently not there. Where should one turn to analyze 'Muslim' debates on 
how to conduct 'Danish relations'? 
One may note that Islam and Muslims are diverse – and then pick one Islam anyway: 
Hidden in a cross-secterial conspiracy of Islamofascists (Mozaffari 2007; cf. Crone et 
al. 2008). Burried in Qur'anic text (Magaard 2007). Exemplified in various versions 
of 'Euro-Islam' reform theology (Crone 2010). Personified in the leader of Al-Qaeda, 
Osama bin Laden (Buzan & Wæver 2009) – or in individual, intellectual, veiled or 
un-veiled women (Christiansen forthcoming). All these picks may, depending on the 
specific purpose of the study, be legitimate and relevant. But none of them represent 
a discursively privileged arena for the internal identity politics of Islam. The point is 
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not that 'Denmark' is a monolith. But 'Muslim debates on Denmark' is structured in a 
markedly less hierarchical and centred way than 'Danish debates on Muslims'. Such 
an asymmetrical relation makes it even more interesting what roles the – 
hierarchically structured – Danish side presents for the – dispersed – Muslim side to 
take up. Because the interaction necessarily takes place primarily on the conditions 
laid out by the structured side to the relation. 
Evidently, a relational dynamic is best observed by observing both ends of the 
relation. However, even observation of each of the ends may produce important 
knowledge of the relation: Imagine a TV transmission covering a game of volleyball 
with only one camera focusing on the one side of the net. This coverage would still 
provide important knowledge of the game if it showed that the team in focus 
consistently missed the ball. And it would be equally significant to know if this team 
consistently delivered the ball to one specific position on the other side of the net. In 
parallel; for a relation to be dialogical requires dialogicality in each part of the 
relation. If, contrarily, one party characterizes the other by invectives or denominates 
it as a threat, the chance of a dialogue is scarce – however the other party reacts. And 
less unambiguously aggressive narrations of the other also imply a more or less 
limiting grammar for the subsequent interaction. So, even an analysis of one end of a 
relation may contribute to an analysis of a relational dynamics. Perhaps it is 
impossible to radicalize a conflict all by yourself. But you may do your part to make 
de-radicalization impossible. 
4.4.2 Performing ... Politics, Science? Criteria for validity 
The asymmetrical analysis and the blind spot it produces is related to the normative 
bias induced by the trouble to which the dissertation is formulated as a response. 
Chapter 1 mentioned how the normative position of the dissertation prescribes a 
contribution to turning the Danish debate on Muslims away from radicalizing 
conflict. With this normative point of departure, the dissertation must be read as 
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performing the same kind of articulatory operation as it studies: It grasps together a 
beginning and a series of alternative ends to form a policy narrative by highlighting 
certain choices as choices to be made and glossing over others as covered by 
necessities.  
In that sense, the dissertation constitutes a constructive move: "No help for it: 
language is always on the side of power; to speak is to exercise a will to power: in the 
space of speech, no innocence, no safety." (Barthes 1986:311 qtd by McQuillan 
2000b:25) Pertinently, the audience to which this speech act is directed is Danish; 
therefore the bias. 
Fortunately, the constructive move does not in itself deprive the dissertation of its 
scientific credentials: no matter how much scientists or politicians insist, politics and 
science does not constitute two mutually distinct spheres. All scientific interventions 
are political; not all political interventions are scientific. 
Rather, paraphrasing Rorty, it is so that 'science is what our peers will let us get away 
with saying' (cf. Rorty 1980:176). The point is, of course, that 'our peers' will not let 
just anything pass. In that sense, it is "not enough just to tell stories"; one has to 
"establish the provenience of the story" (Czarniawska 1998:17).
160
 To pass as science, 
an intervention needs to articulate the institutionalized social practices of science 
(Wetherell 2001:397; Dahler-Larsen 2008:84; 105; cf. Derrida 1988c:150f).  
For a speech act to be successful it needs a convention to which it can refer – even if 
"[g]etting away with things is essential, despite the suspicious terminology" since it 
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 André Sonnichsen reminds med that the renowned methodological dictum of Feyerabend 
([1975] in Delanty & Strydom 2003:81-4), 'anything goes', distinctively did not concern 
individual scientific interventions – it concerned the research programmes to which 
individual interventions refers. 
268 
may create new conventions (Austin 1975:30).
161
 The criteria delimiting what one 
may get away with vary from academic discipline to academic discipline; within the 
social sciences they vary from philosophical position to philosophical position 
(Delanty & Strydom 2003).
162
 This dissertation reports a qualitative inquiry. It 
constructs data as data as part of the development of its analytical strategy aiming at 
deontologization (Andersen 1999:13ff). But such a philosophical point of departure 
still carries obligations concerning the conduct and presentation of research (cf. 
Andersen 1999:15ff; Hansen 2006:9ff; Knorr-Cetina [1993] in Delanty & Strydom 
2003:419f). One ambitious place to start, when assessing the academic merits of a 
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 This is basically what Laclau acknowledges when he seem to view his articulation of 
Lacanian tropes rather as a part of a hegemonic project than as a matter of philosophical 
compatibility (1999:59). It is what Bhabha performs when he meets a critique of his 
eccentric reading of Lévinas with the words "but it works for me". (Q&A session at a 
symposium on The Conditions of Hospitality, University of Stavanger, September 8, 2008.) 
And it is what Foucault defends when he claims that "The only valid tribute to [anyone's] 
thought ... is precisely to use it, to deform it... And if commentators then say that I am being 
faithful or unfaithful ..., that is of absolutely no interest." (qt'd in Scheurich & McKenzie 
2005:861). Compare the answer Hubert Dreyfus gave to Bent Flyvjerg when asked how one 
recognize a paradigmatic case: "Heidegger says, you recognize a paradigm case because it 
shines, but I’m afraid that is not much help. You just have to be intuitive. We all can tell 
what is a better or worse case – of a Cézanne painting, for instance. But I can’t think there 
could be any rules for deciding what makes Cézanne a paradigmatic modern painter. . . . It 
is a big problem in a democratic society where people are supposed to justify what their 
intuitions are. In fact, nobody really can justify what their intuition is. So you have to make 
up reasons, but it won’t be the real reasons." (qtd in Flyvbjerg 2006:232). Flyvbjerg's 
response is that "Like other good craftspeople, all that researchers can do is use their 
experience and intuition to assess whether they believe a given case is interesting in a 
paradigmatic context and [NB, -/upg:] whether they can provide collectively acceptable 
reasons for the choice of case." (2006:233). When, however, the text that needs to pass is a 
doctoral dissertation, the power structures involving the candidate and the committee are 
differently configured (cf. Kvale 1989:86) than when an academic superstar responds to a 
critical audience: the rite de passage of the defence means not only that the dissertation is 
constituted as science but also that the defendant is constituted as scientist, as peer. 
162
 This dissertation would certainly not pass the criteria of all traditions and philosophies of 
social science. A concern with reliability and validity of data presupposes a fixed ontology 
to be depictured; that data exist as data independently of the investigation (Dahler-Larsen 
2008:81f; cf. Andersen & Enderud 1990:82f w. Kvale 1990:233-6; Svenning 1996:61ff). 
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text which subjects other pieces of text to myopic reading, could be with Dahler-
Larsen (2008) who recommends an "active perspectivism" as a way to conduct 
qualitative investigation. It involves an active and explicit reflection on the conditions 
of constitution of the perspective taken up and on the co-constitution of the object of 
inquiry (2008:110).  
To insist to be performing science while acknowledging the contingent, self-
referential character of both the scientific institutions as a whole and of the individual 
scientific investigation requires us to explicate our combination of contingency and 
stringency: Contingency first and foremost forms the conditions of the inquiry in the 
way that data does not constitute itself in any definite way; they are constructed as 
data by the choices made in the investigation (2008:91ff). Stringency forms the 
condition of the inquiry as part of the scientific investigation in the way that the 
analyst, to perform science, need to communicate both internal coherence and 
coherence with institutionalized scientific criteria of seeking truth in a rational way 
(2008:104ff). Brought together this mean that the analyst must, firstly, communicate 
the choices made; secondly, explicitly lay out which blind spots the choices produce; 
thirdly, avoid making choices that sum up to an internally incoherent inquiry; 
fourthly, follow through in a rigorous way whatever choices made (2008:111).  
In this way, a 'craftmanship' validity becomes pivotal; does the work present itself as 
the work of a skilful scientific craftsman, who knows what s/he is doing? (2008:85). 
In Dahler-Larsen, the craftmanship criterion of validity is supported by (and 
supports) three further criteria: transparency (is it clear what you have done?); 
heuristics (have you found out something new?); and certain forms of communicative 
validity (do others recognize your findings?). Contrarily, Dahler-Larsen dismisses 
pragmatic validity (have you found out something useful? for whom?) as irrelevant 
(2008:89). I will, firstly, deal with transparency, and then, secondly, relate the 
question of pragmatic validity to the criteria of heuristics and communicative validity 
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in relation to certain audiences. This combination will constitute the main criterion of 
success-as-science for the dissertation. 
The ideal of transparency imply that the data constructed by the analytical strategy, 
while condensed, is nevertheless re-presented in toto in the form of a (preferably 
single page!) display (2002:41; 46ff). This ideal perfectly exemplifies a paradox as it 
is both inescapable as an ideal and impossible to realize. This is clear from the way a 
demand for transparency implies two problems: 
First, to adhere to this – in principle laudable – principle, I contend, the story one will 
be able to tell must remain rather simple. Strict adherence to this criteria means that 
you may a) transparently display only a simply structured material and/or b) if the 
material is complicated in structure, transparently display only a very limited quantity 
of material.
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 The transparency principle, hence, limit qualitative investigations to 
deal with very limited case studies as Dahler-Larsen advocates (2008:46).
164
 To 
constitute an alternative to this kind of self-imposed myopia, the dissertation needs to 
accept a certain measure of reduction of the material which is not transparent. More 
specifically; it violates Dahler-Larsen's 'rule of inclusion' – which would imply that 
every utterance of relevance should be accounted for.
165
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 And the material is complicated, for as Foucault mentions in his discussion of discursive 
change and transformations "The appearance and disappearance of positivities, the play of 
substitutions to which they give rise, do not constitute a homogenous process that takes 
place everywhere in the same way. We must not imagine that rupture is a sort of great drift 
that carries with it all discursive formations at once" (1972:175). 
164
 It is not bad – and definitively need not be inconsequential – to study small numbers, 
small cases and small amounts of text. But it leaves too much generalization as the 
prerogative of qualitative studies bound by a less reflexive practice concerning the reduction 
of data (cf. Dahler-Larsen 2008:18). 
165
 This does not amount to allowing across the board retouching. First; the dissertation 
violates the 'rule of inclusion' only in the case of the odd outlier; it does not allow itself the 
exclusion of the dominant constructions in the discourse singled out for investigation. This 
means that if the dissertation narrates a transformation of discourse A from constructing X 
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A second problem with Dahler-Larsens ideal of transparency stems from the way the 
display – and the ambition to represent data in toto – is meant to discipline the analyst 
to "bound" the data; to explicate the criteria for delimitation of the data (2008:38; 42; 
46). On the one hand, the dissertation has done so by defining itself as a study in the 
construction of Muslims in Danish political identity discourse. On the other hand, the 
delimitation is immediately violated as the parliamentary negotiations and 
government statements explicitly refer to – articulates meaning produced by – 
interventions from outside parliamentary and government texts: bureaucratic texts, 
media reports, scientific interventions, letters from 'regular people', 'common 
knowledge', etc. The data does not respect the delimitation constructed by the 
analytical strategy.
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What is left of a demand for total transparency in the construction of data is basically 
an ethical demand which is distinct for academic interventions and which 
distinguishes them from (other kinds of) political interventions: By posing as science, 
I commit myself to make choices transparent – including choices leading to in-
transparency. 
Having acknowledged the validity of the ideal of transparency – and/but partially 
excused itself – the dissertation now formulates its own primary criteria of success by 
reconfiguring the remaining three criteria discussed by Dahler-Larsen; respondent 
validity, heuristics, and pragmatic validity. 
                                                                                                                                            
as 1 to constructing X as 2, you might still find the odd example of X being presented as 1, 
but that the dominating narrative within A presents it as 2. Secondly, the dissertation does 
not violate Dahler-Larsen's 'rule of authenticity' (2008:43): the necessary constructive 
element in narrating discourses does not extend to making up quotes or purposefully 
misrepresenting them as part of abbreviation or the like. 
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 This should come as no surprise as "the questioning of the boundaries of a 'well-defined' 
text suggests that the textual process not only extends into, but is dependent upon, the 
contextualising referential apparatus which contains and makes possible that textual unit." 
(McQuillan 2000b:10). 
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Dahler-Larsen (2008:83f) reduces the value of validating ones analysis by 
confronting it with the primary producers of data (typically 'respondents') in two 
ways: Firstly, by noting that they do not always want to stand by their earlier 
utterances. Secondly, by pointing to the very denaturalizing aim of inquiry: it makes 
no sense to ask respondents to validate your analysis if the point of the analysis is to 
make explicit the implicit conditions of possibilities of their discourse.
167
 Asking a 
hostile respondent to agree to his/her disclosure is, however, not the only way to 
relate to respondents. We will return to this immediately. 
Dahler-Larsen (2008:87) presents as a criterion of heuristics the question whether the 
inquiry has brought "new knowledge, insight or perspectives". This obviously begs 
the question; new to whom? In the context of the discussion of heuristics, the 
audience for novelty relevant to Dahler-Larsen seems to be the scientific peers. In his 
discussion on pragmatic validity, the 'critical' potential in relation to the social 
practice or lives of the ones studied by qualitative scientists is acknowledged 
(2008:87f). But the critical potential is seen to emerge exclusively from the 
craftmanship of the inquiry; not from taking up pragmatic 'standpoint' validity as a 
criterion for science. Dahler-Larsen here polemicizes against what has become a 
standard hand book of qualitative science (Denzin & Lincoln 2000) which insist that 
qualitative research must "study the world always from the perspective of the 
gendered historically situated, interacting individual" and that  
From this complex commitment flows [as an integral part of the research 
programme] the liberal and radical politics of qualitative research. ... a politics of 
liberation must always begin with the perspective, desires, and dreams of those 
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 Kvale mentions in relation to psychoterapeutic practice that "Freud ... accepted neither 
the patient's yes or no at face value. In addition, he recommended more indirect forms of 
validation by observing the patient's subsequent reactions to an interpretation" (1989:87). 
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individuals and groups who have been oppressed (2000:1047f; quoted by Dahler-
Larsen 2008:23).  
The fact that Dahler-Larsen even after criticizing Lincoln & Denzin still consider 
them sufficiently peer to cite one of them as founding part of the basis for his 
intervention (2008:24) gives courage to let this dissertation pose its own criteria of 
success as science by combining the criteria of heuristics, respondent validity, and 
pragmatic validity in a way different from Dahler-Larsen's: The dissertation has 
succeeded as a scientific – and political – intervention if it succeeds in helping the 
some of the subjects studied (Danish identity politicians; the actors producing Danish 
identity) to recognise themselves in a new way. More specifically; recognize 
themselves in a new way by sharpening their sense of the rhetorical tools they 
themselves and the ones they count as their representatives utilize (cf. Czarniawska 
1998:13). Recognize the illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects of their 
utterances – and thereby recognize the role which they play in generating conflicts 
over identities. Or to quote Foucault: "Practicing criticism is a matter of making 
facile gestures difficult." (Foucault 1988[1981]:155) 
4.5 Summing up the analytical strategy 
This chapter has laid out how and where to focus analysis to allow the theoretical 
world accounted for in chapters 2 and 3 to meet the empirical world in the analytical 
chapters 5 through 9. 
Concerning the basic choices of analytical focus, the chapter concluded: That Danish 
identity discourse itself points out parliament and government as privileged sites for 
negotiating and deciding questions of identity politics. That 'the Muslim' appears as 
the central other to which Danish identity is related. That the Danish party to the 
Danish/Muslim relation is hierarchically structured in a way which allows for a more 
focused analysis than the one which one may conduct on the Muslim party – a limited 
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focus which, it is argued, nevertheless may reveal structures and dynamics important 
for the overall relation. 
Concerning the specific selection of debates for analysis, the chapter argued that it is 
up to the analytical chapters to show how the debates selected are all on Muslims 
relations. Furthermore the debates are diverse in terms of the policy fields from 
which they depart. Finally, a definition of 'debate' was provided which included both 
actors debating with themselves over time and different actors debating across a 
political spectrum.  
Concerning the analytical tools with which the debates are met, the chapter argued a 
three step reading strategy: In the first reading, the debates are approached on their 
own terms to see what appear to be at stake (what concepts and relations does the 
debate revolve around?) and what mechanisms in the discursive structure, agency and 
interaction appear to set off what dynamics (what makes the debate evolve?). In the 
second reading, the analysis is summarized in terms of what policies are promoted in 
the self/other narratives and what grammars for future interaction with the other these 
policies entail. In the third reading, possible reactions from the other are 
prognosticated. As the approach employed in the first reading is comparatively 
inductive, each analytical chapter presents their own set of categories employed 
(summarized in table 4.1). To allow the second and third readings, each debate is 
interrogated with the same set of questions (summarized in table 1.1), designed to 
match the categories of the ontological and theoretical accounts of a world of 
identities in conflict (developed in chapters 2 & 3). 
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5 Muslims as a security problem in Danish integration 
discourse: Peace, welfare, culture 
Part I of the dissertation presented the ontological, theoretical and analytical 
framework for the analysis. This chapter begins the analytical Part II by introducing 
the basic features of the Danish political landscape and by analysing debates on the 
concept of integration. 
5.1 Introduction: Averting the Muslim threat – beyond 
terrorism 
On September 11, 2001, terrorism suddenly moved up 'the international security 
agenda', no matter according to which criteria such a thing may be arranged. Among 
the first experts called to the TV studios were social scientist who had done research 
on the terrorism in Western Europe of the 70ies. Quickly, however, they were 
substituted in front of the cameras by experts on international relations and Middle 
East area studies. A terrorism, which calls itself Islamic, had become widely accepted 
as an international security problem.  
To some IR academics such a phenomenon would count as somewhat paradoxical to 
focus on: Only few would contend that the odd terrorist attack poses a serious threat 
to the survival of Western states – and to hard core adherents of the 'realist' tradition 
in IR theory, this is what security is about: The survival of states. Others apply a 
broader perspective by including the security of the individual. This clearly makes 
terrorism a security problem – along with a number of the countermeasures taken by 
states.  
A third perspective is the one presented by the so called Copenhagen School which 
studies security – not by weighing threats to states against threats to individuals, but 
by analyzing 'securitizations', i.e. by observing, how and when something is turned 
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into a security problem. Analyses informed by this perspective had by 2001 for 
almost a decade described how political actors were turning refugees and migrants 
into a security problem (Wæver 1993). While these security problems might be 
conceived of as 'foreign policy' in the sense of dealing with what is constituted as 
foreign, they were hardly part of 'international relations. A separates point of this 
perspective is, however, that constructing something as foreign and threatening is 
intricately part of constructing ones own identity (Wæver 1994; cf. Connolly 1991; 
Campbell 1992; Neumann 1999; Huysmans 2006; Hansen 2006).  
This chapter analyzes how Muslims – in official Danish discourse – are implied to 
constitute threats. As its first reading of the debates, the chapter asks: What is it 
exactly that must be defended from the Muslims? And what is the answer to the 
threats? 
More specifically, the chapter analyses government policy narratives on integration 
of refugees and migrants included in oral and written policy statements of the 
government. The debate analysed is internal to the government in the sense that the 
agreements constituting the debate are between the various narratives which the 
government has been telling. In that sense, the focus is on the disagreement between 
different government narratives on integration – made possible by the agreement on 
the imperative of integrating migrants and refugees. The category selected to make 
the disagreement visible is the 'self/other security narrative': The chapter reads the 
narratives in which the governments describe what integration entails to serve as the 
necessary means to avert a threat to a valued referent-object. Or in other words, it 
asks: What does the government say that 'We' need to do to 'Them' to get Them 
integrated – and why is it important? Even if at the outset, the narratives are not about 
religion – and scarcely about culture, but rather about labour market integration – 
'Muslim culture' and 'Islam' gradually takes up explicit and distinct roles as the 
narratives evolve. 
277 
What is it that Muslims threaten? The answer to this question is more complicated 
than the iconic date of 9/11 would suggest. To set the stage for the analysis of just 
how the complications arise, section 5.2 introduces the Danish parliamentary 
landscape as it presents itself when debating Muslim relations. By zooming in on the 
narratives told by the government on how to engage Muslim others, the rest of the 
chapter completes the more nuanced picture of the Danish debates on integration.  
Section 5.3 takes a step back to discuss the criteria for judging when Muslims are 
made a security problem. The discussion takes its point of departure in the 
Copenhagen Schools theory of securitization. Its point of arrival, however, is a 
concept of securitizing self/other narrative including not only narratives which points 
out an other as an existential threat to the self – but also narratives which provoke 
answers that in the continued co-narration are likely to produce new security 
problems. 
Sections 5.4-5.8 analyses official Danish discourse on integration as it is manifested 
in policy papers and statements from government ministers. More specifically, 
section 5.4 characterizes the debate on Muslims by singling out how they are pointed 
out as threats to the peaceful society, welfare and culture. Section 5.5 identifies the 
first threats to peaceful society – threats intruding from outside. Section 5.6 follows 
the merging government narratives of the threats to welfare and culture. Section 5.7 
introduces two background narratives – one of the functionality of homogenous 
culture; one of the universal validity of Our values – which are articulated to add 
legitimacy to the need for cultural integration. Finally, section 5.8 charts how the 
merging narratives – by involving the threat from the home grown terrorist – end up 
awarding both culture and state roles diametrically opposed to the ones awarded at 
the outset. 
Section 5.9 concludes by performing a second reading of the debates – as described 
in chapter 4 – in terms of the theoretical account of how a an identity configuration 
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may be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict. The final section (5.10) 
performs the third reading of the analytical strategy, focusing on how the narrative(s) 
promoted in the debate interpellate the other. More specifically, the section discusses 
how the identity political strategies of Danish Muslims may spark further 
securitization when meeting this reconfigured official Danish integration narrative. 
5.2 Danish debates on integration of Muslims 
The Danish debates on integration are often – as presented in subsection 5.2.1 – 
described as two neatly divided camps: Culturalists vs. Multiculturalists. Subsection 
5.2.2 opens up the two camps by sketching the history of the debates over the last 
decade of the old millennium and the first decade of the new and by introducing the 
political parties who are the main actors of the Danish identity political landscape. 
5.2.1 Danish debates on integration: Two camps? 
The Danish debates on integration are often presented as a confrontation between two 
discourses Culturalism and Multiculturalism (cf. Stjernfeldt & Eriksen 2008): In 
terms of the diacriticon distinguishing Us from Them, religiously defined culture, the 
two discourses agree. The discourses also agree that the physical distance between Us 
and Them is negligible; They are Here among Us - or at least They are very close to 
Us, even if They might live in ‘parallel societies’. The fundamental difference 
between Culturalism and the Multiculturalism springs from the way hierarchy is (not) 
constructed: Where Multiculturalism presents the different cultures as being of equal 
worth, Culturalism is decidedly ontopological: The very fact that ‘We’ were ‘here’ 
first makes Us superior. Further, according to Culturalism They are causally 
influencing Us; They are known to be at odds with everything we stand for.
168
 And 
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 Stolcke has diagnosed the basic tenet of this construction as "the 'problem' is not 'us' but 
'them,' 'We" are the measure of the good life which 'they' are threatening to undermine, and 
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They are probably not capable of changing – as long as They as individual Muslims 
are under influence of Islam, their agency is almost reduced to a structural effect of 
their religion. The posture of this structural determinant, hence, becomes crucial – 
and it is, at times, described as aggressively challenging, even decidedly destructive 
of everything Danish/European/Western. Hence, no dialogue is possible due to ill 
will on the part of the Other. In terms of basic grammar for self/other relations 
Culturalism is first and foremost Orientalist in its insistent distinction between Us and 
Them. As the other is valued negatively, the policy preference of Culturalism tends 
towards Monologue often tilting into Securitization. 
In contrast, Multiculturalism prioritizes the grammar of Segmentation: these different 
Cultures are – or should be – equal in and equally recognized by the state: The 
cultural We and the cultural They are both part of a larger We; we share a state and a 
society. The ideal type Multiculturalist policy for cultural plurality within the nation 
state is one of Dialogue: Another fundamental of Multiculturalism is the insistence on 
the dialogicality of all groups.  
The completion of this analytical schematic would prescribe that the Multiculturalist 
position should insist on, firstly, the permanence of the cultural groups and, secondly, 
on the reduction of individual agency to structural effect: As in ideal type Culturalism 
you are defined by your immutable culture – only from the Multiculturalist 
perspective, your culture is as fine as mine. Here, however, the symmetry with 
Culturalism breaks down: Empirically it is very difficult to find a consistent voice for 
full blown Multiculturalism.
169
 Obviously, there are sufficient recognisable tropes for 
                                                                                                                                            
this is so because 'they' are foreigners and culturally 'different'" (1995:2). She labels it 
'cultural fundamentalism'. 
169
 In contrast to what Stjernfeldt & Eriksen (2008) claim, Holm – based on analysis of 
parliamentary debates – notes that "the idea that integration should take place by awarding 
group rights to refugees and immigrants at no point challenged the dominant concept of 
integration which was primarily oriented to the individual" (2007:214; my transl.). 
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Culturalists to (re-)construct this favourite opponent of theirs – but it is equally 
possible to reconstruct the purportedly ‘Multiculturalist’ positions as prescribing a 
grammar of Encompassment employing a version of ‘repressive tolerance’ towards 
the difference of the other while waiting for the other to self-assimilate to Our 
(universally preferable) way of life: The capability of change of the other is 
frequently stressed – just as the lack of causal influence of Their presence on Us (at 
least when talking of any characteristic of society beyond taste in cuisine).  
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Figure 5.1 The domesticated twin others of Culturalism and Multiculturalims 
 
Perhaps only two things keep the notion of Multiculturalism alive: Firstly, 
Multiculturalism has become a label for any opposition to the securitizing tendencies 
of Culturalism (the opposition summing up to a rather inefficient attempt at a 
discourse of de-securitization). Secondly, the perfectly symbiotic relation which ideal 
type Multiculturalism has with Culturalism as its official opponent: By agreeing to 
disagree on premises which systematically make it loose in every debate, 
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Multiculturalism has served Culturalism well.
170
 The symbiosis of the domesticated 
twin others of Culturalism and Multiculturalism is illustrated in figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.2 Carving out a space for integration narratives without culture 
 
This chapter claims that a presentation of the Danish identity political landscape in 
terms of the two camps of Culturalism and Multiculturalism is too simple to account 
for the structures and dynamics which may contribute to radicalization of conflict. 
Primarily, a more nuanced picture of the narratives told by the government is 
necessary. In between the self-reproducing symbiosis of the discourses of Culturalism 
and Multiculturalism, two governments – first, one under Social-Democratic 
leadership; now, one headed by the Liberal party – has tried to carve out the room for 
an alternative policy of integration by talking at little as possible about culture. This 
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 Wren (2001) and Hervik (2004:247) find culturalism to be dominating in Danish media 
and popular discourse. Hedetoft (2006a: 419-20; 2006c:1, 6) and Emerek (2003) – relatedly 
– find that ‘integration’ in official Danish discourse includes a substantial measure of 
cultural assimilation. Haldrup et al. (2006) find culturalist popular discourse to be mutually 
constitutive with a number of everyday practices of othering Muslims which they label 
practical orientalism. 
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project is inserted in between the two usual suspects in figure 5.2. Talking ‘as little as 
possible’ about culture has, however, gradually turned out to be ‘a lot’. 
The government narratives have evolved from shying away from culture – and in a 
parallel move; shying away from the state – to embracing both. This evolution may 
be described by looking at what Muslim threats 'integration' is meant to ameliorate. 
That is why this chapter asks how Muslims constitute a security problem. 
Before the chapter may proceed to answer this question, a concept of what constitutes 
security problem is needed – just as a more detailed map of the identity political 
landscape which the government is manoeuvring is needed. A map of the Danish 
parliamentarian landscape is (in subsection 5.2.2) related to shifts at the most general 
level of Danish debates on migrants. The concept of security in the context of 
migration politics is discussed in section 5.3.  
5.2.2 Animosity against strangers spreading and condensing on 
Muslims 
This subsection portrays the Danish political landscape from two perspectives: 
Firstly, the substantial debate on migrants and Muslims from 1990 to 2010 is 
characterized on the most abstract level. Secondly, the institutional conditions for the 
debates – in the form of the composition of Parliamentary factions – are described.  
If one reads Danish debates sufficiently broad – from marginal publications of the 
80ies; via the letters to the editors of populist tabloid Ekstra-Bladet and conservative 
broad sheet Jyllands-Posten in the 90ies; to the nooks and corners of the internet in 
the new millennium – one may find strangers, aliens, immigrants, and Muslims 
pointed out as threats to literally everything. It is, however, beyond doubt that two 
movements have made a difference: 
Firstly, a considerable shift has taken place over the decades both concerning what 
one may say about 'the strangers' and concerning who may – or rather: must – say it. 
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Animosity against strangers has moved from a marginal status to a position close to 
hegemony. This movement has taken place via the tabloid campaigns of Ekstra-
Bladet in the mid-90ies (Hervik (red.) 1999); via the foundation of the Danish 
People's Party in 1995 and its election to parliament in 1998; via the dependency of 
the centre-right government on the votes of the Danish People's Party for its 
parliamentary majority after 2001; and via the adaption of the social democrats and 
the Socialist People's Parties to the rhetoric of the new alien policy (Jacobsen et al. 
2007). 
Secondly, animosity against strangers has condensed around religious difference. It is 
no longer 'strangers', 'aliens', or 'refugees and immigrants' whom are pointed out as 
the problem: It is the Muslims (Jacobsen 2008:234, 267-8). To the extent that the 
older concepts – or euphemisms like 'new Danes' or '2nd g's' – are used, they 
increasingly have a semantic density around 'Muslims' (Andreassen 2005:256ff; 
Hastrup 2004:105; cf. Ardener 1989:169). In this connection 9/11 and the falling twin 
towers has served as a symbol for the condensation. Furthermore, the bombings on 
the London underground at July 7, 2005 and the related concept of 'home grown 
terrorists', as well as the Cartoon Crisis and the related concepts of 'culture struggle' 
and 'value struggle' have served to link religion, integration, and counterterrorism 
across the distinction between domestic and foreign policy.
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Since the 1970ies, Denmark has a tradition of coalition governments often constituted 
by parties commanding only a minority of the votes in parliament. Most often the 
social liberals – at times joined by a couple of other small centre parties – have 
decided whether to join the social democrats to the left or a coalition of the liberal 
and the conservative party to the right. More often than not, one or two parties either 
on the far left or on the far right have been supporting the government without 
                                           
171
 The analysis returns to this below. 
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appointing ministers. For the better part of the 80ies, the centre parties went to the 
right – in the 90ies, they went to the left. 
Alien policy did play an important role in Danish national politics in the 80ies and 
90ies – but rather in the parliamentarian manoeuvrings than in electoral politics. In 
1983, the social liberals – while supporting a centre-right government from the 
outside – formed a majority with the left to reform the Alien law to the benefit of 
asylum seekers. The coalition government – including the conservatives and the 
liberals – finally voted for the reform, mainly to keep the social liberals onboard 
(Brøcker 1990:339). The conservative minister for justice, however, subsequently 
denied a group of Tamil refugees their rights to family reunification (Hornslet 1992). 
These illegal decisions caused him to be the first Danish minister in 85 years to be 
impeached and convicted for abusing his office. The centre parties took the 
'Tamilgate' as an occasion to switch sides and join the social democrats in 1993. The 
change of governments was made without calling an election. During the 90ies, a 
series of the elements in the 1983 regulations benefitting asylum seekers and 
migrants were gradually reversed, while increased emphasis was put on the need to 
'integrate' the 'strangers'. Both processes were impelled by social democratic mayors 
residing over suburban housing projects with high concentration of people born 
outside Denmark.  
Alien and immigration policies were, however, marginalized in electoral politics 
through the 80ies and most of the 90ies. Only the Progress Party campaigned actively 
on the topic, combining extreme positions on both public spending and migration. 
The 1998 elections, however, were very successful for the newly formed Danish 
People's Party. The DPP had grown out of the turbulent Progress Party, but the right 
wing platform had been reshuffled to combine nationalism in EU and alien policy 
with an economic policy branded as old style social democracy. 
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The general condition of the centre parties functioning as a switch board between 
centre right and centre left governments was dramatically altered in the 2001 
elections. The liberal party – one of the two main contenders for the office of the 
prime minister – for the first time actively campaigned on migration and integration 
policies. Therefore the 2001 elections became the first general elections campaign 
fought over alien policy (Mikkelsen 2008:168). The centre-left government lost its 
parliamentary majority. Contrary to the traditional situation, the centre parties could 
not even provide the necessary votes to provide a centre-right government with a 
parliamentary majority. In stead, the liberals and the conservatives formed a new 
government depending on the DPP for its majority.  
The parliamentary majority of liberals, conservatives and the DPP survived the 2005 
and 2007 elections. In both elections, the immigration and integration policies were 
featured centrally. Even as the two elections saw a boost of each their centre party 
campaigning primarily on the need to provide a centre-right majority without relying 
on the DPP – especially in immigration and integration policies – such an alterative 
majority did not materialize. Meanwhile, the social democrats have gradually 
formulated immigration and integration policies in line with the government policies. 
Lately they have been joined in this move by the largest left wing party, the Socialist 
People's Party. Presently, the combined centre parties have collapsed to poll at 
historically low figures – while seemingly pondering over how to formulate alien 
policy in a way which does not disqualify them from entering into post-election 
coalitions with their preferred partners be they to the right or to the left. Left as an 
unconditional opposition to the main stream in these matters is only a tiny left wing 
alliance. 
The 'Culturalism vs. Multiculturalism' image of the Danish debates on Muslims only 
really covers the DPP and this tiny left wing outfit. As table 5.1 shows, this leaves 5/6 
of the parliamentarians trying to formulate other narratives – perhaps somewhat less, 
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if one discounts the odd liberal, conservative and social democrat joining 
Culturalism; the social liberals when they insist on resisting Culturalism; and the odd 
social democrat and socialist relapsing into Multiculturalism. 
Election Unity 
List 
SPP Soc. 
Dem. 
Soc. 
Lib. 
Cent. 
Dem. 
Chr. 
Dem. 
New 
All. 
Con. Lib. DPP Prog. 
Party 
1998 5 13 63 7 8 4 - 16 42 13 4 
2001 4 12 52 9 0 4 - 16 56 22 0 
2005 6 11 47 17 0 0 - 18 52 24 - 
2007 4 23 45 9 - 0 5 18 46 25 - 
Table 5.1 Composition of Folketinget after general elections 1998-2007 
Government coalitions coloured dark – parties supporting to secure parliamentary majority 
coloured grey. Factions consistently upholding culturalist and multiculturalist positions are 
italicized. Not included in the table are 4 MPs elected in Greenland and the Faroe Islands; 
usually three of them caucus and/or vote with the left and one with the right. 90 MPs make a 
majority (88 discounting the North Atlantic MPs). A number of MPs have left the party they 
were elected for during the term – none of the defections have in these periods had any 
lasting effect on the majority constellation. (www.folketinget.dk, accessed 1 March 2010) 
 
The analytical focus of this chapter is neither the Culturalist narratives promoted 
primarily by the DPP, nor, for that matter, the Multiculturalist counter-narrative. The 
focus is on the attempts to formulate narratives on integration without talking culture. 
More specifically; the focus is on the most important attempts: The ones promoted by 
the government – which, on the one hand, at times explicitly distances itself from the 
DPP, but which, on the other hand, cannot afford to alienate the supporting party.  
Beginning the analysis in 2001 is, on the one hand, an obvious choice because of both 
9/11 and the change of government from centre-left to centre-right. On the other 
hand, the significance of 2001 should not be overstressed: The new government 
continued, developed and implemented a series of thoughts and ideas put into play by 
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the preceding government
172
 – especially by taking over its so called 'Think tank on 
challenges to the integration effort in Denmark'. The present government primarily 
needs to articulate Culturalism directly in the form of its institutionalized voice in 
parliament, the DPP – the previous government attempted to articulate Culturalism in 
the electorate and in the organizational structures of the social democratic party. The 
establishment of the 'Think tank' in 2000 was one way of doing so: A select group of 
experts was assigned to evaluate the integration effort and advice the Minister of the 
Interior on how to improve it. To do so, it needed to explicate a definition of 
integration. The new government let the experts continue their work, reassigning 
them to the newly formed Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. 
Through the years 2001 to 2007, a series of reports from the 'Think tank' analysed 
various aspects of integration.
173
 As will be clear from the analysis in this chapter, the 
reports were an important part of the political debate. And it will be clear that the 
concept of integration in both the reports and the in the debates evolved. 
5.3 What is a security problem? 
Before we may approach the debates and the policy papers and statements of the 
governments, we need, however, to clarify the analytical lenses to be employed in the 
first reading of the texts. Section 5.3 takes up this task by developing the concept of 
security narrative. It does so by asking what constitutes a security problem – and by 
discussing the answers to this question provided in debates over the Copenhagen 
School of security studies. 
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 The three consecutive prime ministers Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (soc.dem.), Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen (lib.), and Lars Løkke Rasmussen (lib.) are not related.  
173
 The reports of the 'Think tank' are available at the home page of the Ministry of 
Integration, http://www.nyidanmark.dk/da-dk/Integration/forskning_og_udvikling/ 
taenketanken.htm accessed 1 December 2009. 
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5.3.1 Securitization 
So, what is a security problem? According to the Copenhagen School of security 
studies a securitization implies that the solution of a problem is made the number one 
priority and that extraordinary measures are legitimized – as the problem involves an 
existential threat to something valued (the 'referent-object'). In this perspective a 
securitization is successful when the application of extraordinary means to avert the 
threat is accepted by a relevant audience (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; cf. chapter 
3). 
Traditionally, state sovereignty has been the typical referent-object and the 
extraordinary means have been military – at least when the threat was coming from 
another state. But in addition one may easily list threats – from without or within – to 
the security and integrity of the state which have been met by security services, states 
of emergency, etc. 
Referent-
Object
Extra-
Ordinary 
Means
Existential 
Threat
 
Figure 5.3 The threat construction of a securitizing move 
 
The first point of the Copenhagen School is that audiences may accept the use of the 
rhetorical figure (existential threat + referent-object + extraordinary means) in other 
circumstances, with other referent-objects than 'the state as such'. Threats may be 
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pointed to 'the nation', 'the economy', or 'the climate'. This rhetorical figure – the 
threat construction of a securitizing move – is illustrated in figure 5.3. A second point 
is that by the use of this specific rhetorical figure – no matter what the referent-object 
is – one often turns to the state and its well-established toolbox of extraordinary 
means to avert threats. 
Often but not always. Threats to various types of referent-objects and various 
extraordinary means set the stage for various conflict dynamics. A classical point in 
IR security theory is that threats to/the defence of sovereignty may give rise to 
'security dilemmas' in which the one party takes action to secure itself – the defensive 
actions are, however, perceived as threatening by the other party, who must then 
secure itself – which the first party perceives as a threat, etc. (Herz 1950).  
When the threat pointed out is not directed to sovereignty but to an identity – i.a., a 
national or ethnic identity – the risk of a destructive dynamic is even greater: When 
the military is involved, it is – at least in well-organized states – quite clear who is in 
charge of pointing out threats and employ extraordinary means: It is state business. 
When the issue concerns threats to softer identities the range of possible 'securitizers' 
– and even the range of who may take extraordinary action – is much wider (Wæver 
1993): Opposition groups may instigate all kinds of defensive measures on behalf of 
the nation – but without the blessing of the state – ranging from the symbolic joining 
of hands to form chains across borders via community singing to corporal attacks on 
migrants. 
Adding to this opening up of security to politics, identities are impossible to keep 
identical: Any change, slide or pollution may potentially be pointed out as a threat to 
identity. And by pointing to the failure of identity, defensive measures will contribute 
to increased insecurity (Wæver 1994¸ cf. Derrida 1988b:52). 
When focusing this article on securitization of Muslims, one may imagine Muslims to 
be pointed out as a threat in a lot of different ways. As a traditional security threat 
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one would imagine the Turkish army marched up at the gates of Vienna or (when 
threatening Denmark:) by the obsolete border post where the highway crosses into 
Jutland from Germany. Employing a broader concept of security one may also be 
able to observe Muslims pointed out as threats to a variety of elements central to 
Danish identity – or, for that matter, observe Muslims pointed out as a specific threat 
to the environment or the economy, etc. 
In parallel, the means presented to avert each specific threat may vary. Muslims may 
be inscribed into a traditional security discourse evolving around the defence of the 
physical border, clandestine services, restriction of civil liberties, and (as a last 
resort:) physical violence. But other means for the aversion of the threat may also be 
pointed out: cultural rearmament, reformed welfare legislation, etc.; ways which may 
not count as extraordinary in any meaningful sense of the word when viewed in 
isolation. 
When actual analysis is to be conducted, the question of what constitutes a means as 
extraordinary is complicated: What if the extraordinary is institutionalized; may it 
still count as extraordinary? (cf. Buzan et al 1998:24; Wæver 2003:26f). And what if 
there are rules for when rule-breaking is allowed? (cf. Werner 1998:5ff). Perhaps it is 
of more practical analytical use to say that the ordinary way of doing politics is 
constituted by what is lifted out of the ordinary by means of securitization (Huysmans 
2006:ch.8).  
5.3.2 Security discourse 
So the next question is how far one may stretch the criteria of the Copenhagen School 
before it no longer makes sense to talk about a problem as a security problem. One 
answer to that question follows from Huysmans analysis of migration and asylum as 
a security problem in the EU (2006:ch.5). His analysis describes how the situation is 
rather complex. 
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First of all, more than one securitization concerning migrants is at play in the EU: A 
threat is pointed out to 'internal security';
174
 a threat is pointed out to the welfare state; 
and a threat is pointed out to cultural identity. Secondly, it is not the migrant as such 
which is pointed out as the threat in any of these threat constructions: it is the terrorist 
and the criminal hiding amongst the migrants which is pointed out as threats; the will 
and abilities of the migrant to contribute to the economy; and the cultural habitus of 
the migrant. Thirdly, neither of these threats are necessarily accepted as acutely 
existential in isolation. 
But the migrant– fourthly – ends up inscribed in a security problematique anyway. 
Partly because the various threats are articulated to migration:  
[I]mmigation and asylum are powerful political categories. ... They are not a single 
category identifying a single force that threatens survival of a political community, 
whether defined in terms of identity or sovereignty. They exist more as floating 
signifiers that have been inscribed with connotations of danger, unease and fear that 
can refer to different groups of people ... and different social dynamics related to 
migration and asylum (Huysmans 2006:83). 
Migration is furthermore inscribed in a security problematique by the way the 
individual threats are linked exactly in their way of distributing fear and trust; 
administer inclusion and exclusion; as well as in their way of predispose for violence 
(Huysmans 2006:51). Being pointed out as a direct threat is only one way of 
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 Huysmans' concept of 'internal security' refers to the fight against 'abuse' of the free 
movements of the Internal Market – in which immigrants are linked to border-crossing 
crime (weapon, drugs, terror, etc.) (Huysmans 2006:71; cf. Bigo 1994). In a national Danish 
context this link – as we will return to below – shows itself as a threat to the peaceful 
society. 
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becoming a security problem; inscription in a broader discourse of (in)security is 
another way of being the target of extraordinary means.
175
 
5.3.3 Securitizing narratives 
On the one hand, this chapter basically tells the same story about the linking of 
threats as does Huysmans' in his analysis of the EU – even if the story has different 
implications as its focus is on 'Muslims' rather than 'migrants'. On the other hand, the 
reason why the chapter concludes that official Danish discourse on Muslims is 
securitizing does not coincide with Huysmans'. The argument in this chapter is that 
the analysis needs to focus on the dynamics of discursive interaction: A discourse 
also qualifies as securitizing if it systematically produces reactions which will present 
themselves in the discourse as security problems. 
When the analytical focus is on identity,
176
 one important question is: Who fixes 
identity? Or rather – as identity is never fixed once and for all: Under what 
circumstances is identity negotiated. As laid out in chapter 2, a narrative about ones 
identity necessarily includes a series of 'others' in relation to whom one is (cf. 
Ricoeur 1988:246ff). A series of roles, which 'others' are expected to play, are 
described as a necessary part of the narrative. The description of these roles may 
leave more or less room for improvisation: When the floor is yours, you may use it 
for saying something different than expected – even if the risk implied in (and the 
consequences of) diverting from the script may be more or less dramatic (Butler 
1997:133). 
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 In such a broader perspective there is no doubt that securitization of migrants (Ceyhan & 
Tsoukala 2002) as well as Muslims (Aydin & Acikmese 2008) is rather widespread in the 
Western world. 
176
 One may argue that securitization is always (also) about identity (cf. Neumann 1998:16-
7). It does, however, make a difference, whether the analytical focus is on identity or on, 
e.g., sovereignty. 
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This chapter analyzes how official Danish narratives describe Muslims as threats – 
and how they describe what 'we' should do to 'them' on that occasion. In the first 
reading, the focus is on whether and how Muslims are pointed out as threats. But in 
the second and third reading, the focus is moved to the roles thereby described for 
Muslims – and what answers may be formulated from these speaking positions. The 
aim is to discuss whether some of the roles are so tightly circumscribed that it is 
impossible to use them as a platform for a reply which departs from the script – 
without the answer working as a threat to the Danish identity which the roles were 
described to interact with. Such a situation would amount to a 'securitized identity 
configuration' in which two identities are locked in mutually narrating each other as 
threatening.
177
 
5.4 Muslims as security problems in official Danish discourse 
So what is it exactly – according to Danish official discourse – that must be defended 
from the Muslims? And what is the answer to the threats? Subsection 5.2.1 sketched 
two very general movements in Danish debates on integration: Firstly, that a wider 
part of the political spectrum expresses animosity against strangers. Secondly, that 
the animosity has gradually condensed around the difference of Muslims. These two 
movements, however, do not necessarily imply that government representatives 
exclaim that 'Muslims are an existential threat to Denmark – so we have to implement 
this and that draconic measure towards Muslims'.
178
 Bearing in mind, however, the 
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 As noted in chapter 2, Buzan & Wæver (2009) develops the concept of 'constellation' to 
denote to (or more) mutually reproducing securitizations on a macro scale. No theoretical 
barrier appears to hinder the application of the concept on a micro scale (cf. Wæver 1994). 
No matter what, the analysis of this chapter may contribute an analysis of a part of a macro 
constellation upheld by various forces presenting themselves to represent the West and 
Islam respectively (cf. Buzan & Wæver 2009; and chapter 10). 
178
 Even if backbenchers of the government parties at times come close (cf. eg. MP Pind, 
lib., 2008). 
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modification suggested by Huysmans of the analytical setup of the Copenhagen 
School, even threats and means to their aversion presented in less dramatic phrasing 
must be included in the analysis: They may feed into and add up to a less tightly 
knitted discourse of (in)security, and thereby contribute in a more abstract way to 
legitimizing drastic measures. To this argument for widening the focus may be added 
that even a more diffuse narratives of threats and countermeasures may – in the 
dynamic perspective advocated by this dissertation – give rise to 'Muslim' answers 
which in conjunction with the Danish threat narratives result in further securitization. 
When the threshold of what discursively constitutes a security problem
179
 is lowered 
as described above, the question may be reversed to be more operational in practical 
analysis: What kind of countermeasures does the government seek legitimization for 
to avert Muslim threats? What is it that 'we' (Denmark) has to do to 'them' (the 
Muslims) to protect ourselves? 
A first cluster of answers are narratives of 'integration': Muslims need to be integrated 
in the Danish society. A second cluster of answers start out as narratives of the 
prevention of terrorism – but end up telling about the integration of Muslims too. 
In his opening speech to parliament immediately after the inauguration of the new 
government in 2001 the prime minister put three threats into play;the threat to the 
peaceful society, the threat to the welfare society, and the threat to cultural identity.
180
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 As whenever doing research which combines security and an othered identity in the same 
sentences, it is important to note that this is not an analysis of whether or not Muslims in 
some objective sense is posing a threat to Denmark. Contrarily it is an analysis of, firstly, 
whether or not – and if so; how – Muslims are discursively pointed out as threats and 
thereby produced as a security problem, and secondly, what this discursive production 
effects in terms of 'second round' security problems (cf. McSweeney 1996; Buzan & Wæver 
1997). 
180
 These are basically the same three threats identified by Huysmans in his analysis of the 
securitization of migration and asylum in the EU; 
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It is an important investment in the future to have Danish alien policy back in order. 
For years a lax alien policy has been conducted – a policy which is now putting the 
Danish society under pressure. It is a problem that half the immigrants in Denmark 
are out of job. And it is a problem that there are groups of young second generation 
immigrants who are strained by serious crime. A number of them are rejecting the 
values on which the Danish society is built. And they reject integration in the Danish 
society. We have to realize these facts. We have to tighten our alien policy. 
Otherwise a growing opposition will evolve between the population groups in the 
Danish society. Being a peaceful and harmonic people is emblematic to Denmark. 
That is the way it should be in the future too. It is not so that we shall be identical all 
of us. Of course not. There has to be freedom to differer. But we have to build a 
strong society where there is a community around some basic values and attitudes. 
(A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2001.12.04)
181
 
So Danish welfare is threatened by the low employment rate of the immigrants; the 
peaceful Danish society is threatened by their crime; and the Danish community of 
values is threatened by someone rejecting the values. The three threats are presented 
as connected – but the specific connections are unclear: What group of "them" of 
whom "a number" reject the Danish values – is it only the criminal second generation 
immigrants or does the group include the unemployed? In what direction is the 
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 "Det er en vigtig investering i fremtiden, at vi får bragt orden i dansk udlændingepolitik. 
I flere år er der ført en slap udlændingepolitik, som nu sætter det danske samfund under 
pres. Det er et problem, at halvdelen af indvandrerne i Danmark er uden arbejde. Og det er 
et problem, at der er grupper af unge 2. generations indvandrere, som er belastet af alvorlig 
kriminalitet. Flere af dem forkaster de værdier, det danske samfund bygger på. Og de 
nægter integration i det danske samfund. Vi er nødt til at se disse kendsgerninger i øjnene. 
Vi er nødt til at stramme udlændingepolitikken. Ellers vil der udvikle sig et voksende 
modsætningsforhold mellem befolkningsgrupperne i det danske samfund. Danmark er 
kendetegnet ved at være et fredeligt og harmonisk folk. Sådan skal det også være i 
fremtiden. Ikke sådan at vi alle skal være ens. Naturligvis ikke. Der skal være frihed til 
forskellighed. Men vi skal bygge et stærkt samfund, hvor der et fællesskab om nogle 
grundlæggende værdier og holdninger." (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 
2001.12.04). 
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causality: is it a job that leads to Danish values or is it the other way around? And 
what is most important? And what is it exactly which will put an end to the peaceful 
society? 
In the following years a series of distinct integration narratives may be distinguished 
in government policy papers and the interventions of cabinet ministers in parliament, 
in the press, and in public appearances. Each of the narratives describes a relation 
between the good which is threatened, the source of the threat, and the necessary 
countermeasures. In that way each narrative leave a more or less distinct set of roles 
to take up for the one who is to be integrated. 
The threat to the peaceful society is narrated in three ways: First, two parallel 
narratives on the criminal second generation immigrant and on the intruding terrorist 
– later, a narrative on the 'home grown' terrorist. In between are a series of attempts to 
tell stories that articulate the threat to welfare and the threat to culture. These central 
integration narratives on culture and welfare are, however, reconfigured – in a rather 
surprising way – when they are merged with the narrative on the threat from the 
home grown terrorist. 
5.5 The first threats to the peaceful society: intrusion 
The threat to the peaceful society in the form of crime only takes up very little space 
in the first initiatives of the new government – in the field of integration.182 In stead 
the matter is treated as an integrated part of a more general reform of the penal code. 
The threat is to be averted by adjusting the incitement structures facing the individual 
– primarily negatively in the form of more severe punishment, but also positively in 
the form of supplying alternative possibilities.
183
 Only one initiative is targeted 
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 Crime is mentioned in a subordinate clause on page 16 in (Ministeriet 2002). 
183
 Ministeriet (2002:16).  
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directly at the ethnic background of the criminal: penalty is in more cases to include 
the discontinuation of the residence permit for non-citizens.
184
  
Even if the connection forged by the prime minister between crime and the rejection 
of Danish values is not explicitly present in policy papers and legislative initiatives in 
the field of integration, the connection is re-established in various parliamentary 
debates:
185
 The crime rate is a consequence of values which have migrated to the 
country from outside. 
Another threat to the peaceful society – the terrorist – demands reactions which 
qualify as extraordinary no matter what yardstick we may apply.
186
 At first, however, 
the threat is not directly aimed at Denmark: 
                                           
184
 VK-regeringen I (2001); Regeringen (2002); VK-regeringen II (2005:33). 
185
 Even when the parliamentary debate is occasioned by a survey documenting that 
members of ethnic minorities dissociate themselves from a series of specific crimes by a 
larger proportion than ethnic Danes (cf. Folketinget 2007.04.26). 
186
 To the DPP, the two threats to the peaceful society are the same as Muslim crime is a 
small scale form of Islamic terror “[T]he effort to be made against terror must not only be 
targeted at the persons already caught by terror networks but has to attempt to forestall such 
things from happening at all. In this context it is important to severely crack down on 
criminal, young immigrants moving in circles where crime and Islamic fundamentalism are 
mixed. It is well known that for example the Hizb-ut-Tahrir is recruiting young Muslims on 
the street level, often young Muslims offending against the law. … Terrorism may be 
defined in different ways. One definition is that terrorism is characterized by violence and 
speculation in fear being used to further a political opinion or a political aim. Another 
definition is that terror is crimes threatening, undermining or outright destroying the 
political, economic, or social structures of the countries. The riots we have seen in Paris are 
frightening; it might not be terror but it is frightening. It is not terror in the original meaning 
of the word but it is, anyhow, a mob rule which is terror in embryo. The unrest in Rosenhøj 
near Århus is, of course, of an altogether different scale, but these problems too are caused 
by the lack of respect for authorities and for the society which the immigrants ought to be 
part of. It is the lack of respect for the authorities which boosts the seeds of terror” 
"[I]ndsatsen mod terror [skal] ikke alene ... rette sig mod de personer, som allerede er blevet 
indfanget af terrornetværk, men også skal forsøge at foregribe, at noget lignende 
overhovedet sker. I den forbindelse er det vigtigt at slå hårdt ned på kriminelle, unge 
indvandrere, der færdes i et miljø, hvor kriminalitet og islamisk fundamentalisme 
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When we engage ourselves in the solution of the problems of the world, it is, i.a., 
because we have some fundamental values of what is fair and equitable ... That is 
why we have shown solidarity with the USA and other countries in the international 
fight against terrorism. (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2001.12.04)
187
 
The countermeasures presented are, firstly, fighting terrorism with military means 
'out in the world' together with the USA;
188
 secondly, to make sure that the terrorists 
do not get in side Denmark;
189
 thirdly, to keep him under surveillance, catch and 
persecute him if he does anyway.
190
 
Quite soon, however, the narrative on the threat from the terrorist is changed so that 
the referent-object of the threat in a more clear way includes 'us'. The government 
explicitly points out terrorism as the threat taking over from the existential threat of 
the Cold War: 
                                                                                                                                            
sammenblandes. Det er velkendt, at Hizb-ut-Tahrir eksempelvis hverver unge muslimer på 
gadeplan, ofte unge muslimer, der er på kant med loven. ... Terrorisme kan defineres på 
forskellig måde. Én definition er, at terrorisme er karakteriseret ved, at vold og spekulation i 
frygt bruges til at fremme et politisk synspunkt eller et politisk mål. En anden definition er, 
at terror er forbrydelser, der truer, underminerer eller ligefrem ødelægger landenes politiske, 
økonomiske og sociale strukturer. De optøjer, vi har set i Paris, er skræmmende, det er 
måske ikke terror, men det er skræmmende. Der er ikke tale om terror i ordets egentligste 
forstand, men det er i hvert fald et pøbelvælde, som indeholder kimen til terror. 
Urolighederne i Rosenhøj ved Århus er naturligvis i en helt anden målestok, men også disse 
problemer skyldes, at man ingen respekt har for autoriteter og heller ikke for det samfund, 
som indvandrerne burde være en del af. Det er mangelen på respekt for autoriteterne, der 
øger kimen til terror" (MP Skaarup, DPP, in Folketinget 2005.11.16 15:45).  
187
 "Når vi engagerer os i løsningen af dennes verdens problemer, så er det jo blandt andet, 
fordi vi har nogle grundlæggende værdier om ret og rimeligt. ... Derfor har vi vist solidaritet 
med USA og andre lande i den internationale kamp mod terrorisme." (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, 
lib., in Folketinget 2001.12.04). 
188
 Folketinget (2001.12.14). 
189
 By ammending the Aliens Act (Haarder, Min. f. Int., lib., in Folketinget 2001.12.13). 
190
 At first, by passing new anti-terror legislation (Folketinget 2002.05.31). 
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The threats of the 21st century are fundamentally different than the ones we faced 
during the Cold War and in the first years after the fall of the Wall. The nightmare is 
no longer an all-destructive nuclear war but massively destructive attacks from global 
terror networks or desperate regimes which have placed themselves outside the 
international community. Terrorism today is a real and essential threat to populations 
everywhere in the world. (Regeringen 2003:2)
191
 
These initial narratives on both crime and terror may be summed up to say that They 
come from outside with values allowing or inducing Them to commit crime and 
terror. Thereby They threaten Our peaceful society. Therefore We must stop Them 
from intruding and make it harder for those who nevertheless get inside to follow 
Their values. The threat construction of this narrative is illustrated in Xfigure 5.4X. 
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Figure 5.4 The threat to the peaceful society 
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 "Det 21. århundredes trusler er fundamentalt anderledes, end dem vi stod overfor under 
Den Kolde Krig og de første år efter Murens fald. Mareridtet er ikke længere den 
altødelæggende atomkrig, men massivt ødelæggende angreb fra globale terrornetværk eller 
desperate regimer, der har stillet sig uden for det internationale samfund. Terrorisme er i dag 
en virkelig og væsentlig trussel mod befolkningerne overalt i verden." (Regeringen 2003:2). 
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At the same time it is important for the government to make clear that the threat does 
not emanate from Islam or Muslims as such: 
Some in Denmark were swift to declare war on the large part of humanity which 
professes more or less to the world religion of Islam. We have, of course, to distance 
ourselves from such a generalization and such throwing suspicion. Individual 
Muslims in Denmark should not suffer from this. Terrorism shall not be answered 
with new persecution of more nations. It is the criminals who shall be hunted for with 
every mean compatible with our conception of justice. (Hornbech, MP, lib. in 
Folketinget 2002.01.31 11:35)
192
 
After the bombing of the London underground in 2005 and the Cartoon Crisis in 
2006, this dissociation is placed in a new light by the concept of 'home grown 
terrorists' and by the linking of local and global threats in one and the same 'value 
struggle'. By then the threat is aimed at 'us-Denmark' and not just at the more non-
committal 'us-who-shares-values' and 'us-the-populations-everywhere-in-the-world'. 
We will return to this below. 
5.6 Narratives of threats to culture and welfare 
First, however, we need to chart the central debate on Danish integration policy. This 
central debate pertains to the importance of labour market integration relative to 
cultural assimilation. What is it that needs to be protected; welfare or culture? Or if 
both; how are the two threats connected? 
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 "For nogle i Danmark gik det meget hurtigt med at erklære krig mod den store del af 
menneskeheden, der i større eller mindre grad bekender sig til verdensreligionen islam. Den 
generalisering og mistænkeliggørelse skal vi naturligvis tage afstand fra. Det skal ikke gå ud 
over de enkelte muslimer i Danmark. Terrorisme skal ikke besvares med ny forfølgelse af 
flere folkeslag. Det er forbryderne, der skal jagtes med alle de midler, der er forenelige med 
vort retssyn." (Hornbech, MP, lib.,.in Folketinget 2002.01.31 11:35). 
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5.6.1 What is the threat to culture: Their culture or multiculturalism? 
It is well known that the DPP which supports the government in parliament every 
now and then point out Islam, Muslim culture in the abstract or specific 'Muslim' 
practices as threats to Danish culture among a series of other referent-objects (cf. 
Jacobsen 2008:267f). The threat construction of this basic DPP narrative is illustrated 
in figure 5.5. This threat construction forms the background for the phrasing repeated 
time and again by the first minister for integration in the centre-right government: "I 
have repeatedly said that I am not minister for shower curtains, veils and [pork] liver 
pâté in kindergardens." (Haarder, Min.f. Intgrt., lib., in Folketinget 2004.05.11 
13.25)
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 The words served as an explanation for why he would not take action 
against Muslim cultural traits said to threaten this or that practice implied to be 
emblematic for Danish culture.  
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Figure 5.5 The threat to Danish culture from Muslim culture, according to the DPP. 
 
So it is clear that the threat constructed by the DPP does not serve as the point of 
departure for the official narrative of Danish integration policy. But that does not 
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 "Jeg har gentagne gange sagt, at jeg ikke er minister for badeforhæng og tørklæder og 
leverpostej i børnehaver." (Haarder, Min. f. Int., lib., in Folketinget 2004.05.11 13.25). 
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imply that there is no threat to avert. The threat described by the government is aimed 
at the function of Danish culture as that which sets the rules of the game on Danish 
soil: 
Danish culture is more important than other cultures. When I as a minister for 
education put the biblical narrative centre stage in religious instruction [literally: 
Christian studies; -/upg] it was clearly an act of discrimination. One needs to be 
familiar with the biblical story, and one needs to be acquainted with other religions. 
This is discrimination and this is the way it should be. The same way in the Danish 
lessons; there one read Danish literature – it is more important than foreign literature. 
So, I contend, all this talk of equality of cultures and equality of religion – it is 
nonsense... Well, Denmark is a Danish society. It is the Danes who decide in 
Denmark. And we are, as well, the ones who decide how many should be let in... Isn't 
this discrimination? Of course it is discrimination. (Haarder, Min. f. Int., lib., in 
Hardis 2002)
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In this way the source of the threat is formally displaced from specific Muslims and 
Islam as such to the accept and protection of minority cultures promoted by an 
abstract multiculturalism.
195
 After this displacement the threat at first stems – rather 
than from Muslims – from parties promoting ideals of integration like this:  
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 "Dansk kultur er vigtigere end andre kulturer. Da jeg som undervisningsminister satte 
den bibelske fortælling i centrum af kristendomsundervisningen, så var det klar 
diskrimination. Man skal være fortrolig med den bibelske fortælling, og man skal have 
kendskab til andre religioner. Det er diskrimination, og sådan skal det være. Tilsvarende i 
dansktimerne. Der læser man dansk litteratur – det er vigtigere end udenlandsk litteratur. 
Derfor siger jeg, at al den tale om kulturlighed og religionslighed – det er nonsens. ... 
Danmark er nu engang et dansk samfund. Det er danskerne, der bestemmer i Danmark. Det 
er også os, der bestemmer, hvor mange der skal lukkes ind. Det er jo ikke tilfældigt, at der 
ikke bare i vores grundlov, men i alle andre landes grundlov står, at det er parlamentet, der 
bestemmer, hvem der skal lukkes ind. Er det ikke diskrimination? Jo, selvfølgelig er det 
diskrimination." (Haarder, Min. f. Int., lib., in Hardis 2002). 
195
 This threat may, of course, also be found in DPP narratives. 
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integration is a mutual process which needs to be based on equal opportunity and 
absence of discrimination [which demands that] society makes room for a plurality of 
cultures and ... that the possibilities for the ethnic minorities to communicate 
knowledge of their culture and conditions in Denmark are strengthened. (SPP in 
Folketinget 2000.11.23)
196
 
Discrimination may be regarded an extraordinary countermeasure – but the very point 
of this intervention of the Minister for Integration is to present discrimination as 
something non-extraordinary, as a normal course of action. In that sense the pointing 
out of multiculturalism as a threat serves to constitute 'Danish culture' as the 
normalized framework for political community. 
And then again: It is not just multiculturalism and the way it places cultures on equal 
footing which constitutes the threat. Multiculturalism is, as illustrated in figure 5.6, a 
threat because it allows Muslim culture to threaten Danish culture. Because the 
concept of culture implied is digital (Eriksen 1995) in the sense that culture is an 
either/or question. Culture comes as a package deal: You either take it or leave it:  
[T]he parents are entirely outside the Danish society. This means that the children 
grow up in a vacuum, suspended between two cultures: The culture of the native 
country is of no use in Denmark, and they are bared from the Danish culture by their 
behaviour. (Haarder, Min. f. Int., lib., in Dørge 2003)
197
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 "integration er en gensidig proces, der skal baseres på lige muligheder og fravær af 
diskrimination [hvilket kræver] at samfundet giver plads til mangfoldighed i kulturer, og ... 
at man styrker etniske minoriteters muligheder for at formidle viden om deres kultur og 
forhold i Danmark" (Beslutningsforslag fra SF in Folketinget 2000.11.23).  
197
 "[F]orældrene er totalt uden for det danske samfund. Det vil sige, at børnene vokser op i 
et tomrum, spændt ud mellem to kulturer. Kulturen fra hjemlandet kan ikke bruges til noget 
i Danmark, og den danske kultur spærrer de sig selv ude fra ved deres adfærd." (Haarder, 
Min. f. Int., lib., in Dørge 2003). 
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Figure 5.6 The threat to Danish culture from Multiculturalism 
 
So when the minister retells the perfect integration narrative, it goes like this: 
The Chinese are perfect immigrants because they fulfil the only criteria for 
integration: integration in the labour market. It is an entrepreneurial culture where 
one has to contribute before one may consume. And there is no one demanding that 
they dispose of their culture as long as they prove themselves able to work and 
participate in the Danish community... If all immigrants were like the Chinese, my 
job as Minister for Integration would be deeply superfluous. (Haarder, Min. f. Int., 
lib., [2002] in Surrugue & Astrup 2004)
198
 
The point of establishing this ideal is that not all immigrants are like the Chinese. Not 
all migrants have the Chinese culture which – according to the Minister – does not 
bar them from working and participating in society. So the government needs a 
narrative about the connection between the threat to Danish culture and the threat to 
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 "Kineserne er perfekte indvandrere, fordi de opfylder det eneste krav til integration: 
integration på arbejdsmarkedet. Det er en iværksætterkultur, hvor man skal yde, før man kan 
nyde. Og der er ingen, der siger, at de skal afskaffe deres kultur, når bare de kan finde ud af 
at arbejde og deltage i det danske samfund ... Hvis alle indvandrere var som kinesere, ville 
mit job som integrationsminister være inderligt overflødigt " (Haarder, Min. f. Int., lib., 
[2002] in Surrugue & Astrup 2004). 
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Danish welfare. Such a narrative comes in a series of versions. At first, welfare 
comes out on top – later, things gradually get more complicated. 
5.6.2 The state – and culturalism – as threats to welfare  
In the first formulations of an integration policy of the new government, focus is 
unambiguously on the labour market: "To the government there is no doubt that a job 
is the key to successful integration." (Ministeriet 2002:1)
199
 
This 'rationalist' narrative points out the low proportion of aliens in jobs as a threat to 
the way the the welfare society is financed and to its ability to compete in the world 
market. In this narrative a citizen able to provide for himself is a well-integrated 
citizen. The low proportion of immigrants in active in the labour market is a threat to 
Danish welfare:
200
 
If we satisfactorily accomplish the task [of integration] it will increase employment 
and reduce public spending on social security. If we do not succeed we will have an 
increased pressure on the economy of the welfare society while we at the same time 
risk a society with labour shortage. (Indenrigsministeriet 2001:section 2.2)
201
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 "For regeringen hersker der ingen tvivl om, at et arbejde er nøglen til succesfuld 
integration." (Ministeriet 2002:1). Even when the text does not present labour market 
integration as exhausting the concept of integration, it is not culture but political 
participation which is the necessary supplement: "A job is an important road to integration, 
but it does not do the trick on its own. Integration is also about being able to participate in 
others parts of societal life, so that the individual new citizen may enter into work in civil 
society associations and school boards." (2002:1). 
200
 And welfare is not just a technical way of ordering things – it is a central element in the 
identity of the Danish nation state: The solidary Danish people has built for itself a welfare 
society to nest the unfolding of its inner qualities (Hansen 2002:51f, 60f, 69, 80ff). 
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 "Løser vi [integrations]opgaven tilfredsstillende, vil det øge beskæftigelsen og nedbringe 
de offentlige sociale udgifter. Lykkes det ikke, får vi et samfund med et voksende pres på 
velfærdssamfundets økonomi, samtidig med at vi risikerer et samfund med mangel på 
arbejdskraft." (Indenrigsministeriet 2001:section 2.2). 
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But notably, in this narrative the welfare society and the immigrant is in the same 
boat as his exclusion from the labour market is a threat aimed at both:  
In Denmark all citizens must have equal access to work life and the societal life – 
including our new citizens who have come here as refugees and immigrants. ... 
Today an all too large share of our new citizens are outside the labour market. If the 
affiliation to the labour market of the new citizens was the same as that of the rest of 
the population, 60.000 more persons would be in jobs. (Ministeriet 2002:1)
202
 
The first version of the narrative is that the threat comes from the exclusion, as 
illustrated in figure 5.7. And the source of the threat is not the one excluded but 
someone else doing something to the excluded.  
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Figure 5.7 The threat to welfare 
 
This first narrative is also the first narrative about the connection between cultural 
integration and labour market integration. This, the first narrative of the government 
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 "I Danmark skal alle borgere have adgang til arbejds- og samfundslivet – også vores nye 
borgere, der er kommet hertil som flygtninge og indvandrere. ... I dag står en alt for stor 
andel af vore nye borgere uden for arbejdsmarkedet. Hvis de nye borgeres tilknytning til 
arbejdsmarkedet var den samme som den øvrige del af befolkningens, ville der være 60.000 
flere personer i arbejde." (Ministeriet 2002:1). 
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on the connection between cultural integration and labour market integration, begins 
when"The vast majority of new citizens arrive in the country wanting to contribute an 
effort to create a new life for him or herself in Denmark." (Ministeriet 2002:2)
203
 
The common threat to Danish welfare and the new citizens come from the 
"clientification" performed by the welfare state to the new citizens (Ministeriet 
2002:2).
204
 The countermeasures proposed are, first the deconstruction of harmful 
bureaucracy, and, secondly, a reconstruction of the incitement structures greeting the 
new arrival. The point of both is to get the immigrant (or his children) in job as soon 
as possible.
205
 
The obvious way to fit culture and religion into this narrative is awarding it the role 
of an irrational distraction: 
It is remarkable that employers who have experienced new-Danish apprentices 
quickly forget about the cultural background of the apprentices. In the humdrum of 
everyday life it is professional and social abilities which are important 
(Beskæftigelsesministeren, Frederiksen, lib., 2002b) Therefore it is about making 
space and room for everyone, disregarding the colour of skin and names sounding 
foreign. One of the problems is the massive focus on religion, culture and tradition. 
(2002a)
206
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 "Langt de fleste nye borgere kommer til landet med ønsket om at yde en indsats for at 
skabe sig en ny tilværelse i Danmark." (Ministeriet 2002:2).  
204
 "[K]lientgørelse" (Ministeriet 2002:2).  
205
 Ministeriet (2002:2ff).  
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 "Det er jo bemærkelsesværdigt, at de arbejdsgivere, der har erfaring med nydanske 
elever meget hurtigt 'glemmer' elevernes kulturelle baggrund. I den grå hverdag er det ikke 
kultur, men faglighed og social kunnen, der er vigtig." (Beskæftigelsesministeren, 
Frederiksen. lib., 2002b); "Derfor handler det om at skabe plads og rum til alle, uanset 
hudfarve og fremmedklingende navn. Et af problemerne er den massive fokus på religion, 
kultur og tradition." (2002a). 
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A misguided focus on cultural difference – culturalism – is a threat, albeit a minor 
one compared to clientification. This second threat should be countered by everybody 
taking up a more relaxed approach to cultural differences and by more interaction 
across cultural difference. The place awarded to culture as a secondary threat is 
illustrated in figure 5.8.. 
But a narrative involving such an outspoken hostility to culturalism is not viable in 
the long run, when one is simultaneously attempting the articulation of a narrative 
awarding Danish culture the double position as that which is threatened and in itself 
an important countermeasure to the threat.
207
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Figure 5.8 The threat to welfare from Culturalism 
 
One way of making ends meet is the paperclip method: just listing the two aims of 
integration: What is decisive is labour market integration – but there is also this other 
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 The new government is, as mentioned, specifically dependent on the articulation of this 
narrative as it is dependent on forming a majority in parliament with the DPP. The 
preceding government attempted – in a more tentative way – the articulation of the narrative 
by way of its resonance in the electorate. 
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threat in need of countermeasures in the form of another kind or element of 
integration. This method gives rise to texts rattling off like this: 
in our opinion it is the following social conditions which are decisive for whether we 
may speak of a successful integration: Education, employment, and self-supportance. 
... One of the goals of a successful integration is that the foreigners endorse some 
fundamental values and norms in Denmark. (Indenrigsministeriet 2001:sections 2.4; 
2.11)
208
 
Figure 5.9 illustrates how – according to the 'paper clip' texts – a process of 
'integration' should avert threats to both welfare and values without explaining how 
the two are related.  
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Figure 5.9 The paper clips connection between labour market and cultural integration 
No narrative connection between labour market integration and cultural integration – only 
related by listing 
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 "[D]et er efter vores opfattelse følgende sociale forhold, der er afgørende for, at man kan 
tale om en vellykket integration: Uddannelse, beskæftigelse og selvforsørgelse ... Et af 
målene for en vellykket integration er, at udlændinge tilslutter sig og efterlever nogle 
grundlæggende værdier og normer i Danmark." (Indenrigsministeriet 2001:sections 2.4; 
2.11). 
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Another version relates the two types of integration causally so that labour market 
integration will in the end lead the immigrant to the learn the Danish values. This is 
illustrated in figure 5.10. 
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Figure 5.10 Labour market integration as a means to cultural integration 
 
5.6.3 Relating culture and welfare by letting welfare lead to culture 
Over time, however, a narrative surfaces which constructs a causality in the opposite 
direction: Labour market integration is still the central aim – but to reach the aim, 
cultural integration is needed. At least certain central culturally and religiously based 
values, norms, and practices must be left behind as they exclude competing Danish 
values, norms, and practices (cf. Stolcke 1995:4). The shift to this new narrative is 
explicated in a report from the government 'think tank on challenges to the integration 
effort': 
In the first report of the Think Tank the endorsement of fundamental values and 
norms was not emphasized as one of the most important goals for a successful 
integration a par with education, employment and self-supportance. The experiences 
and inquiries obtained since 2001 seem, however, to indicate that values and norms 
should be ascribed a larger significance ... The point that foreigners should endorse 
fundamental values and norms does not in it self mean that foreigners have to give up 
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their original culture, e.g. religion, attire, or cuisine. This may, however, be necessary 
if insistence on the original culture is in conflict with values and norms in Denmark 
to such an extent that foreigners cannot participate on equal footing in working life 
and societal life in other respects. (Ministeriet 2007:4)
209
 
In this new narrative, the culture, religion, values and norms of the individual 
immigrant ends up as a threat to Danish welfare. The threat construction of this 
narrative is illustrated in figure 5.11.  
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Figure 5.11 Cultural integration as a means to labour market integration 
 
The weight of the countermeasures is gradually shifted over the years. Initially 
"diversity management" and local, "practical solutions which satisfy everyone" are 
                                           
209
 "I Tænketankens første rapport blev tilslutningen til grundlæggende værdier og normer 
ikke fremhævet som et af de vigtigste mål for vellykket integration på linje med uddannelse, 
beskæftigelse og selvforsørgelse. De erfaringer og undersøgelser, der er kommet til siden 
2001, synes imidlertid at vise, at værdier og normer skal tillægges større betydning ... At 
udlændinge skal tilslutte sig grundlæggende værdier og normer indebærer som 
udgangspunkt ikke, at udlændinge skal opgive deres oprindelige kultur, fx religion, 
påklædning eller madkultur. Dette kan dog være nødvendigt, hvis en fastholdelse af den 
oprindelige kultur strider mod værdier og normer i Danmark i et sådant omfang, at 
udlændinge ikke kan deltage på lige fod med danskere i arbejds- og samfundslivet i øvrigt." 
(Ministeriet 2007:4; cf. Ministeriet 2003:kap.4.2.3). 
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mentioned (Ministeriet 2003:kap.4.2.3).
210
 Later, as we shall see, a more clear 
allocation of roles and responsibilities is explicated. 
5.7 Back-up narratives 
Before the government narrative clarifies the allocation of responsibilities, it has been 
'beefed up' by articulating two more abstract narratives: A functionalist narrative 
focused on 'cohesive force' points out cultural homogeneity as a prerequisite for 
welfare. An exceptionalist narrative about Denmark as a pioneer nation points out 
Danish values as universally valid. Though the two narratives may at first seem at 
odds, they – as described by Mouritsen (2006:78ff) – both add weight to the same 
countermeasure: the spread of Danish values.
211
 
5.7.1 Functionalism: Plurality as the threat to welfare 
The 'functionalist' narrative pivots around the concept of 'cohesive force'.
212
 Like the 
narrative which constructed cultural integration as a means to labour market 
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 "[H]åndtere mangfoldighed... praktiske løsninger, som tilfredsstiller alle." (Ministeriet 
2003:kap.4.2.3). 
211
 Mouritsen analyses the two narratives under the labels 'instrumental homogeneity' and 
'particular universalism' as part of a discussion of national and civic values as they are 
related in debates on Muslims. Hedetoft sketches elements of both narratives – focusing, 
however, primarily on functionalism – in an analysis of Danish policy, media and public 
discourse on integration 2003:3; 2006a:398, 401, 407). Lægaard (2007a) discusses the 
particular universalism of Danish liberalism as a form of nationalism. 
212
 Peter Gundelach reminds me (pesonal communication, 2008.05.25) that the established 
sociological terminology has 'social cohesion' for the Danish 'sammenhængskraft'. I have 
elected to retain the literal translation 'cohesive force' because of the connotations which the 
phrase carries in Danish: Firstly, 'cohesive force' is something that is temporally and 
causally situated before cohesion; it is a force which effects cohesion. Secondly, omitting 
the prefix 'social' allows 'cohesion' to articulate either 'social', cultural', or both; a specific 
polyvalency which is active in the narratives presented by the prime minister. This lack of 
specificity is different from the established sociological use of 'social cohesion' which in 
English denominates the social cohesion across cultural plurality – and which has allowed a 
twin concept of 'cultural cohesion' to be mainly applied in organizational and management 
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integration, this narrative presents the national economy (and the welfare goods it 
allows) as the threatened referent-object. But this narrative does not explain a 
competitive economy with a high employment rate only: 
The government will suggest ... specific steps with a view to strengthen our 
competitive force and our cohesive force. Cohesive force; that is to secure a society 
that hangs together. A society in which there are not too great social or economical 
divisions. ... But cohesive force is also to secure a society that hangs together in 
terms of values. One of the strengths of the Danish society is that we - despite 
differences in opinion on a series of specific questions - nevertheless build on a 
common foundation of certain fundamental values. Some of these values are 
challenged these days. (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2005.06.15 9:10)
213
 
Economical success for a nation comes from being competitive – and a decisive 
factor in Denmark's ability to compete is the trust among people made possible by 
cultural homogeneity. The threat in this narrative is not individual unemployment but 
cultural difference as such.
214
 And cultural difference is not just any link in the causal 
chain; it is the source of the threat: 
                                                                                                                                            
studies to denominate the need for an organization not to be pluricultural. The Danish 
'cohesive force' allows – as we shall see – both a threat from cultural plurality as such and a 
threat from lack of social cohesion across cultural plurality 
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 "[Regeringen vil foreslå]... en række konkrete ... skridt, som skal forstærke både vores 
konkurrencekraft og vores sammenhængskraft. Sammenhængskraft, det er at sikre et 
samfund, der hænger sammen. Et samfund, hvor der ikke er for store sociale og økonomiske 
skel. ... Men sammenhængskraft er også at sikre et samfund, der værdimæssigt hænger 
sammen. En af styrkerne i det danske samfund er, at vi trods forskellige holdninger til en 
række konkrete spørgsmål dog bygger på et fælles grundlag af visse fundamentale værdier. 
Nogle af disse værdier bliver udfordret i disse år." (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 
2005.06.15 9:10).  
214
 The point is that in Danish political debates the concept of ‘cohesive force 
[sammenhængskraft]’ did not always have these twin implications. The concept was 
originally articulated into the discourse of the prime minister as a means to explain a shift in 
the overall socio-political aim: At the 2004 congress of the Liberal party, the prime minister 
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distanced himself from his earlier vision of a minimal state by saying: "I have come to the 
conclusion that social cohesive force [sammenhængskraft] and only a little inequality is a 
competitive issue" "Jeg er nået til den erkendelse, at social sammenhængskraft og kun lidt 
ulighed er en konkurrenceparameter" (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Hein 2004). In his ‘state 
of the realm’ address to parliament on the 24 February 2005, the prime minister maintained 
this concept of cohesive force as a means to bridge social cleavages: "We can and we shall 
not compete on wages. ... we shall compete on knowledge, ideas and the ability to adapt ... 
We need, however, to realize that not everyone is equally well-equipped to meet the 
challenges of an ever-tougher competition. So we need to beware that our society is not 
divided into two groups; an elite capable of handling every challenge and a residual group 
in perpetual risk of unemployment and social problems. So we are facing a double task. We 
have to strengthen Denmark as a knowledge society ... and we have to make sure that all 
groups in the Danish society are brought onboard. ... I am convinced that we will be able to 
accomplish this double task so that we secure a Danish society in which there is not too 
large a social and economical inequality. I propose that we all unite around an ambitious 
strategy which can make Denmark a leading knowledge society and the most competitive 
society in the world." "Vi kan og skal ikke konkurrere på lønnen. ... vi [skal] konkurrere på 
viden. På idéer. Og på evnen til at omstille os ... Vi må imidlertid se i øjnene, at ikke alle er 
lige godt rustet til at møde udfordringerne fra den stadig stærkere konkurrence. Vi skal 
derfor være meget opmærksomme på, at vort samfund ikke bliver splittet op i to grupper 
med en elite, der kan klare det hele, og en restgruppe, der hele tiden er udsat for stor 
ledighedsrisiko og sociale problemer. Derfor står vi over for en dobbelt opgave. Vi skal 
styrke Danmark som et vidensamfund, så vi fortsat kan høre til blandt de mest velstående 
samfund i verden. Og vi skal samtidig sikre, at alle grupper i det danske samfund kommer 
med. ... jeg er overbevist om, at vi kan løse denne dobbelte opgave. Så vi sikrer et dansk 
samfund med en stærk konkurrenceevne og med en stærk sammenhængskraft. Et samfund, 
hvor der ikke er for stor social og økonomisk ulighed. Jeg vil lægge op til, at vi alle samles 
om en ambitiøs strategi, der kan gøre Danmark til et førende vidensamfund. Og til verdens 
mest konkurrencedygtige samfund." (Rasmussen, PM, lib., R1, 2005.02.24 10:15). An 
analysis dated in the spring of 2005 focusing on the reconfiguration of the ideology of the 
Liberal party and the concept of cohesive force may, hence, credibly leave integration of 
immigrants out of the account. Four months later in the final general debate before 
parliament broke for the summer, it was not only social cleavages that needed to be bridged 
to secure the cohesive force of the society; in addition, cultural cleavages needed to be 
mended. This double concept of cohesive force – as something opposed to both social and 
cultural divisions – are, however new to the prime minister, not invented from scratch. Half 
a decade earlier, then Social Democratic Minister for Social Affairs Karen Jespersen warned 
against the threat arising in the form of a new “social and cultural underclass” that was 
coming into being in the ghettos: “The strength of the Danish welfare society is that we are 
so homogenous and have a great cohesive force. ... But if there are large groups with 
entirely different values in a neighbourhood, then our society starts falling apart.” "Styrken 
ved det danske velfærdssamfund er, at vi er så homogene og har stor sammenhængskraft ... 
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a minority among the immigrants have become more religious – and ... they have 
become so in a way that may be of significance for the integration. We need to take 
this seriously... Why is it important to integration to talk about values? Because 
education and jobs are not enough. If we want to keep the cohesive force in the 
Danish society, everyone needs to know and observe the fundamental rules of the 
game. (Hvilshøj, Min. f. Int., lib., 2007)
215
 
In that way the referent-object threatened in the functionalist narrative is still welfare 
– but cultural homogeneity is (qua a necessary link in the causal chain narrated) co-
promoted as a valuable good. This allows the narrative an enhanced compatibility 
with purely culturalist narratives. The threat construction of the functionalist narrative 
is illustrated in figure 5.12. 
5.7.2 Exceptionalism: Their values as a threat to our (common) values 
The exceptionalist narrative describes how Denmark – by virtue of its history and 
culture – is uniquely disposed to act as an example to the world: The narrative equals 
a series of specifically Danish values and practices with the universally good. In that 
sense this second narrative seeks recourse to sedimented elements of Danish identity 
discourse constituting Denmark as a humanitarian example to the world (cf. chapter 
6). 
                                                                                                                                            
Men hvis der i et område bliver store grupper med helt andre værdier, så begynder vort 
samfund at falde fra hinanden" (Jespersen, Min.f. Soc.Affairs, soc.dem., in Olsen 1999). 
Soon before the Liberal prime minister re-articulated the concept of ‘cohesive force’ to 
include cultural values, Jespersen broke with the Social Democrats and developed the 
concept in a book (Jespersen & Pittelkow 2005). Before the general elections of 2007, she 
joined the Liberal party whom she shortly represented as Minister for Welfare. 
215
 "[E]t mindretal blandt indvandrerne er blevet mere religiøse, og det er på en måde, der 
kan have betydning for integrationen. Det skal vi tage alvorligt. ... Hvorfor er det vigtigt for 
integration at tale om værdier? Fordi uddannelse og job ikke er nok. Hvis vi skal bevare 
sammenhængskraften i det danske samfund, skal alle kende og overholde de grundlæggende 
spilleregler." (Hvilshøj, Min. f. Int., lib., 2007). 
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Figure 5.12 The functionalist narrative 
Value community as a precondition for welfare 
 
 
Mouritsen focuses his analysis on the possibility of Muslims’ citizenship on two 
arguments adding to Danish exceptionalism (2006:79-83). The first argument claims 
that the Lutheran version of Christianity is a precondition for differentiating between 
politics and religion - and thereby a precondition for freedom (Berg-Sørensen 2006). 
On the one hand, Christianity liberates politics from religion: "It is Christianity which 
constitutes the distinction [between politics and religion] … the preaching of Jesus 
makes it possible [for us to] discuss politics and agree or disagree about politics 
without the matter going 'sacral'." (Fergo, Min. f. Church, lib., 2003:4)
216
 On the other 
hand, Christianity liberates people from salvation becoming a political project: 
"Without gospel salvation becomes a political task. Political ideologies will reign 
freely over people’s souls." (Hornbech, lib. chair of parl. Comm. on the Church, 
                                           
216
 "Det er kristendommen, der sætter sondringen [mellem religion og politik]. ... Jesu 
forkyndelse er med til at gøre det muligt [at vi] kan diskutere politik og være enige eller 
uenige om politik uden at der går 'hellighed' i sagen." (Fergo, Min. f. Church, lib., 2003:4) 
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2001:168)F
217
 If, the story goes, Christ had not already taken care of salvation, an 
attractive – and dangerous – market would be open for political projects offering the 
prospect of salvation. 
The second argument, which Mouritsen presents, claims that democracy and equality 
in Denmark – by virtue of, i.a., the folk high schools and the co-operative movement 
– has developed into a form of life.218 On top of freedom, equality and democracy the 
same argument may be identified in relation to other central concepts (cf. chapter 9). 
The threat construction of the exceptionalist narrative is illustrated in figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.13 The exceptionalist narrative 
Integration as a means to realize universal values 
 
An especially forceful narrative is constructed when the prime minister articulates the 
exceptionalist narrative with the functionalist: 
                                           
217
 “Uden evangelium bliver frelsen en politisk opgave. De politiske ideologier får frit spil 
over sjælene.” (Hornbech, lib. chair of parl. Comm. on the Church, 2001:168). 
218
 The two arguments are tied together by, i.a., two prominent figures: Grundtvig og Hal 
Koch; by their substantial national and theological messages as well as the roles they are 
awarded in historical narratives (cf. Mouritsen 2006:80f). 
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As a small, peaceful country – where the people is homogenous and where the 
borders of language and country nearly coincide – we have very special conditions 
for influencing with our values. We have a deeply rooted democracy which is not just 
based on certain formal institutions and laws, but exists as a culture in the Danish 
population. One may introduce institutions and laws but it is of no use if there is not 
a very strong democratic culture deep in the population. ... Conversation is an 
important part, we are very consensus-orientated, and we prefer to take the views of 
minorities into account. (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, in Ib 2003:16)
219
 
The effect of this link between functionalism and exceptionalism is triple: Firstly, an 
image is developed in which Denmark is a perfectly calibrated nation state in which 
the boundaries of the state, the nation, the territory, the culture, the language and the 
religion coincide. This national self-image becomes, in the narrative promoted by the 
prime minister, a precondition for perfect freedom and democracy. Secondly, that 
perfection places on the shoulders of Denmark a special obligation to export our 
knowledge and values to the rest of the world: 
It is not a form of cultural imperialism in which our way of thinking is forced upon 
other peoples. But we do have an obligation to be on guard for freedom and human 
rights – and with that also to try to spread it to other parts of the world in which one 
does not have peace and freedom, and where the human rights are violated. To me 
                                           
219
 ”Som et lille fredeligt land, hvor folket er homogent, og lande og sproggrænser stort set 
følges ad, har vi helt særlige forudsætninger for at påvirke med vores værdier. Vi har et 
rodfæstet demokrati, der ikke kun er baseret på nogle formelle institutioner og lovgivning, 
men som er en kultur i den danske befolkning. Man kan sagtens indføre institutioner og 
love, men det nytter ikke noget, hvis der ikke er en meget stærk demokratisk kultur dybt i 
befolkningen. ... Samtalen er en væsentlig del, vi er meget konsensusorienterede og kan 
bedst lide, at der bliver taget hensyn til mindretallene” (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Ib 
2003:16). Mouritsen (2006:n.13) concentrates his analyse on the two sentenses "Vi har et 
rodfæstet demokrati..." and "Samtalen er en væsentlig del...". 
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there are certain entirely fundamental values – which one may call universal – which 
are not to be repressed. (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Ib 2003:16)
220
 
Thirdly, the way others outside Denmark does not live up to the ideal national 
package deal constitutes a threat to the universal realisation of universal values: 
But one need to be patient when it concerns the Middle East since there are a lot of 
historical, cultural and religious barriers, and it might be so that one must for a 
considerable span of time accept forms of democracy which do not in all regards 
fully live up to what we in Europe and the USA understands by this concept. (A.F. 
Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Ib 2003:16)
221
 
In the early versions of the narrative, the threat against the universal values is not 
acute. But, as we will return to, the threat appears more pertinent when linked directly 
to terror and when the terrorist is home grown. 
5.7.3 Freedom; an offer you can't refuse 
Just as the combined functionalist and exceptionalist narrative legitimizes Danish 
’systems export’, the way in which Denmark embodies universal values legitimizes 
more heavy handed integration measures at home. 
Observers of the Danish welfare state have noted a recent change in the governmental 
techniques employed. Central to the function of the welfare state is now the induction 
of a ‘duty to be free’ in its clients (Andersen 2003a:114-23). When this tendency 
                                           
220
 "Det er ikke en form for kulturimperialisme, hvor vores måde at tænke på skal påtvinges 
andre folkeslag. Men vi har en forpligtelse til at stå vagt om frihed og menneskerettigheder 
– og dermed også til at forsøge at udbrede det til andre dele af verden, hvor man ikke har 
fred og frihed, og hvor menneskerettighederne krænkes. Der er for mig nogle helt grund-
læggende værdier, som man godt kan kalde universelle, og som ikke må undertrykkes." 
(A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Ib 2003:16). 
221
 "Men man bør være tålmodig, når det gælder Mellemøsten, for der er mange historiske, 
kulturelle og religiøse barrierer, og det kan også godt være, at man i en rum tid bliver nødt 
til at acceptere former for demokrati, der ikke i alle henseender lever fuldt op til, hvad vi i 
Europa og USA forstår ved begrebet" (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Ib 2003:16). 
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meets the narratives of integration, it acquires the form of an obligation to secure the 
drittwirkung of certain human rights which the state takes upon itself: the rights of 
the individual are not – as human rights traditionally – threatened by the state but by 
others in the civil society. More specifically the state obliges itself to free Muslims 
from their culture – whether or not the individual realize that it is oppressed or not:  
We must help the individual immigrant woman to live an active life and we must 
change the opinion of both men and women for the benefit of integration... It is 
related to another worrying tendency... that is, the coming generations. Turkish and 
Pakistani descendants have not gotten closer to Danish values and norms entirely as 
it could be expected taking into account that they have grown up in Denmark. This 
shows that there is still a need for a strong integrating effort. A huge challenge is still 
ahead of us... We have long ago left the naïve belief of earlier times that everything 
will solve itself by itself. (Hvilshøj, Min. f. Int., lib,. 2007)
222
 
The government’s ’think tank’ allocates the responsibility so that, on the one hand, it 
is so  
that the aliens take responsibility themselves for becoming a part of the Danish 
society and that they accept they myst change certain of the values of the country of 
origin to be integrated (Ministeriet 2007:25)
223
 
while on the other hand 
                                           
222
 "Vi skal hjælpe den enkelte indvandrerkvinde til et aktivt liv og have ændret holdninger 
hos både mænd og kvinder til gavn for integrationen. ... Det hænger også sammen med en 
anden bekymrende tendens ... nemlig de kommende generationer. Tyrkiske og pakistanske 
efterkommere har ikke nærmet sig danske værdier og normer helt som man kunne vente, i 
forhold til at de er vokset op i Danmark. Det viser, at der fortsat er behov for en stærk 
integrationsindsats. Vi har stadig en stor udfordring foran os. ... Vi har for længst forladt 
tidligere tiders naive tro om, at det hele løser sig af sig selv." (Hvilshøj, Min. f. Int., lib,. 
2007). 
223
 "[A]t udlændinge selv tager et ansvar for at blive en del af det danske samfund, og at de 
accepterer, at de må ændre visse af oprindelseslandets værdier for at blive integrerede" 
(Ministeriet 2007:25). 
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we in Denmark – to a much greater degree than is the case today – draw the attention 
to and inform [oplyser] about Danish culture and way of living as well as about what 
norms and unwritten rules we have in Denmark. (2007:25)
224
 
It does, however, not suffice to 'draw attention' to our values; it is necessary that 
we in Denmark dare to make clear demands on the aliens that they must endorse 
fundamental values in the Danish society and that we lay down clear guidelines 
which they ... must accept. (2007:26)
225
 
For the demands to reach the target group, the street level bureaucrats of the welfare 
state must be deployed: 
Teachers, social workers and other persons in concact with aliens on a daily basis 
should ... in their daily work make direct and distinct demands on the aliens that they 
must endorse the fundamental values in Denmark. (2007:27)
226
 
While the initial integration narrative of the government was in 2001-2 that the 
welfare state with its clientification was threatening the (labour market) integration, 
six years later the conclusion is that the welfare state is the necessary countermeasure 
against the threat aimed at cultural homogeneity.
227
 The welfare state needs in one 
                                           
224
 "[V]i i Danmark, i langt højere grad, end tilfældet er i dag, gør opmærksom på, hvilke 
grundlæggende værdier det danske samfund bygger på og oplyser om dansk kultur og 
levevis, samt om, hvilke normer og uskrevne regler vi har i Danmark." (2007:25). 
225
 "[A]t vi i Danmark tør stille klare krav til udlændinge om, at de skal tilslutte sig 
grundlæggende værdier i det danske samfund, og at vi udstikker klare retningslinjer, som de 
... må acceptere." (2007:26) 
226
 "Pædagoger, lærere, sagsbehandlere og andre personer, der dagligt har kontakt med 
udlændinge, bør ... i deres arbejde stille direkte og tydelige krav til udlændinge om, at de må 
tilslutte sig de grundlæggende værdier i Danmark." (2007:27). 
227
 The Think Tank on Integration in its report suggested that clear instructions and 
guidelines were produced for the employees in individual institutions and municipalities 
(Ministeriet 2007:27). The parliamentary debate on the report, however, concluded by 
calling for "[that it is discussed locally how one is to relate to how to handle conflicts of 
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and the same move to avert the threat which Muslim culture poses to the freedom of 
each Muslim individual – and thereby against the universal realization of the 
universal value of freedom. The threat construction of the fused functionalist and 
exceptionalist narratives is illustrated in figure 5.14. 
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Figure 5.14 The fused functionalist and exceptionalist narratives 
State employed to secure Danish universal values 
 
The Danish values are offered to the Muslims as a possibility – but by being a 
possibility of universal value, it is actually ‘an offer you can’t refuse’. And like the 
Godfather, the government cannot afford not to deliver on the offer, lest Culturalism 
is to make more demands for assimilation. The employment of state power is needed 
to make migrants live up to their potential by integrating to universal values. This 
novel role for the state is stressed when the threat from the home grown terrorist must 
be averted too. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
values] lokalt drøfter hvorledes man skal forholde sig til hvordan man håndterer 
værdikonflikter" (Folketinget 2007.05.03). 
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5.8 The second threat to the peaceful society: Home grown 
In the aftermath of the bombings on the London underground on July 7, 2005, it was 
clear that the narrative on the threat from the terrorist had changed. Whereas 
September 11 prompted the need for Danish solidarity with the US, the aim of the 
terrorist has now moved to be aimed at a much closer 'we': ”In Denmark terrorism is 
a threat to society, to the values it is built upon, and to the individual citizen” 
(Espersen, Min. f. Justice, con., in Folketinget 2006.03.31) F
228
 
At the same time the narrative included new means to avert the threat. The prime 
minister still stresses the need for every “necessary means for fighting terrorists and 
terror networks” (ibid. 15:20)229 abroad and at home. But after allocating the 
responsibility for the London bombings to 'home grown' terrorists, another task is 
presented as urgent:  
We have to prevent support and recruitment for terrorism ... through an active 
integration policy at home ... We have to prevent young people from being attracted 
to the ideology of extremists (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2005.11.16 
15:15-20).
230
 
The narratives of the threat to the peaceful society is in this way explicitly merged 
with the narrative of the threats to cultural homogeneity – and the integration 
measures is definitively a part of the "broad spectrum" (Ministeriet 2008:29)F
231
 of 
measures employed to prevent terrorism. The home grown terrorist is, however, not 
                                           
228
 "I Danmark er terrorismen en trussel mod samfundet og de værdier, som det bygger på, 
og mod den enkelte borger." (Espersen, Min. f. Justice, con., in Folketinget 2006.03.31). 
229
 "[N]ødvendige instrumenter til at bekæmpe terrorister og terrornetværk" (ibid. 15:20). 
230
 "Vi skal forebygge opbakning og rekruttering til terrorisme ... gennem en aktiv 
integrationspolitik herhjemme ... Vi skal forebygge, at unge mennesker føler sig tiltrukket af 
ekstremisternes ideologi" (A.F. Rasmussen, PM, in Folketinget 2005.11.16 15:15-20; cf. 
Regeringen 2003:13). 
231
 "[B]redspektret" (Ministeriet 2008:29). 
324 
an isolated threat. To the contrary, it is part of a broader threat which now – also – 
emanates from 'home'. 
After the Cartoon Crisis following the publications in daily Jyllands-Posten of 12 
caricatures commissioned to 'scorn and ridicule' the followers of the prophet 
Muhammed, the narratives are tied together even tighter across the distinction 
between foreign and domestic politics. Employed is the concept of 'value struggle'. F
232
F 
The prime minister strikes up his opening speech in 2006 in two ways: Firstly, he ties 
9/11 and the Cartoon Crisis together as two episodes in a narrative of the fight against 
the same threat. Secondly, the freedom of expression – immediately resonating with 
the context of the Cartoon Crisis to everyone in the audience – is posed as the 
decisive front in that struggle: 
On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked four airplanes in the USA. Thousands 
of innocent human beings were killed. And ever since, the world has not been the 
same. Over the last five years it has become clear that we are in the middle of a 
global value struggle. It is not a value struggle between cultures or religions. It is a 
values struggle between sensible enlightenment and fundamentalist darkening, 
between democracy and dictatorship, between freedom and tyranny. In this struggle, 
one cannot remain neutral. We must actively support freedom and popular rule. We 
have to guard our rights and freedoms. Guard the right to choose how we want to live 
our life. Guard the freedom of expression – the most important of all rights and 
                                           
232
 The concept of 'value struggle' developed in the rhetoric of the prime minister, out of the 
concept of 'cultural struggle'. As was the case with 'cohesive force', the PM initially 
employed the concept without any articulation to 'Muslim relations': The cultural struggle 
was in his 1993 book advocating a "minimal state" envisioned as part of a struggle to free 
the citizens from the state by eradicating their "slave mentality" in relation to the "social 
state" (Rasmussen 1993). 
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freedoms. It is important that we make it clear to ourselves what type of extremist 
forces we are facing. (A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2006.10.04)
233
 
The prime minister then employs the words “The global value struggle is taking place 
in Denmark too” (A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2006.10.04)234 as a bridge 
to listing problems relating to "extremists" and "fanatical fundamentalists" in 
Denmark. Finaly, he links these problems to challenges to labour market integration 
by saying that: 
It is difficult to reach fanatical fundamentalists through better integration. But we 
may and must prevent the medieval thoughts and opinions of fundamentalism from 
having a fertile ground in Denmark. Therefore it is very crucial that the young Danes 
with an immigrant background get an education, get a job, get equal opportunity and 
a fair treatment in the Danish society. (A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 
2006.10.04)
235
 
The new counterterrorism narrative produced, hence, takes the direction illustrated in 
figure 5.15: Labour market integration should prevent fundamentalism. 
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 "Den 11. september 2001 kaprede 19 terrorister fire fly i USA. Tusindvis af uskyldige 
mennesker blev slået ihjel. Og siden har verden ikke været den samme. Gennem de sidste 
fem år er det blevet klart, at vi står midt i en global værdikamp. Det er ikke en værdikamp 
mellem kulturer eller religioner. Det er en værdikamp mellem forstandig oplysning og 
fundamentalistisk formørkelse. Mellem demokrati og diktatur. Mellem frihed og tyranni. I 
den kamp kan man ikke være neutral. Vi må aktivt støtte frihed og folkestyre. Vi skal værne 
om vore frihedsrettigheder. Om retten til selv at vælge, hvordan vi vil leve vort liv. Om 
ytringsfriheden – den vigtigste af alle frihedsrettigheder. Det er vigtigt, at vi gør os klart, 
hvilke ekstremistiske kræfter, vi står overfor." (A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 
2006.10.04). 
234
 "Den globale værdikamp foregår også i Danmark." (A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in 
Folketinget 2006.10.04). 
235
 "Det er svært at nå fanatiske fundamentalister gennem bedre integration. Men vi kan og 
skal hindre, at fundamentalismens middelalderlige tanker og holdninger får grobund i 
Danmark. Derfor er det meget afgørende, at de unge danskere med indvandrerbaggrund får 
uddannelse, får job, får lige muligheder og en fair behandling i det danske samfund." 
(A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2006.10.04). 
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Figure 5.15 Labour market integration as a means to counterterrorism 
 
5.8.1 Back to multiculturalism236 
Nevertheless the narrative presenting integration as a means to counter terrorism 
departs from a distribution of roles in which "Danish Muslims and immigrants in 
Denmark are decisive allies in the fight against terrorism."
237
 
Therefore it is decisive for the success of the narrative that these allies play the role 
which they are awarded. The ministry of Integration – in its 2008 draft "Action plan 
to prevent extremist views and radicalization among young people" – finds that 
Culturalism may be a threat to the participation of the allies:  
[Our t]hrowing suspicion on ethnic and religious groups can be utilized actively in 
the propaganda we see from the ones opposed to a plural, democratic society. For 
                                           
236
 The merging of integration policies with counter-terrorism policies – and the involved 
policies of dialogue sketched in the last subsections of this chapter – is the focus of a more 
detailed analysis in chapter 8. 
237
 "[D]anske muslimer og indvandrere i Danmark er afgørende allierede i kampen mod 
terrorisme." (A.F.Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Folketinget 2005.11.16 15:20). 
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this reason too it is important that suspicion of being part of the problem is not 
thrown on anyone able to contribute to the solution (Ministeriet 2008:13).
238
 
The result is a narrative involving elements of both inclusion of difference and two-
way dialogue - combined to resemble the very multiculturalism which was initially 
pointed out as a threat. Now inclusion and dialogue is a necessary means to avert the 
threat from radicalization. The threat construction of this narrative is illustrated in 
figure 5.16. 
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Figure 5.16 Dialogical inclusion as a means to counterterrorism 
 
5.8.2 130BBring the state back in 
The next episode of the narrative, however, involves a necessary measure of control 
and surveillance. First of all focused on the 'poorly integrated' already in focus as 
'criminal second generation immigrants'. Secondly, however, these measures are also 
focused on what appears to be 'well-integrated' Muslims: They must, on the one hand, 
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 "Mistænkeliggørelse af etniske eller religiøse grupper kan bruges aktivt i den 
propaganda, som vi ser fra dem, der er modstandere af et mangfoldigt demokratisk samfund. 
Også derfor er det vigtigt, at ingen, der kan bidrage til løsningen, mistænkeliggøres for at 
være en del af problemet." (Ministeriet 2008:13). 
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be included and engaged in dialogue. But simultaneously they are nevertheless 
potential terrorists exactly because they are Muslims. This task demands vigilance in 
the street level bureaucrats of the welfare state – but it also demands that they are 
aware of their limitations so that they may call in the necessary expertise to assist: 
To judge whether it is a case of violent radicalization or just political or religious 
interest demand such a highly specialized knowledge that it will be impossible for the 
individual [crime-prevention] worker to distinguish. (Nyidanmark 2008(2):11)
239
 
The narrative, thus, continues as the government – to avert the culturally based threat 
to the peaceful society – turns to the very multiculturalism, which was initially 
presented as a threat to Danish culture. But as multiculturalism still involves a threat, 
it is necessary to employ the very welfare state which was initially presented as a 
threat to labour market integration. 
The resulting narrative institutionalizes a set of procedures for surveillance and 
control of the limit of acceptable cultural and religious difference – the limit of who 
may be included and who may be engaged in dialogue without endangering the 
peaceful society. This threat construction involved in this final twist of the 
government integration narrative is illustrated in figure 5.17. On the background of 
this narrative, the conclusion must be that – even if the government does not 
explicitly point out Muslims as an existential threat in the sense of the Copenhagen 
School – Muslims are nevertheless implicated in a security discourse as threatening 
along the lines described by Huysmans in his analysis of EU discourse.
240
 And if they 
are not, they will – as we shall see in section 5.10 – probably implicate themselves. 
                                           
239
 "At vurdere, om der er tale om voldelig radikalisering eller blot politisk eller religiøs 
interesse, kræver en så højt specialiseret viden, at det for den enkelte medarbejder vil være 
umuligt at skelne." (Nyidanmark 2008(2):11). 
240
 A discourse which, notably, also spins itself around the government narrating it in the 
sense that it awards roles to the welfare state and to Multiculturalism almost diametrically 
opposite the one pointed out for it by the government at the point of departure. 
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Before turning to this sketching of possible identity political dynamics, section 5.9  
distils the picture of the envisioned future interaction presented to the Muslim other 
by Danish debates on integration. 
Dialogue
Exclusion
Inclusion
Funda-
mentalist 
opinions
Peaceful 
society
Employ 
state to 
control
Muslim 
difference
 
Figure 5.17 The need to control Muslim difference to allow dialogical inclusion as a 
means to counterterrorism 
 
5.9 Conclusion: 'As little culture as possible' means a lot 
So what are the contributions to radicalization of conflict from the way the 
government's concept of integration evolves in its statements and policy papers? How 
are the present and future relations presented and necessitated? 
The distance between Us and Them is nil: They are here – and Their presence 
influences Us. The influence is – if nothing is done – negative; hence the need for a 
policy of integration to change the prospect of the future. The diacritica for 
distinguishing Us from Them are double: On the one hand, basically to be in the 
target group for 'integration', you need to be of non-Danish descent. As the narratives 
evolve, it is clear that Muslims are the prime target. On the other hand, it remains 
unclear to what extent it is the aim of 'integration' to abolish the distinction between 
Us and Them. Initially when dealing with the threats against the peaceful society and 
330 
the welfare, the differences which need to disappear are the differences in crime rate 
and unemployment rate. When the threats are articulated as pertaining to culture and 
values, it is less clear what difference may survive the process of integration. 
A central rhetorical strategy employed to make the narratives meaningful is recourse 
to sedimented elements in Danish identity discourse: Denmark is implied to be an 
exemplarily peaceful society, as a pioneer welfare state, and as a culturally 
homogenous society. The necessity of integration is installed by pointing out 
oughtnotologies involving Them threatening each of these elements by not being 
integrated: the threats to welfare and to culture are primarily placed in the future 
while the threat to the peaceful society is already present (and more severely so as the 
narratives evolve). 
No matter what element of Danish identity 'integration' is meant to protect, it is 
implied that the relevance of the distinction between Us and Them will be diminished 
by successful integration – and that it should diminish by Them becoming more like 
Us (in one or more respects): The hierarchy is to Our advantage, even if the 
legitimization of the superiority of our ways vary from ontopology via functionalism 
to universalism. Their identity is presented as changeable – and Their posture towards 
Us is in the balance: if not properly integrated, they threaten our peaceful society, our 
welfare or our culture.  
The success of the process of integration – and thereby Their future posture – is, 
however, not only for Us to decide: They are awarded a critical agency in the sense 
that it is basically Their choice and responsibility to integrate or not. All We can and 
must do, is to construct the incentive structures to be most facilitating to their choice. 
In that sense, They are presented as dialogical: We may influence Their choice.
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 Whether We need to be dialogical too – and, hence, be open to Their influence – is more 
doubtful: The final twist of the narrative (promoting integration as a means to counter 
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Basically, however, the grammar of Encompassment dominates the way the future 
interaction between self and other is envisioned: We monologically communicate that 
They should become (more like) Us. 
In sum, the invitation to future interaction presented to the Muslim other by the 
evolving official integration narratives is, on the one hand, simple: We expect you to 
integrate – that is to become more like Us. On the other hand, the details of the role 
for the Muslim are everything but simple: Firstly, it is not clear when 'more like us' is 
enough. Nor is it, secondly, clear what kind of integration is the important one 
(labour market or culture). In the end, the impression may very well be that 
integration can never be successful. Firstly, We present the other with a highly 
conflictual policy for future interaction. Secondly, We in effect imply that it the other 
is probably not able to play its part. 
The final section 5.10 considers what kind of response such an invitation to future 
interaction may provoke. 
5.10 Perspectives: Counternarratives as security problems 
The third reading of the concepts of integration implied in the government narratives 
of identity and security asks in which ways the narrative may meaningfully be 
continued. On the one hand, any continuation of a narrative depends on how the ones 
awarded a role in the narrative partakes in the continuation. On the other hand, such a 
partaking must take its point of departure in exactly that: The taking up of a part, a 
role presented by the narrative – whether the taking up leads to a take-off from the 
role, to taking issues with the role, or to taking exception to the way it is described.  
                                                                                                                                            
terrorism) gestures in that direction – but as hinted at (and detailed in chapter 8) the gestures 
might be withdrawn by the implied need to keep the partner engaged in dialogue under 
surveillance. 
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As the aim of this analysis is to identify contributions to radicalization of conflict, the 
specific aim of this part of the analysis is to identify limits to which kinds of 
continuations, the narrative can handle without producing more securitizations. And 
even more pertinent: to identify security dilemmas. I.e., situations in which the 
official Danish narrative on what to do about – and do to – Muslims produces 
perspectives of the future which – all, many, some, a few – Muslims insist that they 
can only meet with a 'counter-securitization'. And where the answer to the existential 
threat posed by the official Danish narratives (according to this specific Muslim 
identity narrative) is continuing the spiral by posing a threat to the Danish narrative. 
Ghassan Hage, in an analysis of the limits to multiculturalism as a form of 
governmentality (2008) points to two mechanisms which may be relevant to the 
Danish situation. The mechanisms may, however, here set in earlier than in Hage's 
analysis, in so far as multiculturalist strategies are, when push comes to shovel, a 
rather limited feature of the Danish narratives. 
Firstly, even the most far reaching multiculturalism is not a narrative of equal 
cultures. To the contrary, it is a narrative on how to make sufficient room for the 
other culture to flourish in a way which does not make it feel threatened on what it 
finds to be decisive for its identity. The precondition for this narrative is that there is 
still a 'neutral' frame set by the majority culture (2008:498). This is the reason why 
even the most far reaching multiculturalisms presents themselves to be threatened by 
'the seriously religious Muslim' – Hage's label for those Muslims who insist on the 
space for Islam must in principle be unlimited (2008:505). And this is the reason why 
there is no big difference between old school demands for assimilation and "the new 
milder form of asserting the need for immigrants (meaning primarily Muslims) to 
adopt the 'core values' of particular nations" (Hage 2008:507). 
This mechanism has quite clearly been at work in the trouble which 'seriously 
religious' Muslims have met when engaging in party politics: Even when declaring 
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themselves willing to endorse a party platform without any substantial reservations, 
the theologically phrased discursive work they need to do, exclude them from the 
eligible (Hervik 2002; Jørgensen forthcoming). It is not possible to be simultaneously 
100% Dane and 100% Muslim. The official Danish narratives demand that one 
choose or at least prioritize between the two. 
Secondly, Hage draws attention to differences in the way various types of nationalism 
performs exclusion: Traditional, culturalist nationalism either does not welcome 
aliens at all – or openly awards them a subordinate role. Such 'non-interpellation' or 
'negative interpellation' obviously produces a sense of being marginalized from 
community; of not belonging (2008:503f).  
Present day official nationalism, however, does actually often award what appears to 
be an equal role for the alien. It may be a 'multiculturalist' role which appears 
immediately equal. Or it may be a role in a 'process of integration' which places 
equality at the end of a process of adjustment. Here, however, a problem may arise as 
the alien happily accepts and takes up his role – only to be refused: 'The role wasn't 
meant like that – it wasn't meant to be played like that or by someone like you.' 
Perhaps one more demand was added to the list adding up to 'well-integrated'. This 
type of 'mis-interpellation, writes Hage, gives rise to a sense of being marginalized 
within a community, a sense of disappointment with the community one thought one 
belonged to (2008:503f). 
That mechanism obviously appears in a Danish context – not the least because the 
roles in the Danish integration narratives shift according to the threats in need of 
aversion. The threshold for 'successful integration' is an incessantly moving target. 
And the question is whether 'successful integration' – on the terms of the narrative – 
is possible at all, when the Muslim background may produce a distinct need for 
vigilance on the part of the welfare state. Is it possible for a Muslim to escape the role 
of a potential threat?. 
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Hage, finally, describes how the two mechanisms may reinforce each other: When 
the 'well-integrated' Muslim finds that his or her way of playing the role is questioned 
– the result may be "assimilation or recognition fatigue" (2008:507). And in that 
situation, an identity as a 'seriously religious Muslim' may appear as an attractive 
alternative (2008:507f). 
If this choice is made, Danish narratives of integration have been securitizing: They 
have produced an answer which in their own continuation may best be told as a 
threat. And the threat, notably, is produced without the 'seriously religious Muslim' 
engaging him or herself in terrorism or denouncing democracy: The mere act of 
formally departing in Islam when reasoning ones way to democracy is a threat to the 
narrative.
242
 You may begin your argument for democracy in Jesus, in Jahve, or in the 
nature or dignity of Man – but not in Muhammad. Because a 'seriously religious 
Muslim' is not to be trusted. The answer to that threat may be yet another round of 
demands to be 'fully integrated' as well as the surveillance necessary to confirm the 
integration – which may instigate yet another round of dissociation. 
The way to break this destructive spiral involves attention to its existence, as  
it is precisely when faced with authoritarian forms of requirements to assimilate that 
people create protected spaces where they can express and live their cultures outside 
the authoritarian gaze demanding conformity. (Hage 2008:507). 
The pains taken to formulate an invitation to dialogue when writing the counter-
radicalization action plan (Ministeriet 2008) may be interpreted to signal such an 
attention – even if the plan did not succeed in escaping the spiral. In the same way, 
one may find reason for optimism in the answer of the new prime minister when 
pressed to engage himself in the 'value struggle':  
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 Cf. Hervik 2002; Jørgensen forthcoming; and chapter 8 of this dissertation. 
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Well, I would like those girls to take off their veil. But I would like them to do it 
themselves. Because if I should be the one doing it, two more would start wearing the 
veil in protest for every one taking it off. That is my approach. And it is not because I 
do not se the challenge that I do not want to force them. I flatter myself that it is 
actually because I do see the challenge. (L.L. Rasmussen, PM, lib,. in Krause-Kjær 
2009:268)
243
 
A few months later, however, the government decided that since  
the burqa and the niqab does not belong in the Danish society ... the government 
urges that existing rules and possibilities for actually limiting the use of the burqa 
and the niqab are fully exploited. (Regeringen 2010)
244
 
To understand this backtracking, the proceeding chapter zooms out and reads Danish 
parliamentary debates on Alien policy as not just parliamentary manoeuvrings but as 
a struggle to renegotiate the limits of Danish identity discourse. This is the 
perspective chosen for the first reading of chapter 6. 
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 '"Altså, jeg vil jo gerne have de dér piger til at tage tørklædet af. Men jeg vil gerne have 
dem til at gøre det selv. For hvis jeg gør det, vil der dagen efter være to mere, som tager 
tørklæder på i protest. Det er min indfaldsvinkel. Og det er ikke, fordi jeg ikke kan se 
udfordringen, at jeg ikke vil tvinge dem. Jeg bilder mig ind, at jeg faktisk er, fordi jeg kan se 
udfordringen" (L.L. Rasmussen, PM, lib., in Krause-Kjær 2009:268). 
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"Burqa og niqab hører ikke hjemme i det danske samfund ... regeringen [opfordrer] 
kraftigt til, at de eksisterende regler og muligheder for faktsik at begrænse brugen af burqa 
og niqab anvendes fuldt ud" (Regeringen 2010). 
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6 Explaining away international criticism of human 
rights practices: A rhetorical tight-rope secured by a 
concrete block 
The preceding chapter 5 began the analytical Part II of the dissertation by introducing 
the basic features of the Danish political landscape and by analysing what threats are 
meant to be averted by policies of integration. This chapter continues the analysis of 
Danish debates on Muslims by, firstly, introducing basic features of Danish identity 
discourse and, secondly, analysing the struggle over its re-delimitation as it is played 
out in debates on the human rights of refugees and migrants.  
6.1 Introduction: Avoiding dislocation in internal identity 
politics 
When the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Alvaro Gil-
Robles, issued a report on his visit to Denmark in 2004, the criticism of a number of 
specific elements of Danish policy towards immigrants, refugees, and ethnic 
minorities spurred much debate. At the centre of the most heated debate were a 
number of specific restrictions to family reunification introduced by the new 
parliamentarian majority after the 2001 elections as well as the (lack of) procedures 
to secure a transparent administration of the rules. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the way in which the Danish politicians have 
received this human rights based message from Europe. Or in other words: how an 
articulation of Danish identity voiced by an other in external identity politics is 
debated in internal identity politics. Contrary to chapter 5, the focus is on the variety 
of narratives promoted across the parliamentary landscape rather than on a variety of 
narratives promoted by the government at different points in time. The disagreement 
between the parties in the debate pertains to how to make sense of international 
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human rights based criticism of Danish alien policy – based on the agreement that 
Denmark is a human rights pioneer. Or rather, that it should be a human rights 
pioneer ... or, at least, a pioneer. The point of (not) formulating the agreement on 
which the debate is founded is that the agreement is crumbling: As the analysis 
shows, the debate is characterized by opposing hegemonic projects each aiming to re-
delimit Danish identity discourse. 
The chapter shows this in its first reading of the debate. The first reading asks three 
questions:  
 What are the rationales for action and responsibility discursively awarded to the 
(Danish state) self and (Muslim migrant) other?  
 What are the narratives legitimizing the framing of the HR based criticism?  
 And how is materiality articulated by the actors to install necessity in their own 
narratives and avoid necessity in the narratives of their opponents? Especially the 
distinctions delimiting the categories of politics and jurisprudence appear to be of 
crucial importance to uphold in specific ways.
245
  
The empirical material covered by the analysis reported in the next section of the 
chapter all relates to the proceedings of the Danish Parliament, Folketinget, on this 
criticism.
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 The choice of these distinctions was not made due to prior theoretical or historical 
knowledge; the distinctions were pointed out as relevant by the empirical material. 
246
 The material analysed in this chapter is listed in the references section of the chapter. The 
material consists of parliamentary debates which include references to the criticism voiced 
by the CoE Commissioner for HR in his 2004 report. Included are also the related questions 
posed by MPs to minister and the ministers’ answers and material referred to by the 
ministers in their answers. Furthermore, the newspaper articles explicitly referred to in the 
debates are included. Finally, the written reactions by Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and 
Integration Affairs, annexed to the Gil-Robles report when submitted to the Council of 
Europe Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly are included. The 
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Initially, the chapter establishes the background for the empirical analysis by 
introducing (in section 6.2) the basic contours of Danish identity discourse and (in 
section 6.3) the Alien legislation debated. Sections 6.4-6.6 presents the analysis of the 
debates: Firstly, section 6.4 lays out the human collectives constructed in the 
parliamentary debates as self and other – along with the propensities for action 
narratively awarded to them. Secondly, section 6.5 lays out the identity narratives 
promoted in the debate to get the cirticism from the European other back in place. 
Thirdly, section 6.6 charts the negotiations of the distinction between law and politics 
(which appear to be of crucial importance for the politicians to uphold) by focusing 
on the framing of the critical reports and other physical objects.  
Section 6.7 sums up the basic struggle taking place in parliament in terms of attempts 
redefine Danish identity. Section 6.8 concludes by performing a second reading of 
the debates in terms of the theoretical account of how an identity configuration may 
be structured to contribute to radicalization of conflict. Finally, section 6.9 performs 
the third reading focused on how the narratives promoted interpellate the other. 
6.2 Reading Danish identity as discourse 
In order to understand the reactions of the Danish politicians to the criticism by the 
Human Rights Commissioner, a basic picture of the Danish identity discourse which 
frames the reception is needed. Hence, this section will recollect the basic contours of 
Danish identity discourse. 
As discussed in chapter 2, the concept of ‘discourse’ employed in the dissertation 
originates with Foucault who defined a discourse as a “regularity in the dispersion of 
utterances” (1972:38). Danish identity discourse is delimited by the agreement – the 
                                                                                                                                            
parliamentary debates and questions were identified by the search engine on the web-page 
of the Danish parliament Folketinget, www.ft.dk, asking it to report any debates or 
questions including the words ‘Gil-Robles’ or ‘menneskerettighedskommissær’. 
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regularity in dispersion of utterances – that there is such a ‘thing’ as a Danish 
identity. This agreement functions as a starting point for disagreements over what 
Danish identity would more specifically be (cf. Haahr 2003:39).  
Chapter 2 also laid out how the claim that someone is identical entails that someone 
else is different; that any identity is constructed in relation to one ore more others. 
The disagreements allowed by the agreement constituting Danish identity discourse 
often take the form of debates over which others we should relate ourselves to, and 
how the relation is and ought to be. But even as the debates in this way appear as 
'foreign policy debates' they implicitly produce and reproduce notions of who we are.  
Danish identity has, over the years, had a number of different others pointed out as 
primary reference. Most prominently, the Danish nation state has been opposed to 
Sweden and Germany as competing nation states – and the Danish nation state as the 
primary point of identification has been challenged by, first, the proletarian 
internationalism embodied in the Soviet Union and, later, the European integration 
process. During the 90ies, the ‘stranger’, the ‘alien’ or the ‘immigrant’ has been 
awarded a steadily more prominent role. Today (as noted in chapters 1 and 5) the 
'Muslim' is arguably a central other in Danish identity discourse. The prominent place 
which 'Muslims' take up in Denmark's relations to its neighbours – Sweden, 
Germany, and the European Union
247
 – testifies to the importance of Muslim 
relations:  
For centuries, Denmark has competed with Sweden for the domination of the 
Scandinavian Peninsula and the Baltic Sea. Since the middle of the 19th century a 
romanticist Scandinavianism has morphed into a pragmatic cooperation between the 
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 Protests may be raised that the EU is not a 'neighbour' to Denmark since Denmark is part 
of the EU. In Danish parliamentary debates, however, this is both true and it is not true as 
two "opposing constructions of the EU, 'EU as our community' and 'EU as something 
different from the Danes', display considerable stability" (Sousa 2010:264). 
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Nordic welfare states. For the last decade, however, the most heated public debates 
across Öresund has focused on the two countries' very different approach to 
multiculturalism (Hedetoft et al. 2006; Sundström 2009).  
Denmark was historically constituted as a nation state when a series of wars with 
German states resulted in the 1864 defeat at Dybbøl and the loss of Schleswig. In 
1920, the weak German Reich agreed to a plebiscite which returned the Northern, 
primarily Danish Speaking, part of Schleswig to Denmark – and the nationalist 
Grænseforeningen [The Border Association] was formed to support the Danish 
minority 'left' in German Southern Schleswig. In 2007, this association felt the need 
to re-brand itself under the slogan "For an open Danishness" to distance itself from 
right wing chauvinism and promote Dano-German relations in the border region as 
multicultural ideal.
248
 
During the 70ies and 80ies Danish nationalism mainly oriented itself to the 
opposition against membership of the European Union. The greatest victory of the 
opponents to EU – including both right wing nationalists and left wing self 
proclaimed internationalists – was the Danish No in the 1992 referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty. The Danish and the European establishment handled the situation 
by arranging four 'opt outs' exempting Denmark from the Euro, the common defence 
policy, and from the supranational aspects of collaboration of the Justice and Home 
Affairs. Today, a broad majority of the Danish parliament would like to abolish these 
opt outs by referenda – except for one element: When negotiating the Lisbon Treaty, 
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 Cf. the political strategy of the association, available at 
http://www.graenseforeningen.dk/pdf/strategi_2007-2011.pdf; Slumstrup (2007); 
'Grænseland og integration', DR P1 Vita 2008.05.21, 
http://www.dr.dk/P1/Vita/Udsendelser/2008/05/17232531.htm; and the news section of the 
homepage of 'The Border Foundation', especially from August 2007 to June 2008, 
http://www.graenseforeningen.dk/artikel/19, all visited 2009.09.04. 
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the government made for a more narrow opt out from the JHA which would allow 
Denmark to uphold its tight immigration and asylum policies (Adler-Nissen 2008). 
So even in the politics surrounding Denmark's relations to its historically central 
others – Sweden, Germany, and the European Union – 'Muslim affairs' play a 
surprisingly central role today. Islam as a radically threatening other is, however, not 
a novel phenomenon: In the incarnation of 'the Turk' it played a decisive role in the 
narratives constituting Christendom and Europe as relevant entities in the post-
Roman era (Neumann 1999:ch.2). This character of 'the Turk' had a distinct revival in 
Denmark – inspired by German theology – during the protestant reformation 
(Jørgensen 2005:172; Lausten 2010). So there are repertoires of discourse available 
for constructing the Muslims as a threatening other – only they have not been widely 
activated for decades, perhaps centuries.  
Over the years this variety of others has been placed in contrast to a series of positive 
characteristica ascribed to Denmark. Denmark has generally been portrayed as 
populated by a homogenous and solidaristic Danish people [folket] (Haahr 2003:27f, 
Sjørslev 2007; cf. Gullestad 2002:ch.3). In Denmark, the people have built for itself a 
welfare state to nest the unfolding of the inner qualities of the nation (Hansen 
2002:51f, 60f, 69, 80ff). Thereby, the state and the nation have been conceptually 
intertwined to a degree exceeding even the European nationalist average (Hansen 
2002:60, 78; Haahr 2003:35, 37). Hence, the Danish state basically belongs to the 
Danish people – even if part of the narrative is, that the people might be let down by 
the elite (Hansen 2002:58, 60f; Haahr 2003:40).  
The Danish fusion of cultural nation and welfare state is seen as an example to the 
world (as discussed in chapter 5). Denmark is constructed as a humanitarian pioneer 
country (Browning 2007). First, the world could learn a lot from Denmark about how 
to order domestic society (Hansen 2002:76f): Denmark did not need revolutions to 
create a welfare society (cf. Hansen 2002: 60). And on the top of it all, Danes see 
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themselves as modest and hyggelige [cosy] people (Dencik 2006) with a enlightened, 
tolerant attitude to difference (Enoch 1994). Second, Denmark is – trailing perhaps 
only her Nordic brethren (cf. Hansen 2002:68) – in front when it comes to working 
actively to make the rest of the world an equally nice place. As an observer of the 
process establishing Danish development aid put it: ”the national welfare state [must 
be] projected out on the international level” (Henning Friis quoted by Kaur-Pedersen 
2008:74).
249
 Danes are in the absolute top of the global per capita development aid 
donor list (Bach 2008). Denmark has a long tradition of contributing to UN peace 
keeping. And Denmark actively promotes democracy and human rights (Hansen 
2002:59).  
On the one hand, this series of characteristica has been 'packaged' by various 
narratives to form a holistic picture of Denmark (as exemplified in chapter 5). On the 
other hand, the list of characteristica constitutes – when the package is opened – a 
repertoire of discursive resources which may be re-articulated in new narratives. As 
part of such re-articulations, some elements are awarded more prominent places than 
others – and some may be excluded altogether.  
The self-understanding of Denmark as tolerant at home and benevolent abroad has in 
recent years repeatedly been challenged (Nielsen 2004; Lawler 2007). One of the 
significant early instances was the criticism by the Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights in relation to the Danish policies on immigrants, refugees, and 
ethnic minorities. This chapter analyses the struggle over what elements to prioritize 
and what elements to exclude when rearticulating narratives to make sense of the 
criticism.  
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 ”[D]en nationale velfærdsstat [må] projiceres ud på det internationale plan” (Kaur-
Pedersen 2008:74). 
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6.3 Danish Alien Policy: Concentric fortifications 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the parliamentary debates, this section 
introduces the specific context of the Human Rights based criticism; i.e. the Danish 
Alien legislation as it has been reformed by the new centre-right government after 
2001. 
Basically, there are three ways to get to live in Denmark: You may come to work, 
you may be granted asylum, or you may be granted family reunification with a 
spouse (or a parent) already living in Denmark. In all three cases, the first residence 
permit will be temporary. Later, you may qualify for a permanent residence permit 
and even later for citizenship. The rules in effect constitute concentric fortifications 
around the geographical territory of the Danish nation state and its social and legal 
community. The fortifications, however, include both palisade sections especially 
difficult to force, drawbridges, and gates wide open. Which part of the fortification 
meets you depend, firstly, on whether you seek work, asylum, or family reunification; 
secondly, on your country of origin. The intention of this section is to give the reader 
a feeling for how Aliens are welcomed should they want to live in Denmark. The 
focus is especially on where the fortifications are erected to be specifically tall. The 
message of the section is the thrust of the regulations as such rather than the 
individual detail.
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If your country of origin is Nordic, you are free to enter and stay. If your country of 
origin is in the EU
251
 you may work and reside in Denmark under the EU regulations 
on free movement. If you are from outside the Nordic countries and the EU and you 
seek work, your chances first depend on whether your skills are needed on the Danish 
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 The description in this section summarizes the rules as they are welcoming the foreigner 
on the official home page of the Ministry for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 
Nyidanmark.dk, visited 2009.09.03. 
251
 Plus Switzerland and Liechtenstein. 
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job market – the need, notably, being so urgent that your profession is currently 
experiencing a shortage of qualified professionals or the job you are offered has a 
gross annual pay of no less than appx. 50.000 €. 
If you want to seek asylum the first fortification you meet is that it can only be made 
by a person physically present in Denmark.
252
 Which means that you need to get into 
the country before you can apply for asylum. Currently, only two primarily Muslim 
countries are included in the list of countries whose citizens may enter Denmark 
without a visa: Malaysia and the tiny oil sultanate Brunei. The list of 'visa countries' 
is divided in three: the 'tourist group', the 'immigration group', and the 'asylum group'. 
Currently, a dozen Muslim countries are in the tourist group – most of them Arabic 
oil states or post-Soviet countries in Central Asia. Citizens from these countries are 
eligible for visas for tourist-related visits without invitation or economic guarantee. 
Another dozen Muslim countries are in the 'immigration group' – including Turkey, 
Lebanon, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Citizens from these countries may be asked for an 
economic guarantee of appx. 8.000 € to make sure that they leave Denmark again. 
And most citizens from most of these countries are normally only let in if they have a 
personal or familial relation in Denmark.  
The 'asylum group' consists only of primarily Muslim countries – and as the name of 
the group suggests, it includes the countries presently 'producing refugees': 
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Kosovo, Pakistan, Somalia, stateless Palestinians. Citizens 
from these countries are generally only granted visas if they are spouses, children 
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 A separate annual quota of 500 residence permits is allotted to UN refugees, i.a., 
according to the refugee's "chances of settling in Denmark and benefiting from a residence 
permit. This involves looking at such factors as language skills, educational background, 
work experience, familial situation, network, age, and motivation" (Nyidanmark.dk, 
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/coming_to_dk/asylum/quota_refugees.htm, accessed 21 
December 2009). Criticism has been voiced that this criterion of 'potential for integration' is 
being used do disqualify Muslims from getting quota status (Fogedby 2008). 
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under the age of 18 or parents of someone with a residence permit. Iraqi and Somali 
citizens will normally only be granted a visa if a family member in Denmark has died 
or suffers from a life-threatening illness. 
If you get a visa – or if you somehow find a way to Denmark without a visa – you 
may apply for asylum. If, however, you have been in contact with authorities in 
another EU country, you will – according to the procedures of the Dublin Treaty – be 
returned to this country and have your application processed there.
253
 If your 
application is processed in Denmark, two procedures may be followed: If your 
application is considered 'manifestly unfounded' by the Immigration Service, you 
may only contest the decision with the support of the Danish Refugee Council (an 
NGO).
254
 If your application is not immediately found manifestly unfounded, it is 
processed by the 'normal procedure' based on a factual and individual assessment of 
the statement provided by the asylum seeker as well as general information about 
conditions in the country of origin. If the application is rejected by the Immigration 
Services, the Refugee Appeals Board will make the final ruling; appeals to the courts 
are not possible. Finally, if you are not eligible for asylum you may be granted 
temporary residence on humanitarian grounds by the Ministry, if you suffer from a 
serious physical or psychological illness for which the necessary treatment cannot be 
obtained in your country of origin, or – under certain conditions – if you are part of a 
family with young children who come from a nation at war.  
The final way to enter Denmark is by marrying. If you – as a Danish citizen – marry a 
non-European foreigner, your partner may be granted family reunion provided that 
you and your partner fulfil certain conditions: There must be no doubt that you have 
                                           
253
 Other 'safe third countries' to which you may be returned include the US, Canada, and 
Switzerland. 
254
 Furthermore, there is an oral, 'expedited version of the manifestly unfounded procedure' 
applicable to asylum seekers from countries where persecution is deemed highly unlikely. 
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entered into your marriage voluntarily. You must both be over the age of 24. Your 
combined attachment to Denmark must be greater than your combined attachment to 
any other country (– unless you have held Danish citizenship for 28 years or resided 
legally in Denmark for more than 28 years beginning in early childhood). You must 
have accommodation of adequate size at your disposal – which means, firstly, that 
you need to own it yourself or if you rent your accommodation, the period must 
extend at least three years on; and secondly, that each person sharing the residence 
must have half a room and 20 sq. metres at disposal. You may not have received 
social security benefits within the last 12 months, and you must post a bank-backed 
collateral of appx. 8.000 € to cover any social security paid to the spouse within the 
first seven years of legal residence. Furthermore you may not have been convicted of 
violent acts against a former spouse or partner within the last 10 years. 
After seven years of legal residence, you may be granted a permanent residence 
permit – provided that you have completed the introduction programme as dictated 
by the Integration Act; that you have passed the integration test; that you have held a 
full-time job for 2,5 years; that you have passed a Danish language test suited for 
people with a limited educational background; that you have not been sentenced to 
two or more years in prison for i.a. drug offenses, trafficking, murder, assault or rape; 
that you do not have any overdue public debt; and that you have signed the 
integration contract and a declaration about your commitment to integration and 
active integration in Danish society. 
When you have had residence in Denmark for a continuous period of a least 9 years 
you may apply for Danish citizenship – provided that you still live up to the demands 
listed above; sign a declaration in which you swear allegiance and loyalty to 
Denmark and the Danish society and declare your willingness to observe Danish 
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legislation and respect fundamental Danish principles of law;
255
 report all criminal 
offences (including "regardless of the amount, an old fine for shoplifting or a 
speeding fine") committed in Denmark or abroad; renounce your present nationality; 
have not been sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months or more (– shorter sentences 
only delays the procedure); have not received any social security within the last year 
at all and only for six months within the last five years; have passed a Danish 
language test suited for people with a high school education or equivalent graded "D" 
or better; passed a multiple choice citizenship test to prove your knowledge of the 
Danish society and of Danish culture and history.
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This listing completes the background presentation of the way non-European aliens 
who wants to live in Denmark are welcomed. The debates analysed in this chapter 
focus on only a tiny corner of this greeting; the parts debated in the aftermath of the 
CoE Commissioner for Human Rights criticising Danish Alien legislation.
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 More on this in chapter 7. 
256
 This criterion has been tightened in consecutive rounds since 2001, bringing the number 
of naturalizations below 1000 per year. After the latest agreement to further tighten the 
regulation – to be implemented in 2010 – the speaker on naturalization for the DPP no 
longer sees the need for further tightening (Krarup in DR 2010). 
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 The parliamentary debates analysed in this chapter dealt with the criticism raised by the 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights. The debate on the L78 revision of 
Aliens Act focused, firstly, on two specific points raised which the government chose to 
follow while noting their inconsequentiality (Ministry of Integration etc. 2004.11.26, 
Proposal L78 pp. 10, 25, 29; cf. Nørby, F9, 2005.04.29 11.15): a) a tiny modification of the 
procedures for appointing the Refugee Appeals Board, and b) the inclusion in the very text 
of the law of a number of specific exclusions – already practiced – from a general refusal of 
family reunification, needed to ensure the right to family life. Secondly, also included in the 
L78 and, hence, in the debate were a number of proposals not related to the criticism raised 
but (contrarily) meant to further limit the access to Denmark. These proposals most 
prominently included a) a prolonged waiting period for permanent residence permit and 
citizenship for persons having worked illegally; b) a modification of the motivational 
measures aimed at refused asylum seekers resisting repatriation; and c) the introduction of a 
right for the authorities to make enquiries about the health situation of persons seeking 
residence permit on humanitarian grounds without the consent of the person in question. 
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6.4 Human collectives-in-relation: rationales for action and 
responsibility 
This section outlines the way the relation between the Danish self and the 'alien' other 
is constructed in the debates. The focus is, firstly, on the types of agency ascribed to 
the other, and, secondly, on what responsibilities the construction of the aliens put on 
the shoulders of the representatives of the Danish state.
258
 
The ‘aliens’ are discursively equipped with a very simple basic rationale for agency: 
The most important impulse of these aliens seems to be their wish, firstly, to get their 
foot inside and, secondly, to stay inside Denmark (MP Simonsen, lib.; MP Krarup, 
DPP, L78, 2005.03.04 12.20; 12.30).
259
 This impulse to stay in Denmark explains the 
importance of the motivational measures aimed at making refused asylum seekers 
stop resisting repatriation (MP Simonsen, lib.; MP Kjær, con., L78, 2005.03.04 
12.20; 12.35). As “[i]t is their choice” to resist repatriation (Min.f. Integration 
                                                                                                                                            
The F9 debate was specifically focused on the human rights based criticism. Apart from the 
criticism as such and the reactions to it by the government, the debate focused on specific 
points made by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights concerning; a) the 
restrictions on family reunification of spouses in marriages where one of the parties has not 
reached the age of 24 introduced to protect young people against forced and arranged 
marriages; b) the restrictions on family reunification of children aged 15 to 17 introduced to 
protect them from being sent on re-education journeys to their home country; c) the alleged 
discrimination in family reunification matters due to ethnic background (since 28 years of 
citizenship or comparable affiliation with Denmark is required) or due to property (since a 
financial guarantee of 50.000 DKK is required); and d) the lack of transparency in the 
administration of the rules for family reunification due to the lack of public annual reports. 
258
 Initially, the focus will be on the dominant discursive construction of the ‘strange’ other; 
voiced opposition to this construction will be noted in the footnotes.  
259
 This construction casts a reflection back on the Danish Self which, hence, appears to be a 
most attractive place to be. A challenge to this image is articulated when the image of 
Denmark as a pioneer welfare state is said to be ruined by the present alien policy – a ruin 
claimed to dissuade immigrants, especially the most well educated ones, from wanting to go 
to Denmark (MP Gerner, soc.lib., F32, 2006.03.28 19.35). 
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Hvilshøj, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 13.00)
260
 the Danish authorities need to modify the 
incentive structures.
261
 
Those aliens who are allowed to stay in the country are said to have a “potential for 
integration”, but do not necessarily seem to have the impulse to realise the potential 
by themselves; hence, the need for the Danish authorities – on behalf of Denmark – 
to discipline the alien to do so (MP Simonsen, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 12.15).
262
 
On the background of these two propensities for action in the other – the urge to enter 
and stay, and the lack of urge to realize the potential for integration – the Danish 
authorities present for themselves two responsibilities. Firstly, the responsibility to 
limit the influx of aliens. And, secondly, the responsibility to discipline the aliens 
who are anyhow allowed to stay in Denmark to realize their potential for integration. 
Furthermore, one more responsibility rest on the shoulders of the Danish authorities 
in relation to aliens: They should protect children and youngsters against their alien 
parents in relation to a number of practices: 
 The authorities have a responsibility to secure that the children of refused asylum 
seekers are not abused by their parents: “It would undermine the system [of 
                                           
260
 "Det er deres valg." (Min.f.Integration Hvilshøj, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 13.00). This is 
challenged on the grounds that it is an “unfair” "ikke rimelig" treatment – at least for some – 
since they are actually not able to go to their country of origin (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., 
L78, 2005.03.04 12.45). 
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 The impulse to stay in Denmark in parallel explains the importance of the introduction of 
a right for the authorities to make enquiries about the health situation of persons seeking 
residence permit on humanitarian grounds without the consent of the person in question 
(MP Simonsen, lib.; MP Krarup, DPP; Min. Hvilshøj, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 12.20; 12.30; 
12.55). This, however, is said to constitute an infringement of her/his most intimate personal 
space (MP Klint, soc.dem., L78 12.25; 2005.03.04 12.40); while at the same time risk 
worsen the relations between doctor and patient (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., L78, 2005.03.04 
12.45). On the contrary, it is claimed, the “point of departure must be that an applicant who 
wish to have his/her application considered wish to contribute to the illumination of the 
case” (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., L78, 2005.03.04 12.45). 
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 What 'integration' means in Danish debates is the focus for chapter 5 of the dissertation. 
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repatriation] if parents with children can just say that, well, they don’t care. ... 
[T]he parents should consider what kind of situation they are putting their children 
in" (Min Hvilshøj, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 13.05).
263
 The point is that as the children 
cannot be forced to leave, and as the children are protected by a right to family life 
and my, neither can their parents be forced to leave.
264
 
 The authorities have a responsibility to protect youngsters from being sent back to 
their country of origin (or, in some cases; their parents’ country of origin) on “re-
education journeys” when their parents perceive them to be in danger of being 
ruined by Danish culture (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration 
Affairs 2004:26). 
 The authorities have a responsibility to protect youngsters from being entered into 
‘forced, quasi-forced and arranged marriages’ with persons from their (parents’) 
country of origin (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 
2004:26; MP Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 10.25). 
The invocation of the two last practices in the government’s narrative of the necessity 
of a bill frames the explicitly alien other as implicitly Muslim. This hints at the self 
image of Denmark as a homogenous nation state with a single national culture (cf. 
section 6.2 and chapter 5) as the main reference for the need to limit the influx. 
To sum up: The aliens are endowed with the basic impulse to get inside Denmark and 
stay there, if possible – and they are endowed with cultural traits revealing its 
implicitly Muslim character. The basic responsibilities of the Danish state authorities 
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 "[D]et vil undergrave [repatrierings]systemet, hvis forældre, der har børn, bare kan sige, 
at så kan de jo bare være ligeglade ... forældrene skal overveje, hvad det er for en situation, 
de sætter deres børn i.. " (Min Hvilshøj, lib., L78, 2005.03.04 13.05; cf. MP Simonsen, lib., 
L78, 2005.03.04 12.20).  
264
 The responsibility of the state may alternatively be constructed as concerning more 
directly the wellbeing of the children (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., L78, 2005.03.04 13.00). 
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seem to be to limit the influx of aliens, to discipline the ones that are let in to 
integrate, and to protect their children from their parents. 
6.5 Narratives: disagreements within Danish identity 
discourse 
Within the limits of Danish identity discourse – i.e. the agreement, that there is such a 
thing as a Danish identity, and that it is structured roughly to include the elements 
sketched in section 6.2 – a number of competing positions are disagreeing over how 
Danish identity should more specifically be configured. The disagreements may be 
observed by focusing on small policy narratives describing how Denmark is in its 
relation to the alien other and to other others. Most notable in the debates analysed is 
- apart from the alien other – a European, humanitarian other.  
These statements about what Denmark is may be analyzed as policy narratives. The 
reason is that the statements often implicitly involve causalities based in the past and 
they involve choices between futures: They imply what Denmark should be and why. 
The most significant struggle in these debates circles around the compatibility of two 
narratives; a narrative of international norm abidance and a narrative of limiting the 
influx of aliens. A third narrative of humanitarianism and a fourth narrative of 
national sovereignty are played out, and held back respectively to support each of the 
two most significant narratives – while at the same time threatening to undermine 
them. 
The narrative of international norm abidance has as its core policy that it is important 
for Denmark to abide by international norms, especially when inscribed in 
international conventions which Denmark has signed. In all instances, it seems that 
the interventions seek to articulate this narrative to the self image of Denmark as a 
pioneer country (cf. section 6.2). Sometimes the narrative explicitly continues to lay 
out the alternative 'oughtnotologies' which are to be prevented. It may continue to 
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claim that Danish norm abidance is a prerequisite to the promotion of human rights 
norms abroad (MP Gerner, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.00). It may go on to argue that 
norm abidance is important since contravention may damage the image of Denmark 
abroad (MP Gerner, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.00; 9.10). Or it may be weaved into 
the narrative of humanitarianism described below (MP Gerner, soc.lib., F9, 
2005.04.29 9.10). But mostly the narrative is a dead end; it does not refer explicitly to 
anything beyond the need to abide by international norms: No reasons are mentioned 
(MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.50). Either because the reason is to be 
understood implicitly or because norm abidance has become an end to itself. When 
the specific wording of an intervention by one of the government party 
representatives occasionally seems to leave the necessity of international norm 
abidance in doubt (MP Simonsen; lib.; MP Kirk, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.50; 12.40) 
s/he is quickly called back in line by an opponent (MP Lidegaard; soc.lib.; MP 
Østergard, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 10.05; 12.40). 
The narrative of limiting the influx of aliens has as its core a policy of distinguishing: 
It says that it is important to secure that fewer aliens make their way across the 
borders; be they asylum seekers, refugees, immigrants or reunified family members – 
and that aliens who might have made it across the boarder should, if no compelling 
reason arises to the contrary, be returned (MP Simonsen; lib.; MP Meldgaard, 
soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 9.50; 10.25). The narrative regularly depart from the 
proposition that limiting the influx is necessary to allow for the integration of the 
aliens already present in Denmark (MP Meldgaard, soc.dem.; MP Kjær, con., F9, 
2005.04.29 10.25; 11.50) – but this preamble is most often left implicit (i.a. MP 
Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.25). 
In general the speakers representing the parties in government (the conservatives and 
the liberals) as well as the social democrats struggle to insist that the two main 
narratives are compatible; that Denmark may limit the influx of aliens (in the texts 
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analysed mainly by limiting the right to family reunification) and at the same time 
abide by international conventions on human rights (MP Simonsen, lib.; MP 
Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 10.05; 10.25). 
The speakers representing the social liberals – and less prominently, the speakers 
representing the two left wing parties – challenge the compatibility of these two 
narratives: They claim that it is not possible to limit the influx and abide by 
international norms at the same time. One of the discursive resources for challenging 
the compatibility is the material objects of the papers embodying the criticisms 
articulated by the various human rights institutions (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., F9, 
2005.04.29 11.55). The chapter will, in the section below, return to the question of 
how this challenge is handled by the government and the social democrats. 
Another cue for challenging the compatibility (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., F9, 
2005.04.29 11.20) is the fact that the speakers representing the Danish People’s Party 
also support the compatibility between the two narratives – even if they at the same 
time voice a narrative of national sovereignty (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 
11.20; 11.40). The narrative of national sovereignty explicitly challenges the 
narrative of norm abidance by insisting that nothing should be above the Danish 
people, the Danish parliament and the Danish government (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 
2005.04.29 11.20; 11.40). The story basically goes that 'True democracy [folkestyre] 
should not be limited by anything not rooted in the solid reality of the people; if 
needed, Denmark should quit the international human rights conventions' (MP 
Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.25; 11.40). 
To support the norm abidance narrative, both the social liberal and the left wing 
speakers voice concern that the present conditions for immigrants, refugees, and 
ethnic minorities are inhumane (MP Gade, soc.; MP Arbo-Bæhr, UL, F9, 2005.04.29 
10.20; 11.05). The story is that 'Denmark is a humanitarian country; therefore we 
should treat aliens humanely – and the need to limit the influx does not trump this'. 
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Occasionally a social democrat joins in this narrative of humanitarianism (MP 
Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 10.30). More often than not the social democrat 
in question is teased by a speaker for a government party or Danish People’s Party 
with reference to the priority of the narrative of limiting the influx (i.a. MP Skaarup, 
DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 10.50). When seldom applied to a social liberal or a left wing 
speaker this disciplining manoeuvre has an altogether different ring to it; on these 
occasions less seems to be at stake since the speaker at the receiving end of the 
disciplining has already positioned her/himself outside the agreement that a limitation 
of the influx of aliens is of paramount importance (MP Simonsen, lib.; MP Gerner, 
soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.25). The social democrats, it seems, have placed 
themselves in a conspicuously constrained position by trying to combine not only the 
narratives of international norm abidance and limiting the influx of aliens, but also 
the narrative of humanitarianism (MP Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 10.25). 
The government party speakers appear less vulnerable to attacks departing from the 
narrative of humanitarianism (MP Østergaard, soc.lib.; MP Kjær, con., F9, 
2005.04.29 11.55). 
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To sum up: The speakers for the government parties and – even more fragilely; the 
social democrats – struggle to keep the narratives of international norm abidance and 
of limiting the influx of aliens compatible. The right wing speakers agree, but their 
back up is perceived as ambiguous as they frequently supplement the narrative of 
international norm abidance with a narrative of national sovereignty. The social 
liberal and left wing speakers attack the compatibility of limiting the influx and 
international norm abidance. Among other tools applied in the attacks is a narrative 
of humanitarianism for which the social democrats seem to have a weakness. The 
identity political landscape of the debates is summarized in figure 6.1. Section 6.6 
analyzes how framing through negotiation of distinctions and categories is one of the 
strategies used in the battle over, whether the narratives are compatible or not. 
6.6 Framing to avoid dislocation 
The speakers for the government parties and the social democrats work to uphold the 
compatibility of the narratives of international norm abidance and of limiting the 
influx of aliens. Enter a report from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights and subsequently a report from The Danish Institute for Human Rights. Both 
paper piles include written texts questioning exactly the compatibility of international 
human rights norms and the effort to limit the influx of aliens to Danish territory, at 
least in the legal form currently promoted by these parties. These reports appear in 
the debate as physical things that need to be either explained away or at least framed 
in such a way that they do not dislocate either of the narratives or their compatibility. 
This subsection analyzes the discursive battle of framing these reports and other 
potentially dislocating items. 
The main item which needs to be framed in the debates is the criticism endowed with 
the materiality of writing by various human rights institutions and jurists. The 
framing of this criticism takes up a prominent place in the discursive struggles. More 
specifically, this part of the struggle aims at controlling the limits of the category 
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‘politics’ and certain categories bordering hereon. The limits of these categories are 
not given. 
The central categories in play in this battle of framing are, on the one side, ‘politics’ 
[politik], and on the other, a series of different concepts opposed to 'politics': 
‘jurisprudence’ [jura], ‘civil service [embedsværket/embedsmændene/de ministerielle 
jurister]’, and ‘neutral expertise’.265 The relevant basic distinction constructed is 
between politics as subjective and jurisprudence as objective.
266
 No one, however, 
seems to be willing to defend the existence of jurisprudence totally cleared of 
subjectivity, i.e. politics (MP Gerner, soc.lib.; MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 9.30; 
11.30; 11.40). Just as the use of the label ‘populism’ as an invective indicates that 
some minimal measure of objectivity, however defined, is needed in politics (MP 
Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 10.20). Nevertheless, the framing of positions and 
papers as either (subjective) political points of view or (objective) legal reasoning is 
decisive.  
Two actually existing and one hypothetical pile of paper were framed in the debate:  
 The criticisms included in the reports of the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights and the Danish Institute for Human Rights were for all practical 
purposes discursively placed in the same pile.  
 The other pile consisted of a memo written by civil servants (in the Ministry of 
Refugees, Immigrants and Integration, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of 
                                           
265
 More categories are employed – but the ones mentioned seem to be the pivotal. The right 
wing and the social liberals/left wing respectively are much more at liberty than the 
government parties or the social democrats to attack the constructions of these distinctions. 
Hence their liberal use of categories like ‘propaganda’ (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 
9.30), ‘political culture’ (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., F9, 12.30), and ‘(dis)honesty 
[(u)hæderlighed]’ (MP Gade, soc.; MP Langballe, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 12.40; 12.45).  
266
 Cf. Andersen (2000:71f) on the need for politics – and for the civil service – to delimit 
themselves reflectively from each other. 
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Foreign Affairs) to counter the criticism and a series of related answers from the 
ministers to parliament committees.  
 A third pile of paper was – if the motion proposed were carried by parliament – to 
be produced by a panel of “independent experts” examining the criticisms raised 
by the human rights institutions. 
The most unambiguously clear framing of the reports by the human rights institutions 
were made by a speaker for Danish People’s party. His main intervention in the 
debate deserves to be quoted at some length:  
[The foundations for the 1983 Aliens Act was] poor jurisprudence originating in 
idealist abstraction and unearthly idealism… The foundation for the criticism of the 
present alien policies is jurisprudence of an equally poor and equally 
politically/ideologically character. This includes first and foremost the criticism by 
the [Danish] Institute for Human Rights... Gil-Robles relates in the same way. He too 
belongs in a political/ideological context. (MP Krarup,, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 
11.15)
267
 
Hence, to the speaker the criticism is political. 
The opposite framing – that the criticism should be taken as jurisprudence, if not 
objective then at least neutral – is rarely taken up with a comparable enthusiasm.268 
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 "[Udlændingeloven af 1983 var] dårlig jura udsprunget af idealistisk abstraktion og 
overjordisk idealisme ...[G]rundlaget for den kritik af den nuværende udlændingepolitik, 
som forespørgslen bygger på, er jura af en lige så ringe og lige så politisk ideologisk 
karakter som Hans Gammeltoft-Hansens fra 1983. Det er først og fremmest kritikken fra 
[det danske] Institut for Menneskerettigheder, og det er i sammenhæng hermed 
menneskerettighedskommissær Gil-Robles' kritik.... På samme måde forholder det sig med 
Gil-Robles. Også han hører hjemme i en politisk ideologisk sammenhæng." (MP Krarup, 
DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.15; cf. 10.50). The background for the force with which the 
message is conveyed will be clear when the chapter lets the quote proceed in the section 
below. 
268
 In one instance, the Danish Institute for Human Rights is named “independent” 
"uafhængige" (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 12.20). Contrarily, the social 
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Within the discursive settings analyzed it is hardly possible meaningfully to insist 
that the criticism raised by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
and the Danish Institute for Human Rights is based only on legal reasoning and not 
reflecting a political standpoint.
269
 
The second pile of paper had on top of it a memo written by the government lawyers 
to counter the criticism by the human rights institutions. The authors of the memo 
were described by a speaker for the Danish People’s Party as “conscientious and 
meticulous”, if not objective (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.30; 11.40).270 The 
opposing social liberal, social democrat and left wing speakers refrained from 
                                                                                                                                            
democrats’ speaker does not find the director of the Danish Institute for Human Rights 
suited to a seat on the panel of independent experts since “he is a party to this case” "han er 
parthaver i denne sag" (MP Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 11.00).  
269
 This tendency to waiving the invitation to label the Human Rights institutions 
independent or neutral might be due to the specific discursive setting of the debate: The 
social liberals and the left wing had teamed up with the social democrats to make a motion 
for a parliamentary decision. The platform on which the parties could meet only included 
the need to have an independent expert panel examine whether the criticism voiced by the 
human rights institutions did actually point to concrete instances of Denmark breaking the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Hence an explicit insistence on the impartiality 
and neutrality (let alone objectivity) of the criticising bodies might threaten the fragile 
cohesion of the opposition alliance. Either way the conclusion is the same: in the specific 
discursive situation it is near to impossible to successfully insist that these human rights 
institutions present ‘pure’ jurisprudence rather than (just) a political standpoint. The 
background for this discursive de-legitimization of the human rights institutions falls 
without the scope of this analysis. It could very well be the result of the debacle following 
the attempt by Danish People’s Party to have the then Human Rights Centre closed in the 
wake of the 2001 elections. In stead the Human Rights Centre re-emerged as the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights within the organizational framework of a newly formed Danish 
Centre for International Studies and Human Rights. 
270
 "[S]amvittighedsfuldt og redeligt" (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.30; 11.40; cf. 
MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.25). The adjectives chosen leaves the interpretation 
open to the listener if the qualities of the civil servants in question – conscientious and 
meticulous – are directed towards the law as such or towards the task given by the people to 
the present parliamentarian majority and the government to limit the influx of aliens. 
Which, though, for the moment has similar consequences. 
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explicitly challenging the quality of the memo. In stead they argued for ‘lifting from 
the shoulders of the civil servants the burden of being the impartial judges on the 
work they have themselves done on behalf of the government’ (MP Gerner, soc.lib.; 
MP Meldgaard, soc.dem., F9, 2005.04.29 9.25; 9.45; 11.05). Hence, the opposition 
argued, there is a need for a third pile of paper produced by a panel of independent 
experts (MP Gerner, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.25). 
The speakers for the government parties walk a rhetorical tightrope when framing the 
piles of paper in a way which allow them to insist on compatibility: The narrative of 
international norm abidance implies that Denmark needs to take the criticism 
seriously, because Denmark has agreed in the Council of Europe to the workings of 
the Commissioner of Human Rights, and at the UN General Assembly to the Paris 
Principles and thereby to have an independent human rights body (cf. MP Meldgaard, 
soc.dem.; MP Kjær, con., F9, 2005.04.29 10.25; 11.50). So this is exactly what is 
said:  
We have – every time – looked at the criticism presented. The lawyers in the 
Ministries of Integration and Justice have gone through the criticism, so we look at it 
every single time, so we are sure that we abide by the international conventions. 
(Min. Hvilshøj,, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 13.10)
271
 
The criticism of the human rights institutions is fine jurisprudence – we’ve taken it 
seriously by looking through it – and the jurisprudence of the civil service is fine as 
well. What remains is politics: 
The final assessment is a political question. … The assessment of when a rule 
expresses a fair weighing of means and ends is primarily a matter for the legislators, 
                                           
271
 "Vi har hver gang forholdt os til den kritik, der har været. Juristerne i 
Integrationsministeriet og Justitsministeriet har gennemgået kritikken, så den forholder vi os 
til hver evige eneste gang, så vi er sikre på, at vi overholder de internationale konventioner." 
(Min. Hvilshøj,, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 13.10) 
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and the government finds the weighing of means and ends in the alien policy to be 
fair. (Min. Hvilshøj lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.10)
272
 
This assurance is materially backed up by a majority in parliament waiting to vote to 
reject the decision proposed by the opposition.
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What is left to do for the opposition speakers is to try to introduce other physical 
items for the majority speakers to explain away. Firstly, opposition speakers 
complain that the government actively works to avoid having similar papers from 
human rights institutions, not least the European Court of Human Rights, 
materializing – not by generally deciding family reunification cases in accordance 
with the conventions but by adjusting the decision in specific cases taken up by the 
European Court of Human Rights to avoid a 'guilty' verdict (MP Østergaard, soc.lib., 
F9, 2005.04.29 12.40) and by refusing to make public an annual report on the cases 
decided (MP Gade, soc.; MP Østergaard, soc.lib.; MP Arbo-Bæhr, UL, F9, 
2005.04.29 12.40; 12.50). 
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 "Den endelige vurdering er et politisk spørgsmål... Vurderingen af, hvornår en regel er 
udtryk for et rimeligt forhold mellem mål og midler, er i første omgang et anliggende for 
lovgivningsmagten, og regeringen mener, at der er et rimeligt forhold mellem mål og midler 
i udlændingepolitikken." (Min. Hvilshøj,, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.10) Support for this position 
– that the rest is politics – is sought by recourse to the last part of a quote from the 
responsible head of department at the Institute for Human Rights: “We see ourselves as the 
independent instance and we have already done an independent inquiry. It is a political 
question [whether there should be a panel of independent experts].” "Vi opfatter os selv som 
den uvildige instans, og vi har allerede lavet en uafhængig undersøgelse. Det er et politisk 
spørgsmål" (Birgitte Kofod Olsen quoted by MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.25; cf. 
Min. Hvilshøj, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 9.10) 
273
 This show of power is directly challenged by a social liberal speaker claiming that “the 
political culture of this country has since 2001 evolved in such a way that a unified 
opposition are not even admitted an expert opinion of an issue brought up for discussion … 
We want a different culture” " den politiske kultur i det her land siden 2001 har udviklet sig 
på en måde, så man ikke engang kan få den indrømmelse, at den samlede opposition kan få 
en ekspertvurdering af et område, som er til debat ... Vi ønsker en anden kultur" (MP 
Østergaard, soc.lib., F9, 2005.04.29 12.30). 
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Secondly, the speakers for the government parties and Danish People’s Party are put 
to discursive work by the opposition speakers seeking to install necessity in the 
narrative of humanitarianism by introducing cases where individual human beings are 
said to have been denied their human rights. The majority speakers do, however, get 
these cases back in the category where they supposedly belong: Individual cases 
should not be considered in parliament but by an impartial civil service, not least 
since confidential details of the individual cases cannot be discussed in public (MP 
Simonsen, lib.; MP Krarup, DPP; Min. Hvilshøj, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 10.20; 13.20).  
Several individual cases were mentioned and described, some even by name (MP 
Østergaaard, soc.lib.; MP Arbo-Bæhr, UL, F9, 2005.04.29 11.05; 12.10; 12.50). In 
one instance, a married couple having been denied family reunification is pointed out 
as physically present in the strangers’ gallery of the parliament (MP Gerner, soc.lib., 
F9, 2005.04.29 9.35). This is countered by the government and right wing speakers 
characterizing the move, firstly, as an attempt to make the parliamentarians engage in 
deciding in individual cases (MP Krarup, DPP; Min. Hvilshøj, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 
13.20). Secondly, as "doing ... populism on individual cases" (MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 
2005.04.29 10.10).
274
 The very dragging individual cases into public is indeed 
“morally indecent” – not because of the potential infliction of the privacy of the 
individual involved but because it is “impossible to argue against it, it is therefore 
also indecent to argue with” (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 13.20).275 
To sum up: While the Danish People’s Party insist that the criticism by the human 
rights institutions is based not on legal reasoning but on a political standpoint, the 
speakers for the opposition do not counter this by characterizing the ministerial 
papers as poor jurisprudence. Rather, this decision should be left to a body of 
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 "[K]øre ... populisme på enkeltsager" (MP Simonsen, lib., F9, 2005.04.29 10.10). 
275
 "[M]oralsk uanstændigt ... umuligt at argumentere imod, det er derfor også uanstændigt 
at argumentere med" (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 13.20). 
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independent experts. The speakers for the government parties insist that both are 
jurisprudence to be taken serious, only the ministerial argument is conclusive. Hence, 
the narratives of international norm abidance and of limiting the influx are 
compatible. This rhetorical tightrope is secured to the concrete block of a 
parliamentary majority ready to conclude the debate by voting on which conclusion is 
correct. 
6.7 Moves to reconstitute the limits of Danish identity 
discourse  
On the background of the constructions of the 'alien' other and the responsibility of 
the authorities representing the Danish self (laid out in section 6.4), the clash of 
narratives and the struggle to control the distinctions upholding their compatibility 
(analysed in section 6.5 and 6.6) may be reread as a struggle to redefine Danish 
identity discourse: The debate involves two projects aiming to redraw the limit of 
what may meaningfully be included and excluded from accounts of what ‘Denmark’ 
is:  
On the one side, the social liberals and the left wing aim to let the narrative of 
international norm abidance overrule the importance of upholding the cultural 
homogeneity of the Danish nation state. The self-understanding of Denmark as a 
pioneer country in the service of good might serve as resonance to this move.  
On the other side, the Danish People’s Party works to exclude the human rights from 
Danish politics. In this process they juxtapose a series of positive articulations: 
Danish – people [folk] – democracy [folkestyre; literally: people’s rule] – reality 
to a series of negative articulations: 
international – human rights – propaganda – tyranny – idealism 
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(MP Langballe, DPP; MP Krarup, DPP; MP Kjærsgaard, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 9.20; 
9.30; 9.35; 11.40; 12.45). The Danish Institute for Human Rights and the Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, both being part of the ”goodness industry” 
(MP Krarup, DPP, L78, 2005.03.04 12.30)
276
, fit nicely into the negative series. 
Obviously the chains are easily prolonged to include the parties within parliament; so 
that the Danish People’s Party are privileged as mouthpiece for ‘the people’, while 
the Social Liberal Party and the parties on the left wing are “weighed and deemed too 
light” (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.20).277 And as it appears from the 
metaphors employed in the remains of the quote from the speaker for Danish 
People’s Party (which the section 6.6 promised to let this section complete); this is 
serious business:  
[I]t is justified to point out [the 1983 Aliens Act] as one of the most fatal events in 
modern Danish history. Here, the Danish people were derived of their right of 
primogeniture by lawyers and politicians always taking the side of ideas against 
reality or, which amounts to the same thing, taking the side of the strangers against 
the Danes. … [The legal philosophical base of the 1983 Aliens Act] is not only poor 
jurisprudence originating in idealist abstraction and unearthly idealism, but it is also a 
token of an abuse of the people whose reality bears the brunt of these abstract ideas. 
The 1983 Aliens Act was ... a national catastrophe, a kind of rape of the Danish 
people whose fatal consequences we are only now beginning to grasp. (Krarup, F9, 
2005.04.29 11.15)
278
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 "[Godhedsindustrien" (MP Krarup, DPP, L78, 2005.03.04 12.30). 
277
 "[V]ejet og fundet for let" (MP Krarup, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 11.20; cf. MP Langballe, 
DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 12.45). 
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 "[Det er] berettiget at kalde [Udlændinge]lov[en af 1983] for noget af det mest 
skæbnesvangre, der er sket i Danmarks nyere historie. Her blev det danske folks 
førstefødselsret berøvet det af jurister og politikere, som altid tog ideens parti imod 
virkeligheden, eller, hvad der er det samme, tog de fremmedes parti imod danskerne.... [Det 
retsfilosofiske grundlag for Udlændingeloven af 1983] er dels dårlig jura udsprunget af 
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Figure 6.2 illustrates the distinction which both moves attempt to establish – from 
each their side. The boldness of the move by Danish People’s Party could indicate 
that it has less dire prospects than the move by the left wing and the social liberals: 
Whereas the DPP's move (the claim that nothing should be above the sovereign 
Danish nation state) is made explicitly, the opposition move (Denmark should not 
necessarily be culturally homogenous) is not explicated but only implied by 
prioritization.  
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Figure 6.2 Two moves to reconstitute Danish identity discourse 
DPP moves to exlude humanitarianism and international norm abidance – left wing moves 
to exclude cultural homogeneity 
 
Furthermore, even the 'pioneer image' element of Danish identity discourse is 
articulated by the DPP; only the substance of the example which Denmark is to the 
world is altered:  
                                                                                                                                            
idealistisk abstraktion og overjordisk idealisme, men det er også udtryk for mishandling af 
det folk, der skal lægge ryg og virkelighed til de abstrakte ideer. Udlændingeloven af 1983 
var en ... national katastrofe, en slags voldtægt af det danske folk, hvis skæbnesvangre 
følger vi først nu begynder at begribe." (Krarup, F9, 2005.04.29 11.15) 
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the societies around [us] are a matter of fact backing what has happened in Denmark 
[i.e. the limiting of the influx of strangers]100 % up. […We] are regularly 
approached by foreign politicians who would like to copy what has happened in 
Denmark because they themselves have this very, very huge problem …. Really, a 
lot of foreigners come to Denmark to find out how we handle the alien legislation 
and, then, copy it in their own countries. (MP Kjærsgaard, DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 
9.35)
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Figure 6.3 Expansive version of DPP narrative 
DPP moves to exclude humanitarianism – and to include re-configured version of 
international norms and Danish pioneer role 
 
Figure 6.3 illustrates this expansive version of DPP's nationalist narrative. So far, 
however, the government parties and the social democrats insist to represent a Danish 
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 "[De omkringliggende samfund faktisk bakker hundrede procent op om det, der er sket i 
Danmark. ... [J]ævnligt får [vi] henvendelser fra udenlandske politikere, som gerne vil 
kopiere det, der sker i Danmark, fordi de selv har det meget, meget store problem ... Der er 
rigtig mange udlændinge, som kommer til Danmark for at finde ud af, hvordan vi håndterer 
udlændingelovgivningen, og derefter kopierer den i deres egne lande." (MP Kjærsgaard, 
DPP, F9, 2005.04.29 9.35) 
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identity which is both a pioneer country in relation to human rights and at the same 
time has its unique homogeneity protected by limiting the influx of Muslims.
280
 
6.8 Conclusion: Keep out  
How does the way in which Danish/Muslim relations are structured in the debates on 
the CoE HR Commissioner's criticism of Danish Alien legislation contribute to 
radicalization of conflict? How are the present and future relations presented and 
necessitated? 
In the discourse articulated in the debates on criteria for entrance the immediate 
diacriticon explicitly distinguishing Us from Them is Danish citizenship. A hierarchy 
is implicit in the sense that We, the Danes, may decide over Them, the non-Danes. 
The distance between Us and Them is small since They are figuratively at our 
borders. Therefore They potentially influence Us – and the influence of those of 
Them who have already entered is implied to be manifest. In the context of these 
debates, the essential propensity for action which They are known to have, is that 
they want to – and will do next to anything to – get inside and stay in Denmark. The 
background for this propensity is not explicated – but it does not appear alterable; 
only the incentive structures which this inclination is playing up against may be 
altered. Their posture towards Us is constructed as immediately affirmative in the 
sense that Our country is such an attractive place to be that They want to be here too. 
But their affirmation is simultaneously a challenge, since Their entrance is implied to 
be a problem. As their agential capacity seems to be limited to a rather blunt utility 
function, the question of a possible dialogue never occurs as relevant.  
A supplementary agreement featured as a basis for the debates, however, hints at a 
different – yet partially coinciding diacriticon for distinguishing between Us and 
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 Lately, the SPP has accommodated this position too without explicitly embracing it. 
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Them: They are also known to have an inclination for treating their women and 
children in authoritarian, paternalistic ways. More specifically They force their 
children into marriages and send their children on ‘re-education journeys’. These 
practices are – by recurrence to broader Danish debates – flagging the Muslim culture 
of the aliens in question. This reference simultaneously reinstates the hierarchical 
position of the Danish self above this Muslim other in two ways: Firstly, such 
practices are valued negatively. Secondly, they are placed at a stage in human 
development which We have risen above. The debates analysed in this chapter do not 
discuss the question of whether Muslims have the capability of changing the 
inclination to engage in such practices; only the incentive structures needed to make 
Them refrain from the practice are at issue. 
In relation to both diacritica for distinguishing Us from Them – citizenship and 
religio-cultural essence – the narratives combine the grammars of Orientalism and 
Encompassment: Orientalism is inherent in the way that They are outside and 
(medievally) Muslim, and We are inside and (modern) non-Muslims. At the same 
time, Encompassment is active in as much as Our hierarchical superiority (morally in 
being modern, materially in being in control of our state) allows Us unilaterally to 
allocate Them to a subordinate position without consulting them. 
However, an institutionalized yet ambiguous securitization underlies the debate in its 
entirety: They do not (oughtnotology) want to stay in Their place (oughtology). 
Hence, it has been necessary to apply the extraordinary measure of diverting from the 
Alien policies in place for the period from 1983 to 2001. This 1983 legislation has 
been unquestioned from the perspective of international human rights and may count 
as ‘ordinary‘ in the sense that Danes are used to view their state as humanitarian 
pioneers. Diversion from this legislation has been necessary to avert the threat from 
the aliens wanting to get inside Denmark. The threat is aimed at the possibility of 
‘integrating’ the aliens already in Denmark; this possibility is supposedly hampered 
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by the arrival of more aliens. What the process and aim of ‘integration’ are – and, 
hence, what the referent-object of the securitization is – remains unsaid in these 
debates.
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The government speakers insist on the compatibility of, on the one hand, limiting the 
influx of aliens and, on the other hand, adhering to international human rights norms. 
Thereby they seek recourse to two sedimented elements of Danish identity discourse: 
the cultural homogeneity (in a somewhat muted way in these debates) and the image 
of being an example to the world (in a somewhat restricted way, since the content of 
the example is not to be mentioned). 
The speakers for the right wing make the cultural homogeneity element of the 
narrative explicit. In addition they imbue the government’s insistence on 
compatibility with a certain ambiguity as they, on the one hand, agree that limiting 
the influx is compatible with international human rights standards, while, on the other 
hand, find the abidance with international human rights regulations less important 
than – or even detrimental to – national sovereignty; another well-sedimented 
element in Danish identity discourse. 
In sum, when the majority concludes the debate, the policy for future interaction 
presented to the other at the border is a very simple one: We expect you to show up – 
you may expect that our preference is to deny you entrance; anyhow the decision is 
ours alone. There is no need for a dialogue: we already know your preferences and 
you will not influence ours, no matter what you say. As the Alien other is not 
supposed to be present on Danish territory, this relation only gets conflictual if the 
other shows up anyway and does not leave when told to do so.  
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 Chapter 5 analysed debates explicitly discussing the question. 
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6.9 Perspectives: Referring to universality as a strategy in 
Denmark 
At first sight, all the narratives on family reunification and permanent residence are 
about the intruding alien other. These narratives, however, co-constructs roles for 
other others as well: Most importantly, the efforts made to keep their spouses, family 
members, friends, and compatriots out implicitly relay two messages to the aliens 
who has been permitted to reside in Denmark: Firstly, that it would have been best if 
they too had stayed away. Secondly, that they – residence and citizenship or not – are 
not equal to the proper Danes: They do not have the same right to see their spouse, 
family members, friends and relations as the Danes. As this category of others is – 
legitimately – present on Danish territory, this way of narrating the difference may 
contribute to radicalization of conflict.  
In the debates analysed in this chapter, however, the situation of this other is not re-
presented as a distinct target group when it comes to human rights infringements: 
Even the opposition speakers encompassed legally present aliens in a larger group of 
persons without access to their spouses etc. – a group including ethnic Danes: Rather 
than challenging ethnic discrimination directly – as suggested by the CoE HR 
Commissioner – the opposition challenges the legislation referring to individual 
human rights. This suggests that the right of Danes to a culturally homogenous 
Denmark as an element in Danish identity discourse is so sedimented that it is hard to 
challenge explicitly.  
This sedimentation has two implications: Firstly, unless the other chooses a strategy 
of cultural self-assimilation, some measure of conflict seems inevitable. Secondly, 
when unmediated universalism meets nationalism, universalism looses. Universalism 
needs to be articulated as Danish to have a chance. Chapter 5 showed how such an 
articulation of Denmark as embodying universal values makes a potent legitimizing 
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narrative. This chapter has demonstrated the weakness of a hegemonic project in the 
name of a universality in conflict with Danish identity.  
Chapter 7 pursues the question of human rights in the context of Danish Muslim 
relations: It analyses debates on protection of foreign writers whose freedom of 
expression is infringed – a question which quickly turns out to be a Muslim question. 
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7 Conditions for hospitality or defence of identity? 
Asking writers in need of refuge to recognize Danish 
values 
Chapters 5 and 6 introduced basic features of the Danish political landscape and of 
Danish identity discourse. Furthermore, chapter 5 analysed how 'Muslim threats' were 
constructed to the peaceful society, to welfare and to Danish culture – and how these 
threats legitimized extraordinary means to their aversion, not least since Denmark 
embodies universal values. Chapter 6 laid out how cultural homogeneity as an 
element in Danish identity discourse was difficult to negotiate away – even when the 
consequence of prioritizing homogeneity was to provoke a critique for infringing 
human rights. This chapter zooms in on an extreme combination of the two 
tendencies: What is most important to protect; the cultural homogeneity of Denmark 
– or the lives and freedom of foreigners promoting the very same universal values 
which Denmark is said to embody? 
7.1 Introduction: Setting out to protect the other 
As one of the last decisions before it disassembled for the summer break in 2008, the 
Danish Parliament, Folketinget, passed two bills to facilitate the participation of 
Danish municipalities in the International Cities of Refuge Network.
282
 On the face of 
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 To facilitate the participation in the International Cities of Refuge Network, two bills 
were proposed: One, presented by the Minister for Culture, amended the Literature Act to 
allow municipalities to spend money on hosting the writers; another, presented by the 
Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, amended the Aliens Act to allow 
the writers in question into the country in the first place. This analysis is based on the 
government presentations of these bills, the parliamentary debates, and the reports of the 
parliamentary committees scrutinizing them, as well as the consultative statements by 
NGO’s etc. and answers by the ministers to the questions of the committee made public in 
the reports. Included are also earlier parliamentary debates explicitly referred to in the 
debates on ICORN. 
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it, yet another country opens its borders to writers targeted with threats and 
persecution.  
As it were, however, the debates in parliament and the detailed legal text framing this 
show of hospitality both reveal that Danish hospitality is far from being 
"unconditional." The debate, the legal regulations, and the very problematique of 
freedom of expression in Denmark are placed squarely within a discourse on 
"Muslim relations".  
As a condition for refuge in Denmark any writer granted "refuge" under the umbrella 
of ICORN in Denmark now has to sign a rather peculiar document – a "Declaration 
on recognition of the fundamental values of the Danish society" (cf. the appendix to 
this chapter). The writer thereby declares, i.a., to "understand and accept the 
fundamental values of Danish society”; to “protect the Danish democratic principles” 
including non-discrimination and the condemnation of terrorism; and finally to be 
aware that s/he is obliged to leave again within two years. This chapter takes this 
puzzling document as its point of departure and relates it to the discursive situation in 
which it was produced.  
As in chapter 6, the analysis focuses on the variety of narratives promoted across the 
political landscape. The issue under debate is framed as an instance of 'Muslim 
relations' in two ways: First, as the question of protecting persecuted writers is 
explicitly articulated to the Cartoon Crisis. Second, as a declaration to be signed by 
the writers granted refuge is designed to protect Denmark against certain 'Muslim 
practices'. 
The parliamentary disagreement over whose security to prioritize when inviting 
persecuted writers to seek refuge in Denmark is based on an agreement that Denmark 
is a champion of the freedom of expression. The disagreement is in the first reading 
analysed by asking, first (as in chapter 5), what self/other security narratives are 
promoted; secondly, what diacritica are employed to delimit other from self – and to 
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what effect. The first reading, thus, proceeds in three steps: Section 7.2 focus on 
whom the 'good' and the 'bad' guys are made to be, when the Danish parliament 
discusses writers in need of refuge. SectionX7.3 asks whose security is important in the 
debates. Section 7.4 analyses the difficulties involved in making the Muslim an other 
by explicating 'fundamental values' as diacritica for exclusion  
Section 7.5 performs the second reading to assess the contribution to radicalization 
from the structures of the identity configuration centred on Danish debates on 
Muslims. A final section (7.6) performs the third reading focused on the 
interpellatory effects of the narratives and debates – and briefly considers the 
strategic tasks which any proponents of the hospitality towards Muslim strangers – in 
Denmark and beyond – will encounter. 
7.2 Who are the good guys? And who are the bad guys? 
In his initial presentation, the Minister for Culture stated that "This bill is presented to 
show that Denmark supports the struggle for freedom of expression and open, 
democratic societies which takes place outside the borders of our country."
283
 In their 
contribution to the committee reports on the bills, the government parties claimed that 
"Denmark, after facilitating this arrangement, will be in the forefront of spreading 
freedom of expression."
284
 This assertion describes Denmark as a nice place to live in 
– and, conversely, places evil oppression somewhere outside Denmark. But more 
than that: it presents Denmark as a benevolent agent capable of doing and furthering 
good deeds beyond its borders.  
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 "Lovforslaget er fremsat med henblik på at markere, at Danmark støtter den kamp for 
ytringsfrihed og åbne demokratiske samfund, der foregår uden for vores lands grænser." 
(Mikkelsen, Min.f.Culture, con., in presentation of L157). 
284
 "Danmark med denne ordning vil være med allerforrest, når det gælder ytringsfrihedens 
udbredelse." (lib. and con. members of Committee reports on L151 and l57). 
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In many ways, there exists a general agreement in parliament on this picture of 
reality:
285
 "Our freedom of expression is, on the whole, unlimited" (MP Kjær, con., 
2008.04.15 14:08) .
286
 At the very least, everybody seems to concur that Denmark is a 
"country which has many a time been pioneering exactly when it comes to freedom 
of expression" (MP Mortensen, soc.dem., 2008.04.15 14:02) F
287
 
So Denmark is on the side of Enlightenment. At first sight, the opposing dark side 
consists of oppressive states, since " in many countries those in power want to control 
the opinion of the citizens of the country and how it is expressed" (MP Christensen, 
lib., 2008.04.15 13:39).
288
 Hence, "certain writers … are persecuted for being critical 
towards the system ruling the country they are living in” (MP Kjær, con., 2008.04.15 
14:08).
289
 
The opponents of freedom of expression, however, need not be states. A critical 
attitude towards the state is not the only reason for persecution; another reason may 
be that "they write or in other ways express themselves about something that is not 
accepted where they live" (MP Kjær, con., 2008.04.15, 14:08).
290
 Moreover, "the 
dictatorship" which "many writers are fighting to oppose" (MP Christensen, lib., 
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 Only a few, minor problems (e.g., for civil servants disagreeing with their political 
bosses, cf. MP Ammitzbøll, 2008.04.15 13:59) are mentioned. 
286
 "Vores ytringsfrihed er stort set ubegrænset." (MP Kjær, con., 2008.04.15 14:08) 
287
 "[L]and [som] mange gange har været foregangsland, netop når det drejer sig om 
ytringsfrihed" (MP Mortensen, soc.dem., 2008.04.15,14:02). 
288
 "Magthaverne i mange lande vil have hånd i hanke med, hvad landets indbyggere mener, 
og hvordan det kommer til udtryk." (MP Christensen, lib., 2008.04.15 13:39) 
289
 "[V]isse skribenter ... bliver forfulgt, fordi de er kritiske over for det system, der er 
herskende i det land, de bor i" (MP Kjær, con., 2008.04.15 14:08). 
290
 "[D]e skriver eller på anden vis ytrer sig om noget, der ikke er accepteret det pågældende 
sted." (MP Kjær, con., 2008.04.15, 14:08) 
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2008.04.15, 13:39)
291
 need not be a state; it might be an ideology or another system 
of thought.  
The Minister for Culture himself sets the context straight:  
We have seen it here at home too, most recently the plots to kill cartoonist Kurt 
Westergaard. It is a shame, and terrible to think about, that even in this society we 
find forces who might want to eliminate a cartoonist just for expressing opinions 
diverging from their own (2008.04.15, 14:27).
292
 
 Or, in the more radical formulation of a speaker for the Danish People's Party: "[T]he 
freedom of expression has within the last decades come under pressure in the 
Western World, especially from extremist Muslims" (MP Henriksen, DPP, 
2008.05.23, 11:34).
293
 
With this framing of the Cities of Refuge debates as a sequel to the Cartoon Crisis, it 
is clear that the debates are part of the ongoing struggle to define Denmark’s 'Muslim 
relations'. Some opposition parties' speakers try to correct this framing by 
distinguishing between good and bad manifestations of the freedom of expression: 
"This is about freedom of expression where it means something, where people have 
been fighting state power, and not just ... trying to speak against people you dislike in 
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 "[M]ange forfattere kæmper for at sige diktaturet imod" (MP Christensen, lib., 
2008.04.15, 13:39). 
292
 "Vi har jo også set det herhjemme, senest med mordplanerne for tegneren Kurt 
Westergaard. Det er skammeligt, og det er forfærdeligt at tænke på, at der også i dette 
samfund er kræfter, som måske vil en satiretegner til livs, blot fordi vedkommende 
udtrykker nogle andre holdninger end dem, de selv har." (2008.04.15, 14:27) Kurt 
Westergaard drew the cartoon of an angry bearded man with the bomb in the turban in the 
Jyllands-Posten; the cartoon most often found offending (cf. Spiegelmann 2006).  
293
 "[Y]tringsfriheden de seneste årtier er kommet under pres i den vestlige verden fra 
specielt yderliggående muslimers side." (MP Henriksen, DPP, 2008.05.23, 11:34) 
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a hateful way" (MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., 2008.04.15, 15:05).
294
 But as it is part of 
the government's platform to articulate 'Muslim relations' with the nationalist DPP, 
these attempts to give the debate a different turn proved unsuccessful.  
The then secretary general of the United Nations took the cartoon incidents as 
occasion to characterize Denmark as a "country which has recently acquired a 
significant Muslim population, and is not yet sure how to adjust to it" (Anan 2006). It 
would, however, be more precise to say that 'some in Denmark' are not yet sure how 
to deal with the new situation. At least the Danish People's Party seems quite sure 
about how Denmark should adjust to the new situation. Hints as how this may look 
like can be found in the above mentioned "Declaration on recognition of fundamental 
values of the Danish society," the committee reports, and the records of the 
parliamentary debate. We will return to this in section 7.4. 
The point to be made here is that the rest of the Danish political actors are – as Kofi 
Annan suggested – rather unsure when it comes to the question of how to relate to the 
recent increase of the Muslim population. Meanwhile, the DPP has moved in and 
filled the vacuum left by the equivocality of the government parties and the 
discordance of the opposition. They have set the conditions for the debate – the 
'conditions for hospitality'. These conditions pertain to security: the security of the 
writers but, more importantly, the security of Danes – and by no means only the 
security of Danes in times of terror. What is at stake is the security of Danish identity 
in times of global migration. 
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 "Det her handler om ytringsfriheden, hvor den betyder noget, hvor mennesker har 
kæmpet imod statsmagten, og ikke bare ... [om at] prøve at tale imod folk, som man ikke 
bryder sig om, på en hadefuld måde." (MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., 2008.04.15, 15:05) 
385 
7.3 Security for whom? Refuge for … refugees?  
The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET is the Danish acronym) plays a 
double role in the parliamentary debate on the writers in need of refuge. For the 
opposition parties it is important to make sure that the intelligence service takes care 
of the security of writers who might need protection even in their Danish refuge – and 
that the state pays for their protection (i.a. MP Mortensen, soc.dem., 2008.04.15, 
13:46).F
295
 
The DPP, however envisions another role of the intelligence service. As a condition 
for their support of the bill, they want to make sure that "the alien in question is in 
advance security checked by the PET" and that "the alien in question may be refused 
without further explanation if the PET finds that he constitutes a threat to Denmark." 
(Committee report on the bill to amend the Literature Act, p.3)
296
 The Minister for 
Culture assures that "[W]e shall not just roll over and wait for others to take over our 
                                           
295
 The issue of the economy involved in hosting the writers in general was another point of 
contention in the debates. At first, the entire burden of hosting the writers was put on the 
shoulders of the municipalities – while the national funding was only to be used for 
publications and PR related to the writer while in Denmark. Only when in 2009 parts of the 
national funding was reallocated, the first municipalities agreed to invite foreign writers (cf. 
http://jp.dk/indland/aar/politik/article1905151.ece; 
http://www.aarhuskommune.dk/view/forside/view_col1_forsideliste?_page=nyhed/8302072
; http://www.kum.dk/sw90006.asp; accessed 28 December 2009). 
296
 "[D]en pågældende udlænding på forhånd sikkerhedstjekkes af PET [og ...] den 
pågældende uden begrundelse kan afvises, såfremt PET vurderer, at den pågældende udgør 
en trussel mod Danmark" Furthermore, they insist that "the alien in question is falling 
within provisions for expulsion ... if [he] abuses the stay in Denmark ... e.g., by engaging in 
criminal activities." "den pågældende udlænding er omfattet af udlændingelovens regler om 
udvisning ... såfremt udlændingen misbruger opholdet i Danmark ..., f.eks. begår 
kriminalitet" (Committee report on the bill to amend the Literature Act, p.3) 
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right to express ourselves and our democracy" (Minister for Culture, con., 
2008.05.23, 11:20).
297
 
Both the provisions advocated by the opposition and the provisions advocated by the 
DPP make sense if your chosen danger is immediate and comes in the form of the 
violent Islamist: he might try to curb our freedom and way of life as an assassin 
killing a writer or as a terrorist blowing up a commuter train. The government assures 
that the PET will cater to the security of the writers (Minister for Culture, 2008.04.15, 
14:41) and protect the Danes against potential violent attacks (Minister for 
Integration’s answer to questions no. 8 & 9 reprinted in the report from Committee on 
Integration). 
When it comes to the duration of hospitality, however, the security of Danish cultural 
identity wins over the security of the individual writers. The writers are not allowed 
to stay and possibly compromise the homogeneity of Denmark. The International 
Cities of Refuge Network (ICORN) has members in a number of countries. But one 
cannot help noticing that Norway houses a greater number of writers than any other 
country. One reason may be that the hospitality which Norway extends to the writers 
in need of refuge is more generous than that of other countries: If a writer is accepted 
as in need of refuge by ICORN and invited by a Norwegian city, s/he is granted 
asylum under Norwegian law. A number of opposition parties in the Danish 
parliament suggested that Denmark do the same (MP Krag, soc., 2008.04.15, 15:07; 
MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., s.d. 15:11; MP Clausen, red/green, s.d. 15:17). On this 
point, however, the government – as well as, notably, the leading oppositional party, 
the Social Democrats – chose to follow the DPP: Within two years, the new arrival 
should return home. 
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 "[V]i ikke bare skal lægge os ned og vente på, at andre overtager vores ret til at ytre os, 
vores demokrati." (Mikkelsen, Minister for Culture, con., 2008.05.23, 11:20) 
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Actually, the nature of the stay offered in Denmark will be nothing of an asylum:  
Writers etc. have under existing regulation the same possibilities as other foreigners 
to apply for and possibly attain asylum in this country if they have had to flee from 
their homeland due to persecution, but a special option to do this should not be 
offered (Government’s remarks to bill no. L 131, p. 3).298 
The stay of the writer will rather be like a stay allowing time to work or educate 
oneself. And the writer is not considered a refugee – s/he has "more features in 
common with ... aliens coming to this country as workers or students and whose basis 
for residence is temporary and connected to a specific activity." (Ibid.)
299
 In 
conclusion, a warning is expressed  
against using the term 'persecution' and against using it too much and over-
interpreting it. We are after all not talking about asylum here.... We are talking about 
that you are granted permission to stay according to a very airy criterion for very 
special reasons and when part of a very special group (Minister for Integration, 
2008.04.15, 15:22).
300
 
In this matter, Danish language comes to the aid of the government since a 'city of 
refuge', when translated, does not refer to 'refugee'. A refugee is a flygtning in Danish, 
someone fleeing – while a city of refuge is a friby, a 'free city', connoting frirum (free 
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 "Forfattere m.fl. har efter de gældende regler mulighed for - på lige fod med andre 
udlændinge - at søge om og eventuelt opnå asyl her i landet, hvis de har måttet flygte fra 
deres hjemland på grund af forfølgelse, men der bør ikke skabes en særlig adgang hertil." 
(Government’s remarks to bill no. L 131, p. 3) 
299
 "[F]lere træk til fælles med ... udlændinge, der kommer her til landet som arbejdstagere 
eller som studerende, og hvis opholdsgrundlag er midlertidigt og knyttet til en bestemt 
aktivitet." (Ibid.) 
300
 "[A]dvare imod glosen forfulgte, og at man altså bruger den i for høj grad og 
overfortolker udtrykket. Der er jo netop ikke tale om asyl her ... Der er netop tale om, at 
man efter et meget luftigt kriterium af helt særlige grunde, og når man er en helt særlig 
gruppe" (Hornbech, Minister for Integration, lib., 2008.04.15, 15:22) 
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space); and even fritid (spare time). In general, in the government's terminology, the 
writers to whom hospitality is offered or granted are not 'persecuted writers' but 
'writers whose freedom of expression is infringed upon in their homeland'. Especially 
the Minister for Integration painstakingly avoids calling the writers 'persecuted' (cf. 
2008.04.15, 15:27) – an attribute too closely related to the language of international 
law on refugees. Thus the clash of concepts is not as acute – since rhetorically not so 
obvious – in Danish as it might be in English. 
The point to be made here is that it is of the utmost importance for the government 
not to undermine the efforts made to 'limit the influx of aliens' (cf. chapter 6). 
Therefore, the final point of the declaration put in front of the writer at arrival urges 
the writer to repeat that  
I am aware that my stay in Denmark as part of the Cities of Refuge arrangement is 
temporary and that it is intended that I shall return to my homeland. The purpose of 
my stay is, hence, to allow me to practise my literary activities in Denmark for a 
period of time, while afterwards return to my homeland.
301
 
The importance of making sure to get rid of the guest again warrants two 
considerations – one on the future, one on the past. Together the considerations imply 
that the narrative of hospitality is trumped by a narrative of defence. Firstly, Derrida 
(2000) examines the possibility of a pure, unlimited hospitality. For every practical 
purpose, however he finds it necessary to have a law to distinguish guests from 
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 "[J]eg ved, at mit ophold i Danmark som led i fribyordningen er midlertidigt, og at det er 
hensigten, at jeg skal vende tilbage til mit hjemland. Formålet med mit ophold er således, at 
jeg får mulighed for i en periode at udøve mine litterære aktiviteter i Danmark for derefter at 
vende tilbage til mit hjemland." Two notes on the translation of this excerpt: First, the 
passive Danish form of “it is intended” is kept in the English version, since it is a way of 
camouflaging agency and responsibility typical of Danish bureaucracy. Second, the 
extension of the sentence “while afterwards return to my homeland” does not make 
grammatically sense in Danish, but serves the purpose of including the return in the purpose 
of the stay. 
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parasites (Derrida 2000:59). This necessity points to the way in which the quality and 
duration of the entire stay of the guest is condensed into the situation of the arrival. In 
this light, the Danish 'show of hospitality' demonstrates that the shadow of the future 
sometimes entirely eclipses the moment of arrival – the moment of hospitality.302 
Secondly, the importance of making sure to get rid of the arriving stranger points to 
the rhetorical (?) question put by Derrida: "Perhaps only the one who endures the 
experience of being deprived of a home can offer hospitality?" (Dufourmantelle 
2000:56). Denmark often prides itself of a 1000 years long history as a Kingdom. Its 
borders have moved – mainly to shrink the territory – but what today counts as 
Denmark has, in the eyes of many Danes, served as their homeland since time 
immemorial. Denmark may simply not be suited to offer hospitality; it might only be 
suited to "show that [it] supports the struggle for freedom of expression" (italics 
added)
303
 as the Minister for Culture put it when introducing the law. If so, the list of 
values in the declarations presented to the writers of refuge is not meant to be the 
precondition to hospitality (i.e. the minimal recognition given by the stranger in 
return for an open door). It might simply be designed to ward him off by 
interpellating him negatively; by radicalizing her as an other.  
Figure 7.1 illustrates how time – past and future conspiring – is collapsed to eclipse 
the moment of hospitality; the present moment of articulation. A securitized future 
closes down the space for seeking knowledge about the other and leaves definition of 
the other to an Orientalist grammar ruling unchallenged in the construction of the 
past: As we know who the Muslim is – and we know that only danger may come out 
                                           
302
 In that sense, Gullestad is both right and wrong when she notes (2002:100, n.57) that 
Derrida concentrates on the immediate reaction to a guest as s/he arrives.  
303
 "[M]arkere, at Danmark støtter den kamp for ytringsfrihed" (Min.f.Culture, italics 
inserted, cf. fn. 283). 
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of engaging him – we welcome him with a monologue designed to end the 
engagement. 
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Figure 7.1 Time collapsed in narrative of defence to eclipse moment of hospitality 
 
7.4 The difficulty of making Muslims other 
If you see yourself as the main character in a heroic narrative, defending yourself 
against terrorists and against floods of migrants, then it is obviously important whom 
you are offering hospitality to. Derrida (2000:26f) insist that hospitality can manifest 
itself only as conditional; usually, you at least ask the stranger for his name before 
inviting him in. In Denmark, however, some more conditions have to be met. 
Actually, the declaration, which the writers are required to sign upon arrival, is a 
caricature catalogue of the vices of Muslims, as they permeate Danish debates on 
integration. As a caricature it has the same interpellating effect as the drawing of the 
prophet published by Jyllands-Posten. Denmark awards the immigrants the 
hospitality of permanent residence or citizenship on condition that they give up a 
series of cultural traits. But notably not, as Derrida remarks à propos the case of 
Algeria, that they give up "what they thought of as their culture" (2000:145; italics 
added). The cultural traits they are asked to give up by the Danish declaration are the 
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ones that we identify them by. Why would you want someone to declare that he does 
not hit his children, unless you expect him being inclined to do just that? 
Thus, according to said declaration, Muslims can be expected to 
 violate Danish laws 
 undermine the Danish democratic principles in every respect 
 disrespect the freedom and personal integrity of the individual 
 disrespect and oppress women 
 disrespect freedom of expression and religion 
 discriminate on the grounds of race and skin colour 
 threaten and scorn other religious and sexually oriented groups  
 disrespect and oppress children (especially girls) to make sure that they do not grow 
up to be capable of making their own decisions 
 support acts of terrorism (or at least refrain from assisting the authorities in 
preventing them)  
 harbour no commitment to Danish society or democracy. 
Indeed, the list in the declaration that people seeking permanent residence in 
Denmark (after being granted family reunion) are confronted with is even more 
comprehensive. These Muslims are expected to 
 commit or at least threaten violence against their spouses 
 circumcise their daughters 
 use force to marry their children against their will 
 hit their children. 
From the reports of the parliamentary committees we can deduce that the DPP 
actually wanted to further expand the list of the declaration that refugee writers have 
to sign, as they might  
 behave in a disorderly manner 
 assume a brazen and disrespectful attitude toward Denmark and the Danes 
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and, finally, (as one of the prominent problems connoted with Muslims) he(!) might 
 bring along more than one wife. 
Let us leave the question of polygamy aside and rather focus upon the DPP's 
demands for orderly manners, humility, and respect for Danes. This demand was not 
included in the final version of the declaration. This because, as the Minister for 
Culture remarks;  
[D]ictators hate art; they are afraid of it. ... They believed that they could eliminate 
the nuances and make people uniform.... But it is so that art and culture and writing 
insist on nuance; insist on the existence of things not just black and white. They insist 
on complexity, on showing us the ugly and the provoking and the things in our minds 
and hearts where the dictators have no access. (Minister for Culture, con., 
2008.04.15, 14:21)
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A DPP member of the parliament Committee on Culture asked the Minister  
how to secure that the persecuted writer when in this country is primarily occupied 
with literary activities directed towards his/her homeland – where the literary 
freedom is infringed – and not towards entirely different countries, e.g. Denmark, the 
USA, or a third country? (additional committee report dated 28 May 2008, app. 11, q. 
15, p. 4)
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 "[D]iktatorer hader kunsten, de er bange for den. ... De troede, at man kunne udradere 
nuancerne og gøre folk ensrettede ... Men sagen er jo den, at kunst og kultur og 
forfattervirksomhed insisterer på nuancer, insisterer på, at der er ting, der ikke bare er sorte 
og hvide. De insisterer på kompleksitet, på at vise det grimme og det provokerende og det, 
der findes inde i vores hoveder og vores hjerter, hvor diktatorerne ikke kan komme til." 
(Minister for Culture, con., 2008.04.15, 14:21) 
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 "[H]vordan sikres det, at den forfulgte forfatter her i landet primært beskæftiger sig med 
litterær virksomhed rettet mod sit eget hjemland – der hvor den litterære frihed blev 
knægtet, og ikke mod helt andre lande, f.eks. Danmark, USA eller andre tredjelande?" 
(additional committee report dated 28 May 2008, app. 11, q. 15, p. 4) 
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The Minister in his answer reassured him that "[p]robably a persecuted writer invited 
to come to Denmark as a sanctuary with everything paid for will not feel occasioned 
to criticise his host country." He added, however, that  
since the aim of the Cities of Refuge arrangement is to promote freedom of 
expression, the writers must be able to speak and write freely, even if they might 
come up with criticizing conditions in Denmark or other third countries. (Minister for 
Culture, con., answer reproduced in additional committee report dated 28 May 2008, 
app. 11, p. 4)
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For the Minister of Integration, however, things are a bit more complicated. Due to 
the complexities at hand, it is necessary to quote her at some length: 
[W]e cannot demand from our citizens that they must love the law or that they must 
love democracy – and had we been talking about asylum seekers ... we could not 
have demanded this kind of declaration. Because in Denmark, you are allowed to be 
opposed to democracy. But here we are talking about a very specific, very airy and 
far-reaching basis for residence compared to the one we grant when dealing with 
refugees and family reunions et cetera... [W]riters are people using the word as a 
weapon, and we might as well be honest and say: We are talking about a political 
agreement, and we are talking about not letting someone in who will use the word to 
break down the Danish society... I have been eying through this declaration to make 
sure that there is no obligation to be a democrat, and we are not talking about that 
you have to love democracy – but you do have to respect and subject yourself to 
democracy when you are let in here on this far-reaching basis for residence. That is 
the reason why I can defend this and why I am of the opinion that it is right that we 
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 "Formentlig vil en forfulgt forfatter, som inviteres til Danmark som et fristed med 
opholdet betalt, ikke føle sig foranlediget til at kritisere sit værtsland. Men da friby-
ordningen tager sigte på at fremme ytringsfriheden, skal forfatterne kunne tale og skrive frit, 
også selv om de måtte finde på at kritisere forhold i Danmark eller andre tredjelande." 
(Minister for Culture, con., answer reproduced in additional committee report dated 28 May 
2008, app. 11, p. 4). 
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let the writer think for a moment if it is the right country he is coming to – and that 
we do not down right let in a fifth column who is after all not individually persecuted 
in the sense of the provisions for refugees under the Aliens Act (Minister for 
Integration, 2008.04.15, 15:22).
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Consequently, the point of the list to be signed by the writer is not primarily to set the 
minimal conditions for hospitality. It is, rather and foremost, a defence against a fifth 
column entering to feed on the welfare state before finishing it off by turning it into a 
totalitarian sharia state. Not just parasites who feed on the host, as Derrida discussed, 
but parasitoids who will, in the last instance, kill the host. 
However, will requiring a signature on such a declaration help keeping the parasitoids 
out? In an earlier debate, parliament discussed introducing something similar to – yet 
different from – a "Green Card," i.e., a work permit: a "Love Card" allowing you to 
love. The idea was that if a Danish citizen were solemnly to declare that s/he loves a 
partner they have met abroad, then said partner should be awarded a 'Love Card' 
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 "[V]i kan jo ikke kræve af vores borgere, at de skal elske loven, eller at de skal elske 
demokratiet, og havde der været tale om asylansøgere ... kunne vi ikke har forlangt sådan en 
erklæring her. For det er tilladt i Danmark at være imod demokratiet. Men her er der altså 
netop tale om et ganske specifikt, særlig luftigt og vidtgående opholdsgrundlag i forhold til 
dem, vi ellers har, når det drejer sig om flygtninge og familiesammenføringer osv. ... 
[F]orfattere er nogle, der bruger ordet som våben, og det kan man jo lige så godt sige ærligt 
her: Der er tale om en politisk aftale, og der er tale om, at man altså ikke lige her lukker 
nogen ind, som vil bruge ordet til at nedbryde det danske samfund. ... [J]eg har altså også 
selv prøvet at kigge den erklæring igennem for at være sikker på, at der altså ikke er nogen 
tvang til at være demokrat, og der er slet ikke nogen tale om, at man skal elske demokratiet, 
men man skal altså respektere og undergive sig demokratiet, når man kommer med det her 
særlig vidtgående opholdsgrundlag. Det er grunden til, at jeg godt kan forsvare det og 
mener, at det er rigtigt, at vi lige lader den forfatter tænke sig om, om det er det rigtige land, 
han vil tage til, og at vi ikke ligefrem lukker femte kolonne ind, som jo ikke er individuelt 
forfulgt efter udlændingelovens flygtningebegreb." (Minister for Integration, 2008.04.15, 
15:22). 
395 
allowing her/him temporary residence. F
308
 In the debate on Cities of Refuge, the DPP 
speaker – now in favour of a declaration on fundamental values – was reminded that 
he had dismissed the declaration of love with the words "People will sign anything to 
get into Denmark" (MP Henriksen, DPP, quoted by MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., 
2008.05.23, 11:38).
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Thus, rather than preventing parasitoids from abusing the host country, such a list of 
values represents an attempt to merge identity politics with security politics: it serves 
the construction of an existential threat – a radical other – to legitimize extraordinary 
means to defend identity; an identity which paradoxically needs the other to define 
itself (Wæver 1994). Even if the list of Danish values is carefully monitored by a 
respectable liberal intellectual – which the Minister for Integration admittedly is – the 
very existence of the list, and the act of listing work to turn Muslims into others. 
The declarations and lists analysed in this chapter are but one of the results of the 
insistence in Danish debates on the existence of 'fundamental values of Danish 
society' which Muslims are suspected to disregard and even undermine. The 
explication of such fundamental values as criteria for inclusion andexclusion, 
however, implies a danger – the danger of excluding the wrong persons. During the 
debates on the Cities of Refuge, a recent parliamentary debate on the values of 
immigrants was brought to memory as a speaker for an opposition party exclaimed 
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 Currently this is not always possible even if you marry your beloved, since for family 
reunification to be granted the provisions of the Aliens Act requires that the joint affiliation 
of the couple to Denmark be greater than to any other country (cf. chapter 4) – which, by 
simple math, it is not if you have met your partner in her/his home country and s/he has 
never been to Denmark. 
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 "Folk vil skrive under på hvad som helst for at komme ind i Danmark" (MP Henriksen, 
DPP, quoted by MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., 2008.05.23, 11:38). 
396 
that "it would be a relief if the MPs from DPP would sign the declaration in question" 
(MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., 2008.04.15, 15:05).
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This earlier debate (2007.04.26) focused on the values of migrants compared to the 
values of Danes.
311
 In this earlier debate on Danish values special attention was 
awarded to one MP for the Danish People’s Party, theologian Søren Krarup. During 
decades as a maverick right wing intellectual, he has renounced or violated more than 
a couple of the values which was now listed as fundamental to Danish society. 
Among some of those that he had taken issue with in book-length showdowns were 
those of human rights and democracy. In the parliamentary debate, however, Krarup 
concentrated his defence on newspaper reports accusing him (when asked questions 
carefully crafted to the purpose) of having failed to unambiguously accept 
homosexuality and to universally denounce the death penalty.  
This problem is not new to Krarup; he has accustomed himself to explaining how his 
old radical formulations are consistent with his present voting in parliament after he 
changed career from self-styled intellectual outcast to de facto responsible for 
government policies. In the debate on Danish values, Krarup argues that the criticism 
of his digressions from political correctness amounted to hairsplitting – or that they 
refer only to highly hypothetical situations.
312
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 "[D]et ville være rigtig befriende, om Dansk Folkepartis folketingsgruppe skrev under på 
den pågældende erklæring" (MP Ammitzbøll, soc.lib., 2008.04.15, 15:05; cf. MP Clausen, 
red/green, 2008.05.23, 11:41). 
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 The debate was put on the agenda of the parliament on the occasion of a report from the 
government 'think tank on the challenges to integration' (cf. chapter 5) reporting an opinion 
poll style survey. 
312
 Another argumentative strategy employed by Krarup amounts to a perfect illustration of 
the Lacanian concept of jouissance (re-introduced into English language political theory by 
Slavoj Žižek as 'enjoyment'), defined as "pleasure in unpleasure"; …the paradoxical 
satisfaction procured by a painful encounter with a Thing that perturbs the equilibrium of 
the "pleasure principle".... The hatred of the Other is the hatred of our own excess of 
397 
What is significant, however, is the two effects Krarup's example had on the debate: 
In the first instance, the effect was that the reach of the concept of Danish values was 
restricted. In the second instance, however, this first effect was annulled in the sense 
that discriminative exclusion is in effect upheld. Let me explain: 
The debate on fundamental Danish values culminated in a frontal attack by the 
opposition on the very concept of ‘Danish values’ which was by the government put 
up as a threshold for integration. The point of departure of the attack was the 
inclusion by the speaker for the Liberal party of most migrants as Danes – and the 
derived exclusion of a minority: 
luckily there is a large group which I call Danes with immigrant background who 
have both respected and adopted the values in Denmark and the way of life and 
democracy and everything that comes with it. We also have a small group which is 
problematic (MP Simonsen, lib., F37, 2007.04.26, 10:30).
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enjoyment.... [T]he fascinating image of the Other personifies … what … prevents us from 
achieving full identity with ourselves (1992:194-6). A text book example of jouissance is 
found in this quote by Krarup explaining his change in position on whether parents should 
be legally allowed to hit their children: "What makes it so terribly difficult to talk about the 
right of chastisement today is, that we have been swamped by a culture for which violence – 
the holy right of the man to beat his wife and children black and blue – is natural. This 
means that the Danish tradition for the right of chastisement has been more or less 
compromised by a Muslim tradition which is so different." "Det, der gør det så forbistret 
vanskeligt at tale om revselsesret i dag, er, at vi er blevet oversvømmet af en kultur, for 
hvilken vold - mandens hellige ret til at banke sin kone og børn gule og blå - er naturligt. Og 
det vil sige, at den danske tradition for revselsesret er blevet mere eller mindre 
kompromitteret af en muslimsk tradition, der er ganske anderledes" (MP Krarup, DPP, in 
Seidelin 2005). In this case, protection of Danish identity requires us to painfully relinquish 
a piece of Danish culture. 
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 "[L]ykkeligvis er [der] en stor gruppe, som jeg kalder danskere med indvandrerbaggrund, 
der både har respekteret og taget værdierne i Danmark til sig og levevisen og demokratiet 
og alt, hvad herunder hører. Vi har også en lille gruppe, som det er problematisk med" (MP 
Simonsen, lib., F37, 2007.04.26, 10:30). 
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By combining the exclusion of those who do not accept “the values in Denmark and 
the way of life and democracy and everything that comes with it” with the long list of 
specific value questions of the surveys reported by the think tank, speakers for the 
opposition parties could claim that Krarup violated these values.  
Even if Krarup's explanations were accepted by the speaker for the Conservative 
party (MP Kjær, con., F37, 2007.04.26, 14:05-.10), she denied that her party had  
a community of values with Danish People’s Party. We [merely] have a good 
working community with Danish People’s Party and we also share some common 
values; otherwise we would not have been able to agree on so much as we have 
agreed on. (MP Kjær, con., F37, 2007.04.26, 13:55)
314
 
The speaker for the Liberal party in a similar manoeuvre contracted the concept of 
‘fundamental norms’ to the most basic ones and, hence, referred the remarks by 
Krarup to a less destructive level; the level of ‘opinions’:  
I have a community of values with everyone – I suppose – in this parliament. All of 
us in here are Danish citizens subordinated to what is to me a very high set of values 
which consist within the framework of the Constitution. But I cannot find a single 
one of you in here with whom I am in agreement concerning all opinions. ... [T]he 
fundamental values are: everything that lies within the text of the constitution. (MP 
Simonsen, lib., F37, 2007.04.26)
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 "[E]t værdifællesskab med Dansk Folkeparti. Vi har et godt arbejdsfællesskab, og vi 
deler også nogle fælles værdier; ellers kunne vi ikke blive enige om så meget, som vi er 
blevet enige om." (MP Kjær, con., F37, 2007.04.26, 13:55) 
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 "Jeg har et værdifællesskab med samtlige - går jeg ud fra - der sidder her i salen. Vi er 
alle sammen herinde danske statsborgere, der er underlagt et for mig meget højt sæt værdier, 
nemlig bestående inden for grundlovens rammer. Men jeg kan ikke finde en eneste af jer 
herinde, som jeg holdningsmæssigt er enig med alt i. ... [D]e grundlæggende værdier er: Det 
er alt det, der ligger inden for grundlovens tekst." (MP Simonsen, lib., F37, 2007.04.26) 
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So in the debate, the concept of ’Danish values’ was pushed back to include only the 
‘fundamental values’ enshrined in the Constitution. 
At first it seems, indeed, to be a difficult task to make the Muslim other by listing 
values. The second point is, however, that it nevertheless still works. Even if Søren 
Krarup's values may be characterized as un-Danish, nobody seriously wants to deport 
him or take away his citizenship. But when a young woman with brown skin, wearing 
a hijab or not, born and raised in Denmark, does not renounce the death penalty in the 
most hypothetical society of all hypothetical societies (e.g. in an Islamic Utopia, 
where everyone lives in perfect adherence to the will of Allah), then she is considered 
not Danish – she turns into the other (Hervik 2002; Larsen, R.S. 2007; Jørgensen 
forthcoming). 
7.5 Conclusion: Negative interpellation as a reflexive policy 
So what are the contributions to radicalization of conflict from the way the persecuted 
writers are debated? How are the present and future relations presented and 
necessitated? 
An undisputed basis for the debate is the need to promote freedom of expression 
abroad. For the government and the right wing the need to limit the influx of aliens is 
also beyond debate. 
In the interventions of the government representatives the diacriticon for distinction 
between Them and Us is, at one level, citizenship.
316
 And again this is not the only 
criterion since the point of the debate and the legislation is to allow some of Them to 
enter. Some, but not all: It is OK for Them to disturb us but not to act as a fifth 
column. The list of values to be signed at the entrance is flagging the Muslim 
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 As it was in the debates on the Human Rights based criticism of Danish Alien legislation 
analysed in chapter 6. 
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character of Them – and this flagging reproduces the civilizational hierarchy between 
Their authoritarian and medieval practices and Our democratic and modern ditto. The 
distance is implied to be short: They seem to be lined up, ready to enter Our territory. 
It is implied that Their presence – especially if They are the radically other-version of 
Them – will be felt. The very listing of values which They are to embrace presents 
itself as founded on a knowledge of what They would most likely be doing if no list 
were presented for signature. It is not clear whether the other is described to be 
capable of change or to be permanent. Whether the posture of the radical version of 
the other – aggressively challenging – is a structural effect (of Islam) or an individual 
choice is not explicated. But dialogicality is implied to be present in the less-than-
radical Others. Only a precondition for you – as a Muslim – to be accepted into 
dialogue is that you, literally, promise to stop beating your wife: You must accept the 
picture painted of 'the Muslim' by explicitly distancing yourself from it. 
The basic interactional grammar in the government narratives is Orientalist; the 
policies proposed is generally one of keeping the radical other distinct from Us by 
keeping Them outside. The grammar of Encompassment is, however, relevant as far 
as concerns the less-than-radical other; s/he needs our protection – and with him/her 
we may engage in a dialogue. We may even, when protecting, accept hearing 
counter-narratives which we dislike. We will, however, not listen to them in the sense 
of taking them in with a view to considering self-reform. The distinction between the 
radical and the less-than-radical other complicates the cast of characters of the 
narrative since the less-than-radical other is defined in terms of religiously defined 
culture (Islam) – while the radical other is defined in terms of religiously defined 
ideology (Islamism).
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 The implications of this distinction is in focus for the analysis in chapter 8. 
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On the one hand, the oral interventions of the government seek recourse to a 
sedimented element in Danish identity discourse; the self-image of being an example 
to the world when it comes to democratic values. On the other hand, the list of 
Danish values to be signed and accepted by the writer upon arrival extends the set of 
sedimented elements to which recourse is sought: Recourse is sought, primarily, to 
the self-image of being an exemplary democratic country (threatened by Islamists) – 
and, secondarily implied; to the self-image of being a culturally homogenous nation 
(threatened by the influx of Muslims).  
The DPP suggests, firstly, as a diacriticon for the less-than-radical other to be allowed 
in, that s/he should behave in a reverent way; secondly, that the list of values 
diacritical for distinguishing the radical other should be extended with yet another 
Muslim characteristicon unacceptable in Denmark. Both suggestions add to the 
Orientalist grammar and both add to its tendency to securitization. The narratives of 
the opposition contrarily concentrates on Our responsibility to protect the less-than-
radical other – and on the value for Us of the dialogue thus made possible. The 
narratives of the government, in sum, seek to unite the two sedimented elements of 
Danish identity discourse preferred by the DPP and the opposition respectively: 
homogeneity threatened by Muslims and being an example to the world. The 
articulation of the two narratives is in this debate, however, rather external: In the 
oral debates, the government mainly agrees with the opposition – at times, the 
government even explicitly distances itself from the DPP. In the texts of and 
procedures instituted by the law, however, the narratives of DPP are to a large degree 
facilitated. 
7.6 Perspectives: Hospitality as a strategic task 
The very premise for the debate is that there is a conflict between Us and the 
Islamists – and that you need to choose our side to be accepted as a partner in 
dialogue. If you do not, there is not position to speak from in Denmark. In that sense, 
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the debates – the Minister for Culture's insistence on accept of criticism of Denmark 
disregarded – should not facilitate conflict in the first instance: The ones who could 
be expected to engage in conflict will most probably not enter the territory on this 
ticket. In the second instance, however, the way in which Muslims already in 
Denmark – and Muslims abroad without any intention to ever go to Denmark, for that 
matter – is co-interpellated by the listing of 'Muslim' practices and values may 
contribute to radicalization of conflict. 
The way in which the distinction between Islam and Islamism is upheld in the 
narrative promoted by the government – through the demand for a signature on the 
declaration on fundamental Danish values – in effect annuls the very same 
distinction. It does so by asking the other to explicitly dis-interpellate himself from a 
specific narrative of otherness: it asks the arriving stranger to sign up to a 
characteristic of a Muslim and simultaneously distance himself from that identity. 
Otherwise s/he cannot hope to be accepted as the one he might always have thought 
he was. 
The very inclusion in the declaration of a list of values is, on the one hand, employing 
a negative interpellation of the other as a rhetorical strategy to ward of possible 
intruders. On the other hand, this interpellation is seeking recourse to formality in the 
sense that the form of the declaration to be signed presents itself as bureaucratic 
routine. The combined effect is that the formalization doubles the effect of the 
interpellation by making it exceedingly difficult to talk back. 
In Of Hospitality, Anne Dufourmantelle stresses the political role of philosophy in 
being granted the right to philosophize about absolute, utopian hospitality without a 
fixed purpose or a practical agenda (2000:66). True; if we want to keep the political 
debate high-ceilinged, someone needs to keep the pillars supporting the ceiling erect 
and tall. So there is a role for speculative philosophy. We should, however, also heed 
Derrida's call for giving "place to a determined, limitable, and delimitable – in a 
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word, to a calculable – right or law ... to a concrete politics and ethics" of hospitality 
(2000:147-8). In order to do so, we need to make ourselves familiar with the strategic 
terrain we intend to intervene in. In the words of anthropologist Daniel Miller, though 
coined in a different context: "Having shown that we can be philosophers, we need 
the courage to refuse this ambition and return to ethnographic empathy and ordinary 
language" (2005:15).  
This ambition, firstly, points out an important role for what might be termed 
"strategic studies," conceived of as identifying openings in the discourses of politics, 
of media, of everyday life – openings for articulating just a little more 'real life' 
hospitality. Such a task needs to be based on analyses of the specific strategic terrain 
into which we choose to intervene; a terrain saturated with fears and strategies of 
defence. Utopian idea(l)s and moral principles alone will not do. Even if they may be 
shown to systematically break down under their own weight. Or perhaps because 
they can be shown to do so. We need to analyze the present processes of othering – to 
identify opportunities for turning the radicalized other into a less-than-radical other, 
into a foreigner to whom conditional hospitality can – should – be offered.  
Secondly, any specific intervention on behalf of hospitality requires a turn away from 
essentializations, and toward hybridity: We need to insist that it is possible to be both 
Danish and Muslim; simultaneously a democrat and a Muslim. But, as Frello warns: 
"if the concept of hybridity gives rise to an indifferent celebration of difference it 
creates blindness to the unequal power relations always involved" (2005:101, my 
transl.). Thus this turn also, finally, implies deliberately prioritizing some forms of 
hybridity over other forms: we need to include democratic Muslim Danes, and 
exclude Danish non-Muslim non-democrats.  
Switching identity politics to revolve around a different distinction – i.a. away from 
Dane/Muslim to Democrat/Non-Democrat – is, however, not an easy task to 
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accomplish. This difficulty ends up in focus when chapter 8 analyses how the concept 
of dialogue is employed to describe policies to counter terrorism. 
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Appendix: The Declaration 
Erklæring om anerkendelse af de grundlæggende værdier i det danske samfund 
Navn: ________________________________________ 
Udl.nr./personnr.: _______________________________ 
Jeg erklærer herved, at jeg anerkender de grundlæggende værdier i det danske samfund. 
Jeg erklærer derfor følgende: 
 Jeg vil på alle måder overholde den danske lovgivning og værne om de danske 
demokratiske principper. 
 Jeg respekterer det enkelte menneskes frihed og personlige integritet, kønnenes 
ligestilling og tros- og ytringsfriheden, som er grundlæggende i Danmark. 
 Jeg ved, at diskrimination på grund af bl.a. køn eller hudfarve og trusler og hån mod 
grupper på grund af bl.a. tro eller seksuel orientering er ulovlige handlinger i Danmark. 
 Jeg anerkender, at mænd og kvinder har lige pligter og rettigheder i Danmark, og at både 
mænd og kvinder skal bidrage til samfundet. 
 Jeg anerkender, at der i Danmark skal være lige respekt og udfoldelsesmuligheder for alle 
børn - både piger og drenge - så de kan vokse op til at blive aktive og ansvarlige 
medborgere, der er i stand til at træffe deres egne valg. 
 Jeg anerkender, at det danske samfund tager skarpt afstand fra terrorisme, og at enhver 
borger bør bekæmpe terrorisme bl.a. ved at bistå myndighederne i det forebyggende og 
opklarende arbejde. 
 Jeg anerkender, at aktivt engagement i det danske samfund er en forudsætning for 
demokratiet. 
Jeg erklærer også, at jeg ved, at mit ophold i Danmark som led i fribyordningen er 
midlertidigt, og at det er hensigten, at jeg skal vende tilbage til mit hjemland. Formålet med 
mit ophold er således, at jeg får mulighed for i en periode at udøve mine litterære aktiviteter 
i Danmark for derefter at vende tilbage til mit hjemland. 
 
Dato:________________ Underskrift: ______________________________ 
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Declaration on recognition of the fundamental values of the Danish societyF
318
 
Name: ________________________________________ 
Foreign national’s ID/Civil registry number: ________________________ 
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I understand and accept the fundamental values of 
Danish society.  
I thus declare as follows:  
 I shall comply with Danish legislation and protect the Danish democratic principles 
in every respect.  
 I respect the freedom and personal integrity of the individual, equal opportunities for 
men and women, and freedom of speech and religion which are fundamental 
constitutional rights in Denmark.  
 I understand and accept that discrimination on the grounds of race and skin colour 
and threats and scorn against groups on the grounds of religion or sexual orientation 
is illegal in Denmark.  
 I understand and accept that men and women have equal obligations and rights in 
Denmark and that both men and women shall contribute to society.  
 I understand and accept that in Denmark all children shall be given equal respect and 
self-expression – be they boys or girls – in order for them to grow up and become 
active and responsible citizens who are capable of making their own decisions 
 I understand and accept that Danish society strongly condemns acts of terrorism and 
that any citizen has an obligation to fight terrorism amongst others by assisting the 
authorities through prevention and investigation.  
 I understand and accept that active commitment to the Danish society is a 
precondition for democracy.  
I also declare that I am aware that my stay in Denmark as part of the Cities of Refuge 
arrangement is temporary and that it is intended that I shall return to my homeland. The 
purpose of my stay is, hence, to allow me to practise my literary activities in Denmark for a 
period of time, while afterwards return to my homeland.  
Date: _______________ Signature:______________________________ 
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 The translation from the Danish is partly copy-pasted from the "Declaration on 
integration and active citizenship in Danish society" on the official home-page of the 
Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs. Where the "Declaration on 
recognition of the fundamental values of the Danish society" differs from this original 
declaration, the author has done the translation. The “understand and accept” of the official 
English version presented to writers to sign carries more specific and binding than the 
Danish “anerkende” which cover both the English “recognize” and “acknowledge”. 
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8 It takes two to Tango: Danish concepts of dialogue as 
counterterrorism 
Chapter 7 laid out how the security of Danish homogeneity is prioritized over the 
security of foreigners. Even when the foreigners need protection because they 
practice values which are presented as universal and whose exceptional embodiment 
Denmark is described to be. To ameliorate this situation, the chapter concluded by 
calling for pragmatic, strategic interventions to supplement principled, universalist 
declamations. This chapter demonstrates the difficulty of such an attempt to switch 
policies away from securitization of cultural identity – even when the attempt is 
performed by the discursively privileged voices of government. 
8.1 Introduction: Narrating the self-reform of the other 
On September 11 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked 4 planes in the USA. Thousands of 
innocent human beings were killed, and ever since, the world has not been the same. 
During the last 5 years it has become clear that we are in the middle of a global value 
struggle. It is not a value struggle between cultures or religions; it is a value struggle 
between sensible enlightenment and fundamentalist darkening, between democracy 
and dictatorship, between freedom and tyranny. In this struggle, one cannot remain 
neutral... The strongest force in this struggle is the desire and demand of millions of 
oppressed people for freedom. We saw that in Iraq when 12 million Iraqis defied the 
terrorists and went to the ballots ... We have to help Africa so that young Africans see 
a hope, see a future, see rich possibilities in their own country, so that they are not 
attracted to extremism, so that they do not end up on the wrong side of the global 
value struggle. The global value struggle takes place in Denmark too. .. Fortunately it 
is so that the great majority of Danes with an immigrant background ... are 
contributing positively to the Danish society. ... But there are also a few extremists 
who seem to hate the society which have secured their political freedom and material 
safety. ... We must not out of naïve and happy-go-lucky tolerance show 
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understanding towards or facilitate religious fanaticism or political extremism. (PM 
A.F. Rasmussen, lib., R1, 2006.10.03 12.05-12.15)
319
 
In these sentences featured prominently in his 2006 ‘state of the realm’ speech, the 
Danish prime minister summarized what the government took to be the conditions for 
the long term counterterrorism policy of the Danish government: Most Muslims are 
waiting to be our partners in emancipating both themselves and us from extremists 
threatening us and oppressing them. Terms like ‘partnership’ and ‘dialogue’ has 
become part of the self-description of specific government policies to counter 
terrorsim.  
The etymology of the word ‘dialogue’ – originating in Greek διά (‘across/inter-‘) and 
λόγος (‘speech’) – suggests that it denotes an inter-action across two or more distinct 
entities.
320
 In Danish government discourse they are, however, generally describing a 
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 "Den 11. september 2001 kaprede 19 terrorister fire fly i USA. Tusindvis af uskyldige 
mennesker blev slået ihjel. Og siden har verden ikke været den samme. Gennem de sidste 
fem år er det blevet klart, at vi står midt i en global værdikamp. Det er ikke en værdikamp 
mellem kulturer eller religioner. Det er en værdikamp mellem forstandig oplysning og 
fundamentalistisk formørkelse. Mellem demokrati og diktatur. Mellem frihed og tyranni. I 
den kamp kan man ikke være neutral. ... Den stærkeste kraft i denne kamp er ønsket og 
kravet fra millioner af undertrykte om at få frihed. Det så vi i Irak, da 12 millioner irakere 
trodsede terroristerne og gik til stemmeurnerne ... [V]i [skal] hjælpe Afrika. Så unge 
afrikanere ser et håb, en fremtid og rige muligheder i deres eget land. Så de ikke bliver 
tiltrukket af ekstremisme. Så de ikke ender på den forkerte side i den globale værdikamp. 
Den globale værdikamp foregår også i Danmark. ... Heldigvis er det sådan, at det store 
flertal af danskere med indvandrerbaggrund ... yder et positivt bidrag til det danske 
samfund. ... Men der er også enkelte ekstremister, som tilsyneladende hader det samfund, 
der har sikret dem politisk frihed og materiel tryghed. ... Vi må ikke i naiv og lalleglad 
tolerance vise forståelse eller give medløb til religiøs fanatisme og politisk ekstremisme." 
(PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., R1, 2006.10.03 12.05-12.15) 
320
 The Online Etymology Dictionary warns that “Mistaken belief that it can only mean 
‘conversation between two persons’ is from confusion of dia- and di-.”, i.e. ‘across’ and 
‘two-’ (http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=dialogue, cf. 
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/dialogue, both accessed 29 September 2008). 
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one way street: We have something that the Muslims need (and most of them want); 
partnerships and dialogues are means to implement this already defined goal. 
This chapter analyses how the use of the term ‘dialogue’ in government policies on 
counterterrorism have gradually changed to include more instances of two-way 
interaction – and places the government narratives in the context of parliamentary 
positions on what 'dialogue' is and ought to be. While the tendency of giving weight 
to policies of dialogue in government policies surfaced first in foreign policy 
formulations, it has recently been taken further in an integration policy document. 
The agreement forming the base of the disagreements analysed is that terrorism 
should be prevented – and that some kind of relation exists between terror and 
Muslims in general (even if the disagreement includes exactly what the relation is). In 
the first reading of the debates, the disagreement is analysed by showing how the 
self/other security narratives gradually turn more reflexive. The most unlikely result 
of the merger of counterterrorism policies and integration policies, then, is not an 
intensified securitization of integration policy but a relative de-securitization of 
counterterrorism. It will, however, not amount to an a-securitization of neither. 
Section 8.2 briefly recollects the concept of identity as a discursive structure 
developed in chapter 2 while beginning the analysis of the chapter. Firstly, the section 
relates the theoretical concepts of philosophical and sociological others. Secondly, 
the section lays out how the way in which the authorities formulate narratives on the 
radically threatening terrorist other implicates less-than-radical others. Specifically, 
narratives of partnership and dialogue involving less-than-radical others in 
counterterrorism serve as a supplement to policies of elimination and control. Section 
8.3 examines how the term ‘dialogue’ may – when used in counterterrorism policies 
– imply either monologue, inclusion, or interchange between two different entities.  
Section 8.4 analyses how a concept of dialogue as a two-way interchange spurs the 
need for control and monitoring the limits to the difference of the party invited into 
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dialogue. Section 8.5 lays out how the need to control and monitor implicated in the 
efforts of the government to position itself as defenders of Danish identity between an 
opposition calling for Self-reform and a supporting right wing party putting the 
possibility of reforming the Muslim other in question.  
Section 8.6 concludes by summing up the contribution of the chapter to the overall 
aim of the dissertation: This second reading assessed the contribution to 
radicalization from the structures of the identity configuration centred on Danish 
debates on Muslims. A final section 8.7 evaluates – as the third reading – the strategic 
situation for Muslims wanting to revise the script for the role as less-than-radical 
others they are awarded by the counterterrorism and integration policies. 
8.2 Radical others and less-than-radical others in narratives 
of self-defence 
This section lays out how authorities need to formulate narratives on the radically 
threatening terrorist other (subsection 8.2.1); how these narratives gradually implicate 
less-than-radical others (subsection 8.2.2); and how they seem to gradually award 
more agency to these less-than-radical others (subsection 8.2.3). 
8.2.1 The Terrorist as radical other and the responsibility of government 
Chapter 2 laid out how identity needs difference to be; you cannot deem someone 
identical without deeming someone else – some others – different. As long as 
everyone agrees on who’s identical and who’s different – who are included as We; 
who are excluded as this kind of They and as that kind of They – and everyone agrees 
that that’s the way things should be; no problem. Problems arise when not everyone 
agrees. Everyone never does.  
The problem with disagreement is that the allocation of various others in boxes does 
not merely affect Them. As our identity is constituted in relation to their difference, 
redefinition of others affects our identity too.  
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In philosophical terms, a radical other is that which prevents you from being the one 
you ought to be. Philosophically speaking there is always another other – even 
another radical other – since identity as a concept implies that any change, any 
difference, any impurity can be pointed out as a threat to identity.  
And threats to identity will be pointed out. If no one names an identity, it is 
meaningless to conceive of its existence. So identity exists only in discourse; only as 
part of the construction of meaning. But why explicate identity if it is unproblematic? 
If an identity is not explicitly problematic, it does not exist – and the moment it is 
brought into existence, it is necessarily made a problem (Wæver 1997:328-9; Žižek 
1992:197; Derrida 1982). 
If a specific group of people – a sociological other – is pointed out as that which 
prevents you from being the one you ought to be, that other is radicalized. Another 
way to put it is that the other is securitized; i.e. pointed out as a security threat: The 
other is no just said to be different from you but said to constitute an existential threat 
to your identity (Connolly 1991:8). In Danish parliamentarian debates, one such 
sociological other securitized to be a radical other is ‘the terrorist’. Terrorists, 
terrorism, and terrorist acts are repeatedly explicitly pointed out as a threat to 
Denmark, Danes, and key elements in Danish identity.
321 
They are characterized by a 
variety of invectives.
322
 And they are routinely dismissed and condemned as an introit 
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 "[T]errorism is a threat to society, to the values it is build upon, and to the individual 
citizen [terrorismen en trussel mod samfundet og de værdier, som det bygger på, og mod 
den enkelte borger.]" (Min. f. Justice Espersen, con., L217, 2006.03.31). "The terrorists we 
know today want to fight democracy and the rule of law. [De terrorister, vi kender i dag, 
ønsker at bekæmpe demokratiet og retssikkerheden. ]" (MP Barfod, UL., F7, 2005.11.16, 
18.20). 
322
 “The threat No. 1 of the future [fremtidens trussel nr. 1]” (MP Poulsen, lib., AD14, 
2004.03.17, 12:10); “abominable [modbydelige]” (MP Poulsen, lib., AD14, 2004.03.17, 
12:10, MP Jensen, soc.dem., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:10; MP Messerschmidt, DPP, F1, 
2005.04.06, 16:25; 17:00); “brutal [brutal]” (MP Poulsen, lib., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:10); 
“evil [ondskab]” (MP Jensen, soc.dem., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:10); “bestial [bestialsk]” 
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to the interventions of each party spokesman.
323
 Indeed, the government point out 
terror as the threat defining our security: 
The threats of the 21st century are fundamentally different than the ones we faced 
during the Cold War and in the first years after the fall of the Wall. The nightmare is 
no longer an all-destructive nuclear war but massively destructive attacks from global 
terror networks or desperate regimes which have placed themselves outside the 
international community. Terrorism today is a real and essential threat to populations 
everywhere in the world. (Regeringen 2003:2)
324
 
Existential threats you need to handle if you are in charge (or want to be put in 
charge) – at least if the referent-object against which the threat is posed is worth 
defending (Wæver 1995). If you are in government (or in politics, in which case you 
want to be in government) you will want to stay in authority. To do so, you need to 
tell how you want to fight off existential threats against the entity you represent. You 
need to tell a plausible story about your choice of policy. These two mandatory 
sequences in a securitizing narrative are illustrated in figure 8.1.
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(MP Behnke, con., F7, 2005.11.16, 17.25-30); “insane [sindssyge]” (MP Behnke, con., F7, 
2005.11.16, 17.25-30); “crazy [vanvittige]” (MP Barfod, UL, F7, 2005.11.16, 18:20). 
323
 “Nothing may, after all, apologize or legitimize terror" "intet kan jo undskylde eller 
legitimere terror.” (MP Baastrup, soc., F7, 2005.11.16 18:10) and “Terror is always an 
indefensible act and an act that always needs to be condemned." "Terror er altid en 
uforsvarlig handling og en handling, der altid må fordømmes.” (MP Hoydal, Faroes, F7, 
2005.11.16 18.30). Even as a prelude to arguing a relatively de-radicalized picture of 
terrorism: “The Red/Green Alliance wants a world without war and terrorism. Any decent 
human being condemns terrorism.” (MP Arbo-Bæhr, UL, R1, 2005.10.06 17:35).  
324
 "Det 21. århundredes trusler er fundamentalt anderledes, end dem vi stod overfor under 
Den Kolde Krig og de første år efter Murens fald. Mareridtet er ikke længere den 
altødelæggende atomkrig, men massivt ødelæggende angreb fra globale terrornetværk eller 
desperate regimer, der har stillet sig uden for det internationale samfund. Terrorisme er i dag 
en virkelig og væsentlig trussel mod befolkningerne overalt i verden." (Regeringen 2003:2) 
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Figure 8.1 The two mandatory sequences of a securitizing narrative: Threat and 
response 
 
In Denmark, the immediate reactions in 2001-2 to the 9/11 attacks on New York and 
Washington focused on ‘fighting the terrorists’. This involves policies of control and 
elimination – illustrated in figure 8.2.  
Control and Elimination
Self
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OtherX
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Radical 
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Figure 8.2 Basic counterterrorism policies: Control and elimination 
 
Domestically policies of controlling the possible activities of terrorists included the 
intelligence services being allowed a series of new operational modes. The policy of 
physically eliminating terrorists was primarily employed abroad by joining the US 
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efforts in Afghanistan. As policies for dealing with others, both control and 
elimination have long traditions (Todorov 1999:132-45; Lindqvist 1992; Foucault 
1978).  
“In this struggle, one cannot remain neutral”, claimed the prime minister (cf. quote 
above). Only seldom, however, a story can be told of a one-on-one showdown 
between you and the evil other. And even if a story may be based on an allocation of 
roles between the two possibilities of ‘Either you are with us or you are with the 
terrorists’, most often a more sophisticated distribution of roles is needed (cf. Hansen 
2006:40). Generally, for such stories, you need a cast of characters – a cast of less-
than-radical Others (Hansen 1998). Different policies invite different less-than-
radical Others to participate. Such a diversification of roles for others is illustrated in 
figure 8.3. 
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Figure 8.3 Diversification of roles in security narrative: Inviting different less-than-
radical others 
 
8.2.2 Counterterrorism policies constructing less-than-radical others  
As time has passed, bringing new events in the Middle East and European capitals, 
the spectrum of Danish counterterrorism narratives have become more complex. 
Correspondingly, the cast of different less-than-radical others needed to take up their 
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roles in an evermore “broad spectrum” (Regeringen 2009b:4, 12, 33) of 
counterterrorism policy narratives has expanded.  
In 2005, in a debate in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombing of the London underground, 
the Danish prime minister explained that  
The overall strategy of the government ... involves three parts: We have to prevent 
support and recruitment for terrorism through our international involvement and 
through an active integration policy at home; we have to fight terrorists and terror 
networks and cut off their access to money and materials; and then we have to 
prepare ourselves for the fact that a terrorist attack may take place (PM A.F. 
Rasmussen, lib., F7, 2005.11.16, 15:15; cf. Regeringen 2003:13).
325
 
It is clear from the interventions of the prime minister and his ministers in the debate 
that policies of elimination and control are still central: domestically, the Minister for 
Justice presents a new catalogue of “necessary means for fighting terrorists and terror 
networks” (ibid., 15:20).326 But the relative weight of the spectrum – not least in the 
foreign policy part – is tilted towards “long term” (ibid., 15:15).327 policies involving 
less-than-radical others: “Through our active foreign policy we seek to counter the 
circumstances out there, in the World, which may provide a breeding ground for 
support for terrorism.” (ibid., 15:15)328 Abroad the measures include foreign aid (to 
prevent terrorists from legitimizing their deeds by reference to global injustices) and 
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 "Regeringens overordnede strategi består ... af tre led: Vi skal forebygge opbakning og 
rekruttering til terrorisme gennem vores internationale engagement og gennem en aktiv 
integrationspolitik herhjemme, vi skal bekæmpe terrorister og terrornetværk og afskære dem 
adgang til penge og materialer, og så skal vi forberede os på, at terrorangreb kan finde sted; 
det kræver et robust beredskab, der kan mindske konsekvenserne af et terrorangreb." (PM 
A.F. Rasmussen, lib., F7, 2005.11.16, 15:15). 
326
 "[N]ødvendige instrumenter til at bekæmpe terrorister og terrornetværk." (Ibid., 15:20). 
327
 "[L]angsigtet" (Ibid., 15:15). 
328
 "Gennem vores aktive udenrigspolitik søger vi at imødegå de forhold, der ude i verden 
kan danne grobund for opbakning til terrorisme. " (Ibid., 15:15) 
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“peace keeping operations” like “the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan” 
aiming “to integrate them in the international cooperation, including the cooperation 
to fight terrorism.” (ibid.)329 In parallel, an "active integration policy at home" (ibid., 
15:15)
330
 aims to “prevent young people from being attracted to the ideology of 
extremists” (ibid., 15:20).331 
The others in focus for these counterterrorism policies are less-than-radical. But these 
others are, nevertheless, others. It might be possible for them to be included in some 
We – but it is not a sure thing, and it is an open question what kind of We they may 
be included in. The less-than-radical others are relatively de-securitized in 
comparison to the highly securitized radical Other. But they are not a-securitized 
(Wæver 1998); they are still discursively inscribed in a security problem. We need a 
policy towards Them, to make sure that They do not somehow end up as radically 
other; end up as part of the existential threat to Our identity. We need to reconstruct 
Their subjectivity – to re-form Their identity and Their propensity for action – to be 
sure to have Them on Our side. 
There is a long history of European and Western attempts to have others reformed – 
most prominently to resemble the model, i.e. the reformer (cf. Todorov 1999). 
Depending on what sort of diacriticon is the threshold for identification the policies 
can be identified as conversion (religion), enlightenment (knowledge), or 
modernization (mode of production). What holds these policies of reformation 
together is that We have a certain characteristicon which We believe They should 
                                           
329
 "[F]redsbevarende operationer hvor genopbygningen af Afghanistan, Irak og Sudan er 
vigtige bidrag til at bringe landene på fode og integrere dem i det internationale samarbejde, 
herunder samarbejdet om bekæmpelse af terrorisme." (Ibid., 15:20). 
330
 "[E]n aktiv integrationspolitik herhjemme" (Ibid., 15:15). 
331
 "[F]orebygge, at unge mennesker føler sig tiltrukket af ekstremisternes ideologi" (Ibid., 
15:20). 
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have as well. Sometimes some of Them agree – sometimes They do not. Which 
warrant more or less coercive means to implement the policy. The policy of 
reforming the other is illustrated in figure 8.4. 
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Figure 8.4 Policy of reforming the other to become less radical 
 
If They are constructed as split between, on the one hand, the masses which agree to 
have a need to be more like us and, on the other hand, a group of oppressors (the 
radical other of the masses) who does not (cf. Hansen 2006:114), a policy of reform 
can be termed as one of emancipation: "We have to take on our shoulders the 
responsibility to help and secure that also the Iraqi population will have a democratic 
and free country to live in." (MP Behnke, con., F7, 2005.11.16 17:40) F
332
 This policy 
of emancipation is illustrated in figure 8.5.  
Policies of elimination, control and reformation are effectively one-way affairs: You 
do something to Them; Their possible actions are only conceptualized as counter-
active re-actions to be dealt with accordingly. When it comes to policies of 
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 "Vi er nødt til at påtage os det ansvar at hjælpe og sikre, at også den irakiske befolkning 
får et demokratisk og frit land at leve i." (MP Behnke, con., F7, 2005.11.16 17:40; cf. prime 
minister A.F. Rasmussen, lib., R1, 2003.10.07 12:30). 
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emancipation, however, there are limits to what kind of action of the other that may 
be discounted in this way. Hence the need arises to engage these less-than-radical 
others in partnerships and in dialogue to secure that their action benefits the common 
goal of their emancipation. 
Self
Radical 
Other
Less than 
radical Other
 
Figure 8.5 Policy of emancipation of a less-than-radical other co-threatened by the 
radical other 
 
8.2.3 Why partnership and dialogue? The other as an active character 
Policies of elimination and control are, as described in the previous sections, 
supplemented by policies of reform and of emancipation. Policies of emancipation 
are, however, more convincing if an other can be constructed to actively participate in 
its own emancipation. If so, policies of emancipation may turn into policies of 
partnership. Andersen concludes a study of partnerships as second-order contracts 
between the state and non-state entities
333
 by describing the complex relation between 
freedom and obligation constructed in the partnership:  
                                           
333
 Including partnerships between 1st and 3rd world NGO’s as part of state orchestrated 
development aid (2008:42ff). 
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What partnerships seek to establish is ... the partner’s freedom to commit to assuming 
responsibility for the partnership. Partnerships represent an attempt to formulate 
mutual obligations concerning the self-creation of individual partners as responsible 
for and relevant to the partnership. It concerns the obligation to create yourself as a 
free and independent partner for the partnership – obligation towards the freedom in 
the image of the partnership. ... [I]t requires freedom reintroduced as obligation, but 
at the same time it has to presuppose freedom since otherwise there could be no 
obligation towards freedom. (Andersen 2008:106) 
As time passes, the immediately chosen policies of elimination and control have been 
sought implemented without any determinate success. Simultaneously, policies of 
partnership are featured more and more prominently in the communication of the 
Danish government. 
In the post-7/7 debate in late 2005, the prime minister talked about two relationships 
in terms of partnerships; one abroad and one at home: As part of the active foreign 
policy 
we have, by The Arab Initiative begun an important dialogue with the Arab countries 
and Iran. The Initiative supports local reform aiming at more free and democratic 
societies – a development which the government finds to be decisive in the 
prevention of further radicalization. (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib.,F7, 2005.11.16, 
15:15)
334
 
Domestically, the contribution to counterterrorism from the active integration policy 
builds on the premise that  
                                           
334
 "[V]i [har] med Det Arabiske Initiativ startet en vigtig dialog med de arabiske lande og 
med Iran. Initiativet støtter lokale reformer i retning af mere frie og demokratiske samfund, 
en udvikling, som regeringen finder afgørende i forebyggelsen af yderligere radikalisering." 
(PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., F7, 2005.11.16, 15:15) The official English translation of what is 
in Denmark literally presented as The Arab Initiative is “Partnership for Progress and 
Reform” between Denmark, the Middle East, and North Africa. Gradually, the English title 
is shortened to "Danish Arab Partnership Programme" (cf. Ministry 2009). 
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Danish Muslims and immigrants in Denmark are decisive allies in the fight against 
terrorism. Together we can win this fight. We shall prevent young people from being 
attracted to the ideology of the extremists – and that requires us to promote dialogue 
and counter radicalization in certain Muslim quarters. (Ibid., 15:20)
335
 
The policy of partnership in the fight against the radical other is illustrated in figure 
8.6.  
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Figure 8.6 Policy of partnership with a less-than-radical other to fight the radical other 
 
Both partnerships are described by the prime minister as involving 'dialogue'. On the 
one hand, 'dialogue' connotes a certain openness springing from an interchange 
between two distinct entities. On the other hand, partnerships as a policy – even the 
ones involving dialogues – generally presuppose a common goal; a goal defined by 
the party articulating the partnership.
336
 Either because the initiator explicates the 
                                           
335
 "[D]anske muslimer og indvandrere i Danmark er afgørende allierede i kampen mod 
terrorisme. Sammen kan vi vinde den. Vi skal forebygge, at unge mennesker føler sig 
tiltrukket af ekstremisternes ideologi, og det kræver, at vi fremmer dialogen og imødegår 
radikalisering i visse muslimske miljøer." (Ibid., 15:20). 
336
 Karlsen & Villadsen describe a proliferation of dialogue as governmental technology in 
the Danish welfare state. On the one hand, they note that "They all require, initiate and 
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goal which the partner has to agree to aim for. Or because the initiator embodies a 
quality which the partner – by entering into the partnership – aims at acquiring. This 
tension between openness and predestination makes for intricate contractions and 
expansions. Figure 8.7 illustrates a policy of two-way dialogue with the less-than-
radical other as part of a partnership aiming to reform the radical other. 
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Figure 8.7 Policy of dialogical partnership with a less-than-radical other to reform the 
radical other 
 
The Arab Initiative was originally conceived of in 2003 as a part of a comprehensive 
foreign policy document
337
 but was only effectively launched to the public in 2005
338
 
and evaluated and adjusted in 2006
339
 in the aftermath of the Cartoon Crisis. The 
parliament debated the initiative and the evaluation on 24 May 2006.
340
 Following a 
                                                                                                                                            
operate through a form of self-analysis or self-reflection, which aims at producing particular 
kinds of self-insight and self-awareness ... The objective is to fill the room with individual's 
authentic statements, but the conversational space is already pre-shaped by regulatory 
procedures." (2008:359-360) 
337
 Regeringen (2003).  
338
 Parallel texts in (Udenrigsministeriet 2005) and (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005).  
339
 Udenrigsministeriet (2006). 
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second evaluation process,
341
 the initiative was re-launched in late 2008.
342
 The 
government texts presenting the Arab Initiative on its own premises explicitly ascribe 
the prioritization of the aims to the Arab Human Development Report, which is 
introduced as "published by the United Nations Development Programme and written 
by a team of Arab researchers and political analysts" (Ministry 2005:3; 7: 2009:4).  
Only when presented within the frame of counterterrorism, the bulk of the specific 
sub-policies included in these policies of partnership – in the Arab Initiative and in 
the action plan to counter radicalization – appear within the basically asymmetrical 
logic of reform towards an aim predefined by us (to counter terrorism). Even when 
framed as counterterrorism the term ‘dialogue’, as we shall see, sometimes implies a 
less lopsided relation between self and other.  
The domestic policies of partnership and dialogue were slower to evolve in the 
discourse of the present government. The articulation – in government policy 
statements at least – of counterterrorism policies and general policies of integration of 
migrants was only cemented after the 7/7 London bombings had propelled the 
concept of ‘home grown terrorists’ into the debate in 2005. Until then the government 
had primarily sponsored a classical economically Liberal concept of integration 
focusing on labour market integration and including some attentiveness to grievances 
like discrimination (cf. chapter 5). The immediate reaction to 7/7 – soon followed by 
the Cartoon affair – was to supplement the labour market efforts with a more 
culturalist concept of integration bordering on cultural assimilation through a focus 
on a steadily growing list of ‘values’ fundamental to Danish society (cf. chapters 5 & 
                                                                                                                                            
340
 Folketinget, plenary negotiations 24 May 2006, 1
st
 reading of F45 (Debate on The Arabic 
Initiative [Partnership for Progress and Reform]). 
341
 Skadkaer Consult (2009). 
342
 Parallel texts in Udenrigsministeriet (2008) and Ministry (2008); also available in Arabic 
and French. 
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7). Recently, however, a government policy paper suggested a partial shift to policies 
of dialogue in integration narratives. The paper departed in counterterrorism 
considerations and was named “A common and safe future. An action plan to prevent 
extremist views and radicalization among young people”.343 
Two reasons for applying policies of partnership and dialogue are presented in this 
paper: 
The first reason is that if We – Denmark – shall be able to successfully communicate 
to potentially radicalized Muslims (in Denmark and in the Middle East), we need 
partners. We need non-radicalized Muslims to communicate to potentially-radicalized 
Muslims since  
[w]hen it concerns working on the opinions and norms of a person who is not yet 
quite settled in questions of identity – or who is already marked by rooted extremist 
ways of thinking – the dialogue taking place face to face is key. (Ministeriet 
2008:30)
344
 
And, as we shall see, the ethnic and religious 'colour' of the face is implied to make a 
difference. Abroad “there might be a need for an increased involvement of the Danish 
resource base with roots in these regions in the international engagement of 
Denmark” (2008:10).345 For instance,  
Efforts should be made to give Muslim populations in various countries factual 
knowledge on Danish foreign policy, conditions for Muslims in Denmark and 
cooperation between the West and the Muslim World. In order to ensure this, an 
                                           
343
 Parallel texts in Regeringen (2009a) and Government (2009) – based on a civil servant 
report prepared for consultations (Ministeriet 2008).  
344
 "[N]år det gælder om at bearbejde holdninger og normer hos en person, der har 
uafklarede identitetsspørgsmål, eller som allerede er præget af fastgroede ekstremistiske 
tænkemåder, er den dialog, som foregår ansigt til ansigt helt central." (Ministeriet 2008:30). 
345
 "[D]er kan være behov for en øget inddragelse af den danske ressourcebase med rødder i 
disse regioner i Danmarks internationale arbejde." (Ministeriet 2008:10). 
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Arabic speaking staff member is employed, inter alia to establish contact with the 
Arab media. (Government 2009:17) 
Domestically, there is a need for teaming up with partners enjoying Muslim 
authority: “Representatives from Muslim communities in Denmark ... may exert 
influence in their local communities." (2009:17) Therefore, a "well organized and 
democratically based leadership in the individual religious community has ... the 
potential to reach large proportions of the religious sectors." (Ministeriet 2008:39)
346
 
But there is also a need for imbuing state authority with Muslim authority by teaming 
up with Muslim employees: "Yet another element that may contribute to increasing 
the contact and trust between the police and the citizens of pluricultural background 
is ...increasing the recruitment of applicants to the police of other ethnic background 
than Danish" (2008:39).
347
 
In parallel, “Teachers with a multicultural background will be able to work as role 
models for children and youth with a similar background” (2008:44).348 Since the 
ethnically Danish Denmark cannot reach the target groups by itself, a partnership 
with someone more alike the potentially radicalized Muslims is needed. 
The second reason for choosing a policy of dialogue is that exclusion (also in the 
forms of perceived exclusion and self-exclusion) is “a threat to the cohesive force” of 
the Danish society (2008:10, 11f; cf. chapter 5).
349
 As the popularized presentation of 
the action plan to counter radicalization explains: “The danger occurs when the 
                                           
346
 "En velorganiseret og demokratisk baseret ledelse i det enkelte trossamfund har desuden 
potentiale til at nå ud til store dele af de religiøse miljøer." (Ministeriet 2008:39) 
347
 "Et yderligere element, som kan medvirke til at øge kontakten og tilliden mellem politiet 
og borgere med flerkulturel baggrund, er ... at øge rekrutteringen af ansøgere til politiet med 
anden etnisk baggrund end dansk." (Ministeriet 2008:39) 
348
 "Lærere og pædagoger med flerkulturel baggrund vil kunne fungere som rollemodeller 
for børn og unge med tilsvarende baggrund" (Ministeriet 2008:44). 
349
 "[T]russel mod sammenhængskraften" (Ministeriet 2008:10). 
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reality which young people experience comes to look like the message which the 
Islamists want to sell.” (Nyidanmark 2008(2):10)350 Hence,  
[our t]hrowing suspicion on ethnic and religious groups can be utilized actively in the 
propaganda we see from the ones opposed to a plural, democratic society. For this 
reason too it is important that suspicion of being part of the problem is not thrown on 
anyone able to contribute to the solution. (Ministeriet 2008:13)
351
 
So we need to affirmatively include Muslims to avoid their self-radicalizing 
exclusion. This is where the counterterrorism policy of dialogue might end up 
reconstructing the integration narratives so far told by the government which have 
primarily been a one-way street of Their adjustment to Our ways (cf. chapter 5). 
8.3 Concepts of Dialogue 
Inclusion of sceptics and the self-excluded are, however, not a straight forward task. 
Furthermore these two reasons to dialogue do not warrant a complete switch to 
policies of uncontrolled dialogue.  
Firstly, the government writers name one of the specific sub-policies “disagreeing 
dialogue” (Government 2009:17)352 to distinguish it from other kinds of dialogue. 
This special category leaves the impression that other kinds of dialogue do not 
involve disagreement. In that sense, the use of the category underlines the need to pay 
attention to the way the word ‘dialogue’ is utilized in Danish political discourse on 
                                           
350
 "Det farlige er, når den virkelighed, de unge oplever, kommer til at ligne det budskab, 
islamisterne gerne vil sælge" (Nyidanmark 2008(2):10) 
351
 "Mistænkeliggørelse af etniske eller religiøse grupper kan bruges aktivt i den 
propaganda, som vi ser fra dem, der er modstandere af et mangfoldigt demokratisk samfund. 
Også derfor er det vigtigt, at ingen, der kan bidrage til løsningen, mistænkeliggøres for at 
være en del af problemet." (Ministeriet 2008:13) 
352
 "[U]enig dialog" (Ministeriet 2008:34; Regeringen 2009a:17) 
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integration and counterterrorism.
353
 Hence, the following sections zoom in on 
concepts of dialogue as monologue (subsection 8.3.1); dialogue as inclusion 
(subsection 8.3.2); and finally dialogue as interchange in need of counterparts 
(section 8.3.3).  
Secondly, the policy for future interaction implied in a narrative of dialogue opens a 
space for the other whom one is engaging. And the space opened up is greater than 
the space opened up by a narrative of partnership on a predefined road towards a 
predefined goal. Nevertheless, there are still limits that need to be controlled. This 
need to monitor the other engaged in dialogue is the focus for section 8.4. 
8.3.1 Dialogue as Monologue: deferring dialogue  
In Danish discourse on integration, the word ‘dialogue’ is – contrary to what the 
etymology of the word would suggest – most frequently used to denote a one-way 
process of one entity acting on another.
354
 The distribution of agency in such a policy 
of dialogue as monologue is illustrated in figure 8.8. 
First of all, in the government action plan on prevention of radicalization the word 
“dialogue” is often accompanied by “enlightenment”.355 Even if a headline says 
“dialogue” the content of the policy might be “enlightenment”. One example is how 
the description of "dialogue and information" initiatives abroad include "efforts to 
                                           
353
 In parallel, the need to stress the element of mutuality in “Mutual integration in the civil 
society associations” "Gensidig integration i foreningslivet" (2008:14, 41; italics added) 
highlights how ‘integration’ in Danish discourse at the point of departure equals Their 
assimilation to Our ways. The specific initiatives listed under this heading does – 
irrespective of the heading – only include measures to equip Them to engage in Our 
unmodified organizational forms. 
354
 Lindekilde conceptualizes two logics of dialogue and deliberation observed in Danish 
debates during the Cartoon affair as ‘monological’ and ‘multilogical’; both often termed 
‘dialogue’ (2007:4f; 20). 
355
 (Ministeriet 2008:34, 35, 37; Government 2009:11-17). Literally ‘oplysning’ means 
'enlightenment, but it may also – less drastically – be translated ‘informing/information’. 
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promote a nuanced and objective understanding of the relations between the West / 
Denmark and the Muslim World" aiming to "give ... factual knowledge" (2009:16-7) 
– but no two way interaction. In this instance the label ‘dialogue’ is either void or 
substantially described to denominate a monologue.
356
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Figure 8.8 Dialogue as monologue 
 
A policy of one-way information is frequently accompanied by an analysis of the 
distribution of knowledge claiming that We have the truth and They are plain wrong: 
"[T]he cartoon affair has ... shown ... that Arab populations have a scanty knowledge 
of our society and not the least of our great effort and engagement in the region." 
(MP Poulsen, lib., F45, 2006.05.24 16:45)
357
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 The description of domestic "dialogue and information" involves that "the young people 
should be made familiar with facts" via "targeted information activities", "information 
meetings", "information material", "targeted use of the internet". But it also involves that 
"The young people should also feel that they have the opportunity to make their opinion 
known and that someone is listening – even if they will not always agree." (Government 
2009:15f). 
357
 "[T]egningesagen har ... vist, at arabiske befolkninger har et alt for ringe kendskab til 
vores samfund og ikke mindst vores store indsats og engagement i regionen." (MP Poulsen, 
lib., F45, 2006.05.24 16:45) 
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Misinformation, propaganda, misunderstandings and problems of communication 
constitutes important parts of the complex of problems of which extremist opinions 
are also a part. ... A comprehensive plan will be drawn up for information and 
communication on the government’s and other authorities policies and efforts in 
areas like integration, the conditions for religious communities, Denmark’s 
engagement in the outside world, etc.. ... It is ... a key challenge that normal channels 
of information does not necessarily reach the young people whom one as a public 
authority wants to engage in dialogue. (Ministeriet 2008:57)
358
 
Secondly, a series of educational measures are listed which aim at securing that 
grown ups as well as primary school children (in public and especially private – i.e. 
Muslim – schools) acquire the “societal goals and values” (2008:43)359 and “the 
ability to see a question from all sides and the knowledge of democratic dialogue and 
argumentation.” (2008:45f)360 In these instances there might be a two-way dialogue 
somewhere in the horizon – but the immediate policy remains monological. 
A third primarily monological variation implies dialogue to be simultaneously a 
central part of both a) the goal of enlightenment and b) the means to achieving that 
goal:  
The purpose [of the Arab initiative] was to establish a Ubasis for a broader 
dialogueU with the countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa and, Uhence, 
                                           
358
 "Misinformation, propaganda, misforståelser og kommunikationsproblemer udgør 
væsentlige dele af det problemkompleks, som ekstremistiske holdninger også er en del af. ... 
Der udarbejdes derfor en samlet plan for information og kommunikation om regeringens og 
andre myndigheders politikker og indsatser på områder som integration, trossamfundenes 
forhold, Danmarks engagement i omverdenen m.v. ... Det er ... en helt central udfordring, at 
de normale informationskanaler ikke nødvendigvis når ud til de unge, man som offentlig 
myndighed vil i dialog med." (Miniseriet 2008:57; cf. Nyidanmark 2008(2):13) 
359
 "[S]amfundsmæssige mål og værdier" (Ministeriet 2008:43). 
360
 "[E]vnen til at se en sag fra flere sider og kendskabet til demokratisk dialog og 
argumentation." (Ministeriet 2008:45f). 
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contribute support to the development of democratic and economic reformUs ... 
[T]he initiative shall focus far more on support to the forces who want to develop 
free media, free communication, spreading of information [oplysning; literally: 
enlightenment] and knowledge. An enlightened population has a better possibility for 
independently making up its mind and thereby for choosing. Knowledge is power – 
and therefore access to Uknowledge isU for the Arab populations Uthe master key to 
choosing democracy and dialogue Urather than dictatorship and violence. (MP 
Christmas-Møller, con., F45, 206.05.24, 17:30; underlining added)
361
 
In other words; we may – by means of engaging Them in dialogue – support Their 
way towards a stage of development where They are able to choose dialogue as a 
preferred means of interaction. If this stage is reached, the difference of the other is 
reduced sufficiently for other to be ready for inclusion in two-way interchange.  
The effectual deferral of inclusion in two-way interchange is what unites concepts of 
dialogues-as-monologue: Now you listen and do as We say – later you might be 
ready speak in a way that is worth listening to. The way in which narratives of 
dialogue-as-monologue interpellates the other does not play very well with narratives 
of dialogue-as-inclusion and dialogue-as-interchange: These narratives are in the 
focus for the following two subsections. 
8.3.2 Dialogue as Inclusion: precarious invitations 
Inclusion of non-radicalized Muslims in partnerships and in society in general is 
central to the Danish government’s policies for countering terrorism. To have 
                                           
361
 "Formålet var at etablere en basis for en bedre dialog med landene i Mellemøsten og 
Nordafrika og dermed at bidrage med støtte til udvikling af demokratiske og økonomiske 
reformer ... [I]nitiativet kommer til at fokusere langt mere på støtte til de kræfter, som 
ønsker at udvikle frie medier, fri kommunikation, spredning af oplysning og viden. En 
oplyst befolkning har bedre mulighed for selvstændig stillingtagen og dermed for at vælge. 
Viden er magt, og derfor er adgang til viden de arabiske befolkningers hovednøgle til at 
vælge demokrati og dialog frem for diktatur og vold." (MP Christmas-Møller, con., F45, 
206.05.24 17:30). 
432 
someone accept invitations to be included, however, it is seen as decisive that they do 
not feel patronized. 
The domestically focused government action plan to counter terrorism proposes the 
establishment of a “Dialogue forum against militant extremism” (Ministeriet 
2008:34; Government 2009:17; italics added) – that is, it invites partners who are free 
to engage in a partnership with an obligation to the predetermined goal defined by the 
partnership: "The aim of the effort is ... to promote the understanding of the partners 
in dialogue that countering violent radicalization is a common interest and a common 
responsibility." (Ministeriet 2008:34-5)
362
 
But securing the inclusion of someone who is currently reacting to perceived 
exclusion by further self-exclusion is not easy: One means to the implementation of 
dialogical inclusion envisioned is the establishment of community centres. F
363
F A 
central argument for basing these centres in public libraries is that "they are 
physically located locally where the young are, and ... they are offered openly without 
presenting themselves as a social service or inferring with the dignity of the receiver." 
(2008:37)
364
 
In parallel, the authorities need to downplay authoritative encompassment and 
upgrade understanding and respect to invite for inclusion: 
The police needs to an even higher degree than today to focus on understanding 
culture [to facilitate t]he police’s dialogue with young people – not least young 
                                           
362
 "Målene for indsatsen er at ... fremme dialogpartnernes forståelse af, at imødegåelse af 
voldelig radikalisering er en fælles interesse og et fælles ansvar." (Ministeriet 2008:34f) 
363
 "[M]edborgercentre"; literally: co-citizen centres. 
364
 "[F]ysisk befinder sig lokalt, hvor de unge er, samt at de er åbne tilbud, der ikke 
fremtræder som et tilbud fra de sociale myndigheder eller antaster modtagerens værdighed." 
(Ministeriet 2008:37) 
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Danes with a pluricultural background - [which] is of essential significance for a 
respectful and trustful relation (2008:39).
365
 
Similarly, the policy of including Middle Eastern Muslims is precarious:  
Concerning the work in the Muslim world it is especially important that the effort is 
not perceived as ‘cultural imperialism’ and that it does not get an aura of religious 
missionary work. The renewal must be done in respect for local values and in a way 
supported by the affected populations. Only in that way is there a prospect for its 
success. (Regeringen 2003:16)
366
 
Hence, Denmark does not insist on neither the point of departure, the point of arrival, 
nor the route in between – only the general direction and overall intention needs to be 
right: "There is no single recipe for democratic development... The starting points as 
well as the outcomes of every process of development will always be those of each of 
the nations involved." (Ministry 2005:4) 
In sum, we need in a non-authoritative and non-coercive way to invite partners to 
freely engage – as far, as much, and as deep, as they want to – in their own obligation 
to the project to liberate themselves. 
But how is the invitation to inclusion of difference envisaged to be issued without 
authority and coercion? Firstly, domestically there is a need for an instant 
performance of the inclusion of difference; a celebration which in itself performs the 
inclusion: "A visible campaign will be carried out celebrating democratic cohesion, 
                                           
365
 "Politiet bør ... i endnu større omfang end i dag have fokus på kultur-forståelse [...for at 
facilitetere] Politiets dialog med de unge – ikke mindst unge danskere med flerkulturel 
baggrund – [som] er af væsentlig betydning for et respektfuldt og tillidsfuldt forhold" 
(Ministeriet 2008:39). 
366
 "Når det gælder arbejdet i den muslimske verden er det særlig vigtigt, at indsatsen ikke 
opfattes som 'kulturel imperialisme' og at den ikke får et skær af religiøs 
missionsvirksomhed. Fornyelsen må ske med respekt for lokale værdier og på en måde, der 
støttes af de berørte befolkninger. Kun på den måde er der udsigt til, at den vil lykkes." 
(Regeringen 2003:16) 
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diversity as well as the common and mutual responsibility for a good society with 
opportunities for all and respect for the individual." (Government 2009:16; cf. 
Ministeriet 2008:36) 
But, secondly, more important are the long time performative mechanism of 
individuals who "experience positive fellowship" (2009:19) and therefore "feel that 
democracy offers them opportunities, responsibility and recognition" (2009:11). The 
result is that they "acquire democratic competencies" (2009:19) including "the ability 
to partake in democratic processes and to resolve problems through dialogue as well 
as respect for the views of others and knowledge of other cultures" (2009:17). Among 
the specific sites of learning are civil society associations (2009:19), student’s 
councils (Ministeriet 2008:40f), public housing resident democracy (Government 
2009:22), and even “practical lessons in local democracy in prisons” (2009:23). 
Similarly in the international efforts, the very process of dialogue itself is seen as a 
mechanism of inclusion; not only inclusion in a practical community of interaction 
but also inclusion in the set of values which is to frame the partnership:  
The government’s overall goal ... is to support reforms and progress in the Arab 
countries ... and promote political dialogue between parties in these countries and 
Denmark. These two objectives are seen as two sides of the same coin. ... This 
implies that the vast majority of activities under the programme will be developed 
and carried out in partnerships between Danish and Arab organisations [... since] 
partnerships between Danish organizations and institutions ... and their Arab 
counterparts ... leads to natural dialogue on questions of reform (Ministry 2005:7, 
9).
367
 
                                           
367
 Two specific examples are exchange of students, research cooperation, exchange of 
curricula, etc., between universities and co-production and exchange between journalists 
(Udenrigsministeriet 2006:23). 
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So the word ‘dialogue’ may mean an invitation to inclusion through experiencing 
participation. It is a delicate task to formulate such an invitation, since it needs to 
downplay the very hierarchical relation involved in Our supplying the goal, terms and 
resources for the relationship. Nevertheless, the point of a dialogue-as-inclusion is not 
to facilitate interchange between two independent entities. Rather it is to facilitate the 
inclusion of the other in the self (at least as certain diacritica are concerned). This 
concept of dialogue is illustrated in figure 8.9. 
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Figure 8.9 Dialogue as inclusion 
 
However, as the quote above continues; The Arab Initiative includes a different kind 
of projects as well: "[D]ialogue projects proper are to diminish clashes of opinion and 
create contacts across divisions which would not necessarily have been crossed 
otherwise." (Ministry 2005:9; underlining added)
368
 This ‘dialogue proper’ involves 
two-way interchange between different entities. Dialogue as a two-way interchange 
implies Our need to listen to what the other say, even if it was originally intended that 
                                           
368
 The Danish text has “bryde meningsmodsætninger [literally: break contrasts of opinion]” 
where the English text has "diminish clashes of opinion" which could imply a policy of 
inclusion rather than one of interchange (Udenrigsministeriet 2005:9). 
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we should do the talking. This concept of dialogue is illustrated in figure 8.10  and is 
the focus for the next subsection. 
Self
Less than 
radical Other
 
Figure 8.10 Dialogue as two-way interchange 
 
8.3.3 Dialogue as Interchange: the need to listen to have counterparts 
In the evaluation of the Arab Initiative, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes “the 
proper intention of dialogue [as]: mutual exchange of experience and broadened 
horizons on both sides” (Udenrigsministeriet 2006:10; italics added) – e.g. a two-way 
interchange between different entities. This definition occurs in the text presented to 
parliament, however, only in passing. It occurs as a justification for what in the text 
appears to be an unforeseen need for self-development on the part of the Danish 
NGOs as part of the process of establishing partnerships: "[M]any of the Danish 
organizations have had to learn and conclude their own experiences during the 
cooperation with the Arab partner." (2006:10)
369
 The MFA in parallel recollects from 
a survey of Middle Eastern perceptions of Denmark in the aftermath of the Cartoon 
                                           
369
 "[M]ange af de danske organisationer har skullet lære og drage egne erfaringer under 
samarbejdet med deres arabiske partnere" (Udenrigsministeriet 2006:10). 
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affairs "an expressed wish for a dialogue in which there is a true reciprocity ... in 
which both parties as a point of departure recognize the existence of differences and 
show a will also to relate to the problems of ones own society." (2006:13)
370
 
These examples testify to the force of the very word ‘dialogue’: If you invite some 
other to a dialogue, you run the risk that they demand it to be a two-way interaction. 
And if you engage in a two-way interaction by not only speaking but also listening, 
you might meet demands for your self-reform – even if the aim of your invitation was 
the reform of the other.
371
 
In domestic policies of integration, the need to listen as part of a policy of dialogue is, 
i.a., negotiated through the handling of alleged discrimination against immigrants and 
ethnic minorities. A report from a government think tank on integration is instructive 
in how charges of discrimination have been constructed as not worth listening to: 
Firstly, “the actual discrimination” is next to impossible to measure. Secondly, while 
“the perceived discrimination” may be an actual “barrier against important aspects of 
integration” this perceived discrimination is, however, “subjective” and, hence, 
                                           
370
 "[E]t udtrykt ønske om dialog, hvor der er en ægte gensidighed ... hvor begge parter i 
udgangspunktet anerkender eksistensen af forskelle samt udviser en vilje til også at forholde 
sig til problemerne i ens eget samfund." (Udenrigsinisteriet 2006:13). 
371
 Marie Koch Wegter, who has hands-on experience with the Arab Initiative from her 
work in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intimates to me that the Initiative was 
always so performed in the Middle East (personal communication, 2009.10.05). The 
analytical strategy of the dissertation gives me no basis for judging in that question. The 
analysis of the dissertation pertains to how parliamentary debates and government texts 
referred to in these debates constructs the interactional grammar and policy narratives. 
When presented to parliament, the government formulated narratives of a primarily one-way 
project for Their reform with the pre-defined aim of countering terrorism. Hence the need to 
explicitly describe how it – post-Carricatures – is not so, and to present it in a way which 
conveys the impression that it is not so anymore. 
438 
“reservations need to be made” to reports of it (Ministeriet 2006:12, 13, 93; italics in 
original).
372
 
In the early days after the present liberal/conservative government came into office, 
the worry that discrimination might hinder labour market integration was indeed 
primary to the Minister of Employment: 
we have difficulties listening to people who do not speak proper Danish, i.e. standard 
Danish. We are not tolerant towards anything else than fluent Danish. ... We have to 
consider if our habitual thinking [on what constitutes perfect Danish] stands in the 
way for getting a share of the new-Danish manpower. (Beskæftigelsesministeren 
2002)
373
 
But in the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 London bombings and the 2006 Cartoon 
affair, the worry of discrimination and the need to listen took second place in policies 
of integration. A statement from the same minister dating early 2008 is exemplary. 
According to the minister, perceived discrimination does constitute a problem but the 
main mistake to be corrected is that the majority community has not been decisive in 
demanding cultural assimilation of minorities: 
Out of misguided kindness we have for years wrapped the immigrants up in cotton 
wool. We have called it cultural differences and let things slide while imagining 
Denmark as a multicultural society. ...[Y]oung people of different ethnic background 
do experience discrimination. ... It is no use. Integration is a common responsibility 
and the trades and businesses do have part of the responsibility. ... [But] a lot of the 
                                           
372
 "[D]en faktisk diskrimination", "den oplevede diskrimination", " en barriere for ... meget 
vigtige aspekter af integrationen", "skal tages med forbehold" (Ministeriet 2006:12, 13, 93, 
italics in original). 
373
 "[L]ytte til folk, der ikke taler rigtig dansk, dvs. rigsdansk. Vi er ikke tolerante overfor 
andet end flydende dansk. ... Vi skal se om vanetænkning [om hvad der udgør det perfekte 
dansk] forhindrer os i at få del i den nydanske arbejdskraft." (Beskæftigelsesministeren 
2002) 
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integration problems are about people who have moved to Denmark but do not 
engage in society. It might be about linguistic barriers but it is also about having - 
and not the least about sticking to - different values and norms. ... [C]ulture and 
religion may curb the daily well-being and development in the workplaces. 
(Beskæftigelsesministeren 2008)
374
 
A few months later, however, the action plan to counter radicalization has as a central 
point that it is "important to strengthen the efforts to counter discrimination – and to a 
higher degree also concentrate the efforts towards neutralizing the diffuse sense of 
discrimination apparently felt by some young people." (Ministeriet 2008:32)
375
 
The inclusion of the word ‘apparently’ in the sentence derives the listening part of 
this policy of dialogue-as-interaction of some of its thrust: ‘We hear that you claim to 
perceive to be discriminated. We acknowledge that this perception is a problem. But 
we don’t really believe that the perception is correct.’ So the immediate solution to 
this problem remains a one-way policy: “It is necessary to communicate in a more 
clear way what is done and what possibilities the young people have.” (2008:32)376 
The very need to counter not only (hard to measure) ‘actual’ discrimination but also 
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 "I misforstået venlighed har vi gennem mange år pakket indvandrerne ind i vat. Vi har 
kaldt det kulturforskelle og har ladet stå til ud fra en forestilling om Danmark som et 
multikulturelt samfund. ... [U]nge med anden etnisk baggrund oplever diskrimination. ... 
Det nytter ikke. Integration er et fælles ansvar, og virksomhederne har en del af ansvaret. ... 
[Men m]ange af integrationsproblemerne handler jo om mennesker, der er flyttet til 
Danmark, men som ikke engagerer sig i samfundet. Det kan handle om sprogbarrierer, men 
også om at have – og ikke mindst holde fast i – forskellige værdier og normer. ... [k]ultur og 
religion kan bremse den daglige trivsel og udvikling på arbejdspladserne." 
(Beskæftigelsesministeren 2008). 
375
 "[V]igtigt at styrke indsatsen mod forskelsbehandling - og at man i højere grad også 
sætter ind på at modvirke den diffuse følelse af forskelsbehandling, som nogle unge 
tilsyneladende føler." (Ministeriet 2008:32) 
376
 "Det er nødvendigt, at det kommunikeres klarere, hvad der gøres, og hvilke muligheder 
de unge har." (Ministeriet 2008:32). 
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(subjective) ‘perceived’ discrimination constitutes, however, an openness to listening 
as part of dialogue. 
And more generally the action plan to counter radicalization explicitly embraces a 
policy of two-way dialogue between differing partners:  
The objective is to strengthen the 'disagreeing dialogue' by entering into dialogue 
with individuals who represent controversial views. Often, it is precisely these 
individuals who have the best chance of influencing the attitudes of the young people 
who are in a process of radicalisation, in a non-violent direction. (Government 
2009:17)  
But over what are we disagreeing? What kind of difference is it that we have in 
relation to this other; this other which We are inviting to a two-way dialogue? It is 
clear, that the difference of the counterpart – which is to be upheld – pertains to 
culture and religion: "Let us recognize that there is difference between our cultures 
and let us not believe that we have to remake each others. Muslims shall not be 
Christians and Christians shall not be Muslims." (MFA Møller, con., F45, 2006.05.24 
18:15)
377
 
A substantial difference of culture and religion is needed to constitute a relevant 
counterpart in dialogue – but it is not enough. Neither is the overall commitment to 
an aim of non-violent interaction in itself enough. For dialogue to be meaningful, this 
religio-culturally different yet non-violent counterpart needs to be ‘able to influence’ 
– and if it is not by itself able, we need to empower it: “the effort need to build on 
partnerships, competence building and strengthening the moderate and constructive 
                                           
377
 "Lad os erkende, at der er forskel på vores kulturer, og lad os lade være at gå rundt og 
tro, at vi skal lave hinanden om. Muslimer skal ikke blive kristne, og kristne skal ikke blive 
muslimer." (MFA Møller, con., F45, 2006.05.24 18:15) 
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forces.” (Ministeriet 2008:53)378 And if the counterpart is not present, we may need 
to constitute it: 
Although many young people are active participants to democracy, there 
are,unfortunately, quite a few young people – especially among those with 
multicultural backgrounds – who do not use it or see its possibilities. The 
Government wishes to establish a forum for young people with different cultural 
backgrounds who are involved in associations or networks that are engaged in 
democracy, civic citizenship or intercultural activities. (Government 2009:20) 
Among the functions of this network is that it should work as a "Mouthpiece for 
young people with pluricultural background in questions of current interest, including 
advice to ministries, organizations etc." (Ministeriet 2008:42)
379
 
Existing groups too may enter into partnerships to enjoy both the status as a partner in 
dialogue and material support: 
The government ... will strengthen the dialogue with the Muslim religious 
communities about how extremism may be countered. Through a partnership – 
involving among other things advising, organizational and possibly economic 
support – work may be done to support those Muslim groups who want to contribute 
an effort against extremism and abuse of their religion. (2008:59)
380
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 "[I]ndsatsen [skal] bygge på partnerskaber, kompetenceudvikling og styrkelse af de 
moderate og konstruktive kræfter" (Ministeriet 2008:53). 
379
 "Talerør for unge med flerkulturel baggrund om aktuelle spørgsmål, herunder rådgivning 
i forhold til ministerier, organisationer m.v." (Ministeriet 2008:42). This way of constituting 
counterparts is a well known strategy for the corporatist Danish state. Examples include the 
state initiation of the Danish Consumer Council in 1947 prompted by a need for the state to 
have an interest based organization to counterweigh commercial and agricultural interests. 
380
 " [R]egeringen vil styrke dialogen med de muslimske trossamfund om, hvordan 
ekstremismen kan modvirkes. Gennem et partnerskab med blandt andet rådgivning, 
organisatorisk og eventuelt økonomisk støtte kan der arbejdes for at understøtte de 
muslimske grupper, der ønsker at yde en indsats mod ekstremisme og misbrug af deres 
religion." (Ministeriet 2008:59) 
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There is, however, no such thing as a free lunch.
381
 The status and material support 
come at a price: 
Danish Muslims should be assisted in the development of a code of conduct ensuring 
that extremist forces do not use mosques or Islamic cultural centres as a platform for 
spreading undemocratic views or recruiting members. (Government 2009:25) 
[M]ain priorities are that the abilities and competences of the imams shall be further 
developed; that mosques shall be centers which promote cohesive power, citizenship 
and dialogue; that there shall be responsibility and transparency; and that added 
access to mosques shall be given to women and youth. (Ministeriet 2008:59)
382
 
To sum up: As one of the policies to counter terrorism, the government proposes to 
engage non-radicalized Muslims in dialogue. As the other is engaged in dialogue, the 
government needs to make explicit a concept of dialogue as a two-way process; i.e. a 
process including listening on Our part. The government even wants to engage in 
‘building’ counterparts for this dialogue. The difference of the counterparts relevant 
to engage in two-way dialogue, however, needs to stays within certain limits. These 
limits to the difference of the other engaging in dialogue – and the need to monitor 
the limits – are the focus for the next section. 
                                           
381
 In the end, there was no lunch: The proposed "support" to Muslim religious communities 
was in the final version of the action plan downgraded to a "dialogue" (Government 
2009:25). 
382
 "[H]ovedprioriteter er, at imamernes evner og kompetencer skal videreudvikles; at 
moskéer skal være centre, der fremmer sammenhængskraft, borgerskab og dialog; at der 
skal være ansvarlighed og gennemsigtighed; og at der skal være øget adgang til moskéer for 
kvinder og unge." (Ministeriet 2008:59) 
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8.4 Staying in control: the need to monitor the limits of 
dialogue 
Inviting an other into a dialogue understood as monologue is relatively harmless; the 
worst thing that may happen is that the other does not listen and does not reform 
himself. If you can ignore the resilience of the other, no harm is done.
383
 Inviting an 
other into a dialogue understood as inclusion or as a two-way interaction involves 
stakes that are immediately higher since you have awarded the other a platform to 
speak from: You have legitimized the interventions of the other in advance. So faced 
with a two-way dialogue a need arises to control the direction of the dialogue. To 
control the dialogue, you need to limit the agenda which is to be engaged by the other 
invited; you need to limit the difference of the other invited; and you need to monitor 
that the other stays within the limits of difference. 
Concerning the agenda of the dialogue, one pitfall is that the other might ask you to 
re-make yourself. While the action plan suggests establishing a “contact unity for 
dialogue between the authorities and religious communities” the dialogue is in the 
same very move limited to focus on “the scope of the activities of these 
[communities]” (Ministeriet 2008:38).384 We will have a dialogue – but there is only 
one point on the agenda: ‘You’. 
                                           
383
 Such a resistance to an attempt of a one-way remaking of an other might in itself 
constitute a problem for the remaker, since it challenges the value of the direction of 
remaking; ie. the universality of the values of the Self (cf. Rumelili 2004; 2007). This lack 
of recognition of the self might spur re-conceptualization of the crucial elements of the self-
conception (Gad 2008) – or it might provoke a regression to a policy of elimination. 
384
 "[E]n kontaktenhed for dialog mellem myndigheder og trossamfund om rammernefor 
disses virke." (Ministeriet 2008:38). So, as a comment to the plan of action submitted to the 
Ministry suggests “The description of assignments of the ... contact unity concerns to a 
higher degree ... UinformationU rather than ... UdialogueU proper” "Beskrivelsen af 
opgaverne for ... kontaktenhed[en] vedrører ... i højere grad ... UoplysningU frem for ... 
444 
Controlling the agenda of dialogue by explicitly listing it in advance is one way of 
trying to stay in control Another way is to limit who is invited to join the dialogue. 
Such a limitation is repeatedly performed in highly abstract terms invoking a heavy 
load of liberal, Western political philosophy. The action plan to counter radicalization 
says i.a.: "Our common endorsement of the fundamental values of the society – 
freedom, equality, and mutual responsibility for all – is ... a precondition for our 
differences to be able to thrive in a good way." (Ministeriet 2008:12; cf. Regeringen 
2009a:4; Government 2009:17)
385
 
The Arab initiative delineates its invitation in words of similar origin: 
Dialogue must build on mutual respect. Cultural and religious differences must be 
recognized within the framework of the universal human rights. Religious and 
cultural values and traditions may never serve as an excuse for depriving the 
individual human being of its freedom or rights. Where extremism in one way or 
another is placing itself in the way of democracy and respect for human rights, 
Denmark shall actively support the forces working for tolerance and respect for the 
individual human being. (Regeringen 2003:14)
386
 
Wherever exactly the limit for acceptable difference is drawn, the limit needs to be 
monitored– as this concerns others potentially radical, i.e., a potential existential 
                                                                                                                                            
egentlig UdialogU" (Institut for Menneskerettigheder 2008:6; underlining in original). In the 
final version of the action plan, the contact unit was not included. 
385
 "Vores fælles tilslutning til samfundets grundlæggende værdier om frihed, ligeværd og 
gensidigt ansvar for alle er ... en forudsætning for, at vore forskelligheder kan trives på en 
god måde." (Ministeriet 2008:12). 
386
 "Dialogen må bygge på gensidig respekt. Kulturelle og religiøse forskelle skal 
anerkendes inden for rammerne af de universelle menneskeret-tigheder. Religiøse og 
kulturelle værdier og traditioner må aldrig tjene som undskyldning for at fratage det enkelte 
menneske dets frihed eller rettigheder. Hvor ekstremisme på den ene eller anden måde 
stiller sig i vejen for demokrati og respekt for menneskerettighederne, skal Danmark aktivt 
støtte de kræfter, der arbejder for tolerance og respekt for det enkelte menneske." 
(Regeringen 2003:14) 
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threat to our identity. In the action plan to counter radicalization, the government 
allots some attention to this question of controlling the counterparts in dialogue. Both 
in relation to the Muslim Danes in general (the majority of whom are, as we may 
recall, “decisive allies” in the fight against terrorism), and in relation to the specific 
partners for specific dialogues. 
In relation to young people the well established local cooperation on crime 
prevention involving schools, social services, and police should “raise attention to 
signs of radicalization ... to improve the possibilities for implementing preventive 
measures” (Ministeriet 2008:30)387 including “targeted and individual preventive 
talks” (Government 2009:12) to signal that we know who you are. This raised 
attention should be supplemented with “[m]entoring schemes focusing on young 
people and identity issues” equipped to “assist the young person in finding a more 
constructive direction in life” (Ministeriet 2008:31), and a "Network for school 
principals addressing democracy education and extremism" (Government 2009:18) 
which may be "used as an active tool, so swift reaction may be taken if radical 
activities should blaze up" (Ministeriet 2008:44).
388
 
Waiting for the problems to make themselves visible will, however, not do. Spot tests 
will have to be made:  
[S]chools should prepare the students for living in a society with freedom and 
democracy. ... [A] report should be elaborated to form the basis for an assessment as 
to whether there is a need to modify the relevant independent school legislation. As 
part of this process, a series of inspection visits to 25 selected schools will be carried 
out." (Government 2009:18) 
                                           
387
 "[H]øjnet opmærksomhed på tegn på radikalisering ... [for] at forbedre mulighederne for 
iværksættelse af tidlige præventive foranstaltninger" (Ministeriet 2008:30). 
388
 "[B]ruges som aktivt redskab, så der kan reageres hurtigt i tilfælde af opblussen af 
radikale aktiviteter." (Ministeriet 2008:44). 
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The serious trouble with monitoring the limit of acceptable difference, however, is 
that no matter where one is looking for it, it is difficult to tell. It concerns only slight 
differences on the part of the other hard to tell for Us as outsiders: 
to distinguish between radicalization and ordinary religious interest is difficult. ... To 
judge whether it is a case of violent radicalization or just political or religious interest 
demand such a highly specialized knowledge that it will be impossible for the 
individual [crime-prevention] worker to distinguish. (Nyidanmark 2008(2):11)
389
 
As the difference is hard to tell, the partners in partnerships and counterparts in 
dialogue need to make themselves transparent for monitoring.  
In general, "Well organized religious communities, characterized by transparency ... 
may contribute positively to the Danish society." (Ministeriet 2008:38)
390
 The closer, 
the target group is to radicalization, the closer monitoring is needed of the less-than-
radical other we need as a partner or counterpart in dialogue: 
[A]ppointing more imams [to work in prisons] ... may contribute to countering 
radicalization of Muslim inmates. Imams working in prisons shall pass a thorough 
process of approval to secure that they have the necessary abilities in Danish 
language, knowledge about the Prison Service and insight in Danish societal 
conditions. Furthermore the imam’s opinion on the Prison Service need to be 
evaluated and in each case a security assessment shall be made. Clerical actions and 
sermons shall take place in Danish [a list of exceptions omitted -/upg]... It must be 
                                           
389
 "[A]t skelne mellem radikalisering og almindelig religiøs interesse er svært ... At 
vurdere, om der er tale om voldelig radikalisering eller blot politisk eller religiøs interesse, 
kræver en så højt specialiseret viden, at det for den enkelte medarbejder vil være umuligt at 
skelne." (Nyidanmark 2008(2):11) 
390
 "Velorganiserede trossamfund, som er kendetegnet ved gennemsigtighed ... kan bidrage 
positivt til det danske samfund." (Ministeriet 2008:38) 
447 
possible for the prison officers to follow every clerical action and if necessary record 
them, e.g. with a view to translation. (2008:52)
391
 
By institutionalizing a set of procedures for monitoring the limits of acceptable 
difference it is clear that the position of the Muslim less-than-radical other engaged in 
dialogue is not really a de-securitized position. The terrorist radical other is an overtly 
securitized figure. Concerning the less-than-radical Muslim other, the securitization is 
institutionalized in procedures of monitoring as a necessary supplement to the 
policies of inclusion and dialogue. Figure 8.11 illustrates the need to control the 
difference of the less-than-radical other from degenerating into radical otherness. 
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Figure 8.11 The need to control the limits of difference of the less-than-radical other to 
allow a policy of dialogue 
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 "[A]t ansætte flere imamer [i fængslerne]... kan være med til at modvirke radikalisering 
af muslimske indsatte. Imamer, der virker i fængslerne, skal igennem en grundig 
godkendelsesprocedure, så det sikres, at de har de nødvendige danskfærdigheder, kendskab 
til Kriminalforsorgen og viden om og indsigt i danske samfundsforhold. Endvidere skal 
imamens holdning til Kriminalforsorgen vurderes, og der skal i hvert enkelt tilfælde 
foretages en egentlig sikkerhedsvurdering. Gejstlige handlinger og prædikener skal foregå 
på dansk [en liste af undtagelser udeladt -/upg] ...Personalet i fængslerne skal have 
mulighed for at følge med i alle gejstlige handlinger og eventuelt optage disse, hvis det 
skønnes nødvendigt, eksempelvis med henblik på oversættelse." (Ministeriet 2008:52) 
448 
The next section lays out how it is necessary for the government to perform this re-
securitization. The necessity comes from the need to articulate, on the one hand, the 
necessity of securing identity with, on the other hand, the possibility of dialogue with 
an other potentially asking you to change. 
8.5 Dialogue as Clash – Dialogue as Appendix to self-
engagement 
The government articulates policies of two-way dialogue – only to supplement them 
with measures to monitor the limits of the difference to be allowed in dialogue. This 
articulation is part of the governments positioning of itself as the defenders of Danish 
identity by reforming the other – between a right wing party doubting the possibility 
of reforming the other and an opposition promoting self-reform. 
The monitoring comes explicitly as an answer to Danish People’s Party: 
[C]oncerning the immigrants who are to participate and co-operate in this project [the 
Arab Initiative]: How do we secure that the people we are cooperating with – who 
have a connection to the Middle East and who live in Denmark and who might even 
be Danish citizens – are not identical with the imams who to a very high degree tore 
it for Denmark [during the Cartoon Crisis]? (MP Espersen, DPP, F45, 2006.05.24 
18.25)
392
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 "[M]ed hensyn til de indvandrere, der skal deltage og medvirke i det her projekt [Det 
Arabiske Initiativ]: Hvordan sikrer vi nu, at de folk, som vi samarbejder med her, der har en 
forbindelse til Mellemøsten, og som bor i Danmark og måske oven i købet er danske 
statsborgere, ikke er identiske med de imamer, som i høj grad ødelagde det for Danmark 
[under tegningkrisen]?" (MP Espersen, DPP, F45, 2006.05.24 18.25) Aggressive 
confrontation with Islamism is not the monopoly of Danish People’s Party. MP Naser 
Khader, who won fame during the Cartoon Crisis, left the social liberal party to form his 
own with a platform including a policy on Islamism, radical or not, which supplied the 
headline “Dialogue? Stuff it! [Rend mig i dialogen]” (Khader in Johnsen 2008). After 
leaving also his own splinter party behind, his tough stance has caused trouble in his new 
role as spokesperson on integration policy for the conservative party which he took up by 
449 
The DPP repeatedly questions if Muslims are at all capable of reform; capable of 
democracy: 
even if Denmark is the victim of the [Cartoon] conflict and the Arab world is the 
perpetrator it is us who kindly hold out our hand as an invitation to reconciliation and 
dialogue and we even pay for it. ... [I]t is likeable that we in the democracies ... 
stubbornly against all odds insist that even in the Arab countries there must be a 
possibility for popular rule and development. ... [T]he DPP accepts the continuation 
of the Arab initiative ... not the least because the government has intimated to us that 
... the initiative is simultaneously of great significance for the security of Denmark. It 
is ... to the benefit of Denmark, that as many countries as possible become 
democratic countries. (MP Espersen, DPP, F45, 2006.05.24 17:10)
393
 
To support that dialogue aimed at reforming the Muslim world is a responsible 
counter-terrorism policy, the government works to redraw this image of a Western 
civilization clashing with a Muslim one into a clash between civilization (in the West 
and in the Muslim world) on the one side and fundamentalism on the other side:  
The clash of civilizations which many fear will destroy a calm development of the 
world in the future is taking place right now UwithinU the Muslim civilizations 
where fundamentalists will damage the many good forces in the Arab world who – 
like we do – seek stability, security, and progress and who see it as decisive to have 
the countries opened up politically and economically and thereby contribute to 
                                                                                                                                            
proposing a ban on burqas – a ban which the Minister for Justice, a co-conservative, later 
found unconstitutional. 
393
 "[S]elv om Danmark er konfliktens offer, og den arabiske verden er gerningsmanden, er 
det os, der elskværdigt rækker hånden frem til forsoning og dialog og tilmed betaler. ... 
[D]et er sympatisk, at vi i demokratierne ... stædigt mod alle odds holder fast ved, at der selv 
i de arabiske lande må være en mulighed for folkestyre og udvikling. ... Dansk Folkeparti ... 
accepterer en fortsættelse af det arabiske initiativ ... ikke mindst, fordi regeringen har ladet 
os forstå, at ... initiativet samtidig [er] af stor betydning for Danmarks sikkerhed. Det er ... 
til Danmarks fordel, at så mange lande som muligt bliver demokratiske lande." (MP 
Espersen, DPP, F45, 2006.05.24 17:10; cf. MP Langballe, DPP, in Pedersen 2006) 
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weakening Islamism and stopping the terrorism destroying their everyday life. (MFA 
Møller, con., F45, 2006.05.24 16:30; underlining added)
394
 
But this redrawn clash is taken by the opposition as an invitation to venture into an 
extrapolation so that the DPP is excluded from civilization and relegated to the 
extremist outside: 
[I]f one wants to enter into a dialogue, you may start the dialogue by throwing mud at 
the others and then wonder why it comes to nothing. ... I believe that the Danes to a 
very high degree are of the opinion that they would like to get rid of the fools – that 
is the ones who have organized themselves in Islamic Jihad and Hamas and the like; 
extremist religious groupings on the one side, and the Danish People’s Party 
constantly contributing such generalizations on the other side. (MP Søvndal, soc., 
F45, 2006.05.24,17:15)
395
 
This postulated policy of mutual engagement between civilizational clashers may 
even be labelled a ‘dialogue’ on its own terms: 
The Danish People’s Party and the political Islamists we see in the Middle East are 
feeding each other and feeding on each other and creating a confrontational dialogue 
                                           
394
 "Det civilisationernes sammenstød, som mange frygter vil ødelægge en rolig 
verdensudvikling i fremtiden, finder nu sted inde i de muslimske civilisationer, hvor 
fundamentalisterne vil skade de mange gode kræfter i den arabiske verden, der ligesom vi 
ser det som afgørende at få Mellemøsten konstruktivt med i globaliseringsprocessen, og 
som søger stabilitet, sikkerhed og fremgang, og som også ser det som afgørende at få åbnet 
landene politisk og økonomisk og dermed bidrage til at svække islamismen og stoppe 
terrorismen, der ødelægger deres hverdag." (MFA Møller, con., F45, 2006.05.24 16:30; cf. 
MP Kofod, soc.dem, F45, 2006.05.24 17:05) 
395
 "[H]vis man vil i dialog, kan man godt starte dialogen med at svine de andre til og så 
undre sig over, at der ikke kommer noget ud af det. ... Jeg tror, danskerne i meget høj grad 
synes, at de godt snart vil være fri for tossehovederne - altså både dem, der har organiseret 
sig i Islamisk Jihad og Hamas og sådan noget, ekstreme religiøse grupperinger på den ene 
side, og så det Dansk Folkeparti, der konstant også er med til at bidrage med nogle 
generaliseringer på den anden side." (MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 2006.05.24,17:15; cf. MP 
Kofod, soc.dem., F45, 2006.05.24 17:15; MP Lund, UL, F45, 2006.05.2417:25) 
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from which ordinary people are suffering and which is damaging the attempts of 
other people ... to create dialogue and international [litterally: inter-popular] 
understanding. (MP Lund, UL, F45, 2006.05.24 17:55)
396
 
So to the opposition parties, the alternative is between ‘confrontational dialogue’ and 
‘dialogue and understanding’. But in this alternative, the dialogue becomes an 
appendix to understanding – and the substance of understanding is already 
established. The questions to be asked of the other in dialogue are largely rhetorical: 
"The question is if Denmark today has at all the moral authority necessary to make a 
useful effort in this area." (MP Lund, UL, F45, 2006.05.24 17:45)397 
Equally, the answer of the other to come out of the dialogue is known before any 
dialogue is initiated: "Denmark has come out [of the Cartoon affair] with a reputation 
which makes it more difficult to promote some of the things related to democracy" 
(MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 2006.05.24 17:40).398 
And so it must be, if the conclusion – that We need to engage in Self-reform – is 
known from the beginning: 
These solutions require corrections to our foreign policy; to our foreign policy 
alliances, and to our development aid, etc. They require real integration with real, 
equal opportunities when it comes to education, jobs, and housing, and hence real 
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 "Dansk Folkeparti og de politiske islamister, vi ser i Mellemøsten, jo nærer hinanden og 
lever af hinanden og skaber en konfrontatorisk dialog, som går ud over almindelige 
mennesker, og som skader andre menneskers forsøg ... på at skabe dialog og mellemfolkelig 
forståelse." (MP Lund, UL, F45, 2006.05.24 17:55) 
397
 "Spørgsmålet er, om Danmark overhovedet i dag har den nødvendige moralske autoritet 
til at kunne gøre en nyttig indsats i det område." (MP Lund, UL, F45, 2006.05.24 17:45) 
398
 "Danmark er kommet ud med et omdømme, med et ry, der gør det sværere at fremme 
nogle af de ting omkring demokrati" (MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 2006.05.24 17:40). 
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and robust prospects for the future on equal footing. (MP Baastrup, F7, 18:10-15; cf. 
MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 17:35)
399
 
Implied in such a narrative is that the other may have rational grievances – even if 
they are echoed in the grievances voiced by the radical other. The point of this 
redistribution of rationality between self and other is that we may only hope to 
influence the other to reform himself if we do forego with an example to follow: "If 
our message of democratization and respect for human rights are to have any effect it 
is necessary that we ourselves live up to those standards – and unfortunately 
Denmark does not." (MP Lund, F45, 2006.05.24 17:45)
400
 
So in this policy promoted by the parliamentarian opposition, dialogue basically 
amounts to an appendix to Self-engagement.  
Contrarily, if you see yourself to embody qualities which are to be protected against 
change, any opening to others will only compromise your identity. Even if the other 
whom we engage in dialogue is not the radical other; if the less-than-radical other 
reproduces the demands of the radical other, the result remains the same: "[T]he 
terror has won if [we] are not willing to do what needs to be done when terrorism and 
the terror networks demand. Is [the honored member] really willing to give in to 
                                           
399
 "De løsninger kræver ændringer i vores udenrigspolitik og udenrigspolitiske alliancer og 
i vores ulandsbistand m.v. De kræver reel integration med reelle, ligeværdige muligheder 
for uddannelse, job og bolig og dermed virkelige og håndfaste fremtidsmuligheder på lige 
fod." (MP Baastrup, F7, 2005.11.16, 18:10-15; cf. MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 2006.05.24 
17:35). 
400
 "Hvis vores budskab om demokratisering og respekt for menneskerettighederne skal 
have nogen effekt, er det nødvendigt, at vi selv lever op til disse standarder, og det gør 
Danmark desværre ikke." (MP Lund, F45, 2006.05.24 17:45; cf. MP Helveg Pedersen, 
soc.lib., F45, 2006.05.24 18:00) 
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terrorism and let the threat of terror mean that one decline from doing something" 
(MP Poulsen, lib., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:40).
401
 
In this situation, dialogue must be an appendix to a different form of self-
engagement; not to self-reform but to self-fortification:  
We do ... not want a multicultural Denmark. We find that Danish Christianity, 
history, culture and conception of democracy shall be the foundation upon which 
Denmark rests. We need to be better at dialogue ... and in that dialogue we shall dare 
to say who we are. The presence of people of another ethnic background and a 
different religious faith shall not make us give up what is ours. (MP Hornbech, lib., 
F18, 2000.11.23)
402
 
As the government is not inclined to put its preferred policies of elimination, control 
and emancipation in question, it needs to control the limits of what input may come 
out of the supplementary policy of dialogue. Hence, dialogue is in parliamentary 
negotiations reduced to a rhetorical appendix to self-engagement either in the form of 
an anticipated post-scriptum legitimizing self-reform or as an occasion for self-
fortification. The form of dialogue prescribed by the opposition – an anticipated post-
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 "[T]erroren har vundet, hvis [vi] ikke er villige til at gøre det, der skal gøres, når 
terrorismen og terrornetværkene kræver det? Er [det ærede medlem] virkelig villig til at 
give efter for terrorismen og lade terrortruslen betyde, at man afstår fra at gøre noget" (MP 
Poulsen, lib., AD14, 2004.03.17, 12:40). In this quote not only this or that quality of the Self 
is put into question; the very capability of agency is at stake: If we listen to possible 
demands of an other and retract from this course of action, we will have lost the capacity to 
act altogether – since the same demand is also one of the demands of the radical other. (Cf. 
MP Langballe, DPP, US108, 2004.04.13; MfA Møller, con., US108, 2004.04.13; MP 
Langballe, DPP, F7, 2005.11.16, 17:40-45; MP Espersen, DPP, F7, 2005.11.16, 19:10). 
402
 "Vi ønsker ... ikke et multikulturelt Danmark. Vi finder, at dansk kristendom, historie og 
kultur og demokratiopfattelse og vore frihedsideer stadig skal være det fundament, som 
Danmark hviler på. Vi skal blive meget bedre til dialogen .. og i den dialog turde sige, hvem 
vi selv er, og efter hvilke værdier vi har indrettet samfundet. Tilstedeværelsen af mennesker 
med anden etnisk baggrund og anden religiøs tro skal ikke få os til at opgive vort eget." (MP 
Hornbech, lib., F18, 2000.11:23) 
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scriptum to self-reform – does, however, uphold the structural opening to the other. 
Even though we have initially not waited to actually listen; if the partner in dialogue 
actually says something it will be difficult to decline listening. We are advocating 
change legitimated by Their supposed grievances – so it will be harder to ignore, 
should They intervene.
403
 Nevertheless, even if a demand from the other for our self-
reform is prognosticated, the very proscription communicates a fortified policy of 
their reform in our image: We need to reform so that We can persuade Them to 
reform to look like Our reformed image. 
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 The MFA, on the basis of surveys in Jordan and Egypt, concedes that “the impression of 
Denmark has changed as a result of the [Cartoon] affair. From giving relatively positive 
associations to a liberal and open minded welfare society, Denmark is today closely 
associated with the ‘West’ under the leadership of the USA which is typically perceived to 
be cynical and of moral double standards.” "opfattelsen af Danmark er ændret som resultat 
af [tegninge]sagen. Fra at give relativt positive associationer til et liberalt og frisindet 
velfærdssamfund, associeres Danmark i dag tæt med det 'Vesten' under ledelse af USA, som 
typisk opfattes som kynisk og dobbeltmoralsk." (Udenrigsministeriet 2006:13). The MFA’s 
conclusion to this problem is, however, not to choose a policy of dialogue but one of 
enlightenment: “It will take a sustained effort to reestablish a positive image of Denmark 
with a point of departure in the real [sic] Denmark as a peaceful, Scandinavian country.” 
"Det vil blive et langt sejt træk at reetablere et positivt image for Danmark med 
udgangspunkt i det reelle Danmark, som et fredeligt skandinavisk land." (2006:14). Even if 
the final conclusion to the analysis is that “living in strict accordance with our own 
principles will probably be the most efficient lever for the recovery of the trust and 
credibility in the cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries.” " stringent efterlevelse af 
vore egne principper formentlig være den mest effektive løftestang for at genvinde tillid og 
troværdighed i samarbejdet med de mellemøstlige lande." (2006:27), the recommendation 
highlighted in the executive summary is “To make an increased public diplomacy effort to 
communicate motives and values for the Danish engagement in the Middle East and to 
present the Arab Initiative as a part of a comprehensive Danish foreign policy for the 
Middle East which to an equal degree prioritizes the security political and socio-economic 
aspects.” "At der gøres en øget public diplomacy indsats for at kommunikere motiver og 
værdier for det danske engagement i Mellemøsten og for at præsentere Det Arabiske 
Initiativ som del af en samlet dansk udenrigspolitik for Mellemøsten, der i lige så høj grad 
prioriterer de sikkerhedspolitiske og socio-økonomiske aspekter." (2006:3). 
455 
8.6 Conclusion: Dialogue framed by securitization 
How does the way in which Danish/Muslim relations are structured in the debates on 
dialogue as counter terrorism contribute to radicalization of conflict? How are the 
present and future relations presented and necessitated? 
For the government, at the point of departure, the diacriticon for distinguishing Us 
from Them extends to two opposing chains of equivalence constituting an 
antagonism: We embody sensibility and enlightened values which are morally better 
than Their extremist, fundamentalist darkening. They are spread around the globe; 
both outside and inside Denmark – and They are threatening both Us and not-so-
radical others. The radically other – the terrorist – seem beyond repair: The only 
option seem to be elimination or control as the terrorist is actively threatening Us 
determined by a set of ideas (which is, on the one hand, an ‘ideology’ but, on the 
other hand, has some relation to ‘religion’). Dialogue is, hence, out of the question in 
both ends of this relation. Therefore, when relating to the terrorist, the policy is one 
of Securitization: We must expel the radical other from the territory of the nation 
state and annihilate the radical other in the rest of the world.  
The Terrorist as radical other, however, does not appear in a vacuum in the 
government interventions: A cast of less-than-radical others are differentially 
inscribed in the narrative as objects for policies supplementing the primary policy of 
elimination of the radical other. The diacriticon for the distinction between self and 
these less-than-radical others is religiously defined culture. Initially, a hierarchy is 
established so that elements of Their way of organizing society is valued as inferior 
to Ours – therefore They should become more like Us. Simultaneously, however, it is 
imperative not to imply a hierarchy of cultures or religions. Otherwise the invitation 
issued could be counterproductive. The result is somewhat tense: The diacriticon for 
distinction involves religion/culture – but the hierarchy is implied to be defined by a-
cultural, societal organization. Physically They are both distant – in the Middle East – 
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and close to Us; inside Our nation state. As fertile ground for the production of 
radical others – terrorists – They influence Us. They are capable of change – alas, in 
both directions: There is a chance that they could become (more like) Us. A 
radicalization to terrorism remains, however, another possibility.  
The basic policy in relation to the less-than-radical others, hence, becomes one of 
Their reformation; i.e. a harmonization as concerns certain diacritica. It is implied 
that Their attitude towards Our way of doing things, is fundamentally affirmative – 
only their independent agency towards this goal is impeded by the radical others. 
Therefore the policy is one of Their engagement in Their own reformation through 
‘partnerships’.  
Especially when it comes to the reformation of not-that-much-less-than-radical 
Others, the cooperation of the somewhat-more-less-than-radical Others becomes 
urgent: The gap to communicate across is not as wide for Them as it is for Us. The 
sensitivity of communicating an absence of hierarchies, however, makes for the 
staging of a policy labelled 'dialogue'; a concept which is primarily employed to 
promote decidedly one-way harmonizing measures. At times the concept of 'dialogue' 
is, nevertheless, opened up to imply two-way interaction between distinct units. The 
opening presents itself in the text as a reluctant rejoinder to the answer of the other 
resisting Our negative interpellation by seeking recourse to sedimented layers of 
meaning related to the concept of ‘dialogue’. In that situation, it is difficult to insist 
on a 'dialogue' being kept one-way. 
In terms of grammars the construction of both the synchronic structure and of the 
diachronic reconfiguration is highly complex: At one level, We stand in an Orientalist 
contrast to Them. At a higher level of Segmentation, however, We and the less-than-
radical others are one against the radical other. At the highest level, however, We 
decide: Should some of Them protest against this picture, Encompassment allows Us 
to see that They are wrong in their self-description. So wrong that the less-than-
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radical other may in the last instance be securitized if They insist on not cooperating. 
The ability of the grammar of Encompassment to trump any apparent equality is clear 
from the way that the less-than-radical others need to submit to a certain measure of 
monitoring to make sure that They are not radicals in disguise. 
The DPP questions the capability of change of Muslim societies by seeking recourse 
to Orientalist tropes sedimented by an Islamology based in Christian theology. They 
nevertheless reluctantly accept the policy of (preferably one-way) dialogue as a 
means to civilizing the Muslim world. 
The opposition parties aim at re-constituting the antagonism constituting the 
discourse by inscribing the DPP in the chain of equivalence involving the extremist 
other – while simultaneously de-radicalizing the Islamist other by awarding him a 
measure of rationality. Without explicitly assigning the government to the outside of 
Our identity, it is implied that Denmark under the centre-right government is ‘beside 
itself’. Denmark, hence, has to re-realize it’s ‘real self’ by performing a different 
foreign policy and a different policy of integration. By performing differently, 
Denmark will be able to promote humanitarian values abroad (cf. chapter 4 & 5). 
Hence, self-reform is a precondition for presenting a policy better able to perform 
Encompassment of the other. 
The government parties and the DPP, on the contrary, present the suggested self-
reform as a threat: Our identity – and even our very capability of agency – will be 
jeopardized if we accommodate Them: Even if our self-reform is an answer to the 
demands of less-than-radical others, the partial coincidence of these demands with 
the demands of the radical other (the terrorist) makes them unacceptable. The 
prescribed policy is another kind of self-realization: Since the real self is already 
present (even if threatened) the answer is a ‘self-fortification’ indicating the need for 
assimilation inside the nation state.  
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Controlled difference is needed for dialogue to be possible. Inside the nation state the 
degree of difference accepted is lower and the measures of control necessary higher 
than across the border. The potential for conflict, accordingly, is higher if the less-
than-radical other insist on entering our territory – and if s/he, having entered, insist 
on equality disregarding cultural background. The final section 8.7 prognosticates 
what kind of response such a policy for future interaction may provoke. 
8.7 Perspectives: Radicalizing invitations to monological 
dialogue 
Since 9/11, the Danish government has presented narratives of elimination and 
control to counter terrorism – supplemented, increasingly after 7/7 and the Cartoon 
affairs by narratives of reform and liberation. The narratives of liberation have 
involved narratives of partnership and dialogue. Recently, dialogue was increasingly 
implied to be a two-way interchange between different and differing entities. 
Domestic narratives of integration have taken its point of departure in the perceived 
religio-cultural homogeneity of Denmark: Cultural diversity represented by Muslim 
migrants has been pointed out as a threat to this central element of Danish identity 
discourse. In this context of integration seen as one-way assimilation, a turn to 
dialogue could be significant. 
Let us, however, turn the tables and see how the narratives of dialogue look from the 
perspective of the less-than-radical other: Muslims in the Middle East and in 
Denmark are invited to engage in a dialogue with the Danish state. Most of them will 
probably agree to the aim: To avert terrorism.  
As you read through the invitation you have just received, you find that the agenda of 
the dialogue is long and detailed; that a number of the specific points of the agenda 
involves monologues recited by the invitor; that you are supposed to perform in 
specified ways before and after arriving at the table; and that a series of measures will 
459 
be taken to monitor your behaviour and utterances. You also notice that you are only 
invited because you are perceived to be well-connected to or at least in command of 
special skills allowing you to communicate with potential terrorists. Or maybe you 
are invited because you are seen as a potential terrorist yourself...  
Would you – if identified as a Muslim – accept the invitation? Many would probably 
not (cf. Mach 2006:4) and there is a danger that the framing of the invitation might 
turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy by pushing a few of the, hence, potentially-
radicalized others in the wrong direction (Danish Institute for International Studies 
2008:2). So in that sense, the net effect of the initiative could turn out to be negative. 
Should you – as someone identified as a Muslim – accept the invitation? That is a 
truly difficult strategic question. On the one hand, as Judith Butler notes; if one is 
awarded a position "at a distance from oneself" (1997:33f) one may react using that 
position as a platform for speaking back; i.a. by insisting to be included (cf. 1997:91), 
since "it is clearly possible to speak with authority without being authorized to speak" 
(1997:157).
404
 On the other hand, a role awarded in a securitized narrative is 
particularly circumscribed: When attention is pre-focused to consider any deviation 
from the script for potential radicalization, creative improvisation is not easy. The 
crux of the matter may, however, be what happens if you do not accept the invitation 
for dialogue. If no one takes up the invitation issued to dialogue, the invitor needs to 
come up with an alternative story to explain and try to solve that problem. Such an 
alternative story might include a renewed invitation to dialogue revised to be more 
hospitable. But the way the invitor continues the narration of the relation may just as 
well close down even the possibility of a circumscribed dialogue. Perhaps the 
relevant question is if there is any other way to resist the delimitation of an identity 
than to insist on redrawing its limits from within (cf. Butler 1997:140). 
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 Cf. Karlsen & Villadsen (2008:360). 
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Such a strategic consideration might conclude differently, depending on whether the 
invitation to dialogue is issued as part of what is sedimented as internal or external 
identity politics: The 2006 evaluation, adjustment and debates of the Arab Initiative 
resulted in slightly more weight to policies of two-way dialogue. This recalibration 
dominates the communication of the initiative as it was re-launched in 2009.
405
 
Whether enough show up for the dialogues envisioned by the domestic invitations to 
make sense in the continued narrative remains to be seen. As does the government's 
reaction if no one shows up; whether the continuation of the narrative will be a 
reformulated invitation – or a different story. 
The analytical design of the empirical analysis of the dissertation does not allow final 
judgment on whether the narratives involving one-way 'dialogues' reaches Muslims in 
Denmark or in the Middle East as an effective interpellation. Concerning the counter-
radicalization action plan, a heated public debate among cabinet ministers left the 
impression that any mentioning of dialogue in the same sentence as terrorism or 
Islamism was controversial (cf. Hardis 2009). In terms of specific policy initiatives 
neither the debate among the ministers nor the consultation process changed much. 
But when the civil servants initial report (Ministry 2008) is compared with the final 
version sanctioned by the government (Government 2009), the most striking change 
is that it is less narrative: There is less explanation why the individual policy initiative 
should be promoted – less talk of what the policies should do and how they should 
achieve their goals. The main impression left is very abstract: that we need to involve 
in dialogue with Muslims to stop terror, even if some of them are controversial 
partners in dialogue.  
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 The launch included a recalibrated version (Ministry 2009/Udenrigsministeriet 2009) of 
(Ministry 2005/Udenrigsministeriet 2009).  
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Concerning the Arab Initiative, two different tracks of communication seems to 
become more and more distinct: On the one hand, when telling stories of how to deal 
with the less-than radical other (the average Middle Eastern Muslim), the Arab 
Initiative is presented as "demand driven" (Ministry 2008:3; italics in orig.), based on 
"equal partnerships" (2008:4; italics in orig.) and oriented towards the realization of 
goals defined by the other (on a general level as represented in the Arab Human 
Development Report; specifically as "formulated by Arab governments and non-
governmental organisations." (2008:3) And two goals of "dialogue" and "reform" – 
which was in the original launch described as "two sides of the same coin" (2005:7) – 
is now just listed side by side.
406
 On the other hand, when telling stories about how to 
deal with the radical other (the terrorist), the Arab Initiative is included as a dialogical 
partnership ultimately contributing to the higher aim of preventing terrorism (cf. 
Udenrigsministeren 2008; Regeringen 2009b:31).
407
 The analytical setup of the 
dissertation does not allow judgment on the interpellatory effects
408
 – but in general 
one may (with Hajer 2009:9-10) warn against believing that the back stage of internal 
identity politics may be kept separate from the front stage of external identity 
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 As the programme is now described as having "the objective to establish a basis for 
improved dialogue, understanding and cooperation between the Arab region and to support 
existing local reform processes in the Middle East." (2008:2). 
407
 Even when departing solidly outside the counter terrorism framing, terrorism is difficult 
to keep away from entering the story (cf. Wass 2009). 
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 Marie Koch Wegter (personal communication 2009.10.05; cf. fn. 371) intimates me that 
it does not, as mutual dialogue has been the core of the Arab Initiative in practice from the 
beginning. The latest evaluation ('review') of the Arab Initiative concludes on the basis of 
comparative study of Middle East reform programmes like the Arab Initiative that "The 
success of The Arab Initiative may, finally, be ascribed to the egalitarian approach on a 
series of levels." "Endelig kan DAIs succes tilskrives den ligeværdige tilgang på flere 
niveauer." (Skadkaer Consult 2009:30). The project comparing Middle East reform 
programmes focused, however, only on the programme formulations, not how the policies 
were practiced (cf. Schlumberger 2009). 
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politics.
409
 The Cartoon Crisis – including its implications for the Arab Initiative – 
seems to confirm the validity of this warning.
410
 
Anyhow, if you accept your role in a narrative of a partnership – dialogical or not – 
aiming at your own reform, you cannot be sure that the role will be available for you. 
The invitation may be revoked. Chapter 9 analyses a debate over whether the 
invitation to Turkey to join the EU should be revoked. The debate concerns the nature 
of the difference of Turkey: Whether it is temporary or permanent – whether the 
relevant difference is religious or not. 
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 The 2009 evaluation of the Arab Initiative asks the MfA to develop a more clear strategy 
for communicating the policies, principles and guidelines of the Initiative (Skadkaer Consult 
2009:25). This might have the unfortunate effect of alienate either the Danish People's Party 
or potential Middle Eastern partners. 
410
 In the domestic context, 'speaking with two tongues' may relegate you to the position of a 
radical other – at least if you are a Muslim (cf. Lindekilde 2007). 
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9 BWill Turkey ever become European? The difficulty of 
deferring decision  
Chapters 5 and 6 analysed debates on how and why it is a problem that Muslims are 
coming to and staying in Denmark. Chapters 7 and 8 analysed debates on how to deal 
with potential perpetrators and victims of 'Muslim violence'. The chapters all found 
narratives insisting that it would be best if They become more like Us – but jumping 
from one diagnosis of the need for reform and one prescription of how to secure 
reform to another. While some voices doubted that Their reform is possible at all. 
This final analytical chapter analyses a debate on exactly this: Whether the reform of 
a Muslim other is possible. 
9.1 Introduction: Muslimizing by pre-emption 
This chapter analyses debates on Turkish membership in the Danish parliament, 
Folketinget.
411
 The fundamental agreement in parliament is that Turkey is different. 
The central disagreement concerns the temporalization of the difference; whether 
Turkey is temporarily backward or permanently different. Turkey is constructed as 
different from Europe in two ways: either as irreparably different or as potentially 
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 The material analyzed was selected by asking the search engine on the web page of the 
Danish parliament, Folketinget, to report all plenary session negotiations combining words 
including ‘tyrki*’, ‘eu*’ and ‘medlem*’ (i.e. ‘Turk*’, ‘Eu*’ and ‘member*’) before 1 
January 2007. The subject was featured in a number of parliamentary debates, most 
prominently in the debates on proposed parliamentary resolutions specifically focusing on 
Turkish membership of the EU (B 175 in May 2004; B17 in October 2004; and B34 in 
February 2007) all tabled by Danish People’s Party, but the subject also surfaced in a 
number of general EU debates (F7 in November 2000; F21 in January 2001; F37 in 
February 2003, B24 in April 2004; F39 and F40 in March 2004; L137 in April 2005; L26 in 
October 2006) and on the occasion of the prime minister’s annual ‘state of the realm’ 
address (R1 in October 2003; October 2004; and October 2005). The full list of debates is 
included in the references section below. A number of quotes from politicians originating in 
other parliamentary material or reported by newspapers – and explicitly referred to in the 
parliamentary debates reported by the search – have been included. 
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capable of concluding a process of civilization; capable of by becoming identical. 
Between these two narratives the government is working to carve out a middle 
ground by insisting on a strategic inconclusiveness: It is to remain an open question 
whether or not Turkey is endowed with the capacity to change sufficiently to allow 
accession. Only in this way may the government today articulate both culturalist 
domestic sceptics and European norms of ‘culture blindness’ without risking 
inconsistency when finally, some day, having to conclude. 
The insistent inconclusiveness is, however, pre-empted by a demand put to the 
government to be consistent in relation to Turkey; consistent in relation to Turkey as 
yet another instance of ‘Muslim relations’. The Muslim character of Turkey – and 
hence its otherness in relation to Europe – is implied by the selection of themes 
recognized as central to other debates on 'Muslim relations'. In this way, a conflictual 
policy for future interaction between the EU and Turkey is imposed on the Danish 
government. 
The proceeding section 9.2 lays out how the production of national identity in the 
context of intertextually related self/other-discourses may be the bi-product of a 
specific dynamics shaping intertextuality as it unfolds in the discourse of professional 
politicians. A series of distinct mechanisms conspire to produce the result; a) the 
demand for consistency of actors makes for b) a functional role of inconclusiveness 
involving c) a pitfall of 'imposed consistency' which – in the debates analyzed – is 
actualized by d) the rhetorical device of thematic allusion to e) diacritica demarking 
Us from Them in different policy fields.  
The first reading of the debates, therefore, focus on, firstly, the temporalization of, 
and secondly, the diacritica delimiting the difference between Us and Them. The 
following section 9.3 argues that Turkey is – in the Danish debates – not just another 
case of EU enlargement, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively. Section 9.4 sketches 
the three main discourses in the Danish debate on Turkey; a ‘culturalist’ discourse 
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depicting Turkey as essentially different; a ‘civilizationalist’ discourse painting a 
picture of a Turkey capable of catching up with European standards; and an ‘official’ 
discourse deferring the choice between culturalism and civilizationalism.  
Section 9.5 notes how official Danish discourse explicitly relates the question of 
Turkish EU accession causally to the integration of Muslim migrants and to global 
Islam. Section 9.6 points out how thematic allusions to diacritica known from 
discourses in these related policy fields are made in debates on Turkey in ways 
effectively Muslimizing Turkey. 
Section 9.7 concludes by performing the second reading assessing the contribution to 
radicalization from the structures of the identity configuration centred on Danish 
debates on Muslims. The final section 9.8 prognosticates that the official discourse of 
inconclusiveness is being pre-empted to exclude of Turkey by allusion to cultural 
difference – and performs the third reading by characterizing the kind of 
interpellation which such a 'coded' discourse may produce. 
9.2 Foreign policies producing national identities and 
consistent actors 
If discourse is defined as regularity in the dispersion of utterances (Foucault 1972:38) 
a number of discourses – a number of regularities – may be analytically discerned in 
any material. If intertextuality means that any text, any utterance, refers to other texts, 
other utterances, other discourses (Kristeva 1986:36-7, 111; Todorov 1984:60; 
Shapiro 1989:11; Hansen 2006:56),
412
 intertextual relations between these various 
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 Kristeva warns that “The term intertextuality denotes this transposition of one (or 
several) sign-system(s) into another; but since this term has often been understood in the 
banal sense of ‘study of sources’, we prefer the term transposition because it specifies that 
the passage from one signifying system to another demands a new articulation of ... 
enunciative and denotative positionality.” (Kristeva 1986:111). The ‘study of sources’ 
included in the analysis of this chapter purports to live up to the standards of a study in 
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discourses may be conceptualized in a number of different ways. If every utterance is 
an attempt, however ultimately impossible, to arrest the flow of meaning by 
establishing a specific complex of intertextual relations (cf. Kristeva 1986:41), then a 
central task for political analysis is to uncover the mechanisms at work in political 
debates (cf. Czarniawska 1998:13). 
The discourses of any society are stratified into “a multitude of concrete worlds, a 
multitude of bounded verbal-ideological and social belief systems” (Bakhtin 
1981:288). This section describes a specific dynamic shaping intertextuality in the 
context of two such stratifications; professional discourses and policy fields. More 
specifically it analyses how in the discourse of professional politicians a demand for 
consistency may pre-empt strategic inconclusiveness across policy fields. This 
observation is particularly relevant to the analytical task of the dissertation – the 
assessment of the contribution to radicalization from the identity configuration 
centred on Danish debates on Muslims – as the dynamic allows extremist voices to 
'hijack' the debate in a way which imports a policy for future self/other interaction to 
a policy field, which is more conflictual than the alternatives left open by the 
inconclusiveness promoted by the central actors. 
A first principle of stratification concerns the ’professional’: the language of the 
lawyer, the doctor, the businessman, the politician ... these languages differ from each 
other not only in their vocabularies; they involve specific forms for manifesting 
intentions, forms for making conceptualizations and evaluation concrete." (1981:289) 
A second principle of stratification of discourse concerns different policy fields 
institutionalized as part of the discourse of the professional politician: Different 
ministries are responsible for formulating and implementing the different bodies of 
                                                                                                                                            
transposition by showing how the intertextuality does re-articulate the positions of both 
Turkey and Denmark. 
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policies in relation to different objects of regulation and strategies of interaction, and 
various parliamentary committees and party speakers discuss these bodies of policies. 
In that sense relatively distinct policy fields are constituted in which differing 
narratives may be told without interfering (cf. subsection 2.3.2). 
For instance, integration policies are performing the nation state in relation to the 
migrant other inside the state – in parallel to foreign policies performing the nation 
state in relation to other states outside the state. While both sets of policies perform 
‘integration’ of identity in relation to something deemed ‘foreign’ to the nation state, 
they are nevertheless institutionally kept apart to a certain degree: Different ministries 
are responsible for formulating and implementing the two bodies of policies, and 
different parliamentary committees and party speakers are responsible for discussing 
the two bodies of policies. In that sense ‘foreign policy’ and ‘integration policy’ 
constitute two relatively distinct policy fields, in which different narratives may be 
told. 
If, however, the two policy fields are being brought together – by the government, by 
the opposition in parliament, or by pressure or events external to the political scene – 
a dislocation may be the result (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:ch. 3; Hansen 2006:31ff). 
Such a destabilization may involve not just one or more of the discourses in each of 
the policy fields but also the subject positions of the actors voicing the discourses (cf. 
subsection 2.2.2). 
Upholding identity – of a nation state and of a rational actor representing the nation 
state – involves discursive work in the form of explanation and narration, since 
identity as a concept imposes on itself a logic of consistency: If you want to be 
accepted as being identical to yourself, you need to act in a way that is accepted as 
‘identical’; you need to be and talk consistently over time as well as in relation to 
‘different’ issues. You need – in relation to different others – to perform a self, that 
may be counted as identical. 
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A number of audiences may judge the performance of identity and consistency: the 
others (states and migrants) may under specific circumstances be allowed to talk back 
in consequential ways (Butler 1997; Rumelili 2007; cf. ch. 2.1.1.3); in electoral 
democracies, the citizenry judges frequently; in parliamentary democracies the 
government has an immediate need for a parliamentarian majority to accept its 
narratives of the self/other-relations of the nation state. The analysis of this chapter 
focuses on this most immediate audience and how it shapes the intertextuality of 
government discourses in a four step dynamics. 
a) The demand for consistency – i.e. regularity – posed to professional politicians 
A first rule of subjectivity in modernity is the need to appear consistent; if an actor 
jump from discourse to discourse – if you say A the one moment and B the next – 
s/he will not be taken as trustworthy. Since contexts evolve it is not enough merely to 
re-iterate the same utterances; a measure of rationality acceptable to the audience is 
needed in countering new arguments, incorporating newly imported situations, 
problems, facts etc.  
Each profession has its own institutionalized thresholds and control mechanisms for 
securing consistency and rationality. Bakhtin diagnoses, in a late piece from the 
70ies, that "Irony has entered into all the languages of modern times ... Man in 
modern times does not declaim but he speaks, that is, he speaks with restrictions. 
Declamatory genres are essentially preserved as parodic or semi-parodic ingredients 
... The uttering subjects of high declamatory genres – priests, prophets, preachers, 
judges, leaders, fathers-patriarchs, etc. have left life." (Bakhtin in Todorov 1984:102) 
Perhaps the one ‘p-word’ left out Bakhtin’s list – politicians – have survived, if not as 
a novelistic character to be taken serious due to his inherent qualities then definitively 
as a character of social life which even the ironic academic need to take seriously due 
to the politicians effectiveness as an actor. We might not care if Julio Iglesias 
declares his love – but we need to care if George Bush declares his enmity. 
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The transparency secured by public access, media surveillance and party competition 
leads to the constantly repeated choreography of Danish parliamentary debates which 
makes this specific institution rather well disciplined and the demand for consistency 
rather high. 
b) The functional role of inconclusiveness in the face of a demand for consistency 
Secondly, this high demand for consistency makes certain forms of inconclusiveness 
functional: To be able to appear consistent in the future when dealing with issues you 
do not fully control, one strategy is to secure yourself a room of manoeuvre. A 
measure of present inconclusiveness is, hence, functional to future consistency: 
Saying A-or-B today leaves room for saying both A, B, A-or-B, most-likely-A etc. 
tomorrow without appearing inconsistent. 
c) The pitfall of 'imposed consistency' when upholding inconclusiveness. 
Thirdly, such inconclusiveness may, however functional it is in relation to avoiding 
inconsistency, involve the risk of leaving the definition of consistency in the hands of 
others. No utterance can explicate the total context necessary for its understanding; 
parts of the meaning must be inferred by the audience (Brown & Yule 1983:chs.2.1.3, 
7). But when you refrain from explicating context X rather than context Y, other 
actors may succeed in imposing their demand for a specific consistency on you by 
inferring a specific context as relevant for understanding your utterance. If you have 
already in this other context imposed on you chosen A – then you will suddenly 
appear inconsistent if you now choose B. 
d) The rhetorical device of ‘thematic allusion’ 
Finally, this pre-emption of the inconclusiveness by inferring a specific context may 
be achieved by a variety of rhetorical means: Neither actors in nor analysts of identity 
politics can once and for all develop a complete inventory of decisive discursive 
resources available for effective articulation in a given social context. The 
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intertextual presence of another discourse may range from “full presence” or “explicit 
dialogue” to “the most discrete allusion” in which the re-activated discourse “receives 
no material corroboration, and yet it is summoned forth ... because it is held available 
in the collective memory of a given social group.” (Todorov 1984:73) In the debates 
analysed, a context of 'Muslim relations' is summoned forth by allusion to themes 
from debates on other 'Muslim relations'.  
e) The discursive figure of ‘diacritica hindering integration’ 
More specifically, the pre-emptive conclusion to the insistently inconclusive narrative 
articulated by the government is inferred by allusion to diacritica – i.e. criteria for 
deciding inclusion/exclusion (Barth 1969) – known from the debates on integration 
policy and global Islam to separate Muslims from Danes. Hence, by listing diacritica 
said to hinder Turkey in integrating in Europe which parallels known lists of 
diacritica said to hinder Muslim migrants in integrating in Denmark and the 
integration of global Islam in the Western world, a picture of ‘a Muslim’ is 
‘summoned forth’. Turkey is in this way inferred to be yet another instance of 
‘Muslim relations’ – and its integration is inferred to be yet another impossible case. 
In sum, the inference of the conclusion that Turkey is irreparably different takes the 
form of a subtle allusion  
 not by quotation ('You have acknowledged that Muslim migrants won't integrate – 
Turkey won't either');  
 not by implication of problems by explicit assignment of qualities ('Turkey is 
Muslim", i.e. '...and Muslims won't integrate') (cf. Hansen 2006: 56f);  
 but by the mere suggestion of themes recognizable from other debates on 'Muslim 
relations' ('Violence against women is a problem in Turkey'; i.e. '...as we know is 
always a problem with Muslims, so other known 'Muslim problems' – including 
Their resilience – probably also applies to Turkey'). 
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9.3 Not just another enlargement: Turkey as different 
On the one hand, the Turkish application for membership of the European Union is 
handled exactly like any other membership application: according to the Copenhagen 
criteria and aiming at the acquis; i.e. the implementation of the entire body of EU 
legislation in the new member states. On the other hand, it is obvious that the Turkish 
application is not handled like the applications dealt with so far. The EU member 
states did unanimously agree to open accession negotiations in October 2005. But 
simultaneously the negotiations have renewed interest in the ‘forgotten Copenhagen 
criteria’; the capacity of the Union to absorb new member states.413  Apart from the 
fact that Turkey is the most populous country to apply for membership of the EU so 
far, the reluctance to embrace Turkish membership is most often assigned to its being 
‘different’ due to its Muslim population. The way in which Denmark stands out on 
these two dimensions – enlargement and 'Muslim relations' – point to radically 
narratives on Turkish membership: 
Firstly, Denmark has a decidedly pro-enlargement record (Friis 2003: 284; 
Schimmelfennig 2001:50; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2002:51). Denmark has 
been promoting the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU which – along with 
the acquis – is generally conceived of as ‘culture blind’; i.e. they do not demand a 
specific culture as a criterion for membership.
 
Furthermore, Denmark supported that 
the late Constitutional Treaty was drafted without reference to any specific religion 
(cf. Adler-Nissen & Knudsen 2005:212-4); likewise its resurrected incarnation, the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
                                           
413
 As stated in the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen 
in June 1993: ”The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the 
momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general 
interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.” (European Council 1993:13). 
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However, the way in which the Commission develops the concept of ‘absorption 
capacity’ in a special report annexed to its November 2006 communication on the 
enlargement strategy highlights that the back door – or perhaps; the front door – is 
still open to cultural arguments against Turkish accession. The Commission reminds 
that 
Democratic legitimacy is essential to the EU enlargement process. Every key 
decision leading to a country’s accession is taken unanimously by the democratically 
elected governments of the Member States and candidate countries. National 
parliaments ratify the decision. ... Democratic legitimacy also means a Europe which 
listens to the expectations of its citizens and addresses their concerns through 
adequate policies. For any of its policies, including enlargement, the EU has to win 
the support of its citizens. (Commission 2006a:23) 
This, secondly, point to the relevance of the debates on Denmark’s ‘Muslim 
relations’ for its stance on Turkish EU membership. Since 9/11 Islam has in the 
Danish debate increasingly been constructed as the condensation point of cultural 
difference in Denmark and globally.
414
 Hence, the way in which Danish identity is 
constructed in relation to Muslims – Muslim migrants or Muslims in international 
politics – may pull the Danish narrative on Turkish EU accession towards the 
opposite conclusion than the one suggested by the narrative of the Danish stance to 
EU accession in general. 
Just a quantitative glance at Danish debates makes it clear that Turkey is not seen as a 
simple continuation of the 2004 enlargements: It has spurred far more debate than 
any other applicant country.
415
 The Danish parliament only began debating Turkish 
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 Cf. chapters 1, 4 & 5. 
415
 The search engine Infomedia.dk covering all Danish print media reports more articles on 
Turkey than the sum of articles mentioning Ukrainian, Albanian, Bosnian, Macedonian, and 
first in line Croatian EU membership, both in 2004-6 and in 1996-2006. Furthermore, the 
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EU membership in 2002 – after the events of 11 September 2001 and in the 
immediate shadow of the final negotiations of the Eastern enlargement during the 
Danish presidency.
416
 
A qualitative analysis of the debates show that the common basis for any Danish 
discourse on the topic is that Turkey is different from Europe in a way which makes 
Turkish accession a problem. As stated by the present prime minister: "[I]t is clear 
that Turkey is a society which is substantially different from the traditional European 
societies." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., US27, 2002.11.20 12:20)
417
 
Actually, the only statement in the material analyzed that comes close to denying 
difference between Turkey and Europe is uttered by a rather marginal figure in 
Danish politics, Peter Brixtofte, a former mayor of suburban Farum for the liberal 
government party who was ousted for corruption charges, but who has – as one of the 
still standing positive achievements – a record of successfully integrating Turkish 
                                                                                                                                            
articles on Turkey are generally discussing the specific case, while the articles reported on 
other prospective member states often just mention the individual case as a part of a listing 
or brief overview of the states waiting in the accession line. (Searches combining 
'tyrki*/ukrain*/alban*/bosni*/makedon*/kroat*', 'eu*' and 'medlem*'.) The Danish 
parliament has not had any debates on individual membership applications within the last 
ten years – except on Turkey's (cf. fn. 411). 
416
 Before 2002, Turkey and the EU were scarcely mentioned in the same sentence in the 
Folketing. Not even the recognition of Turkey as a candidate country by the European 
Council in Helsinki in 1999 spurred parliamentary debate (searches on www.ft.dk, cf. fn. 
411). The Danish newspaper debates show the same pattern: The number of leading articles 
in national dailies mentioning the EU Turkey relationship was five or less p.a. in the first 
half of the 90ies rising to appx. 10 p.a. in the last half of the 90ies. 2001 saw just 1 (a week 
before 9/11); the debate only took off again in May 2002 producing in that year 41 leading 
articles (mostly connected to the Copenhagen enlargement summit). Since then minimum 
30 articles have been published p.a. with an all time high of 89 in 2004 (most during EP 
election campaign or around the summit decision to open negotiations (searches on 
Infomedia.dk, cf. fn. 415).  
417
 "[D]et [er] klart, at Tyrkiet jo er et samfund, som er væsentlig anderledes end de 
traditionelle europæiske samfund" (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., US27, 2002.11.20 12:20) 
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immigrants in the labour market. He is furthermore known to have commercial 
interests in Turkey. He claimed that 
Turkey is a part of Europe. It became so 80 years ago when it had a leader named 
Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk, father of the Turks. He introduced a modern constitution 
separating religion from the state – contrary to Denmark where we have a state 
religion. They introduced the European alphabet, women were enfranchised, and they 
were forbidden to wear veils in public buildings. (MP Brixtofte, indep., R1, 
2004.10.07, 13:50-14:00)
418
 
Worth noting is, firstly, that the basis for his inclusion of Turkey in Europe is its 
substitution of a number of cultural practices known from Danish debates on 
integration to be Muslim (cf. chapters 5 & 7) with 'European' practices. So a digital 
division between Europe and Muslim is upheld, only Turkey is allocated to the 
European side. Secondly, even this most inclusive voice modifies the inclusion of 
Turkey in Europe by implying that Turkey is not yet truly European: "80 years ago 
Turkey took the first step towards being a part of Europe, and now they are 
proceeding modernizing the legislation." (MP Brixtofte, indep., R1, 2004.10.07, 
13:50-14:00)
419
 
So the regularity in dispersion of utterances delimiting Danish political discourse on 
Turkey is that Turkey is different. 
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 "Tyrkiet er en del af Europa. Det blev det for 80 år siden, da det havde en leder, der hed 
Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk, tyrkernes far. Han indførte en moderne forfatning, hvor man 
adskilte religionen fra staten - i modsætning til i Danmark, hvor vi har en statsreligion. Man 
indførte det europæiske alfabet, kvinderne fik stemmeret, og man forbød, at de kunne gå 
med slør i offentlige bygninger." (MP Brixtofte, indep., R1, 2004.10.07, 13:50-14:00) 
419
 "For 80 år siden tog Tyrkiet et meget vigtigt skridt i retning af at blive en del af Europa, 
og nu fortsætter man med modernisering af lovgivningen." (MP Brixtofte, indep., R1, 
2004.10.07, 13:50-14:00) 
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9.4 Absolute cultural difference, civilizational latecomer or 
inconclusiveness 
On the basis of the agreement that Turkey is different, three narratives separate 
themselves from each other by disagreeing at another level: The point of separation is 
what future of the difference should be projected; whether the difference is described 
as (1) an absolute, irreparable cultural difference between Turkey and Europe or (2) 
as a temporary delay of a civilizing process common to Turkey and other European 
countries – or (3) whether the answer to this question is to be left open.420 
Firstly, a culturalist narrative depicts Turkey as essentially different from Europe. 
Turkey, according to this discourse, is a Muslim country and what ever they do 
Turkey will therefore never be European: "Turkey’s culture in no way agrees with the 
cultures of the European peoples" (MP Kjærsgaard, DPP leader, R1, 2005.10.06 
13:45).
421
 
Mostly the difference is articulated as one of 'culture' but occasionally the centrality 
of 'religion' (i.e. 'Islam') in this cultural argument is explicated: 
[T]he cultural aspect also gives rise to even more worry. The cooperation in the EU 
and the European democracies are based on the Christian values ... Even though there 
is in Turkey a clear division between state and religion, it may very well show itself 
to be unstable since forces in the country are working at weakening the division, and 
                                           
420
 Ifversen (2005) identifies culturalism and civilizationalism as the two basic discursive 
modes of talking about Turkey's difference in relation to Europe in a number of Danish 
newspaper articles from 2004-5 on Turkish EU accession. These same two modes of 
discourse on Turkey are also identified in a broader European context by Rumelili 
(2004:44).  
421
 "Tyrkiets kultur stemmer på ingen måde overens med de europæiske folks kulturer" (MP 
Kjærsgaard, DPP leader, R1, 2005.10.06 13:45). 
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the EU cannot include a declared Islamist state rule. (MP Videbæk, Chr.dem., B175, 
2004.05.19 18:25)
422
 
The culturalist narrative is consistently told by members of the nationalist Danish 
People's Party, cautiously by members of the marginal Christian democrats, and 
every now and then by the odd member of the government parties and the social 
democrats.
423
 
Secondly, a civilizationalist narrative counts not a number of incompatible cultures 
(in the plural) but degrees of one civilizational process. According to this narrative 
Turkey is an apprentice in relation to the universal values embodied by and radiating 
from Europe:  
[T]he fact that the prospect was held out to Turkey at an earlier point in time – very 
long time ago, actually all the way back in the 60ies – that there might some time be 
negotiations with them, and that we have from the 90ies seriously said to Turkey that 
if they fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria, democracy, human rights and economic 
development, then we will be prepared to give a date for the start of negotiations; this 
fact has had a huge positive effect in Turkey ... We have as Europeans a unique 
chance to support and strengthen this development (MP Holmsgaard, SPP, B17, 
2004.11.25 16:05).
424
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 "[D]et kulturelle aspekt [giver] også anledning til endnu mere bekymring. EU's 
samarbejde og de europæiske demokratier er baseret på de kristne værdier ... Godt nok er 
der i Tyrkiet en klar adskillelse mellem stat og religion, men den kan meget vel vise sig at 
være ustabil, idet kræfter i landet arbejder på at svække den adskillelse, og EU vil ikke 
kunne rumme et erklæret islamisk statsstyre." (MP Videbæk, Chr.dem., B175, 2004.05.19 
18:25) 
423
 Further examples include MP Skaarup, DPP, B17, 2004.11.25 16:55-17:05, 17:15; and 
F39, 2004.03.30 15:35; MP Langballe, DPP, B17, 2004.11.25 17:20; former minister Kirk, 
con., in JyskeVestkysten 17 May 2004, quoted by MP Arnold, soc.lib., B175, 2004.05.19 
17:35.  
424
 "[D]et, at man på et tidligere tidspunkt, faktisk meget langt tilbage, helt tilbage i 
1960'erne, begyndte at stille Tyrkiet i udsigt, at man måske på et tidspunkt kunne forhandle 
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The civilizationalist picture is painted by members of the centrist social liberal party 
and the left wing Socialist People's Party and Unity List. 
Thirdly, members of the liberal and conservative government parties as well as the 
social democrats work to carve out the room for what could be termed an official 
narrative. This narrative has as its raison d’être to defer the answer to the question 
whether Turkey is irrevocably culturally other or a civilizational latecomer.
425
 On the 
one hand, this third narrative articulates more nakedly what the two first narrative 
have in common: It states that (present day) Turkey is different from Europe. On the 
other hand, it differs on the temporalization of the difference: It insists on leaving 
open whether Turkey is doomed to stay different or Turkey may become European at 
a later point in time:  
[T]he answer is, if one asks if the Turkey we know today may become a member of 
the EU, a very clear answer: No, the Turkey we know today cannot. The next 
question one may pose is: Well, can Turkey in 15-20 years become member of the 
EU? To that question one has to answer that no one today is in a position to say 
anything about that because it depends entirely on what will happen in the course of 
the 10, 15, 20 years, how ever long time it may take. One need to realize that if 
                                                                                                                                            
med dem, og det, at man så for alvor fra 1990'erne har sagt til Tyrkiet, at hvis de opfylder 
Københavnskriterierne, demokrati, menneskerettigheder og økonomisk udvikling, så vil vi 
være indstillet på at give en startdato for, hvornår vi kan påbegynde forhandlingerne, har 
haft en meget stor positiv effekt i Tyrkiet ... Vi har som europæere en enestående mulighed 
for at understøtte og styrke denne her udvikling" (MP Holmsgaard, SPP, B17, 2004.11.25 
16:05) 
425
 Bliddal & Larsen (2006) labels this third discourse ’official scepticism’. In addition to 
the three discourses mentioned so far they identify in Austrian and Danish parliamentarian 
and media debates a fourth (pointing out Turkey as a threat to the integration process of 
Europe by widening beyond the scope of deepening) and a fifth (depicting Turkey as a 
necessary element in the completion of the multiculturalist project of Europe). These two 
discourses are only marginally represented in Danish discourse (2006:73, 81) and scarcely 
in Danish parliamentary discourse, since the discourses which they need to resonate (Euro-
federalism and Multiculturalism) are very seldom met in Denmark (cf. Hansen 2002 and 
chapter 5 respectively). 
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Turkey at some point in time gets closer to being qualified for membership of the EU 
it is because Turkey have in the meantime introduced 80.000 pages of EU legislation 
in its national legislation and we will, hence, in any case be speaking of an entirely 
different Turkey than the one we know today. It will, if I may say so, be a European 
Turkey. (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., R1, 2005.10.06, 19:50-19:55)
426
 
To sum up: The official narrative on Turkey is that ‘we’ – Denmark, the EU and the 
West – should do everything in our power to let civilization reach Turkey; but in the 
end, Turkey may turn out culturally Other anyway. The conclusion is, when talking 
of Turkey, decidedly left open. This inconclusiveness makes it possible for the 
government to keep open the possibility of adjusting to whatever decision taken by 
the EU member states in relation to Turkey without being judged to be inconsistent 
and in the mean time not provoke a sceptic electorate and its voice in parliament; the 
DPP on which the government relies for its parliamentary majority. 
9.5 Relating Turkey to Muslim migrants and global Islam 
Section 9.4 laid out how the official Danish narrative on Turkey in relation to the EU 
stays clear of deciding whether Turkey is permanently culturally other or a 
civilizational latecomer. This section and the following section 9.6 take its departure 
in the way in which official narratives on integration of migrants and global Islam 
have to a greater degree made that choice concerning Muslims in general. This 
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 "[S]varet er, at hvis man spørger, om det Tyrkiet, som vi kender i dag, kan blive medlem 
af EU, et meget klart svar: Nej, det kan det Tyrkiet, som vi kender i dag, ikke. Det næste 
spørgsmål, man så kan stille, er: Jamen kan Tyrkiet om 15-20 år blive medlem af EU? Dertil 
må man svare, at det er der ikke nogen der i dag kan sige noget om, for det afhænger jo 
ganske af, hvad der sker i løbet af de 10, 15, 20 år, hvor lang tid det nu vil tage. Det, man 
skal tænke på, er, at hvis Tyrkiet på et tidspunkt kommer i nærheden af at være kvalificeret 
til et medlemskab af EU, så er det, fordi Tyrkiet i mellemtiden har indført 80.000 sider EU-
lovgivning i sin nationale lovgivning, og så er det altså i givet fald et helt andet Tyrkiet end 
det, vi kender i dag, vi taler om. Så er det, om jeg så må sige, et europæisk Tyrkiet." (PM 
A.F. Rasmussen, lib., R1, 2005.10.06, 19:50-19:55). Further examples include MFA Møller, 
con., S739, 2006.11.15 15:30; MP Barfoed, con., B175, 2004.06.02 16:35. 
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section describes how the question of Turkey’s integration in Europe is explicitly 
constructed as related to these narratives, while section 9.6 shows how the three 
relations – Denmark/migrants, Europe/Turkey, and The West/Islam – are inferred to 
be varieties of the same species. 
If, when reading official discourse, you look for utterances explicitly referring to 
Turkey as Muslim or to its difference as being of an absolute cultural or religious 
quality, you do not find many. Before taking office, however, the future prime 
minister was quoted: "I cannot imagine Turkey being a member of the EU. 
Politically, economically and culturally it would be a strange bird in the cooperation, 
and a Turkish membership could make the cooperation unstable." (future PM A.F. 
Rasmussen, lib., in Larsen 2000:227)
427
 
As prime minister he – with the responsibilities of the office – assumed the official 
discourse of wait-and-see: "[S]ince Turkey had become a candidate country it should 
of course be treated as every other candidate country." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., in 
Larsen 2004:353)
428
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 "Jeg kan ikke forestille mig Tyrkiet som medlem af EU. Politisk, økonomisk og kulturelt 
ville landet blive en fremmed fugl i samarbejdet, og et tyrkisk medlemskab kunne gøre 
samarbejdet ustabilt." (future PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., in Larsen 2000:227). 
428
 "[N]år Tyrkiet nu engang var et kandidatland, skulle det naturligvis behandles som alle 
andre kandidatlande" (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., in Larsen 2004:353). Bliddal & Larsen 
(2006) notes the change of wording between the two editions of the biography of the prime 
minister as a 'change of conviction'. The change has been noted in the debate as well, 
leading a culturalist to make this more general comment: "Well, there has been a tendency 
for politicians in opposition – broadly, in other EU member states as well – to agree that 
Turkish EU membership was not such a good idea, and that therefore you've talked about 
perhaps even 50 years out in the future etc., but as soon as you're in government, you get a 
different opinion; then it's the new politicians in opposition who are sceptic." "Altså der har 
været en tendens til, at oppositionspolitikere sådan bredt også i andre EU-lande har været 
enige om, at det ikke var så god en idé med tyrkisk EU-medlemskab, og at man derfor har 
snakket om måske endda 50 år frem i tiden osv., men når man så kommer på 
regeringsbænkene, får man en anden opfattelse, så er det de nye oppositionspolitikere, der er 
skeptiske." (MP Dahl, DPP, F21, 2003.01.08 16:25). In the 2009 EP elections campaign, 
486 
He did, however, give the official narrative a decidedly culturalist twist as he 
explained his stance during the 2002 EU enlargement summit in Copenhagen: 
[T]he EU had in 1999 decided that Turkey should be a candidate country. My view 
was that – given that this decision was taken – it could have damaging political 
consequences in Turkey if one were suddenly to change that. My fear was that it 
could prepare the ground for extremist Islamist forces in Turkey. (PM A.F. 
Rasmussen, lib., in Larsen 2004:353)
429
 
In this way the geopolitical position of Turkey is read through the lenses of a global 
conflict between the West and Islam: 
[W]e need to have a discussion of security politics and we need to include a security 
political aspect in the question. Because I would rather not that Turkey turns to 
another part of the world, turns to Islam, once again turns to sharia legislation, at a 
                                                                                                                                            
MP B. Bendtsen took up the Culturalist narrative – after leaving the conservative party chair 
and the position as vice-premier minister. 
429
 "EU [havde] i 1999 besluttet, at Tyrkiet skulle være et kandidatland. Min opfattelse var, 
at når først den beslutning var truffet, kunne det få skadelige politiske virkninger i Tyrkiet, 
hvis man pludselig ændrede på det. Min frygt var, at det kunne skabe grobund for 
ekstremistiske islamiske kræfter i Tyrkiet." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., in Larsen 2004:353). 
Bliddal & Larsen (2006) notes the change of wording between the two editions of the 
biography of the prime minister as a 'change of conviction'. The change has been noted in 
the debate as well, leading a culturalist to make this more general comment: "Well, there 
has been a tendency for politicians in opposition – broadly, in other EU member states as 
well – to agree that Turkish EU membership was not such a good idea, and that therefore 
you've talked about perhaps even 50 years out in the future etc., but as soon as you're in 
government, you get a different opinion; then it's the new politicians in opposition who are 
sceptic." "Altså der har været en tendens til, at oppositionspolitikere sådan bredt også i 
andre EU-lande har været enige om, at det ikke var så god en idé med tyrkisk EU-
medlemskab, og at man derfor har snakket om måske endda 50 år frem i tiden osv., men når 
man så kommer på regeringsbænkene, får man en anden opfattelse, så er det de nye 
oppositionspolitikere, der er skeptiske." (MP Dahl, DPP, F21, 2003.01.08 16:25). In the 
2009 EP elections campaign, MP B. Bendtsen took up the Culturalist narrative – after 
leaving the conservative party chair and the position as vice-premier minister. 
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point in time where Turkey has after all gotten so far, as it has. (MP Rohde, lib., F18, 
2005.06.15 10:30-10:35)
430
 
So according to the official narrative it was in fact the Muslim element of Turkish 
identity which constituted the reason for negotiating. But this does emphatically not 
equal a reason for actually letting Turkey in the EU.  
Like the relations of the Western world to global Islam, the policy field of integrating 
Muslim migrants in Denmark is explicitly linked to the question of Turkish accession 
to the EU: "It will be harder to solve the problems related to integration [of migrants] 
in Denmark", if the strict Danish regulation of family reunification is undermined by 
Turkish EU-citizens being allowed to move freely across the borders. (former PM 
P.N. Rasmussen, soc.dem., in Ulrichsen 2004)
431
 
Even for some proponents of Turkish EU membership, the prospect of changing 
Turkey entirely before its accession is the only way to get rid of this threat of Turkish 
immigration:  
If we see a well functioning and economically far more well situated country in 20 
years, or how long we should be talking of, it is exactly a question if there is such a 
great reason for worrying if a lot of Turks will come to the other European countries. 
I think it might be an unfounded worry ... There might even be Turks here in 
Denmark who chose to go home because they may suddenly see a sensible 
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 "Vi er også bare nødt til at have en sikkerhedspolitisk diskussion og et sikkerhedspolitisk 
aspekt med ind i det her. For jeg vil nødig se et Tyrkiet, som vender sig til den anden del af 
verden, vender sig til islam, igen vender sig til sharialovgivning, nu hvor Tyrkiet trods alt er 
nået så langt, som det er." (MP Rohde, lib., F18, 2005.06.15 10:30-10:35). Further examples 
include PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., US27, 2002.11.20 12:20. 
431
 "[H]vis de stramme danske familiesammenføringsregler bliver undermineret af tyrkiske 
EU-borgere, der frit kan bevæge sig over landegrænserne. "Så bliver det sværere at løse 
integrationsproblemerne i Danmark" frygter Poul Nyrup Rasmussen" (former PM P.N. 
Rasmussen, soc.dem., paraphrased and quoted in Ulrichsen 2004). 
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economical and political development in their original home country (MP Antonsen, 
lib., B175, 2004.05.19 17:45).
432
 
So, potential Turkish integration in the EU is explicitly said to be of consequence 
both to the relationship of the West to the Muslim world and to the integration of 
migrants in Denmark. In that sense the policy fields are articulated by a narrative of 
causality. Section 9.6, however, discerns a more subtle intertextual articulation of the 
narratives. 
9.6 Muslimizing Turkey 
As described in section 9.4 and 9.5, the official Danish narrative insists on not 
deciding whether it is possible for Turkey to integrate in Europe, while explicitly 
linking the question to questions of integration of Muslim migrants in Denmark and 
the relations between Islam and the West. This section shows how the 
inconclusiveness concerning Turkey’s capability of change is pre-empted by thematic 
allusion to diacritica which excludes Muslims from integration: The Muslim world 
from integration in the Western world, and Muslim migrants from integration in 
Denmark. These three questions are inferred to be varieties of the same species. 
By pointing out the Muslim as different, Danish identity is constructed as pertaining 
exactly to what distinguishes Us from Them. In that sense, when Muslims – 
incarnated in migrants to Denmark and in global Islam – are said to be different, a 
series of diacritica are in the same movement constructed as key constitutive features 
of Denmark. This section describes how differences are constructed in relation to, 
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 "Hvis vi ser et velfungerende og økonomisk langt mere velsitueret land om 20 år, eller 
hvor meget vi nu taler om, er det netop et spørgsmål, om der er så stor grund til bekymring 
for, om der kommer en hel masse tyrker til de andre europæiske lande. Jeg tror, det måske 
er en ubegrundet bekymring ... Der vil måske endda være nogle tyrker her i Danmark, som 
vælger at rejse hjem, fordi de pludselig kan se, at der er en fornuftig økonomisk og politisk 
udvikling i deres oprindelige hjemland" (MP Antonsen, lib., B175, 2004.05.19 17:45). 
489 
firstly, Denmark’s basic mode of collective identification; secondly, its basic form of 
social interaction; thirdly, its basic form of social organisation; and fourthly, its basic 
mode of knowledge production. By thematic allusion Turkey is implied to relate to 
Europe in parallel ways – the relation being another instance of ‘Muslim relations’. 
Official discourse, however, does not accept the parallel to include a fifth difference 
in relation to the basic form of rationality of government. 
A first difference of the Muslim is said to pertain to the basic mode of collective 
identification. Since Grundtvig – a 19th century vicar who became the leading figure 
of Danish nation building – the Danish nation has been conceived of as a folk, a 
people which has during centuries organically constituted itself based on a linguistic 
community. In our post-Babel predicament, according to Grundtvig, the only way to 
be human is the national way (Lundgren-Nielsen 1992: 96ff). The Grundtvigian 
concept of nationally boxed folkelighed is re-produced in contrast to the universality 
of the ummah which in the depictions of Islam is said to command primary 
allegience. 
Muslim immigrants and refugees do, however – according to the Danish Alien Act 
expressing official discourse – have a “potential for integration” in the Danish society 
and nation state. But as they do not necessarily have the impulse to realise the 
potential by themselves, the Danish authorities need – on behalf of Denmark – by a 
number of measures to discipline the strangers to do so.
433
 
This diacriticon – the lack of will to integrate – may in the debate on Turkey be 
recognized in the description of the cause that is pointed out behind the slow speed of 
the civilization process: "Turkey will not be a member of the EU. And this is how it 
should be as long as the progress is so limited. I simply cannot imagine that the rest 
                                           
433
 Cf. chapters 5 & 6. 
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of us should go as far – and relax our demands so considerably – as Turkey 
demands." (MEP Riis-Jørgensen, lib., 2006)
434
 
The reason that the negotiations drag out is – according to the liberal MEP – that 
'Turkey demand' a 'relaxation of the demands' concerning human rights. This only 
makes sense if Turkey is seen not to share the same values as the EU; they adhere to 
different values. So the reason why civilization does not work is that their values are 
essentially not the same as ours. The contrast to the description of the new East and 
Central European member states is stark; they were presented as Europeans – eager to 
re-integrate; their Europeannes only temporarily suppressed for 40 years of Soviet 
rule. Turkey – like the Muslim migrants in Denmark – lack the impulse to integrate. 
A second difference of the Muslim is said to pertain to the basic form of social 
organisation. Hal Koch, a Grundtvigian theologian, described in a prominent Danish 
theory of democracy (1945) an egalitarian democracy as not just a form of 
governance but a way of life (cf. Mouritsen 2006:81; chapter 5); a concept that was – 
contrasted by the German occupation of WWII – immediately understood to be 
specifically Danish. 
The Danish egalitarianism is re-produced in contrast to the patriarchalism said to be 
inherent in Islam hindering equality in gender and generational relations (Wren 
2001:147-8). In Denmark the headscarf of ‘the Muslim woman’ – an object spurring 
the most diverse debates in many European countries including Turkey (cf. Göle 
2006:250) – are435 mainly discussed on the premises that freedom means that the 
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 "Tyrkiet kommer ikke med i EU. Og det skal heller ikke kunne lade sig gøre, så længe 
fremskridtene ikke er større. Det er simpelthen urealistisk at forestille sig, at vi andre skal 
strække os så langt og lempe vores krav så betragteligt, som Tyrkiet kræver det." (MEP 
Riis-Jørgensen, lib., 2006) 
435
 Along with issues like female sexual mutilation, differentiated education of boys and 
girls and details of everyday life like whether shower curtains should be provided for kids to 
screen off their nudity while showering after phys. ed.  
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individual has a duty to be free from certain cultural traditions rather than the 
freedom of the individual from interference by the majority or the state.
436
 The same 
Muslim patriarchalism is said to deprive children of autonomy in relation to their 
parents who arrange or force marriages and ‘re-education journeys’ to the homeland 
of the parents upon their children (Mouritsen 2006: 86; chapters 5 & 7). In addition to 
being contrary to Danish egalitarianism these ‘Muslim’ practices are said to 
counteract integration respectively by repeatedly importing un-acculturated youth for 
marriage and refreshing alien culture in the youth brought up in Denmark and, hence, 
supposed to be integrating. 
The very invocation of this complex of problems frames Turkey as Muslim: "[I] see 
huge problems in relation to the dominant conception of the female sex in Turkey." 
(MP Christmas-Møller, con., R1, 2004.10.07 19:30)
437
 
A third difference of the Muslim is – immediately related to the difference in the 
basic form of social organisation – said to pertain to the basic form of social 
interaction. It concerns the way problems and disagreements between majority and 
minorities are said to be dealt with by Us and Them respectively (cf. chapter 8). The 
purported absoluteness of Islam is said to cause that Muslims are prone to fight and 
kill both Us and each other. When a religion is based on an absolute truth, there is, 
according to this narrative, no possibility of compromise – unlike when as in 
Christianity contradiction and negotiation is inscribed directly in the scripture 
(through the Gospel being told differently by four evangelists).
438
 This in turn 
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 Cf. chapter 5; and Mouritsen 2006:82, 85-6, n.14; Mørck 1998; Hervik 2004:254, 259-
60; Sheikh & Wæver 2005:32-3. 
437
 Examples referring to generational conflicts include former PM P.N. Rasmussen, 
soc.dem., in Ulrichsen 2004. 
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 Even proponents of integration – of Muslims in the Danish society and of Turkey in 
Europe – submit to the normative primacy of Christianity on this point: “[I]t is in a sense 
correct that it is an anomaly to speak of Christian fundamentalists.” "[D]et er for så vidt 
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explains why They needed to seek asylum here in the first place and/or why their 
countries are so poor that they want to move here (cf. Hervik 2004:254; Langballe in 
Pedersen 2006).  
The way Turkey is dealing with its Kurdish minority (which double as a Kurdish-
Turkish minority in Denmark) is mainly brought up by the right wing and left wing 
opposition parties. Whatever the exact occasions for speaking of ethnic minorities in 
relation to Turkey, the effected connotations are negative – both in relation to internal 
Turkish matters and to the relationship between Denmark and Turkey: They are – 
unlike Us but like other Muslims – not able to settle their differences through 
peaceful compromising: 
According to [Turkish prime minister] Erdogan this broadcaster [ROJ TV, 
broadcasting out of Copenhagen] is controlled by the Kurdish PKK movement and 
encourage terror ... [T]he Turkish embassy here in this city has asked the police to 
investigate the matter. (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., S968, 2005.11.23 13:05)
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A fourth difference of the Muslim is said to pertain to the basic mode of knowledge 
production. During the Cartoon Crisis, freedom of speech was by the Danish 
government epitomized as unlimited especially in relation to religiously legitimized 
practices and prohibitions.
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rigtigt, at det er en anomalitet at tale om kristne fundamentalister." (MP Holmsgaard, SPP, 
B17, 2004.11.25 16:20). 
439
 "Ifølge [den tyrkiske premierminister] Erdogan er tv-stationen [ROJ TV, som sender fra 
København] kontrolleret af den kurdiske PKK-bevægelse og opfordrer til terror. ... den 
tyrkiske ambassade her i byen har anmeldt sagen til politiet." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., 
S968, 2005.11.23 13:05) 
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 Cf. Mouritsen (2006:87); Hedetoft (2006b:1-2); (2006a:413); Wren (2001:157) and 
chapters 5 & 7. Even though Danish law includes regulation of both blasphemy and hate 
speech (Mouritsen 2006:70), and even though the unlimited freedom seems only to apply to 
Danes advocating unlimited freedom and practice of speech: attempts – especially from 
Muslim groups – to question the legitimacy of legal limits or the appropriateness of any 
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Occasion was also found to make this point in relation to Turkey:  
I do not find that it was wise, the démarche by the 11 ambassadors [of Muslim 
countries in relation to the caricatures of the prophet Muhammed published by 
Jyllands-Posten], and I would like to add that I especially find that the Turkish 
ambassador should have reflected twice taking into consideration that Turkey is 
applying for membership of the EU. (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., S492, 2005.11.02 
13:25)
441
 
Other complexes of infringements of the freedom of speech were discussed within 
the framework of the debate on Turkish membership; the conclusion, however, was 
clear on both Danish identity and Turkish otherness: "We have in this country one 
hundred percent respect for freedom of the press and for freedom of speech, and I 
have made it clear that this must apply to Turkey as well." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., 
S968, 2005.11.23 13:05)
442
 
So even when a specific Turkish infringement of the freedom of expression pertains 
in no way to Islam – but i.a., as in this quote, to alleged questioning of national unity 
– the occasion is taken to articulate a difference between Denmark and Turkey. A 
difference which by the very articulation to the question of freedom of expression is 
                                                                                                                                            
particular exercise of the right of expression are constructed as attacks on (the first-class 
Danish version of the universally good of) liberal democracy as such (Wren 2001:157; 
Lindekilde 2007). 
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 "Jeg synes ikke, det var en klog henvendelse, de 11 ambassadører [fra muslimske lande i 
forbindelse med de karrikaturer, Jyllands-Posten trykte af profeten Muhammed] kom med, 
og jeg vil også gerne sige, at jeg ikke mindst synes, at den tyrkiske ambassadør måske 
skulle have tænkt sig om to gange i betragtning af, at Tyrkiet er ansøgerland til at blive 
medlem af EU." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., S492, 2005.11.02 13:25). 
442
 "Her i landet har vi hundrede procent respekt for pressefriheden og for ytringsfriheden, 
og jeg har gjort klart, at det også må gælde for Tyrkiet." (PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., S968, 
2005.11.23 13:05) 
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connected to the Cartoon Crisis and, thereby, inscribes the Turkish side – qua 
infringing – as Muslim.443 
At one point in the debates on Turkish EU membership, however, the government 
resists the construction of an excluding diacriticon. In discourses on other 'Muslim 
relations' a special organization of the relation between politics and religion is 
presented as necessary for Danish identity as a democracy: A strict division between 
a personal realm of faith organized by the Church and a realm of societal interaction 
regulated by the state is claimed to be necessary for liberal democracy to flourish. 
Even Lutheran Christianity needs to be kept on track by a state church (cf. Mouritsen 
2006:79-80; Sheikh & Wæver 2005:29-33). Islam, contrarily, is presented as a law-
based religion without any secular division between private affairs and politics 
(Mouritsen 2006:70-1, 80, 82; Hedetoft 2006b:1; Hervik 2004:254). Muslims, hence, 
are different in relation to the basic form of rationality of government in Denmark (cf. 
chapter 5). 
Given that it is accepted by official discourse that a religiously defined culture is part 
of the problem with Turkey, it comes – especially when bearing in mind this 
particular Danish construction of secularism – as no surprise that culturalists propose 
a radical othering of Muslim Turkey by implying that a Muslim population needs a 
harsh military disciplining to keep up democratic appearances:  
[W]e must count ourselves lucky that the military still has a good deal of influence in 
Turkey, for if it did not ... it would amount to us having a fundamentalist state today. 
... [T]he popular masses [folkedyb] are, and will probably stay for centuries to come, 
of a Muslim and fundamentalist mentality. Does [the honoured member] really think 
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 Further examples include – in relation to the Cartoon Crisis - MFA Møller, con., in 
European Affairs Committee 2006:2, 4-5; and in relation to article 301 of the Turkish penal 
code; PM A.F. Rasmussen, lib., S493, 2005.11.02 13:30. 
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that you may in the course of the next, say, 15-20 years rip the religious soul out of 
such a huge population? (MP Langballe, DPP, B17, 2004.11.25 15:30)
444
 
The speaker for the government party, however, rebuffs the suggestion that military 
repression is needed to keep Islam in its place: "I believe that one may be a Muslim 
without being a fundamentalist. ... I simply do not understand how it is possible to sit 
as a politician in a Danish parliament and say that the only way to uphold democracy 
is by the power of the military." (MP Antonsen, lib., B17, 2004.11.25 15:30)
445
 
A possibility for the radicalization of Turkey is, however, implied to be inherent in its 
Muslim identity: 
[W]hat we do in any case risk by excluding the Turks; by saying: ’You do not belong 
here with us’, is that they turn to Islam. So they will turn to fundamentalism, since 
we will be showing them that there is no hope for them in a democratic, in a Western 
world, and that is incredibly dangerous. (MP Rohde, lib., R1, 2004.10.07, 15:15)
446
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 "[V]i må være lykkelige for, at militæret faktisk stadig væk har en del indflydelse i 
Tyrkiet, for havde det ikke det ... ville det jo betyde, at vi i dag havde en fundamentalistisk 
stat. ... der [er] et folkedyb, og det vil der formentlig blive ved med at være i flere hundrede 
år endnu, som er og bliver muslimsk og fundamentalistisk i sin tænkemåde. Mener [det 
ærede medlem], at man sådan i løbet af de næste 15-20 år kan rive den religiøse sjæl ud af 
så stor en befolkning?" (MP Langballe, DPP, B17, 2004.11.25 15:30). 
445
 "Jeg mener godt, at man kan være muslim uden at være fundamentalist. ... jeg simpelt 
hen ikke forstår, hvordan man kan sidde som politiker i et dansk parlament og sige, at man 
kun kan fastholde demokrati ved militærets magt." (MP Antonsen, lib., B17, 2004.11.25 
15:30). 
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 "[D]et, der i hvert fald er en risiko for der sker, hvis vi udelukker tyrkerne og siger: I 
hører ikke til her hos os, er, at de vender sig til islam. Så vender de sig til 
fundamentalismen, for så viser vi, at der ikke er noget håb for dem i en demokratisk, i en 
vestlig verden, og det er utrolig farligt." (MP Rohde, lib., R1, 2004.10.07, 15:15) 
Proponents of integration – of immigrants in Denmark and of Turkey in Europe – do protest 
against the way Islam, migrants and security concerns are articulated as parallel: “It is of 
historical importance that Turkey may now open the negotiations on its accession which 
have been prepared for 40 years. ... Despite difference, despite religion, democratic 
principles are valid for the community which the EU is. ... We know that forces in Denmark 
and in the Folketing want to hinder this development. Some members of the Folketing are 
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The explicit framework of reference for the critical attitude to Turkey in the official 
Danish discourse remains the Copenhagen Criteria and the EU acquis. But even so, 
the specific points of contention listed when debating are all repetitions from 
discourses othering Muslims domestically or in global affairs. The way in which a 
negative conclusion is argued is illustrated in the comments by a liberal MEP who 
took the 2006 Commission progress report on the accession process as the occasion 
to deflect from supporting Turkish membership: 
First of all there are marked lacks in relation to freedom of religion and speech in 
Turkey, i.a. in relation to article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code which prohibits 
utterances critical of the Turkish state. An article which the EU countries have – out 
of consideration for the freedom of speech – in no uncertain terms called on the 
Turkish government to change. Without success, however. Lately, the Turkish prime 
minister, Erdogan has refused to meet the pope, as Erdogan was supposedly of the 
opinion that the pope had spoken out as a critic of Islam. That did not fall on fertile 
Turkish ground. Examples like these make it difficult to see a community of values 
between the member states of the EU and the Turkish state at the moment. The other 
main problem concerns human rights. Violence against women seems, among other 
things, to be an area in which the launch of a crackdown is needed. In addition one 
still hears a lot of complaints about torture in Turkish prisons and especially of the 
                                                                                                                                            
building an image of an enemy of human beings in the Danish society and in Europe by 
derogatory and insulting terms of abuse aimed, among others, at Muslims. ... These are 
forces which are contributing to making integration a very, very difficult cause, also in the 
Danish society.” "Det er af historisk betydning, at Tyrkiet nu kan indlede de 
optagelsesforhandlinger, som der er gået 40 års forberedelser forud for. ... Uanset 
forskellighed, uanset religion, gælder de demokratiske principper for det fællesskab, som 
EU er. ... Vi ved godt, at der er kræfter i Danmark og i Folketinget, der vil forhindre den 
udvikling. Nogle medlemmer af Folketinget skaber et fjendebillede af mennesker i det 
danske samfund og i Europa ved nedsættende og forhånende ringeagtsytringer, bl.a. om 
muslimer. ... Det er kræfter, der er med til at gøre integrationen også i det danske samfund 
til en meget, meget vanskelig sag" (MP Jelved, soc.lib. leader, R1, 2005.10.06 16:05-16:25). 
Further examples include MP Arnold, soc.lib., B17, 2004.11.25 16:25-16:30; MP Auken, 
soc.dem., L26, 2006.10.10 14:20. 
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difficulties of the Kurdish minority. Human rights seem at times to be a vague 
concept in Turkish terminology. That is a problem since human rights are not an area 
where we can or will compromise. Third comes the case of the divided Cyprus. (Riis-
Jørgensen 2006)
447
 
Of a choice of basic elements of democracy, political rights are featured – not civil-
military relations or independence of the judiciary. Of a choice of political rights, 
freedom of religion and speech is highlighted – and they are highlighted in 
connection with each other so that the freedom of speech problematics involves 
religion as in the Cartoon Crisis, which a Danish audience would have fresh in 
memory. The religious group whose freedoms are implied as infringed is Christian – 
not for instance the Alevi. Of a choice of infringements of individual and collective 
rights, the rights of women – known from the Danish debate on immigrants to be an 
issue with Muslims – is featured before i.a. torture and the rights of the Kurdish 
minority. Cyprus – which was the formally most problematic element in the 
Commission report and caused the subsequent partial freeze of the negotiations 
between the EU and Turkey – is downgraded to third place. In sum; the issue of 
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 "For det første er der markante mangler omkring religions- og ytringsfrihed i Tyrkiet. 
Blandt andet i forbindelse med paragraf 301 i den tyrkiske straffelov, som gør det forbudt at 
ytre sig kritisk om den tyrkiske stat. En paragraf, som EU-landene af hensyn til 
ytringsfriheden i utvetydige vendinger har opfordret den tyrkiske regering til at ændre. Dog 
uden held. Senest har den tyrkiske ministerpræsident Erdogan afvist at mødes med paven, 
idet Erdogan lod til at mene, at paven havde udtalt sig kritisk om islam. Det faldt ikke i god 
tyrkisk jord. Det er eksempler som disse, der gør det vanskeligt at se værdifællesskabet 
mellem EU's medlemslande og den tyrkiske stat lige nu. Det andet hovedproblem angår 
menneskerettigheder. Blandt andet vold imod kvinder tyder på at være et område, der ikke 
slås tilstrækkelig hårdt ned på. Derudover hører man også stadig mange klager om tortur i 
de tyrkiske fængsler, og om især de kurdiske mindretals vanskeligheder. 
Menneskerettigheder forekommer altså til tider at være et vagt begreb i den tyrkiske 
terminologi. Det er et problem. For menneskerettigheder er ikke et område, hvor vi hverken 
kan eller vil gå på kompromis. For det tredje er der hele sagen omkring det delte Cypern." 
(Riis-Jørgensen 2006) 
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Turkish EU membership is inferred to be an instance of Our relation to Muslims by 
the listing of ‘problems which hinder Muslims from integrating’. 
To sum up: On the one hand, the ‘Muslim framing' of Turkey does not bring with it 
all potential negative connotations into official discourse: Even though culturalists 
attempt to rule out democracy in Turkey due to its Muslim population, these 
associations are not accepted by official discourse. That Turkey is different is, on the 
other hand, never questioned – and that the difference pertains to its Muslim 
population is implied by thematic allusion to excluding diacritica known from 
debates on the integration of Muslim migrants and the relations between the West and 
Islam. 
9.7 Conclusion: Pre-empted by allusion to diacritica for 
exclusion 
So what are the contributions to radicalization of conflict from the way in which 
Turkey's possible EU accession is debated? How are the present and future relations 
presented and necessitated? 
A Culturalist narrative presents the diacriticon for distinguishing Us from Them to be 
one of religiously defined culture; They are Muslims and We are Secularised 
Christians. At least in Europe, Our culture is better than Theirs. They should, hence, 
stay outside Europe and not intrude on Us. If They do not stay outside, They will 
influence Us in a negative way – we know that from history. And They seem (as long 
as They are Muslims) not to be able to change. Their posture towards our way of 
doing things is supposedly negative. The basic grammar is Orientalist: Their 
integration in the EU irrespective of Their cultural difference is projected as an 
oughtnotology as it constitutes a radical threat to Our identity. Necessity is installed 
in the narrative by recourse to elements sedimented by an Islamology based in 
Lutheran theology. 
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A Civilizationist narrative presents the diacriticon as one of degree of civilization or 
modernization: They have not come as far as Us – and in that sense they are inferior 
to Us: The inferiority is, hence, not essential to Them. Quite the contrary; They are 
known to have undergone an impressive development. Provided that They continue 
this civilizing process, They will end up being (like) Us. And Their inclusion may 
even be beneficial to us. Their posture in relation to Us is generally affirmative – as 
they choose Europeanization – and They are presented as open to dialogue as a 
means to acquiring the traits pointed out to constitute modernity. The need for our 
own dialogicality is less pronounced, since We and They supposedly agree on the 
goal (i.e., Their reform) – and since we have already reached this goal. The policy for 
future interaction presented by Civilizationalist discourse is, thus, basically one of 
Encompassment with a goal of establishing a future grammar of Segmentation 
(according to which They may be a member state within the EU on a par with others). 
The narrative is invested with necessity by recourse to an idea of European 
superiority sedimented by Enlightenment philosophy. 
As a third option, an official narrative of inconclusiveness refuses to decide on the 
question of Their capability of change. By implication the narrative also refuses to 
decide on the character of the difference and the determinant of the agency of the 
other (is it only a question of modernization or is there an underlying difference of 
culture determining both the stage of modernization and the possibility of agency?). 
The possibility of dialogue is insistently kept open – and in a sense the stakes are 
higher than in the Civilizationalist narrative since the possibility of a difference not to 
be overcome is kept open. The narrative, hence, at the face of it poses the two basic 
grammars of Orientalism and Encompassment as alternatives of equal plausibility. 
This construction, however, is dependent on avoiding the decision on the historicity 
of the other: The discourse – defined by the regularity in dispersion of utterances 
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consisting in the insistence on indecision – will break down at the moment of 
decision.
448
 
However, decision – and, hence, the termination of the narrative of inconclusiveness 
– is sought pre-empted by seeking recourse to other narratives on Muslim relations – 
specifically narratives on the integration of Muslim migrants in Denmark and the 
integration of the Muslim World in the West. In these narratives the diacritica – basic 
mode of collective identification (We are national - They are religious universalists); 
basic form of social interaction (Our egalitarianism vs. Their patriarchalism); basic 
form of social organisation (Our consensus-seeking vs. Their conflict-generating 
absolutism); basic mode of knowledge production (Our freedom of expression vs. 
Their religious taboos) – are via culture tied to religion. Recourse is, hence, indirectly 
sought to elements sedimented by theologically based Islamology. And as Their 
religion is – in the parallel discourse on integration of migrants – implied to be a 
structural determinant of individual agency, there is no capability of change (save the 
unlikely conversion or the almost as unlikely secularization).  
The main line of defence for the narrative of inconclusiveness when faced with this 
attempt at pre-emption is paradoxical: It claims that since They are at the risk of self-
radicalization, we need to keep insisting that the option of civilization is not 
precluded. But since They are at the risk of self-radicalization, we need also to keep 
insisting that the process of civilization is not completed. In effect, the prospect of 
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 A supplementary rhetorical strategy consists in seeking recourse to formality; i.e. the fact 
that a formal invitation has been awarded to Turkey, and that we have to stay true to this 
commitment. This strategy is truly supplementary: On the one hand, it completes the 
narrative of why we have to insist: because otherwise the EU would live up to its own 
norms – and Europe needs to be trustworthy in prioritizing words over swords, because that 
is Europe's main attraction (cf. Manners 2002). On the other hand, the very explication of 
this argument devalues the central part of the narrative: That We and They agree on Us 
helping Them successfully. If things were just evolving smoothly in that direction, there 
would be no need for promises; everyone would just agree. 
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Their self-radicalization reaffirms the Culturalist discourse in claiming that They 
constitute a threat. The role presented to the Turkish other is one of prolonged – 
perhaps eternal – apprenticeship under tight supervision (concerning the direction) 
and monitoring (for digressions). 
To sum up: The debates were structured as an exchange between a Civilizationalist 
narrative prognosticating Turkish assimilation to European standards and a 
Culturalist narrative prognosticating the permanence of Turkish difference. The aim 
of the government interventions seem to be to uphold a position deferring the choice 
between these two narratives. The point that Turkey presently is different from 
Europe is, however, beyond dispute. The official deferral of the decision on the 
permanence of Turkish difference was, however, pre-empted by pointing out that 
Turkey suffers from a series of 'Muslim problems'. As a result, the policy for future 
interaction presented to Turkey is a choice between conversion, exclusion or 
prolonged apprenticeship. 
9.8 Perspectives: The deferred mis-interpellation of coded 
discourse 
Official Danish discourse on Turkish EU membership – adhered to by a broad 
parliamentary majority – explicitly insist on not concluding whether Turkey is 
capable of overcoming its difference by civilizing itself. The question of Turkish EU-
membership is, however, explicitly constructed as having implications for two 
instances of ‘Muslim relations’; the integration of Muslim migrants in Denmark and 
the relations of global Islam to the Western world. And the question of Turkish EU-
membership is itself implicitly framed as yet another instance of Muslim relations by 
thematic allusion to diacritica known in other policy fields to exclude Muslims. 
Turkish EU membership, hence, risks ending up as ‘collateral damage’ of identity 
politics originating in other policy fields. The damage done to Turkish EU-
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membership is ‘collateral’ in two ways. First, the main target for othering is not 
‘Turkey’ but ‘Muslims’. The allusion to diacritica excluding Turkey as ‘Muslim’ 
implies that Turkey will – regardless of any progress on the ground measured by 
Copenhagen criteria or acquis standards – be ‘guilty by association’: By association 
to Muslim immigrants presented to be a problem for Denmark (cf. Jung 2005:8; and 
chapters 5 & 6). And by association to a picture of Islam constructed to serve 
Christian theological purposes (cf. Simonsen 2006:ch. 8; Said 2002:ch.1.III & 3.III; 
chapter 6).  
Second, the exclusion of Turkey-as-Muslim is collateral in the sense that it is not 
necessarily intended by the representatives for the government parties. It might be so; 
we have no way of knowing the true intensions of individual actors. But this way of 
framing Turkey might as well be a structural consequence of a dynamics that shapes 
the way intertextuality works in professional political discourse: The government 
parties need to appear as consistent actors. To prepare for being consistent tomorrow 
in relation to different possible conclusions, a measure of inconclusiveness today is 
functional. Upholding inconclusiveness implies, however, the risk of pre-emption: a 
specific consistency might be constructed for you to adhere to. When you imply 
Islam to be decisive in determining the agency – or at least the propensity – of 
Muslims in some policy fields, then why not in when considering Turkey?  
After all,  
The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes ‘one’s own’ only when the 
speaker populates it ... And not all words for just anyone submit equally easily to this 
appropriation ...: many words stubbornly resist ...; they cannot be assimilated into his 
context and fall out of it ... Language is ... populated – overpopulated – with the 
intentions of others. (Bakhtin 1981:293-4) 
Therefore, "Instead of the virginal fullness of an inexhaustible object, the prose writer 
is faced with a multiplicity of routes, roads and paths that have been laid down in the 
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object by social consciousness" (Bakhtin in Todorov 1984:72; cf. Bakhtin 
1981:278ff). 
When speaking of Turkey in a Danish context, words like ‘freedom of speech’, 
‘violence’, ‘minority’, ‘women’, ‘migration’, ‘integration’, and ‘secularism’ are not 
at the free disposal of the government (or of the opposition, or of representatives for 
Turkey, for that matter). These words resonate with meanings induced into them by 
other speakers – or by the same speakers in debates in ‘different’ policy fields. And 
when debating Turkey, the sound which they resonate is that of the Muslim Other. 
The option remains, however, that the effective Muslimization of Turkey corresponds 
to the intentions of the proponents of the official narrative even if they explicitly 
insist on inconclusion. If so, the rhetorical strategy described as 'thematic allusion' 
equals what Wodak (2007) discusses as a 'coding' of discourse: the deliberate 
construction of a system of ambiguous pseudonyms to stand in for forbidden 
articulations.  
'Coded' discourse is intended not to interpellate outsiders: it is intended to work on a 
select audience. Coded discourse might even be intended to reinforce this audience as 
a separate identity by means of the selection performed by the subtlety. Chandler 
describes – in relation to commercial communication – a kind of intertextuality 
employed which may serve as an example:  
In order to make sense of many contemporary advertisements (notably cigarette ads 
such as for Silk Cut) one needs to be familiar with others in the same series. 
Expectations are established by reference to one’s previous experience in looking at 
related advertisements. …Instant identification of the appropriate interpretative code 
serves to identify the interpreter of the advertisement as a member of an exclusive 
club (2001:200).  
In identity politics such a subtly coded discourse furthermore isolates from critique 
from outside the interpretative community – either because the coding is so 
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impenetrable that it precludes the outsiders from getting the message, or because the 
coding makes the message formally acceptable even if it carries connotations which 
are unacceptable (Wodak 2007; cf. Solomos & Back 1995). As outsiders penetrate 
the code – and perhaps persecute or prosecute the coder – new codes may be 
introduced, and the analyst may find himself pursuing a moving linguistic target. 
Therefore, a coded discourse produces an interpellation which is difficult to counter – 
first and foremost because it is elusive. If the code is broken by an unprepared 
outsider, it most probably happens gradually. It does not – as mis-interpellation 
would in its standard version – say 'Come here' only to say 'Piss off', when you come 
(cf. section 2.4). Rather it says 'Come here' while it simultaneously mumbles 'Piss off' 
– and if you react by asking 'Err, what were you mumbling?', the reply would be 
'What? Nothing, nothing at all'. At first, the interpellatory effect may be the unease 
produced by the doubt whether one really heard something or one was hallucinating. 
Later, if the mumbling continues, one probably gets the message and the result is 
mis-interpellation.  
This chapter completes the analytical part of the dissertation. What remains is to 
conclude on the theoretical, empirical and strategic contributions of the dissertation. 
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10 BConclusion: Dangers of difference – dangers of 
making difference go away 
This chapter concludes the dissertation in three steps:  
Section 10.1 concludes the dissertation's engagement with the philosophical and 
theoretical problematiques central to its analytical strategy: Firstly, the conversation 
between social constructivists and poststructuralists on the ontological status of the 
other in the relational construction of identity. Secondly, how various policies for 
relating to the other contribute to radicalization of conflict between self and other. It 
does so by recollecting the marks left on the philosophical positions and theories 
engaged by the strategic work (in chapters 2 and 3) to prepare the theories for the 
analysis. 
Section 10.2 concludes the empirical analysis by answering the research question of 
the dissertation: The Danish narratives of Muslim relations involve a series of 
conflictual interpellations which contributes to radicalization. The conclusion is 
reached by recollecting and combining the second and third readings of the selected 
Danish debates on Muslims to characterize their contribution to radicalization of 
conflict. The section, firstly, summarizes how the narratives involved in the Danish 
debates construct the present, future and necessary relations between the Danish self 
and the Muslim other. Secondly, the section notes a couple of important dynamics of 
internal Danish identity political negotiations: the difficulty of staying in the middle 
of the road – and a draft towards Culturalism. Finally, the section characterizes the 
interpellation of the other which these narratives and debates perform in conjunction. 
Finally, section 10.3 engages in critical self-evaluation by discussing the strategic 
risks and benefits of the analysis performed. 
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10.1 Theoretical implications 
Chapter 1 placed the dissertation within two problematiques extending beyond the 
specific empirical analysis – a philosophical and a theoretical one:  
Firstly, the dissertation placed itself within a conversation between – or among – 
social constructivists and poststructuralists on the ontological status of the other in 
the relational construction of identity: The position of the dissertation has been that 
any diagnosis of an identity political situation should be able to account for the triple 
function of the other in relation to identity: the other is the constitutive outside to 
identity; the other is a character of the cast of identity narratives; and the other is co-
authoring the continuation of the narratives. Especially when the aim of the study is 
to assess contributions to radicalization of conflict, none of these relations may be left 
out of focus. 
Secondly, the dissertation has investigated theoretically how various policies for 
relating to the other contributes to radicalization of conflict between self and other. 
The dissertation intervened by circumscribing a range of 'grammatical' policies for 
relating to the other; policies which envision a future interaction involving the other – 
and three distinct realms of anti-grammatical policies; policies which envision no 
future interaction between two distinct entities. 
This section concludes the engagement by summarizing how the ontological and 
theoretical discussions have contributed to the central philosophical positions and 
theoretical debates engaged. Subsection 10.1.1 accounts for the position of the 
dissertation in relation to the concept of identity. Subsection 10.1.2 does the same in 
relation to the concept of discourse and the structure/agency dilemma. Subsection 
10.1.3 summarizes how the dissertation conceptualized the temporality of policy 
narratives to prepare for analysis. Subsection 10.1.4 recollects the intervention of the 
dissertation in the way foreign policy is analyzed as performative identity discourse. 
Finally, subsection 10.1.5 represents the central, original theoretical contribution of 
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the dissertation: The typology of policies for relating to the other in grammatical and 
anti-grammatical ways. 
10.1.1 Identity as configuration: the triple function of the other 
When accounting for the ontology to be observed, the dissertation (in the opening 
lines of chapter 2) took its point of departure in the existence of difference and 
conflict – and that identity is something which needs to be produced on the 
background of difference. When dealing with this production, the dissertation noted 
the critique of the proliferation of the concept of identity within the social sciences 
(Brubaker & Cooper 2000). As a response, the dissertation proposed a more nuanced 
conceptual apparatus to do the analytical work assigned to the concept of identity: 
Inspired by Elias (2000[1968]) and Buzan & Wæver (2009) the analytical focus was 
on an identity configuration as a set of relations between relations. Specifically, an 
identity configuration – as defined by the dissertation – consists of a) the constitutive 
and narrative relations between identity and difference; b) the forging of these 
relations by continued narration and by the constitution of new narratives; and c) the 
political relations between the narratives promoted by various identities. This 
conceptualization makes for an analysis of the triple function of the other in identity 
discourse (summarized in section 2.4): Firstly, the difference of the other is 
constitutive to identity. Secondly, the other is awarded a role in the cast of characters 
of the narratives explaining the difference. Finally, the other co-starring the identity 
narratives is endowed with agency and a capacity to co-author the continuation of the 
narrative. 
10.1.2 Reconstructing discourse theory: agency, diverting the 
political, narrative as differential inscription 
When approaching the structure/agency dilemma, the dissertation took its point of 
departure in the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe (1985; 2002; Laclau 1990). 
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Both the reduction of the subject to subject position (1985) and the Lacanian 
reduction of the subject to a lack (1990; Laclau & Zac 1994) was found analytically 
unhelpful. As an alternative inspired by Butler's speech act theory (1997) and 
discourse psychology (Potter & Wetherell 2001) the subject was partially resurrected. 
Not as a sovereign subject, but as a more complex relation between, on the one hand, 
discursive structures facing the subject in the form of expectations and accept of 
others, and, on the other hand, a will to perform identity acceptably consistent 
(section 2.2).  
This move, however, partly disables one of the two essentialist 'motors' which keeps 
Laclau & Mouffe's discursive universes from coalescing: The will to order inherent in 
the subject's everpresent search for identity. In parallel, the dissertation disabled the 
other essentialist 'motor': the omnipresence of dislocation. Inspired by Barth (1969) 
and Frello (2005) the dissertation insists that segmentation and ambiguity may be 
functional for discourse in ways which effectively postpone dislocation (subsection 
2.3.2). 
Taken together, these two modifications detract from the parsimony of the discourse 
theory of Laclau & Mouffe – to the benefit of analytical purchase: When theoretically 
allowing for a bit more stability of context and strategic subjectivity, it is possible to 
analytically focus on what does work when agents attempt to use language 
strategically stead of philosophically insisting that it does not work. In other words, 
the dissertation follows Neumann's call that "Having bettered constructivism in 
killing off the sovereign subject, poststructuralist analyses should nonetheless be able 
to account for the subjects that are still there." (1999:209) 
To account analytically for these resilient subjects the dissertation (in section 2.1.2) 
followed up on the call of Howarth to combine discourse theory with narrative theory 
(2005:346): Narrative, the dissertation suggests, is a specific discursive form – a 
regularity in the dispersion of utterances – which consist in the articulation of a series 
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of events setting the scene for a cast of characters endowed with at least some 
capability of agency (cf. Ricœur 1988).F450 The narrative form, then, is one way of 
specifying what is underspecified in the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe: 
narrative is one way in which elements may be inscribed in discourse as yet another 
orderly difference rather than a radically threatening one. And narrative is not just 
any way of specifying what differential inscription may mean: It is a specification 
which accounts for 'the subjects that are still there' even if no longer sovereign. 
10.1.3 The temporality of policy narratives: focusing analysis on the 
present articulation 
Turning to policy analysis, the dissertation (subsection 2.1.4) found a need to specify 
the distinct temporality of policy narratives. Policies concern the future. More than 
that, policies involve choice between a number of futures: oughtologies worth 
achieving and oughtnotologies to be avoided. Combining elements from Heidegger's, 
Ricœur's, and Koselleck's philosophies of time the dissertation defines a policy 
narrative as the positioning of the narrator in a present by articulating, firstly, the past 
as a space of experience organized to point as a cause to the present ontology; and 
secondly, the future as an implicit or explicit choice between specific projections onto 
the horizon of expectations. The analytical task of policy analysis, the dissertation 
proposes, must be to focus on the articulatory operation. In that sense, the present 
politics is awarded analytical primacy over the past and the future. 
10.1.4 Foreign policy: Focusing analysis on interpellation 
Turning to the specific empirical focus of the dissertation – self/other policy 
narratives – the dissertation followed Neumann's call for focusing analysis on 
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 In that sense, narrative seem to be a discursive form cutting across what Glynos & 
Howarth discuss as three types of logic involved in social science explanation; social, 
political and phantasmatic logics (2007:ch.5) 
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identification not just "as an affair between a subject and an order, [...but] as an affair 
between a subject and an other." (1999:208) It did so by importing the concept of 
grammars for future interaction from Anthropology (Baumann & Gingrich 2004) 
into the tradition in International Relations for studying foreign policy as 
performative identity discourse.
451
 In the context of the analytical framework 
proposed by the dissertation the concept of grammars focuses analytical attention on 
the way in which specific self/other policy narratives invites (or does not invite) the 
other to co-narrate the continuation of the narrative (subsections 3.1.2-3). Various 
forms of such infelicitous interpellations may – as noted by Butler (1997) and 
discussed by Hage (2008) – set off various forms of conflictual dynamics to shape the 
future of the relation (subsection 3.3.2). 
10.1.5 Grammatical policies – anti-grammar as radicalization of 
conflict  
The central, original theoretical contribution of the dissertation pertains to a 
problematique, acute to social sciences from political theory via International 
Relations to Sociology and Anthropology: how various policies for relating to the 
other contribute to radicalization of conflict between self and other. On the basis of 
three basic grammars for future interaction between self and other, distilled from 
social analysis by Baumann & Gingrich, the dissertation constructs a typology of 
policies for relating to the other (subsection 3.1.4). Furthermore, the dissertation 
develops a criterion for what would count as radicalization of conflict related to the 
basic grammars (subsections 2.3.3, 3.1.3 and 3.1.4): 
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 Campbell (1992); Hansen (1998; 2006); Neumann (1999); Rumelili (2007) – all 
explicitly drawing on, i.a., the historical anthropology of Todorov (1999[1982]) and the 
political theory of Connolly (1991). 
515 
The first of the three basic grammars, Orientalism, mirrors self and other: What is 
good in the one is bad in the other and vice versa. This grammar depends on a policy 
of distinguishing between self and other – and it breaks down in case of hybridity. 
Self may then give in to hybridity by pursuing a policy of indifference – or self may 
attempt to save purity by a policy of assimilation. The second grammar, 
Encompassment, insist on subsuming the other. This grammar depends on a policy of 
acting on behalf of the other – and it breaks down in case of paralysis. Two reactions 
to paralysis present themselves: Self may give in to a self-forgetting love or seek part 
in the other's overwhelming capacity for agency by self-assimilation. The third 
grammar, Segmentation, flexibly allocates identity and alterity by fusing and 
distinguishing between comprehensive and particular identities. This grammar 
depends on the production of knowledge of self and other – and it breaks down in 
case of urgency. To save knowledge production from urgency, a paradoxical reaction 
may be securitizing the other who provokes the urgency – or self may jump right to a 
policy aiming to end the relation by physically eliminating the other.
452
 
As the point where each of the grammars breaks down is specified, a range of 
'grammatical' policies for relating to the other is delimited from three distinct realms 
of anti-grammatical policies.) Inside this limit, the policies imply futures in which 
self and other are engaged in some sort of more or less conflictual interchange (be it a 
monologue, a dialogue or an agonistic struggle).  
A narrative prescribing a policy outside the limit of grammar implies a future with no 
interaction involving an other distinct from the self. Such an anti-grammatical policy 
may imply an immediate radicalization of conflict (as implied in physical 
elimination). Or it may interpellate in a way which invites a reaction that in turn 
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 For an overview; cf. figure 3.16. 
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radicalizes the continuation of the narrative (i.a., if the other insist on difference – or 
hybridity – in the face of a demand for assimilation). 
The limit grammar/anti-grammar may – developed in this way as a limit between 
policies for the future relation – serve as a specification of the limit between 
agonistic and antagonistic relations which Mouffe seeks to develop (2002; 2005). It 
may in parallel serve as a specification of the limit between conflict resolution 
(aiming to end the conflictual relation) and conflict management (involving the 
preservation of the relation, only preferably as a less destructive conflict) 
inconsistently sketched by Galtung (1978; 1996). 
10.2 Diagnosing the present – projecting the future 
The philosophical repositioning and the theoretical interventions of chapters 2 and 3 
(summarized in section 10.1) allowed the analytical intervention in the empirical 
problematique of the dissertation – present Danish debates on how to conduct 
Muslim relations – in chapters 5 through 9. 
This section concludes the empirical analysis by answering the research question 
posed in chapter 1. The conclusion takes the form of a recollection and combination 
of the second and third readings of the selected Danish debates on Muslims. First, 
subsection 10.2.1 summarize the present, necessary, and future relations between the 
Danish self and the Muslim other according to the narratives involved in the Danish 
debates. Then subsection 10.2.2 notes a couple of important dynamics of internal 
Danish identity political negotiations. Subsection 10.2.3 characterizes the 
interpellation of the other which these narratives and debates perform in conjunction. 
Finally, subsection 10.2.4 sums up the answer to the research question by 
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characterizing the contribution to radicalization of conflict from the identity 
configuration centred on Danish debates on how to relate to Muslims.
453
 
10.2.1 The present, necessary and future relations presented by 
Danish narratives on Muslims 
On the one hand, it is not always the Muslim difference which appears as the most 
crucial difference in Danish debates on Muslims. One example is that when debating 
access to Denmark – to Danish territory and to the Danish welfare society – 
citizenship is the first relevant diacriticon (ch. 6). Another example is how territorial 
presence may make a difference between life and death in the context of 
counterterrorism; if you are deemed a terrorist in Denmark, you may end up in jail – 
if you are deemed a terrorist 'out there, in the world', you may be hunted down and 
killed (ch. 8). A third example is that when debating integration, having a job was for 
a time promoted as the decisive criterion of success (ch. 5). Finally, when applying 
for membership of the EU, the Copenhagen Criteria and the acquis lists lots of 
demands to live up to – without ever mentioning culture or religion (ch. 9). 
On the other hand, the Muslim difference does make a difference in all the debates 
analyzed. Only it differs from debate to debate what kind of difference the Muslim 
difference makes; it differs whether the difference is explicitly or implicitly Muslim; 
and it differs whether there is agreement that the Muslim difference should make a 
difference: In the debates on access to Denmark (ch. 6 & 7) the non-citizens turn 
Muslim as soon as the reasons for limiting their mobility across the border are 
explicated: We need to stop Them from performing a series of 'Muslim practices' – at 
least They should not be allowed to perform them in Denmark. In the evolving 
government narratives on integration (ch. 5), cultural and religious difference is 
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 The research design of the dissertation does not allow generalization neither to other 
Danish debates on Muslims than the ones analysed nor beyond the Danish debates.  
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gradually awarded a more prominent role as something which need to disappear or at 
least become less pronounced. The necessity of making cultural difference disappear 
or at least smaller is installed by presenting the difference as a threat; to the peaceful 
society, to welfare, to Danish culture and values. It is clear from the specific practices 
which must be integrated away – and from the articulation to terrorism – that the 
cultural difference is constructed as Muslim. As the Muslim difference is articulated 
to terrorism, it is doubtful if any difference may remain without being narrated as 
potentially posing a threat (ch. 8). And as the difference is Muslim, it is doubtful if it 
will go away – because as Muslims, so the story goes, They are guided by Islam to 
stay different (ch. 9). 
The general thrust of Danish narratives on Muslims seems to be that They ought to 
become like Us: It would be better, if They were like Us. If They do not reform to 
become like Us – if they will not or if they cannot – Their difference constitutes a 
threat to Us. More or less severe; more or less urgent (ch. 5, 6, 7 & 8). So if Their 
difference is permanent, They should be monitored or kept out. Also 'out there', 
however, it would be better if They were like Us – even if the task of reforming the 
other out there seems more difficult and less urgent than at home (ch. 5, 8 & 9).  
The Danish People's Party explicitly promotes the security narratives, i.e. narratives 
involving existential threats to revered referent-objects and extraordinary means to 
averting the threats (ch. 6, 7, 8 & 9). The government parties generally formulate 
narratives of assimilating the other (in relation to certain diacritica) which does not 
explicitly securitize but implicitly accept the threat construction as the reason for the 
need to reform the other (ch. 5, 6 & 7). Or the government parties end up telling 
paradoxical narratives which, on the one hand, promotes policies of dialogue and 
explicitly attempt to de-securitize, while on the other hand uphold a security framing 
as the reason for de-securitizing (ch. 8 & 9). The opposition parties produce a variety 
of narratives – both across time and across the party spectrum: Generally, the social 
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liberals and the left wing parties does not take the danger or even the relevance of the 
Muslim difference as a point of departure (ch. 6, 7, 8 & 9) – but in some debates, the 
danger and relevance are not explicitly challenged either (ch. 6 & 7). The social 
democrats on some occasions (primarily when debating domestic politics) joined the 
government (ch. 6 & 7) – on other occasions they followed the other opposition 
parties (ch. 8 & 9). 
10.2.2 Dynamics of internal Danish politics of 'Muslim relations' 
Concerning the dynamics of internal Danish politics of 'Muslim relations', a first 
observation to be made is that it is difficult to uphold a position 'in the middle of the 
road'.
454
 The difficulty, however, presents itself in very different ways in the debates 
analysed: When the government attempts to carve out a space for a narrative of 
integration between Culturalism and Multiculturalism (ch. 5), the narratives, over 
time, end up talking culture anyway. When debating the human rights of migrants 
and refugees (ch. 6), the government – and to an even larger degree, the social 
democrats – place themselves under serious constrains by insisting on the 
compatibility of international norm abidance and the legal reforms aiming to limit the 
influx of aliens. When debating refuge for persecuted writers (ch. 7), the government 
articulates the protection of the writers and the protection of Danish identity in such 
an external way that it is difficult to claim that they are in deed telling one narrative. 
When the government attempts to defer the decision whether the difference of Turkey 
is temporary or permanent (ch. 9), the indecision is pre-empted by thematic allusion 
to other instances of 'Muslim difference'. 
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 When I employ 'middle of the road' as a metaphor here, the 'middle' does not refer to any 
position objectively in the centre of some universally valid map. Rather it applies to the 
structure of the debates analysed, which tends towards "the normal form of the dialogical... 
in which two opposing discourses fight it out within the general unity of a shared code" 
(Jameson 1981:84).  
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A second observation is that it seems to be particularly difficult to stay clear of 
Culturalism in the Danish debates analysed: The government narratives on 
integration (analysed in ch. 5) were initially formulated to be as little about culture as 
possible. Gradually, however, 'as little as possible' turned out to be 'a lot': Labour 
market integration came to be presented as dependent on a measure of cultural 
assimilation. And counterterrorism became a matter of handling religiously defined 
cultural difference; by integrating the difference away, by dialoguing across the 
difference, and by monitoring the limit of acceptable difference (ch. 8). When the 
legal framework for granting refuge to writers was finalized (ch. 7), no doubt was left 
that both the writers and their persecutors were expected to be Muslims – and that 
this quality constitutes them as potential security problems. The government's 
position of 'wait and see' in relation to Turkey was pre-empted by thematic allusions 
framing Turkey as Muslim and implying that Turkey is therefore permanently 
different (ch. 9). 
On the one hand, both the tendency to slide away from the middle of the road and the 
tendency to slide in the direction of Culturalism could be related to the particular 
parliamentary situation since 2001: The centre-right government depends on the 
nationalist DPP – so its narratives of Muslims need to be accommodated. On the 
other hand, a tendency noted in the debates on Turkey indicate broader discursive 
pressures: When relieved of the responsibilities of government (in relation to the EU 
mainstream), the liberals, conservatives and the social democrats each turn the thumb 
down on Turkish membership and more or less directly frames Turkey in Culturalist 
terms. The same pressure could lie behind the reluctance of the opposition when it 
comes to explicitly prioritizing international human rights standards over the need to 
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protect Danish homogeneity (ch. 6).
455
 And the pressure could lie behind the swift 
movement which the present prime minister made: Right after taking office, his 
stated preference was to leave the decision to take of the veils to 'those girls' 
themselves – soon after, however, he 'urged that existing possibilities for limiting the 
use of the burqa and the niqab are fully exploited' (ch. 5). The research design of the 
dissertation does not allow any final judgment on the mechanisms behind; it only 
allows the dissertation to note what appear to be a systematic erosion of any 
attempted middle position and a magnetism of Culturalism. 
10.2.3 The interpellations of Danish narratives and debates on 
Muslims 
The Muslim difference makes a difference in relation to Danish identity discourse. 
The narratives of what the difference means and what should be done about it might 
be told primarily for an 'internal' audience. But the narratives inevitably reach the ears 
of the other. Firstly, because the other is an internal affair: The other is among Us. 
Some of Them even claim to be part of Us. Secondly, because the back stage of 
identity politics cannot be separated from the front stage in a world of globalized 
communication. What interpellations does the Danish narratives and debate on 
Muslim relations produce for the other?
456
 The analytical chapters identified 
narratives which interpellated in a series of conflict prone ways: negative 
interpellations, non-interpellations, mis-interpellations, demands for dis-
interpellation, and securitized interpellations (cf. subsection 3.3.2):  
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 Outside the texts in focus for the analytical chapters of the dissertation, the adaption of 
the major opposition parties to the alien and integration policies of the government and the 
DPP points in the same direction. 
456
 The research design of the dissertation does not allow final judgment on whether the 
roles described and ascribed reaches 'the Muslims' or how they react to the roles. The 
conclusions of this subsection are extrapolated from the analysis of the Danish side of the 
identity political relation. 
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Firstly, the narratives on limiting the influx of strangers and on integration (ch. 5 & 6) 
imply that the presence of Muslims is a problem: It would be better if You were not 
here. Furthermore, the narratives on limiting the influx (ch. 6) have the implication 
that persons descending from Muslim countries are not equal citizens: You do not 
have the same rights to see or live with Your relatives as other citizens. Finally, the 
difference between the Muslims and the secularized Christians is constructed to be a 
temporalized hierarchy: Muslims are medieval – Danes are Modern (ch. 6, 7 & 9). 
The interpellation produced by this version of the grammar of Orientalism is 
decidedly negative.  
Secondly, the government narratives of integration and of limiting the influx leave 
the impression that it is not possible to be simultaneously 100% Dane and 100% 
Muslim. The official Danish narratives demand that one choose or at least prioritize 
between the two (ch. 5 & 7). In that sense 'integration' – no matter what the exact 
goal and threshold – involves some element of assimilation or submission. The 
grammar of Encompassment non-interpellates in relation to important aspects of life: 
In certain matters, Your preferences and agency are not wanted – only are they 
accepted if Your preferences are Ours, and Your agency leads You in the direction of 
Our preferences. 
Thirdly, the threshold of integration is a moving target: Over time, the official 
threshold has been raised and 'culturalized' (ch. 5). Adding to the ambiguity is the 
way in which voices in Danish debates – voices that are both tolerated and awarded 
with influential positions – doubt that the Muslim is at all capable of integration (ch. 
5 & 9). In that sense, there is a risk of mis-interpellation following a situation in 
which a Muslim reaches out for a position as included ('well integrated') which is 
presumably offered – only to experience that the offered position is immediately 
taken away as yet another diacriticon of difference is introduced to be integrated 
away.  
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Fourthly, among the thresholds of integration presented – to the new arrivals and to 
the ones applying for permanent residence or citizenship – are a number of 'Medieval' 
practices. The Muslim is told to implicitly self-identify with these practices – only to 
be able to distance him/herself from them and thereby perform a proof of integration 
(ch. 7; cf. ch. 5). The specific design of the demand, however, leaves the impression 
that rather than to secure integration, the aim of this deliberately negative 
interpellation is to ward off the new arrival. 
Finally, the difference of the Muslim is not just a problem – it is a threat (ch. 5, 6, 7 
& 8). Whether the threat is existential and whether the means needed to avert the 
threat are extraordinary is a matter of whose narratives you listen to: If you listen to 
the DPP; no doubt that threats are existential and some means extraordinary. If you 
listen to the government, the matter is less clearly presented. Or rather; the 
government security narratives involve a more differentiated cast of characters 
ranging from the radically threatening terrorist to various degrees of less-than-radical 
others. But even if a Muslim is 'well-integrated' and 'a decisive ally in the fight 
against terrorism', the Muslim difference remains – in official narratives – a potential 
security problem which needs to be monitored (ch. 8; cf. ch. 9). 
10.2.4 Structures and dynamics of Danish debates on Muslims 
contributing to radicalization of conflict 
So, subsection 10.2.1 briefly summarized the Danish narratives on Muslims to say 
that 'it would be better, if They were like Us'. Subsection 10.2.2 identified a first 
tendency in the Danish political landscape – when debating Muslim relations – to 
have difficulty when trying to stay in 'the middle of the road'; and, as a second 
tendency, to follow a draft to the Culturalist side when diverting from the middle of 
the road. Subsection 10.2.3 listed a variety of conflictual interpellations meeting the 
Muslim listening to Danish debates on what to do to him/her; a variety of roles to 
play in future interaction or – in some narratives – rather a variety of actions to 
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submit to. Now, how may the relations between these relations – this identity 
configuration – be characterized in terms of contributions to radicalization? 
Firstly, as already noted as part of the analytico-strategic considerations in chapter 4, 
the core relation in the configuration – Denmark/Muslims – is not symmetrical: One 
side is a bureaucratically hierarchical state. What is implied to be the other side is – if 
it is an entity at all – without a privileged voice (in spite of claims to the contrary). 
The lack of a privileged centre on the Muslim side makes it quite easy to 'pick a 
Muslim voice' to represent the totality to be whatever part is needed for a narrative. 
But the lack of a privileged centre also makes it difficult to effectively dismiss a 
voice claiming to be – or being pointed out as – the centre. Furthermore, the Danish 
side – supposedly hierarchical – allows a plurality of voices to speak on its behalf. 
The voice supposed to be authoritative – the government – in a series of debates 
passively or actively facilitates the interpellations of DPP's narratives even when they 
distance themselves from them.
457
 When combined, these characteristics of the two 
sides makes it rather easy to establish a 'dialogue of the extremes' which may 
radicalize (or at least hinder the de-radicalization of) the conflict. 
Secondly (as noted in subsection 10.2.1), various Danish narratives point out 
Muslims as threats – and they thereby (as noted in subsection 10.2.2) perform 
securitized interpellations of Muslims. When you perceive yourself to be pointed out 
as a threat in need of aversion by extraordinary means, a natural reaction would be to 
perceive the extraordinary means as an existential threat to yourself. If Muslims – all, 
some, a few – react to a securitized interpellation by counter-securitizing, then the 
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 E.g. when the government promotes the 'cities of refuge' arrangement for persecuted 
writers – while accepting the DPP's demand for a declaration on Danish values to be signed 
by the writer; a declaration designed to keep the Muslim writers out (ch. 7). Or when the 
government, on the one hand, insists that the jury is still out on the question of whether 
Turkey may ever qualify for EU membership, while, on the other hand, accepting the 
framing of Turkey's problems as Muslim problems. 
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configuration will have the structure of a security dilemma. On top of this, the same 
Danish narratives may very well mis-interpellate in the sense that they hold out the 
prospect of accept as 'well-integrated' while effectively deferring the actual accept. 
As discussed (in chapters 3 and 5) mis-interpellation may provoke a few to actively 
dis-interpellate by taking up counter-identities. The Danish narratives may, hence, 
very well end up producing for themselves responses which can only – in the 
continued Danish narration – be explained as threats. If they actually produce such 
answers, they are not just securitized narratives but may properly be characterized as 
securitizing narratives. Both these two characteristics – a) the configuration is 
structured as a security dilemma; b) the configuration includes a relation in which (at 
least) one side systematically invites answers which are perceived as threats – justify 
that the configuration analysed may be characterized as a security configuration.
458
 
Two caveats, however, are necessary in relation to this characterization: One in 
relation to the configuration's status as a security configuration – one in relation to its 
status as a configuration in its own right. 
Firstly, even if the configuration analysed is securitized it is not (only) a 
configuration of relations between securitized relations. The configuration was 
approached and analysed as an identity configuration; a relation of the relations 
between identity and difference: The constitutive, narrative and political relations 
between identity and the difference of the other. The analytics was, hence, kept open 
as to whether and how much these relations would be securitized; i.e. cast in terms of 
existential threats and extraordinary means to their aversion. The analysis showed 
that – in spite of tendencies towards polarization and Culturalism – narratives 
protesting or ignoring securitization and narratives presenting alternatives were in 
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 Or in the vocabularium of securitization theory; security constellation (Buzan & Wæver 
2009). 
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deed present (ch. 6, 7, 8 & 9). It could even describe the pains taken by the 
government to tell a-cultural and de-securitizing narratives, however infelicitous or 
short lived they turned out to be (ch. 5, 8 & 9). So in that sense, the space has not 
been closed down for identity narratives more hospital to difference.  
Secondly, the configuration analysed in this dissertation does not uphold the relations 
between its relations in a vacuum. It is clearly (ch. 5, 7, 8 & 9) related to the global 
configuration of macro-securitizations in which "a political West and a religiously-
speaking Islamic opposition ... manage to confirm each other’s threat and enemy 
images sufficiently well that the conflict is self-propelling." (Buzan & Wæver 
2009:274)
459
 On the one hand, a more thorough examination of this global connection 
would probably be necessary to account for the some of the inputs to and inspiration 
behind what is in this dissertation read as Danish debates. 
On the other hand, this dissertation may contribute a detailed analysis of one set of 
relations – minor, perhaps, but with its occasional fifteen minutes centre stage – to 
the study of this global conflict configuration. When considering strategies for more 
hospitality to difference, awareness of these relations to the overall configuration 
may, on the one hand, temper optimism. On the other hand, awareness of these 
relations may also induce a sense of responsibility: There is a relation between, on the 
one hand, the Danish debates on Muslims and, on the other hand, that overall 
configuration of conflicts which should not be allowed to turn itself into a clash of 
civilizations. But it is not a one-way relation; the way in which we speak and act co-
constitutes the difference between clash and peaceful co-narration. And it constitutes 
                                           
459
 Buzan & Wæver avoids labelling this global constellation by noting that "Notable by its 
complete absence is any label for the whole constellation except for Huntington’s not 
entirely appropriate ‘clash of civilizations’." (2009:269; cf. Hauge 2009:17; Huntington 
1993). I would rather characterize his label as 'entirely inappropriate'. Or perhaps an even 
better characteristique would be that the label is 'appropriating' in the sense that Huntington, 
by the very labelling, appropriates the conflict configuration for his own purpose. 
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the difference between the coalescence of 'civilizations' and the grammatical 
interaction of a plurality of differences. 
10.3 Strategic self-evaluation: Studying change and/or 
complicit in constitution? 
Having concluded the theoretical and empirical interventions of the dissertation (in 
sections 10.1 and 10.2), what remains is the evaluation of the dissertation read as a 
strategic intervention in the current Danish identity political predicament. In the 
introductory chapter, the empirical field of the dissertation was characterised as 
'Danish debates on Muslim relations'. This could be taken to mean that the aim of the 
study was to chart a process completed; to document the change from one discourse 
of identity/difference to another discourse focusing on the Muslim. The aim of the 
dissertation could have been to establish one overall narrative of transformation of 
the discourse on Danish identity in relation to Muslims. For a number or reasons, the 
dissertation does not do so. 
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Figure 10.1 Family resemblance of narratives of Muslim relations 
 
First of all; it does not add up. There is not one monolithic discourse on Danish 
identity in relation to Muslims. There is not one discourse on Muslims – not even if 
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only the actors most obsessed with Muslims were studied. But the dissertation points 
to a family resemblance (in the sense of Wittgenstein 1995[1958]:§§65-9) between 
discourses relating Danish identity to differences of an implicitly or explicitly 
Muslim character across policy fields and across actors. Figure 10.1 illustrates such a 
family resemblance between a group of discourses – each structured as policy 
narratives grasping together an ontology constituted by the past including the choice 
between two policy alternatives (an oughtology and an oughtnotology): None of the 
narratives are identical; yet they form a family by sharing resemblances in couples. 
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Figure 10.2 Intensified family resemblance of narratives of Muslim relations 
 
Furthermore, the dissertation hints that the family resemblance of discourses relating 
Danish identity to Muslim differences is intensified across policy fields and actors. It 
still does not add up – but it adds more up than it did before. For example, the 
'semantic density' of the category of Migrant is more and more (but still not 
exclusively) 'Muslim'. Just as the point of departure for more and more (but not all) 
parliamentarians is that it is necessary (to accept that you have) to be 24 years old to 
be reunified with your non-Western spouse in Denmark. The dissertation is, in that 
sense, a close-up study in the becoming rather than the being of a discourse of 
radicalized Danish identity/Muslim difference. The development is illustrated in 
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figure 10.2; more elements are articulated in the same way in the – still – different 
discourses. 
Secondly, to make the claim that discourse A has taken the place of discourse B, a 
study different from the one conducted should have been devised. A less myopic 
study of change could either have taken the form of an ahistorical analysis comparing 
two synchronous discursive structures – a before and an after – or it could have taken 
the form of a genealogy tracing the elements presently articulated elements along 
their disparate stretches of rhizome. In stead of these formal diachronic analyses, the 
dissertation zoomed in on a series of the specific reconfigurations – as well as the 
clashes of construction, and discursive struggles surrounding them which forms and 
forms part of the overall re-configuration towards tighter family ties between the 
discourses on Muslim relations. 
But why would the dissertation claim to take as its point of departure a discourse 
which it simultaneously claims has not coalesced; a discourse which the normative 
position of the dissertation furthermore explicitly dislikes? The answer is, evidently, 
to serve as a warning. To warn, the dissertation in a sense combines two analytical 
strategies: Firstly, the one of Saïd, who in Orientalism (1978) distilled the essence of 
a discourse to allow the colonized to attack its roots head on. And, secondly, Galtung, 
who focused on the self-supporting dynamics of conflict to impartially advice on 
their dismantling (1978; cf. Wæver 1997:366f). It warns that the coalescence of a 
Muslim Other in Danish and Western discourse constitutes the springboard for a 
vicious spiral of conflict – which We may still avert if We change Our course of 
action. But bearing in mind the Thomas theorem – "if men define situations as real, 
they are real in their consequences" (Merton 1995:380) – it also warns that it might 
not be necessary for a discourse on a Muslim other to 'actually' coalesce to have 
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effects: If someone interpellated as Muslims – a few or a lotF460F – perceive themselves 
to be interpellated negatively by one overarching discourse on Muslims, this may 
suffice to radicalize the spiralling conflict. 
One cannot, however, control what others do with the text one produces (Derrida 
1988a; 1988c).F
461
 In the same way, the dissertation runs the risk of ending up as 
complicit in the constitution of a discourse on Danish identity in contrast to the 
Muslim other. The dissertation willingly runs this risk after assessing and specifying 
its audience: While the hard core of Islamophobes is probably out of reach, a broad 
mainstream of Danes, migrants, Westerners, Muslims, Christians, Copenhageners, 
responsible human beings could be hoped for to accept that the very logic of 
conflicting identities is more dangerous than any of the identities posed in conflict 
(cf. Wæver 1997:332):
462
 The dangers of trying to make difference go away – at least 
in some of the ways it is done – is likely to be more dangerous than the differences in 
themselves. Especially, this broad mainstream should be receptive as it is only a 
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 Roy (2004) finds that Muslims in Western Europe increasingly self-identify primarily as 
Muslims rather than as migrants, nationals of various 'home countries' or otherwise – 
partially as a response to the dominant discourses where they live, but also articulating the 
insistence in Islamic theology and tradition on the unity of the Ummah. The research design 
of the dissertation does not provide a voice for those self-identifying in this way. That is one 
of the prices paid to be able to perform the analysis which the introductory chapter found 
normatively pertinent. 
461
 A couple of examples will do: Firstly, the concept of Orientalism – once coined as a 
critique of essentialism – has been utilized as a point of departure for a counter-essentialism 
from Arab and Turkish nationalists against any criticism (Necef 2003). Secondly, the 
concept of 'societal securitization' has been taken to legitimize what it was meant to study: 
the defence of identity and the destructive dynamics following (Buzan & Wæver 1997; cf. 
McSweeney 1996). 
462
 Pedersen & Tjalve are right when they follow Rorty in ridiculing the philosopher 
confronting Milosevic with his philosophical conclusion; that Milosevic's policies do not 
draw the logical consequences of an empty ontology and the irreducibility of the other 
(2000:47). But that does not mean that philosophical and social science arguments do not 
work with a less entrenched audience. 
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marginal few who explicitly have 'conflict' as a goal. Projecting a prognosis of 
radicalized conflict could therefore resonate and make a difference as an immanent 
critique. 
Edwin Ardener likened the texts of an Anthropologist trying to translate from other 
systems of meaning with the voice of a prophet trying to explain the barely 
incomprehensible future, he has seen, to an audience questioning his sanity.  
Prophets do not predict the future, in the terms of the present. Rather, they foretell a 
present reality before it has been accommodated in the collective representations, and 
in language. ... The anthropological condition is equivalent to this; in narrating and 
writing the other, the anthropologist is author to a reality. (Hastrup 1989:224; 228; cf. 
Ardener 1989:ch.9) 
Implicit in the normative position taken up in chapter 1 is a hope that the analysis of 
the dissertation may serve as a warning: The dissertation seeks to warn of the 
consequences of the choices made by Danish identity politician. A warning does have 
a chance to work, since "[t]o set up a prognosis means to have already altered the 
situation from which it arises. Put another way, the previously existing space of 
experience is not sufficient for the determination of the horizon of expectation." 
(Koselleck 1985:275) There is a space for political action. This space is taken up 
every time someone narrates a past and a future. Including when the dissertation does 
so. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation studies Danish political debates on 'Muslim relations' as interacting 
policy narratives. Theoretically, the dissertation investigates how various policies for 
relating to the other contributes to radicalization of conflict between self and other by 
the specific ways in which they invite (or does not invite) the other to future 
interaction. The dissertation analyses debates on integration and human rights of 
migrants and refugees, counterterrorism, freedom of expression, and Turkish EU 
accession. The analysis concludes that there is not one single, securitized discourse 
on Danish identity in relation to Muslims. But the narratives promoted are structured 
to produce future interaction leading in that direction. 
Resumé (in Danish) 
Denne afhandling analyserer danske politiske debatter om forholdet til 'muslimer' 
som gensidigt påvirkende politik-fortællinger. Teoretisk undersøger afhandlingen 
hvordan forskellige politikker, for hvordan forholdet til den anden skal være, bidrager 
til radikalisering af konflikt mellem selv og anden i kraft af de særlige måder hvorpå 
den anden inviteres (eller ikke inviteres) til fremtidig interaktion. Afhandlingen 
analyserer debatter om indvandrere og flygtninges integration og 
menneskerettigheder, terrorbekæmpelse, ytringsfrihed og tyrkisk EU medlemskab. 
Analysen konkluderer at der ikke findes en enkelt sikkerhedsdiskurs om dansk 
identitet i forhold til muslimer – men de fortællinger, der fremmes, er struktureret på 
en sådan måde, at de lægger op til fremtidig interaktion, som leder i dén retning. 
 
